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Rippo v. Baker

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mar 6, 2017
137 S. Ct. 905 (2017)

Summary

holding that the state court applied the wrong legal standard in requiring that the trial judge be actually biased and observing that the proper inquiry is whether "the risk of bias [is] too high to be constitutionally tolerable"

Summary of this case from Gordon v. Lafler

Opinion

No. 16–6316.

03-06-2017

Michael Damon RIPPO, Petitioner v. Renee BAKER, Warden.


A Nevada jury convicted petitioner Michael Damon Rippo of first-degree murder and other offenses and sentenced him to death. During his trial, Rippo received information that the judge was the target of a federal bribery probe, and he surmised that the Clark County District Attorney's Office—which was prosecuting him—was playing a role in that investigation. Rippo moved for the judge's disqualification under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, contending that a judge could not impartially adjudicate a case in which one of the parties was criminally investigating him. But the trial judge declined to recuse himself, and (after that judge's indictment on federal charges) a different judge later denied Rippo's motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, reasoning in part that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation. Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1246–1250, 946 P.2d 1017, 1023–1024 (1997) (per curiam ).

In a later application for state postconviction relief, Rippo advanced his bias claim once more, this time pointing to documents from the judge's criminal trial indicating that the district attorney's office had participated in the investigation of the trial judge. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 236–237, 397. The state postconviction court denied relief, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Rippo v. State, 132 Nev. ––––, ––––, 368 P.3d 729, 743–745 (2016). It likened Rippo's claim to the "camouflaging bias" theory that this Court discussed in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). The Bracy petitioner argued that a judge who accepts bribes to rule in favor of some defendants would seek to disguise that favorable treatment by ruling against defendants who did not bribe him. Id., at 905, 117 S.Ct. 1793. We explained that despite the "speculative" nature of that theory, the petitioner was entitled to discovery because he had also alleged specific facts suggesting that the judge may have colluded with defense counsel to rush the petitioner's case to trial. See id., at 905–909, 117 S.Ct. 1793. The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that, in contrast, Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations "d[id] not support the assertion that the trial judge was actually biased in this case." 132 Nev., at ––––, 368 P.3d, at 744.

The court further relied on its bias holding to determine that Rippo had not established cause and prejudice to overcome various state procedural bars. 132 Nev., at ––––, 368 P.3d, at 745. Because the court below did not invoke any state-law grounds "independent of the merits of [Rippo's] federal constitutional challenge," we have jurisdiction to review its resolution of federal law. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1746, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016).
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We vacate the Nevada Supreme Court's judgment because it applied the wrong legal standard. Under our precedents, the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge " ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ " Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986). Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) ; see Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1905, 195 L.Ed.2d 132 (2016) ("The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our decision in Bracy is not to the contrary: Although we explained that the petitioner there had pointed to facts suggesting actual, subjective bias, we did not hold that a litigant must show as a matter of course that a judge was "actually biased in [the litigant's] case," 132 Nev., at ––––, 368 P.3d, at 744 —much less that he must do so when, as here, he does not allege a theory of "camouflaging bias." The Nevada Supreme Court did not ask the question our precedents require: whether, considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable. As a result, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and we vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


Summaries of

Rippo v. Baker

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mar 6, 2017
137 S. Ct. 905 (2017)

holding that the state court applied the wrong legal standard in requiring that the trial judge be actually biased and observing that the proper inquiry is whether "the risk of bias [is] too high to be constitutionally tolerable"

Summary of this case from Gordon v. Lafler

holding "the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge 'ha no actual bias.'"

Summary of this case from Herrmann v. Meisner

holding the appearance of bias and impropriety is sufficient to violate due process rights

Summary of this case from Armstrong v. Bd. of Pers. Appeals

finding "[r]ecusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable"

Summary of this case from State v. Williams

establishing that, when considering a due process claim regarding judicial bias, courts must ask "whether, considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable"

Summary of this case from Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm'n

In Rippo, the Supreme Court reviewed, and overruled, the Nevada Supreme Court's holding regarding a substantive federal-law claim in the case-a claim of unconstitutional judicial bias.

Summary of this case from McConnell v. Reubart

In Rippo, the Court said, id.: "Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge... is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'"

Summary of this case from Drake v. Travelers Indem. Co.

In Rippo, the Supreme Court held that recusal is required when, "objectively speaking, 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'"

Summary of this case from Brammer v. Madden

remanding to determine whether trial judge should have recused himself given that he was being investigated by the same district attorney's office prosecuting petitioner

Summary of this case from Weible v. Long

In Rippo, the Supreme Court reviewed, and overruled, the Nevada Supreme Court's holding regarding the substantive federal-law claim in the case - a claim of unconstitutional judicial bias.

Summary of this case from Doyle v. Filson

In Rippo, the Court said, id.: "Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge... is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'"

Summary of this case from Moody v. Balt. City Dept of Soc. Servs.

In Rippo v. Baker, 239 U.S. 807, 137 S.Ct. 905, 907, 197 L.Ed.2d 167 (2017), the United States Supreme Court recently ruled that "[r]ecusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."

Summary of this case from State v. Daigle
Case details for

Rippo v. Baker

Case Details

Full title:MICHAEL DAMON RIPPO, PETITIONER v. RENEE BAKER, WARDEN

Court:SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Date published: Mar 6, 2017

Citations

137 S. Ct. 905 (2017)
197 L. Ed. 2d 167

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