Ringer v. State

Full title: SHERRICK DWAYNE RINGER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, State

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth

Date published: May 13, 2004

No. 2-03-146-CR (Tex. App. May. 13, 2004)

Opinion

No. 2-03-146-CR

Delivered: May 13, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).

Appeal from the 371^st District Court of Tarrant County.

Robert Ford, Fort Worth, TX, for appellant. Tim Curry, Criminal District Attorney, Charles M. Mallin, Michael R. Casillas and Lisa A. Callaghan, Assistant Criminal District Attorneys, Fort Worth, TX, for appellee.

PANEL A: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and McCOY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ¹

1 See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice.

A jury convicted Appellant Sherrick Dwayne Ringer of four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen and sentenced him to fifty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant brings a single point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Batson ² challenge to the State's exercise of a peremptory strike against a black veniremember. Because we hold that the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court's judgment. The prosecutor struck Chris E. Onyeador, a black veniremember. Appellant lodged his Batson challenge, and the trial court asked the State to explain the use of its peremptory challenge. The reasons the prosecutor provided were: (1) the veniremember's name gave her reason to believe that he was born outside this country; (2) his accent gave her the impression that he was from Africa; (3) his accent was so "incredibly heavy" that she could not "understand most of what he said"; (4) she had concerns as to whether he would be able to understand English sufficiently; and (5) he looked "a little . . . lost" a couple of times. Appellant argues that the prosecutor's first two reasons are race-based and that the remaining three are unsupported by the record. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that nationality is a race-neutral reason for striking a veniremember.³ Based on this reasoning, we are compelled to hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's Batson challenge.⁴ We overrule Appellant's sole point and affirm the trial court's judgment.

2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).

3 Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (holding that the country of one's birth, standing alone, is race-neutral).

4 See Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (holding that because the State offered race-neutral motives for its strike, and appellant failed to rebut those motives, the trial court did not err).