Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 17-0279
03-29-2018
ROGER RINGER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. DUSTIN DIAL, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
COUNSEL Roger Ringer, Tucson Plaintiff/Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Robert R. McCright Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Judge Christopher Staring Pima County Attorney's Office, Tucson By Julia L. Matter Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Jonathan Pinkney and Pima County Tucson City Attorney's Office, Tucson By Viola Romero Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Dustin Dial and City of Tucson DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C., Tucson By Lisa Anne Smith Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Pima Community College Employees Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C., Tucson By Christopher L. Enos Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Ranier Diaz, M.D. and Pasadera Behavioral Health Network
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. C20163117
The Honorable Sarah R. Simmons, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Roger Ringer, Tucson
Plaintiff/Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Robert R. McCright
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Judge Christopher Staring Pima County Attorney's Office, Tucson
By Julia L. Matter
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Jonathan Pinkney and Pima County Tucson City Attorney's Office, Tucson
By Viola Romero
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Dustin Dial and City of Tucson DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C., Tucson
By Lisa Anne Smith
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Pima Community College Employees Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C., Tucson
By Christopher L. Enos
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Ranier Diaz, M.D. and Pasadera Behavioral Health Network
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined. WINTHROP, Presiding Judge:
¶1 After undergoing an involuntary evaluation for mental health treatment, Roger Ringer filed a pro per civil complaint against numerous persons and entities, alleging they had violated his constitutional rights and committed tortious acts against him. The superior court granted motions to dismiss some of the defendants and summary judgment for the remaining defendants, and Ringer appeals the resulting judgments. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Ringer has a long and contentious history with Pima Community College ("PCC"), its administrators, and faculty. In 2011, Ringer enrolled at PCC, and he later became a student in the teacher certification program. In 2012, he filed an unsuccessful complaint about a course grade and unsuccessful formal complaints against various PCC employees, including numerous faculty members. Despite the finality of these determinations, he continued to repeatedly contact members of the PCC administration—including the then-acting Campus President, Dr. Lorraine Morales—complaining that "many improper actions [had been] covered up." Relations between Ringer and the college's administration deteriorated rapidly, and as a result of statements made and actions taken by Ringer during his dispute with PCC, concerns began to arise about the state of his mental health.
¶3 On February 20, 2013, PCC police officers visited Ringer at his home and informed him that he was not to trespass on PCC properties. At the time, he was not enrolled in any classes and had not been since the summer of 2012. However, Ringer continued to contact PCC administrators through insulting, hostile, intimidating, and demanding written communications, including emails, indicating his intention to continue to disrupt PCC. On March 19, 2013, Ringer was suspended through December 2013, and was informed that, following the suspension, he could return to PCC only if he followed specified conditions. By June 2013, numerous PCC employees and administrators—including PCC Police Commander Michelle Nieuwenhuis and Vice President of Student Development at the Community Campus Irene Robles-Lopez—began to form concerns that Ringer might pose an immediate risk of harm to others if he was allowed back on campus due to his agitated demeanor, unreasonable demands, intimidating behavior, and expressions of identification with Jared Loughner.
Loughner was the gunman in a January 8, 2011 mass shooting in Tucson. Loughner had previously been suspended from PCC because of his alleged disruptive behavior on the PCC campus.
¶4 By January 2014, Ringer had a conditional right to re-enroll if he complied with the specified terms, and in June 2014, he met with administrators Dr. Aubrey Conover and Robles-Lopez to discuss his desire to return to classes at PCC. At the meeting, however, he stated he would not follow PCC's policies and procedures and attempted to re-visit the issues that had led to his suspension. He became agitated, raised his voice, engaged in name calling, and his tone and intensity escalated, causing Dr. Conover to worry about his personal safety. Based at least in part on Ringer's refusal to adhere to PCC policies, Dr. Conover continued Ringer's suspension until December 2014.
¶5 In December 2014, Ringer filed a complaint for injunctive relief in state court, and in April 2015, he filed a fifteen-count First Amended Complaint against various defendants connected with PCC. See Roger Ringer v. Pima Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., et al., Pima County Superior Court Case No. C20146653. Ringer claimed several PCC personnel had committed numerous civil wrongs against him while he was enrolled as a student. After a bench trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the PCC defendants on all of Ringer's claims. Ringer's appeal of that decision is in the process of briefing in this court. See Ringer v. Pima Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., et al., 1 CA-CV 16-0731.
¶6 Meanwhile, PCC Police Officer Michele Kahn contacted the Tucson Police Department regarding concerns she had about Ringer's continuing behavior, and on June 10, 2015, Officer Dustin Dial of the Tucson Police Department filed an application for involuntary evaluation pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 36-520, alleging Ringer was a danger to others, persistently or acutely disabled, unable to or unwilling to undergo a voluntary evaluation, and in need of supervision, care, and treatment.
We cite the current version of the statutes unless changes material to our analysis have since occurred.
¶7 On Friday, June 12, 2015, Pasadera Behavioral Health Network ("Pasadera") received Officer Dial's application for involuntary evaluation, and Pasadera attempted on June 15, 18, and 22 to contact Ringer at his residence to complete a pre-petition screening evaluation. On June 22, a Pasadera clinician prepared a pre-petition screening report, outlining the contents and details of the underlying application by Officer Dial, and noting that Pasadera staff had been unable to contact Ringer to obtain his responses to the allegations. Pasadera then staffed the matter with Rainier Diaz, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, and determined reasonable cause existed to proceed with a petition for court-ordered evaluation.
¶8 Dr. Diaz and Deputy County Attorney Jonathan Pinkney filed a petition for court-ordered evaluation under A.R.S. § 36-523 on June 24, 2015. Later that day, Pima County Superior Court Judge Christopher Staring issued an order for evaluation under A.R.S. § 36-529(B), which required Ringer to be taken into custody and transported to Banner University Medical Center ("Banner") to undergo an evaluation.
¶9 On June 26, 2015, PCC Officers Kahn and Jonathan Haywood, acting pursuant to the superior court's order for evaluation, took Ringer into custody, and Officer Kahn and another officer transferred him to Banner. Ringer received a physical examination at Banner that day and was admitted as an inpatient to the psychiatric ward.
¶10 From June 27 to June 29, 2015, multiple psychiatrists evaluated Ringer. Dr. Dennis Weimer became Ringer's attending psychiatrist, and he and Dr. Matthew Malone, the medical director, each conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Ringer on June 30.
¶11 On July 1, 2015, Dr. Weimer and Pinkney filed a petition for court-ordered treatment, along with supporting affidavits from Drs. Malone and Weimer. A hearing on the petition was set for July 8, and Ringer continued to be assessed and evaluated until the date of the hearing. At the hearing, Pinkney served as the assigned deputy county attorney, and Drs. Malone and Weimer testified. The court ruled the evidence did not meet the clear and convincing standard to show Ringer met the statutory standard for court-ordered treatment, and Banner discharged him that day.
¶12 Approximately one year later, on July 7, 2016, Ringer filed a thirteen-count civil complaint against Officer Dial, the Tucson Police Department, Judge Staring, Deputy County Attorney Pinkney-Baird (sic), Pima County, Dr. Diaz, Pasadera, Dr. Malone, Dr. Weimer, Banner, Jeffrey Silvyn (legal counsel employed by PCC), Dr. Lee Lambert (Chancellor at PCC), Commander Nieuwenhuis, Robles-Lopez, Dr. Morales, and PCC Officers Kahn and Haywood (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging they had violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and further alleging state-law claims, including false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, medical malpractice, failure to intervene, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Much of the complaint relates to Ringer's prior grievances against PCC and Pima County Superior Court Case No. C20146653.
Ringer later amended his complaint to substitute the City of Tucson for the Tucson Police Department and to correct misspellings in the name of Officer Kahn.
¶13 A series of motions to dismiss pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) followed: On September 15, 2016, Pinkney and Pima County moved to dismiss; on September 19, Judge Staring moved to dismiss; and on September 22, Officer Dial and the City of Tucson moved to dismiss.
¶14 On October 12, 2016, the superior court issued a signed order granting Judge Staring's motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding that all the allegations of Ringer's complaint involving Judge Staring were acts taken in connection with his duties as a superior court judge, and he was entitled to absolute immunity for those acts. On November 3, the court granted the motion to dismiss of Pinkney and Pima County, and on November 18, the court granted the motion to dismiss of Officer Dial and the City of Tucson.
¶15 The superior court was also presented with a series of motions for summary judgment. On November 4, 2016, Banner and Drs. Malone and Weimer moved for summary judgment. On November 30, Pasadera and Dr. Diaz moved for summary judgment, and that same day, the remaining Defendants—Silvyn, Dr. Lambert, Robles-Lopez, Commander Nieuwenhuis, Dr. Morales, and PCC Police Officers Kahn and Haywood (collectively, "the PCC Defendants")—filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment.
¶16 On January 23, 2017, the superior court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment filed by Banner and Drs. Malone and Weimer. The court found no dispute regarding a genuine issue of material fact and that Banner and Drs. Malone and Weimer were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
On February 16, 2017, the superior court issued a judgment in favor of Banner and Drs. Malone and Weimer pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Ringer separately appealed that judgment, and this court affirmed. See Ringer v. Banner Univ. Med. Ctr., et al., 1 CA-CV 17-0193, 2018 WL 710250 (Ariz. App. Feb. 6, 2018) (mem. decision).
¶17 On February 13, 2017, despite Ringer's request for a continuance, the superior court held oral argument on the motions filed by Pasadera and Dr. Diaz and the PCC Defendants. For numerous reasons expressed in the transcript and the court's minute entry, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Pasadera and Dr. Diaz and also granted the PCC Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment.
Ringer did not properly support his request for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. See Lewis v. Oliver, 178 Ariz. 330, 338 (App. 1993).
¶18 On March 14, 2017, the superior court issued separate final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., in favor of Pasadera and Dr. Diaz, awarding them taxable costs, and in favor of the PCC Defendants. The court then issued a separate order entering judgment in favor of Judge Staring, Pinkney and Pima County, and Officer Dial and the City of Tucson pursuant to Rule 54(c).
¶19 Ringer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
ANALYSIS
¶20 Defendants argue we should deem Ringer's arguments waived because his opening brief fails to comply with Rule 13(a)(7), ARCAP, which requires an appellant to support his arguments with supporting reasons, citations of legal authorities, and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which he relies. Although we agree Ringer's brief has substantial deficiencies, we decline to apply a blanket waiver.
¶21 We note, however, that Ringer's opening brief does not challenge Judge Staring's dismissal; accordingly, Ringer has waived that issue. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis, 231 Ariz. 103, 124, ¶ 82 (App. 2012); Belen Loan Inv'rs, LLC v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 448, 457, ¶ 22 (App. 2012).
I. Motions to Dismiss
¶22 Ringer argues the superior court erred in granting Defendants' motions to dismiss. We review de novo a judgment dismissing a complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, 234 Ariz. 397, 401, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). In our review, we look only to the complaint itself, assume the truth of all well-pled factual allegations, and resolve reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor; however, "mere conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7 (2008). We will affirm only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts pled that is susceptible of proof. Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners L.P., 201 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 7 (App. 2001).
A. Dismissal of Pinkney and Pima County
¶23 Ringer argues the superior court erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Pinkney and Pima County.
¶24 Ringer made no allegations unrelated to Pinkney's acting in his capacity as a deputy county attorney, and as an official performing statutorily mandated quasi-judicial functions and acting within the scope of his authority, see A.R.S. §§ 36-503.01, 36-521, 36-523, Pinkney qualified for absolute immunity from liability, see State v. Superior Court ex rel. Maricopa Cty., 186 Ariz. 294, 297-99 (App. 1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985). Further, Ringer did not allege that any Pima County policy or practice caused unconstitutional conduct or injury and thus failed to allege a basis for direct municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see City of Phoenix v. Yarnell, 184 Ariz. 310, 317-18 (1995); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978), and Pima County cannot be held vicariously liable for an alleged violation of § 1983 based on respondeat superior, see Yarnell, 184 Ariz. at 317; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). Finally, because state law mandates involvement of the Pima County Attorney's Office ("PCAO") in Title 36 mental health proceedings, respondeat superior cannot be applied to hold Pima County vicariously liable under state-law claims for the actions of Pinkney. See Fridena v. Maricopa Cty., 18 Ariz. App. 527, 530-31 (1972).
¶25 Ringer also argues that, in not granting his motion to amend his amended complaint, the superior court abused its discretion. See Timmons v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 234 Ariz. 569, 572, ¶ 17 (App. 2014); Romo v. Reyes, 26 Ariz. App. 374, 375 (1976). The only amendment suggested by Ringer with respect to Pinkney and Pima County was the addition of the PCAO as a defendant, and as the superior court correctly noted, adding the PCAO would not have stripped Pinkney of his immunity or established vicarious liability for Pima County. Accordingly, the superior court properly dismissed Pinkney and Pima County as defendants. Elm Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 292, ¶ 26 (App. 2010).
B. Dismissal of Officer Dial and the City of Tucson
¶26 Ringer also argues the superior court erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Officer Dial and the City of Tucson.
¶27 Ringer's lawsuit involves two incidents with Officer Dial, the June 10, 2015 filing of the application for involuntary evaluation and—according to Ringer—when Officer Dial allegedly served Ringer with the court's order for evaluation on June 26, 2015. More than one year after those incidents, on July 7, 2016, Ringer filed his lawsuit against Officer Dial, and he later amended it to add the City of Tucson. Under A.R.S. § 12-821, "[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward." Based on the allegations in Ringer's complaint, the causes of action applicable to Officer Dial and the City of Tucson accrued no later than June 26, 2015, and Ringer suggests no legal justification to support application of the doctrine of equitable tolling to those causes of action. Accordingly, Ringer filed his lawsuit after the one-year statute of limitations expired, and his state-law claims against Officer Dial and the City of Tucson are therefore barred as a matter of law.
We also agree with the superior court that Ringer's state-law claims against Officer Dial were properly dismissed because Ringer failed to properly serve the officer with a notice of claim. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01; Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 61, ¶¶ 20-21 (App. 2010); Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215 Ariz. 344, 351, ¶ 25 (App. 2007).
¶28 Even assuming Ringer's federal claims survive his failure to comply with A.R.S. § 12-821, see Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa Cty., 189 Ariz. 462, 465-66 (App. 1997), the facts as pled by Ringer in his amended complaint do not as a matter of law support the constitutional violation claims against Officer Dial under § 1983. Further, Ringer made no independent allegations against the City of Tucson and did not allege that any City of Tucson policy or practice caused unconstitutional conduct or injury. Accordingly, he failed to allege a basis for direct municipal liability under § 1983, see Yarnell, 184 Ariz. at 317-18; Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, and he cannot hold the City of Tucson vicariously liable for an alleged violation of § 1983 based on respondeat superior, see Yarnell, 184 Ariz. at 317; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479.
¶29 Finally, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Ringer's request to again amend his complaint because an amendment would not cure his failure to comply with the statute of limitations or the notice of claim statute, and Ringer has suggested no amendment that would cure the deficiencies in his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Timmons, 234 Ariz. at 572, ¶ 17; Elm Ret. Ctr., 226 Ariz. at 292, ¶ 26. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss of Officer Dial and the City of Tucson.
II. Summary Judgments
¶30 Ringer next argues the superior court erred in granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and will affirm only if the evidence produced in support of the defense or claim has so little probative value that no reasonable person could find for its proponent. State Comp. Fund v. Yellow Cab Co. of Phoenix, 197 Ariz. 120, 122, ¶ 5 (App. 1999) (citing Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)). When a party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely on mere allegations, conclusory statements, or denials of its own pleading. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e); State ex rel. Corbin v. Challenge, Inc., 151 Ariz. 20, 26 (App. 1986). We review de novo the superior court's application of the law and whether genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment. State Comp. Fund, 197 Ariz. at 122, ¶ 5 (citing Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 178 Ariz. 92, 97 (App. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. 202, 206, ¶ 22 (App. 2005)). We will affirm if the superior court's ruling is correct for any reason. Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 232 Ariz. 327, 330, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).
A. Summary Judgment in Favor of Pasadera and Dr. Diaz
¶31 Ringer argues the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Pasadera and Dr. Diaz.
¶32 Under A.R.S. § 36-515(A), "[a]ny person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information who makes application for evaluation or treatment of another person pursuant to this chapter is not subject to civil or criminal liability for such act." The uncontroverted material facts, as presented to the superior court, show the actions taken by Pasadera representatives and Dr. Diaz in receiving the application for involuntary evaluation, unsuccessfully attempting pre-petition screening on multiple occasions, preparing the pre-petition screening report, and ultimately proceeding with a petition for court-ordered evaluation were pursuant to, and fully in accordance with, Arizona law. See A.R.S. §§ 36-520 to -523. Thus, on the record presented, Dr. Diaz and Pasadera's representatives were entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-515, which Ringer failed to rebut in his response to the motion for summary judgment. Further, the superior court correctly ruled that Ringer's medical malpractice claim against Dr. Diaz required Ringer to provide expert opinion testimony regarding the applicable standard of care, see A.R.S. § 12-2603, and Ringer's refusal to follow the court's order that he obtain a standard of care expert is fatal to his claim, see Romero v. Hasan, 241 Ariz. 385, 385-86, ¶¶ 1, 9 (App. 2017). The superior court also found that neither Pasadera nor Dr. Diaz are government actors and, therefore, § 1983 is not applicable. However, even if Dr. Diaz may be considered a person acting under color of state law, he had immunity on this record. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). Moreover, Ringer made no claim or showing of a policy or custom Pasadera has adopted that might impose liability upon that entity under § 1983, and Ringer cannot hold Pasadera vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Diaz. See generally Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-93. Finally, Ringer was not prejudiced by the court's failure to grant his motion to amend his complaint because his proposed changes would not have addressed the deficiencies. Accordingly, the superior court correctly determined that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and Pasadera and Dr. Diaz are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law on the allegations made against them by Ringer in his amended complaint.
Under the facts presented and the plain language of A.R.S. § 36-521(A) and (B), Pasadera was not required to conduct an in-person psychiatric evaluation of Ringer before filing its petition for court-ordered evaluation.
B. Summary Judgment in Favor of the PCC Defendants
¶33 Ringer also argues the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the PCC Defendants.
¶34 As to the PCC Defendants, the superior court properly granted their motion as well. Other than the claim for malicious prosecution, Ringer's state-law claims against the PCC Defendants are barred by the one-year statute of limitations, see A.R.S. § 12-821, and all his state-law claims are barred for failure to serve a notice of claim, see A.R.S. § 12-821.01; Simon, 225 Ariz. at 61, ¶¶ 20-21; Harris, 215 Ariz. at 351, ¶ 25. Additionally, except for his claims against PCC Officers Kahn and Haywood, Ringer's § 1983 claims against the PCC Defendants are barred by the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions under A.R.S. § 12-542. See Madden-Tyler, 189 Ariz. at 465-66. Further, even taking all of Ringer's allegations as true, Ringer failed to state a viable cause of action against PCC Officers Kahn and Haywood for any constitutional violation when, acting pursuant to a valid court order, they took Ringer into custody to transport him to Banner for his mental health evaluation. Finally, Ringer was not prejudiced by the superior court's failure to grant his motion to amend his complaint because his proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies found by the court. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in finding no genuine issue of material fact and that the PCC Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
See Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 29, ¶ 10 (2004) ("[F]or purposes of the one-year statute of limitations governing malicious prosecution claims, A.R.S. § 12-541, this cause of action does not accrue until the underlying prosecution has terminated in favor of the plaintiff." (citation omitted)). Ringer, however, did not present evidence that a PCC Defendant instituted a civil action against him, which is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. See Chalpin v. Snyder, 220 Ariz. 413, 418-19, ¶ 20 (App. 2008) (citations omitted).
Given our conclusion regarding Ringer's state-law claims, we do not address his argument that the superior court erred in concluding the doctrine of res judicata—based on Pima County Superior Court Case No. C20146653—applied as well.
Ringer also does not explain how PCC Officer Kahn and Robles-Lopez could possibly have violated his constitutional rights by being present, but not offering testimony, at the July 8, 2015 hearing on the petition for court-ordered treatment, at which he prevailed.
III. Other Issues
¶35 Ringer raises other challenges to the superior court's rulings, which we briefly address. He maintains the superior court erred in issuing a protective order regarding his medical history. He waives this issue by not presenting supporting argument or authority on appeal. See State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, 497-98, ¶ 55 (App. 2015); AMERCO v. Shoen, 184 Ariz. 150, 154 n.4 (App. 1995). He also argues the superior court abused its discretion in striking his amended response and affidavit filed February 10, 2017, in response to the PCC Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court properly struck his amended response as untimely, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), (e), and further, he has demonstrated no prejudice from the court's ruling. Moreover, the court did not strike his affidavit as he claims. Ringer also argues we should reverse the superior court's awards of attorneys' fees to Defendants. The record, however, does not indicate the court awarded attorneys' fees to any Defendants involved in this appeal; instead, the court only awarded taxable costs to Pasadera and Dr. Diaz, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Ringer also argues a different lower court judge should be assigned if this case is reversed and remanded. Because we affirm the superior court's judgments, the changing judges issue is moot. --------
¶36 Finally, to the extent Ringer's opening brief raises allegations and issues not presented to the superior court, he has waived consideration of those new allegations and issues. See Harris, 215 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 17; State v. Claxton, 122 Ariz. 246, 249 (App. 1979). And to the extent Ringer attempts to raise new issues in his reply briefs, he has also waived those issues. See Best v. Edwards, 217 Ariz. 497, 504 n.7, ¶ 28 (App. 2008); Jones v. Burk, 164 Ariz. 595, 597 (App. 1990).
CONCLUSION
¶37 We affirm the superior court's judgments dismissing Judge Staring, Pinkney, Pima County, Officer Dial, and the City of Tucson and granting summary judgment to Pasadera, Dr. Diaz, and the PCC Defendants. Ringer's request for attorneys' fees and costs is denied. We award Defendants their taxable costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341, contingent upon compliance with ARCAP 21.