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Ring v. Ring

Superior Court of Connecticut
Jun 13, 2017
No. LLIFA165007959 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 13, 2017)

Opinion

LLIFA165007959

06-13-2017

Madelia H. Ring v. Timothy C. Ring


Filed June 14, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AFTER TRIAL

Kari A. Dooley, Judge.

Preliminary Statement

This dissolution of marriage action between the plaintiff, Madelia Ring, and the defendant, Timothy Ring, was commenced by writ, summons and complaint returnable to the court on February 23, 2016. The matter was tried before the court over a five day period, on various dates ranging between February 7, 2017, and March 28, 2017, when the court heard closing arguments. The parties were each represented by counsel, and have one child together.

Both parties submitted proposed orders regarding both custodial and financial disputes. Both parties seek joint legal custody of their minor child, but they also seek very divergent orders regarding the physical custody of their minor child. Plaintiff/mother seeks primary physical custody of the child so that she can relocate to Ashville, North Carolina with the child. She proposes that the child spend holidays, vacations and summers in Connecticut with the defendant/father. Plaintiff's proposed financial orders vary and are contingent on the court's decision regarding her proposed relocation.

The plaintiff testified at trial that she will not move to North Carolina if she cannot take the minor child with her.

The defendant proposes that the parties share, on an equal basis, physical custody of their minor child, and to continue the custodial arrangement that has been in place since approximately January 2016, when the parties separated. Under that arrangement, the child spends alternating weeks with each parent.

In rendering this decision and making the orders which are to follow, the court has carefully considered the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56 regarding matters of care, custody, and support of the minor child; General Statutes § 46b-56c regarding educational support orders; General Statutes § § 46b-81 and 46b-82 regarding the assignment of the marital estate and alimony, respectively; and General Statutes § 46b-84, regarding support and medical insurance for the minor child. The court has also considered the body of appellate case law interpreting these statutory provisions and the myriad of issues to be decided herein. The court has considered the parties' arguments, proposed orders as well as the testimony given and the evidence submitted.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Jurisdictional Findings

The plaintiff and the defendant were married on July 22, 2006 in Washington, Connecticut. The plaintiff lived in New Milford, Connecticut for at least 12 months prior to the filing of this dissolution action. The court therefore has jurisdiction over the marriage and the parties. The parties have one child born during the marriage, Connor W. Ring, born June 12, 2007. The family has not received any state or municipal financial assistance.

The court finds that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no reasonable hope that the parties can reconcile.

B. The Parties, the Marriage, the Breakdown

The plaintiff is presently forty-seven (47) years old and she enjoys good health. She is well-educated having received her bachelor's degree in 1992 from the University of California at Riverside in Classical Studies. In 1995, she received a master's degree in art history. She began her career on the west coast at Butterfield's Auction House, where she worked on matters involving consignment and contracts administration. Thereafter, she became an administrative assistant in Decorative Arts, and, by 1999, had been exposed to the process of curating, consigning, and evaluating such items. In 1999, at the urging of her then-mentor, she traveled from California to New York to attend a nine-month certification course offered by Sotheby's. She has since developed a specialty in American decorative art, which can encompass a variety of items--from artwork to furnishings, glass or sculpture. After receiving her certification from Sotheby's, the plaintiff began working for an antiques dealer in Woodbury, Connecticut. Her job functions entailed creating files for antiques, conducting research on their provenance and documenting their history. In 2003, she joined Christie's Auction House after being hired by Andrew Brunk. During the course of her employment there, she served as a cataloger and worked on a variety of tasks as objects came into Christie's for sale or auction. She was employed at Christie's at the time of the marriage in 2006.

The defendant is currently forty-six (46) years old. Following his graduation from high school, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps. He served in the Marine Corps from 1989 through 1993. He is a licensed plumbing, heating and cooling contractor. At the time of his marriage, he worked for Petro Home Heating (Petro) as a service technician. While with Petro, he worked at least five days per week--more in the winter--and was an " on-call" technician a great deal. He worked very long hours and earned approximately $80,000.00 per year during his employment with Petro. In 2012, the parties began to discuss the defendant starting his own business, which he eventually did in approximately May 2013 when he formed Ring, LLC. Since its formation, Ring, LLC has grown in revenue, though not in size. The defendant remains the sole employee of the LLC as well as its managing member/owner. The defendant's tax returns reflect earnings from his business for the years 2014 and 2015 to be approximately $50,000.00 and $62,000.00 respectively. The revenue spreadsheet for Ring, LLC's 2016 calendar year reflects an income level for 2016 that was slightly above that for 2015. His financial affidavit, dated January 2017, reflects an annual income of $67,500. The defendant does not expect his income to increase much beyond its current point because, as he himself explained, " there are only so many hours in a day."

Connor Ring was born June 12, 2007, necessitating the plaintiff to take maternity leave from Christie's. After three months on leave, she inquired as to whether she could return to work only on a part-time basis, and was informed that she could not. At that juncture, she left the work force to stay home in order to devote her attention to raising Connor.

Subsequently, in May of 2008, the plaintiff returned to the work force, and was employed on a part-time basis for Litchfield County Auctions. Her schedule there was flexible, and on those days that she worked, Connor went to the Goddard School. By autumn of that year, her position at Litchfield County Auctions became a full-time position, which allowed her to expand her expertise beyond just American decorative art and developed into more of a " generalist."

In September 2012, the plaintiff took a job in New York City at Bonham's Auction House. Though it was a part-time position, it paid higher than her previous employer, Litchfield County Auctions, and, in addition, offered an employee benefits package which Litchfield County Auctions did not, and the plaintiff took this position partially motivated by the fact that the defendant was thinking of starting his own business, which would have meant a loss of the employment benefits they had through Petro. The drawback of the Bonham's position was a commute that averaged between two and two and one-half hours each way.

By 2012, Connor was enrolled in kindergarten full-time and he also attended morning and afternoon daycare on the days that the plaintiff worked. In August 2013, the plaintiff began her tenure as a full-time employee at Bonham's. Simultaneously, the defendant was trying to establish his own business, with the hope that the increased pay would help the family. In 2015, the plaintiff earned $59,000.00 from Bonham's. She remained at Bonham's until February of 2016, at which point Bonham's made significant reductions to its workforce, and, as a result, she was laid off. In connection therewith, she received her outstanding vacation time, a severance package and, thereafter, unemployment compensation. Subsequently, she worked briefly at Fairfield County Auctions in Monroe, Connecticut, and also consulted with a number of auction houses as an independent contractor during 2016. In total, the plaintiff earned approximately $50,000.00 in 2016, despite having been laid off in February of that year.

Although both parties worked full time during the majority of Connor's young life, both parents shared in the child rearing responsibilities and maintenance of the marital home.

The marriage started experiencing strain in 2014. The court cannot--and does not--assign any particular fault to either party for the breakdown of the marriage. The plaintiff's commute, combined with her full-time work schedule, made for extremely long days. The defendant, meanwhile, was attempting to start and build a small business to support his family. Compounding these obligations was the care of a young child. In addition, the parties' very different parenting styles began to emerge as Connor grew older, resulting in increased conflict. The plaintiff believes that the defendant is too permissive, and the defendant maintains that the plaintiff is too impatient and rigid. The confluence of these obligations and conflicting preferences, also perhaps influenced for other reasons yet unclear, with the passage of time, caused the tether which connected them as a couple to begin to fray, eventually unraveling completely. Indeed, at present, the parties do not communicate well, even with respect to Connor. However, in light of both parties clear commitment to Connor, the court is optimistic that the parties will be able to respectfully and responsibly communicate and co-parent going forward.

The court agrees with the Family Relations assessment that neither party's view of the other survives real scrutiny. As their relationship became strained, finding fault in each other became easy. Unfortunately, by the time of the contested hearing, each was resolute in their perspective.

The plaintiff's unfortunate decision to tape record her conversations with the defendant during the pendency of this action unquestionably contributed substantially to the breakdown in their communications.

C. The Minor Child

Connor is an active and engaging boy, loved by both parents and his extended family. Connor's paternal grandparents live within a ten minute drive from his current residence. He sees them very frequently and often spends the night with them, usually at their request. As his paternal grandmother stated, " we take him whenever we can." The paternal grandparents are also available for child care as may be necessary and are generally very active participants in Connor's life. Connor's maternal grandmother lives on Long Island. She too makes regular trips to visit with Connor. At least once per month, she comes to Connecticut for what have come to be known as " Nana days." Connor enjoys spending such quality time with all of his grandparents.

Connor attends the Sarah Noble Intermediate School in New Milford, where he is reported to be an average student meeting grade-level standards. He is also described as respectful of adults and as a social child with many friends. Family Relations Counselor Christopher White (White), whose testimony is credited, observed Connor interacting with both parents in both homes. Connor is comfortable with each of his parents, and enjoys spending time with each of them in their respective homes. Although they have different parenting styles, Connor easily adapts to those styles and transitions easily between the two homes. There is a genuine stability to the current parenting plan which benefits Connor immensely.

When with his father, he enjoys playing in " the hangar, " an empty bedroom inside his father's home, in which he can fly remote-controlled toy aircrafts. He also enjoys building and doing hands-on activities with his father. He has recently begun joining his father for Thursday night work nights at the Roxbury Volunteer Fire Department, where his father has been a volunteer and/or officer for over fifteen years. Additionally, he plays baseball, likes Legos and going " go-carting."

Connor enjoys generally good health. He suffers from allergies which require medication on an as needed basis, including an Epi-pen. He participates in an ongoing clinical trial at Yale-New Haven Hospital to address his allergies, which place him at risk for asthma. He also has been diagnosed with a skin condition which requires a specific treatment regimen and care. At present, Connor is covered by a health insurance policy maintained by the plaintiff The defendant has been paying $75.00 per week toward the insurance premium to account for Connor's coverage. The defendant is able to provide health insurance to Connor through his business at a lower cost as compared to the plaintiff.

Since January 2016, the parties have shared physical custody of Connor. He goes back and forth between the two households on an alternating weekly schedule. He continues to enjoy time with his paternal grandparents during the defendant's parenting time and on each Friday night. Similarly, he continues to have " Nana days" during the plaintiff's parenting time. The arrangement has worked well, despite the parties' communication deficiencies.

Both parties are fit, capable and loving parents to Connor. Connor enjoys a close bond and a good relationship with both of his parents. While they exhibit different parenting styles, as well as differing strengths and weaknesses as parents, there is little question that Connor's physical and emotional needs can be, and are indeed, met when he is with each parent.

D. Relocation

Plaintiff seeks to relocate to Asheville, North Carolina to pursue an occupation with the Brunk Auction House. Brunk Auctions is owned and operated by a friend and colleague of the plaintiff who has offered her an available position if she were to relocate to North Carolina. After losing her job at Bonham's, she has been unable to find or maintain full-time employment within her field of expertise in this line of work. She has provided work to various auction houses and other similar employers as an independent contractor on a project by project basis. However, the market for American decorative arts has been contracting for some time, and continues to do so. As a result, many of the major auction houses have reduced their staffing levels, as the plaintiff herself experienced at Bonham's, when she was a victim of such downsizing. Plaintiff has advanced degrees and has worked hard over the course of her career to develop her skill set in an area of expertise, and thus, her desire to work in her chosen field is understandable.

The court finds that the plaintiff is not motivated by an interest in separating Connor from his father, or otherwise undermining the father-son relationship. Her proposal that Connor spend the summers and school holidays with the defendant underscores this finding.

In connection with the job offer in North Carolina, the plaintiff investigated apartments, schools, and various neighborhoods in Asheville. She set forth a reasonable plan for relocation. The court lends credence to White's testimony that the plaintiff's plan is a viable plan for Connor, and, because of his resilience, Connor would be able to adapt to the new environment.

Unfortunately, North Carolina is too far away in proximity to arrange any frequent, or even regular, visitation or parenting time with the defendant. Many months would necessarily pass between the defendant's opportunities for parenting time. Connor would be deprived of the regular weekly interactions with his father which he currently enjoys. He would be deprived of his Friday night suppers with his paternal grandparents and their substantial involvement in his day-to-day activities. Relocation would also end the monthly " Nana days" with his maternal grandmother.

Connor does not have any family in North Carolina and his nearest aunt, on his mother's side, is several hours away in Virginia. Connor has only been to North Carolina one time, for a brief visit. He met the plaintiff's future employers but knows no one else in the area.

While the plaintiff's concern that she cannot find work in her field if she stays in Connecticut is sincere, it is not a certainty that her efforts will be ultimately unsuccessful. In light of her determination to relocate to North Carolina, the pendency of the dissolution proceeding and litigation of this very issue, she has not, in the court's view, exhausted her avenues for gainful employment if she remains in Connecticut. Nor has she engaged in advertising or marketing of her services as an independent contractor as a means of developing her own business. Even when exerting de minimus efforts in this regard, she earned in excess of $10,000.00 following her layoff in 2016. Additionally, she appears to enjoy an excellent reputation in her field.

II. ORDERS

Based upon the facts found above, the court enters the following orders:

1. The Marriage is Dissolved on the Grounds of Irretrievable Breakdown

2. Custody and Parenting Plan

The parties shall share joint legal custody of Connor. Joint legal custody requires communication and joint decision making as to significant issues affecting Connor's well-being. Non-emergency matters or issues involving schools, health, religion, sports, extracurricular activities, camps and residence must be discussed in good faith and cannot be the subject of unilateral action by either parent. The court's list is not meant to be exclusive. If the decision to be made is going to impact the quality of Connor's life, the parties must discuss the issue.

" [R]elocation issues that arise at the initial judgment for the dissolution of the marriage continue to be governed by the standard of the best interest of the child as set forth in [General Statutes] § 46b-56." Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 184, 789 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A.2d 556 (2002). Section 46b-56(c) " directs the court, when making any order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of children to consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so [the court] may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of [sixteen enumerated] factors . . . The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers." Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn.App. 177, 187, 965 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009). Weighing the factors set forth in § 46b-56, based upon the findings made above, the court finds that granting the plaintiff primary physical custody and permitting relocation to North Carolina would not be in the child's best interest. The parties shall share physical custody as follows:

Each parent will have parenting time on alternating weeks, commencing on Sundays between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. During the defendant's week, the plaintiff shall have parenting time on Wednesdays from after school (or 3:00 p.m. when school is not in session) until 8:00 p.m. During the plaintiff's week, the defendant will have parenting time on Fridays from after school (or 3:00 p.m. when school is not in session) until 8:00 p.m. The parties may, by agreement, choose a different day for the interim parenting time.

Subject to the holiday schedule set forth below, each party shall have two consecutive weeks of parenting time during the summer. The plaintiff shall have first option in even years, notifying the defendant on or before May 1st of her selection. The defendant shall have first option in odd years, notifying the plaintiff on or before May 1st of his selection. For 2017, notification must be made on or before July 1st. Neither party shall take Connor outside of the United States without the express written permission of the other party.

The parties shall alternate parenting time on major holidays: July 4th, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day, Easter and Memorial Day, commencing with mother having Connor for July 4, 2017. If the parent entitled to custody for a major holiday is not the custodial parent at the time, the parent so entitled shall have Connor from 9:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. The plaintiff shall have Connor on Mother's Day. The defendant shall have Connor on Father's Day. In odd years, the plaintiff shall have Connor on his birthday. In even years, the defendant shall have Connor on his birthday. The sharing of holidays may be changed by agreement of the parties.

Day-to-day decisions of a routine nature, i.e. bedtime, diet, homework, shall be made by the parent with whom the minor child is staying at the time the decision is made.

Both parties will allow Connor unimpeded contact with the other parent during their parenting time. Neither party shall do anything to undermine Connor's relationship with the other parent in any fashion.

3. Health Insurance

The defendant shall arrange for Connor to be covered under the health insurance available to him through his business, or a comparable policy, and he will pay for the same. The defendant will provide all necessary information and paperwork to the plaintiff to allow her to access Connor's health insurance information. The defendant shall not impede, in any fashion, plaintiff's access to Connor's health care providers and/or insurance information.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84(e): (1) the signature of either party Madelia Ring or Timothy Ring, shall constitute a valid authorization to the insurer for purposes of processing an insurance reimbursement payment to the provider of the medical services or to either party; (2) neither party shall prevent or interfere with the timely processing of any insurance reimbursement claim, and (3) if the party receiving an insurance reimbursement payment is not the party who is paying the bill for the services of the medical provider, the party receiving such insurance reimbursement payment shall promptly pay to the party paying such bill the reimbursement received. The defendant shall provide a copy of the dissolution judgment to the insurer.

Section 46b-84, entitled " Parents' obligation for maintenance of minor child. Order for health insurance coverage, " provides, in relevant part: " (e) At any time at which orders are entered in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . if health insurance coverage for a child is ordered by the court to be maintained, the court shall provide in the order that (1) the signature of the custodial parent or custodian of the insured dependent shall constitute a valid authorization to the insurer for purposes of processing an insurance reimbursement payment to the provider of the medical services, to the custodial parent or to the custodian, (2) neither parent shall prevent or interfere with the timely processing of any insurance reimbursement claim and (3) if the parent receiving an insurance reimbursement payment is not the parent or custodian who is paying the bill for the services of the medical provider, the parent receiving such insurance reimbursement payment shall promptly pay to the parent or custodian paying such bill any insurance reimbursement for such services . . ."

Each party shall otherwise be responsible for their own health insurance without cost to the other.

4. Alimony

Based upon the facts found above and the plaintiff's historical earnings, education, qualifications, capabilities, age and health, the court assigns an earning capacity of $50,000.00, or $962.00/week, to the plaintiff for purposes of considering both alimony and child support. Extrapolating from her 2015 W-2 information, the court calculates a net earning capacity of $38,584 or $742.00/week.

The plaintiff earned $55,428.00 in 2015 from Bonham's. The court divided $50,000 by $55,428 and then multiplied the remaining fraction by the federal, state, FICA and Medicare deductions taken in 2015.

It is well established that the trial court may " base financial awards on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117 Conn.App. 1, 6, 977 A.2d 722 (2009). " Earning capacity . . . is not an amount which a person can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as his vocational skills, employability, age and health." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 114, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). Indeed, " [section] 46b-82(a) provides in relevant part: 'In determining whether alimony should be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court . . . shall consider the length of the marriage . . . the age . . . station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . The court is to consider these factors in making an award of alimony, but it need not give each factor equal weight . . . We note also that [t]he trial court may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual circumstances of each case . . . There is no additional requirement that the court specifically state how it weighed the statutory criteria or explain in detail the importance assigned to each statutory factor." (Emphasis added.) Wood v. Wood, 170 Conn.App. 724, 729, 155 A.3d 816 (2017).

The defendant has consistently earned approximately $65,000 over the course of the last two years. His net income based upon his most recent financial affidavit is $957.00/week. Considering all of the factors enumerated in § 46b-82, in light of the facts found above, the court awards alimony in favor of the plaintiff in the weekly amount of $55.00. The first alimony payment is due seven (7) days from the filing of this decision. As of July 1, 2017, the defendant may, at his election, pay alimony on the first of each month in the amount of $239.00. This alimony obligation is modifiable as to amount, as may be permitted under the law. Alimony shall continue until the earliest of the following events: a) the death of either party; b) the remarriage of the plaintiff; c) the plaintiff's cohabitation with another party; see § 46b-86(b); or d) five years from the date of dissolution. The alimony is not otherwise modifiable as to term.

5. Child Support

With respect to child support, earning capacity is not a basis upon which to calculate guidelines but rather is one of many deviation criteria. See Fox v. Fox, 152 Conn.App. 611, 633, 99 A.3d 1206, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 945, 103 A.3d 977 (2014). " [C]hild support . . . first is determined without reference to earning capacity, and earning capacity becomes relevant only if a deviation from the guidelines" is being considered. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 635. " [The amount of support determined without reference to the deviation criteria is presumed to be the correct amount of support, and that presumption may only be rebutted by a specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate under the circumstances of a particular case. When the latter is true, § 46b-215a-3(b)(1)(B) allows deviation from the guidelines on the basis of a parent's earning capacity." Id.

Here, the plaintiff's most recent financial affidavit, dated February 5, 2017, reflects a gross income of $566.91 per week and a net income of $547.67. The defendant's most recent Financial Affidavit shows a net income of $957.00. Under the guidelines, a combined net income of $1,500 sets presumptive support at $278.00. The plaintiff's share of this amount is $100.00. The defendant's share of this amount is $178.00. Therefore, if the plaintiff is the custodial parent, the presumptive support obligation of the defendant would be $178.00. If the defendant is the custodial parent, the plaintiff's presumptive support obligation would be $100.00.

The plaintiff prepared a Guidelines Worksheet which reflects a presumptive support amount of $173.00. However, it is unclear to the court the genesis of the gross and net income figures on the Worksheet. They do not appear to reflect the Financial Affidavits of either party and although the defendant's gross income is consistent with the Financial Affidavit, the deductions are not. It does not appear that the calculation is based on the evidentiary record. See Ferraro v. Ferraro, 168 Conn.App. 723, 147 A.3d 188 (2016).

As indicated, the court finds that the plaintiff has an earning capacity of $50,000.00 per year. At this income level, the plaintiff's support obligation would be higher vis-à-vis the defendant's support obligation. Furthermore, the court has established a shared parenting plan which renders each parent custodial possession 50% of the time. The shared parenting plan will require each parent to contribute equally to the child's day-to-day living expenses. In addition, the defendant will be solely responsible for the cost of the child's health insurance. For these reasons, the court finds that it would be inequitable and inappropriate under the circumstances of this case to apply the Child Support Guidelines. Thus, the court deviates from the child support guidelines and does not award child support to either party.

The court completed and filed the Child Support Worksheets using the defendant's most current financial affidavit and a stated net income of $957 and an imputed net income of $742.00 for the plaintiff. See, supra, p. 12 & n.4. if the plaintiff is the custodial parent, the defendant would have a presumptive support obligation of $168.00 per week. If the defendant is the custodial parent, the plaintiff would have a presumptive support obligation of $132.00. The court recognizes that the presumptive support obligation is not determined by looking to either party's earning capacity. See Fox, supra, 152 Conn.App. 633. The disparity between the two calculations was informative, however, when considering whether to deviate from the guidelines calculated using the plaintiff's actual income.

The parties will share equally the cost of any reasonable and customary medical and dental expenses incurred on behalf of Connor which are not reimbursed or covered by insurance. The party incurring such expense shall provide a receipt of same to the other party. Payments due hereunder shall be made within fifteen (15) days of the obligor's receiving of the receipt.

Each party shall be equally responsible for the cost of extracurricular activities, sports, camps and the like which are mutually agreed upon. Neither party shall withhold agreement unreasonably. If either party unilaterally enrolls Connor in an activity, that party will be solely responsible for the cost.

The Marital Residence

The marital home was purchased for $372,000.00 in 2004, two years prior to the marriage. It is titled in both parties' names. The defendant contributed in excess of $110,000.00 of pre-marital assets towards the purchase price. During this ten year marriage, the plaintiff did contribute to the maintenance of the marital home, financially and otherwise. The property is currently appraised at a value of $275,000.00. It is encumbered by a mortgage in the approximate amount of $196,000.00, resulting in $79,000.00 in equity. The defendant's up-front contribution of pre-martial assets far exceeds any proportional share of the remaining equity to which the plaintiff might otherwise be entitled. None is therefore awarded the plaintiff. The plaintiff will quitclaim any good title or interest in the marital residence to the defendant within 30 days of this judgment.

The defendant shall refinance the existing mortgage within six months so as to remove the plaintiff's name from the mortgage and her liability thereunder. In the event he is unable to refinance the mortgage, the defendant will indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless with respect to the current mortgage. The quitclaim deed shall be held in escrow pending a successful refinance by the defendant.

7. Personal Property

Plaintiff shall retain her Subaru vehicle free and clear from any claim by the defendant. She shall be responsible for any and all costs associated with the maintenance and operation of this vehicle and shall hold the defendant harmless with respect to any and all such costs.

Defendant shall retain his Ford F-150, Ford F-350 vehicles, as well as the associated trailer free and clear from any claim by the plaintiff He shall be responsible for any and all costs associated with the maintenance and operation of these vehicles and accessory, and shall hold the plaintiff harmless with respect to any and all such costs.

The defendant shall retain all of his rightful title and interest in his business, Ring, LLC, and all of its assets, free and clear from any claim by the plaintiff. The defendant shall be solely responsible for the debts, liabilities and obligations of the business and shall hold the plaintiff harmless and will indemnify her with respect to said debts, liabilities and obligations.

The plaintiff shall retain all of her rightful title and interest in her independent contracting business, however structured and in whatever form it presently has or may have in the future, and all of its assets, if any, free and clear from any claim by the defendant. The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the debts, liabilities and obligations of the business and shall hold the defendant harmless and shall indemnify him with respect to said debts, liabilities and obligations.

The evidence was not clear as to whether " Americana Research and Genealogy" is a d/b/a, or whether the plaintiff had formed an LLC, and whether, if she had formed an LLC, said LLC continues to exist.

The engagement ring shall be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.

With respect to family photographs and memorabilia, the parties will divide such items by making alternate selections, with the plaintiff choosing first. To the extent either party has photographs stored in an electronic medium, that party will copy all such images onto an external drive and provide that drive to the other party within 30 days of the judgment. The party making the copies shall incur the costs associated therewith.

8. Bank Accounts, Retirement Accounts, Pensions

The defendant shall retain, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff, funds presently held solely in his name at Union Savings Bank, both checking and saving as reflected on his January 23, 2017 financial affidavit. The plaintiff shall retain, free and clear of any claim by the defendant, funds presently held solely in her name at Bank of America, checking, saving and " cash rewards" as reflected on her February 5, 2017 financial affidavit.

The bank account at Unions Savings Bank presently maintained for Connor's benefit shall be closed, the funds divided equally and transferred to separate accounts for the benefit of Connor.

The plaintiff has an IRA administered by Bank of America, an IRA administered by Fidelity Investments and a 401(k) plan administered by Bonham's Butterfield. The defendant has a Knights of Columbus Roth IRA fund, and a smaller, separate Knights of Columbus IRA fund. The marital portion of these accounts shall be divided equally between the parties. Alternatively, the parties may agree to equalize the total value of the marital portion of these accounts through whatever appropriate transfer of funds will accomplish this goal. The defendant also has an interest in two pensions, one with the Town of Roxbury and one with his labor union. The marital portion of these pensions shall also be equally divided. The court retains jurisdiction to enter any Qualified Domestic Relations Orders which may be required to effectuate this aspect of the dissolution judgment.

9. Life Insurance

The defendant shall maintain the current twenty-year term life insurance policy offered through the Knights of Columbus, with the current face amount of $250,000, naming Connor as the irrevocable beneficiary until Connor reaches the age of 23, dies or marries, whichever shall first occur.

The plaintiff shall maintain her current life insurance policy offered through MetLife in the amount of $250,000, naming Connor as the irrevocable beneficiary until Connor reaches the age of 23, dies or marries, whichever shall first occur.

10. Debts and Liabilities

Unless otherwise herein stated, the plaintiff shall be responsible for all individual debts reflected on her financial affidavit and she shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless with respect to same.

Unless otherwise herein stated, the defendant shall be responsible for all individual debts reflected on his financial affidavit and he shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless with respect to same.

11. Attorney Fees

Each party shall be responsible for the payment of his or her own counsel fees.

12. Educational Support Orders

The court finds that the parties would have provided post-secondary education support to Connor had the family remained intact. Therefore, the court retains jurisdiction to enter any post-secondary education support orders as may be necessary upon Connor's graduation from high school.

13. Taxes

The parties will alternate claiming Connor as a deduction with the plaintiff claiming the deduction in even years and the defendant taking the deduction in odd years.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Ring v. Ring

Superior Court of Connecticut
Jun 13, 2017
No. LLIFA165007959 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 13, 2017)
Case details for

Ring v. Ring

Case Details

Full title:Madelia H. Ring v. Timothy C. Ring

Court:Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jun 13, 2017

Citations

No. LLIFA165007959 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 13, 2017)