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Rigney v. City of Rowlett

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Aug 27, 2004
Civil No. 3:04-CV-0590-H (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2004)

Opinion

Civil No. 3:04-CV-0590-H.

August 27, 2004


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


Before the Court is Defendants' Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed July 8, 2004. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has not filed a Response despite this Court's Order that he do so. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and exemplary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First Amendment and Due Process rights. (P.'s Compl. at 8-12.) The case arises out of the termination of Plaintiff's employment as a police officer for the City of Rowlett on December 3, 2001, as well as Plaintiff's subsequent, unsuccessful appeal of that termination. On April 26, 2002, less than one month after the denial of his appeal, Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the City of Rowlett, alleging that the termination of his employment violated the Texas Whistleblower Act. (D.s' Br. at Ex. A.) On August 25, 2003, Plaintiff's state court action was dismissed on summary judgment. (D.s' Br. at Ex. B.) The instant action ensued on March 19, 2004, and Defendants now move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the action is barred both by the statute of limitations and by the doctrine of res judicata. (D.s' Br. at 1.)

II. Legal Standards

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate if material facts are not in dispute and questions of law are all that remain. See Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 5A WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 1367 at 510). In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, a court "must look only to the pleadings and accept all allegations in them as true." St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Convalescent Serv., Inc., 193 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). "[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief." Brittan Communications Intern. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Rule 12(b)(6) decisions appropriately guide the application of Rule 12(c) because the standards for deciding motions under both rules are the same."). "Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999).

III. Analysis

As noted above, Defendants contend that this action is barred both by the statute of limitations and by the doctrine of res judicata. (D.s' Br. at 1.) With respect to statute of limitations, § 1983 actions in Texas must be filed within two years after the plaintiff "becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured." Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). See also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that "[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state" and that "Texas has a two[-]year statute of limitations for personal injury claims"). In the instant case, Plaintiff's employment terminated on December 3, 2001, yet Plaintiff did not file this § 1983 action until March 19, 2004. Thus, the Court concludes that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim that the termination of his employment violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to that claim.

However, Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered violations of his constitutional rights during the appeal of his employment termination. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Susan Thorpe, acting in both her individual and official capacities as the city manager for the City of Rowlett, violated Plaintiff's Due Process rights during his post-termination hearing on March 22, 2004, by (1) not allowing Plaintiff's attorney to participate in the hearing; (2) not allowing Plaintiff to cross-examine a certain witness; (3) not allowing Plaintiff to offer exhibits; and (4) not acting in an impartial manner. (P.'s Compl. at 1, 5-7, 10-11.) The Court notes that Plaintiff brought this claim three days before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata due to Plaintiff's previous state court action.

The Court concludes that the doctrine of res judicata is more appropriately addressed at summary judgment. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim regarding the alleged violations of his constitutional rights during the post-termination hearing.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Susan Thorpe, in both her individual and official capacities, for Due Process violations relating to Plaintiff's post-termination hearing on March 22, 2002. The motion is GRANTED as to all other claims and Defendants.

Defendant Susan Thorpe is DIRECTED to file her motion for summary judgment no later than noon, November 15, 2004.

As noted above, Plaintiff did not file a Response to the instant motion despite this Court's Order that he do so. Plaintiff is admonished to comply with all Orders of this Court. Failure to do so could result in sanctions, up to and including dismissal of this case.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Rigney v. City of Rowlett

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Aug 27, 2004
Civil No. 3:04-CV-0590-H (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2004)
Case details for

Rigney v. City of Rowlett

Case Details

Full title:DAVID RIGNEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROWLETT, TEXAS; SUSAN THORPE, in both…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Aug 27, 2004

Citations

Civil No. 3:04-CV-0590-H (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2004)