Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12857 No. 6852
01-29-2020
WILLIAM F. RIGGS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v . State , 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002). Trial Court No. 1KE-16-00344 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, Trevor Stephens, Judge. Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges. Judge WOLLENBERG.
William F. Riggs was charged with third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver) after officers discovered a large amount of methamphetamine in his marine repair shop in Ketchikan. Following a jury trial, Riggs was convicted of this offense.
On appeal, Riggs argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior attempt to deliver methamphetamine to Ketchikan in 2014. Riggs also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he was on probation for that prior offense at the time of the events in this case, and that he had a probation condition precluding him from having contact with his co-defendant.
For the reasons we explain in this opinion, we reject Riggs's claims, and we affirm Riggs's conviction.
Underlying facts and proceedings
On June 13, 2016, several probation officers visited Riggs's repair shop in Ketchikan. Riggs was on probation for a prior felony drug conviction, and the officers were undertaking a routine probation field visit. As the officers approached the shop, they encountered Riggs driving a car; Scott Arrington was in the passenger seat.
The officers stopped Riggs and performed a probation search of his car. In the pockets of a jacket resting on the center console, the officers found plastic baggies containing methamphetamine. (At the time, both Riggs and Arrington denied ownership of the jacket; it was later determined that the jacket belonged to Arrington.) Based on the items found, the officers obtained a warrant to search Riggs's repair shop, and probation and police officers jointly executed the search warrant.
Riggs's close friend, Charles Woolsey, was working in the shop when the officers arrived. Riggs's name was on the lease of the shop, but both Woolsey and Arrington helped pay rent. Inside a washing machine in the shop, a probation officer found twenty baggies containing over 200 grams of methamphetamine. About six-to-seven feet from the washing machine, law enforcement officers also found plastic baggies, a digital scale, vials, white residue, and plastic scoops in a box.
The police then obtained warrants to search the homes of Riggs, Woolsey, and Arrington. In Riggs's home, the police found $4,000 in cash and four cell phones. In Woolsey's home, the police found two digital scales and several glass pipes, and in Arrington's home, the police found multiple digital scales, glass pipes, baggies, and money ledgers.
A grand jury indicted Riggs on one count of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for possessing, with the intent to deliver, the methamphetamine found in his shop. The grand jury also indicted Woolsey and Arrington on the same count, and indicted Arrington alone for a second count of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for the methamphetamine found in his jacket.
Former AS 11.71.030(a)(1) (pre-July 2016 version).
Riggs and Woolsey were jointly tried and convicted as charged. (Arrington's case proceeded separately.)
Litigation surrounding the admission of evidence regarding Riggs's prior offense, probation status, and no-contact condition
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence surrounding Riggs's prior attempt to deliver methamphetamine into Ketchikan in 2014. In its notice, the State explained that, in 2014, law enforcement officers obtained warrants to search Woolsey's properties and discovered a small amount of methamphetamine along with drug paraphernalia. During the investigation, officers obtained information that Woolsey was distributing methamphetamine in Ketchikan and that Riggs was his supplier, having made multiple supply runs to California.
After the police learned that Woolsey was expecting a shipment of methamphetamine from Riggs via the Alaska Marine Highway System, the police intercepted Riggs and his girlfriend on the ferry. Pursuant to a search warrant, the police discovered approximately sixty-eight grams of methamphetamine in the luggage of Riggs's girlfriend, along with drug distribution supplies.
Riggs entered into a Criminal Rule 11 agreement with the State, under which he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance. Riggs was sentenced and placed on probation for two years. One of Riggs's conditions of probation prohibited him from having contact with felons, including Woolsey.
Former AS 11.71.030(a)(1) (2014) & AS 11.31.100.
Woolsey was convicted of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and placed on probation for two years with a condition prohibiting him from having contact with Riggs.
About sixteen months after Riggs was sentenced, he was charged with the offense in this case. The State sought to introduce evidence of Riggs's prior attempt to deliver methamphetamine to Woolsey. The State argued that evidence of the 2014 incident was admissible for several non-propensity purposes, including its tendency to show that Riggs and Woolsey were jointly engaged in a drug distribution operation. The State also sought to introduce evidence of Riggs's probation status and the probation condition precluding Riggs from contacting Woolsey. The State argued that these two pieces of evidence were relevant to explaining the probation officers' presence on the scene and the search of Riggs's vehicle, as well as Riggs's willingness to risk arrest by having contact with Woolsey.
Riggs argued that the only relevance of the prior act evidence was to show that he had a propensity to engage in the type of conduct charged, a prohibited purpose under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). Riggs also argued that his probation status was not relevant because he would not dispute that the searches of his car and repair shop were lawful.
The superior court granted the State's request to introduce evidence of the 2014 incident. The court reasoned that this evidence had a tendency to show that Riggs had the opportunity to obtain and import methamphetamine into Ketchikan, that he had knowledge of the methamphetamine found in his repair shop, and that the present offense may have been part of an ongoing drug operation (i.e., plan) which was interrupted when Riggs was charged in 2014. The court also found that the prior act evidence tended to show that Riggs and Woolsey had "a 'business' relationship beyond being partners in the shop," which provided case-specific relevance beyond simply suggesting that Riggs characteristically engaged in drug offenses.
The court further found that the "relatively high probative value" of this evidence did not outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice under Alaska Evidence Rule 403. The court proposed giving a cautionary instruction to the jury explaining the limited purpose of the evidence.
The court also found that Riggs's probation status was admissible for the non-propensity purpose of explaining the probation officers' presence on the scene and the reason for the search of Riggs's car — and that admission of this evidence did not appreciably increase the prejudice to Riggs given the admissibility of the evidence surrounding his prior drug offense.
Finally, the court found that the no-contact condition was admissible because, according to the court, Riggs's and Woolsey's willingness to violate their probation by having contact gave rise to a reasonable inference that Riggs and Woolsey were engaged in an unlawful joint enterprise.
At trial, both Riggs and Woolsey argued that they did not possess or have any knowledge of the methamphetamine found in the repair shop. Rather, they claimed that the drugs were Arrington's alone. Their attorneys argued that Arrington was a known "drug dealer," a fact that the State itself conceded.
To counter this argument, the State introduced the facts surrounding Riggs's 2014 conviction, including his probation status and the probation condition prohibiting him from having contact with Woolsey. The State also introduced evidence regarding the methamphetamine trade in Ketchikan. Two Ketchikan police officers testified that methamphetamine is not typically manufactured locally, that it is smuggled in from states like California, and that it can yield a substantial profit in Ketchikan. The officers estimated the resale value of the methamphetamine found in Riggs's shop at approximately $100,000.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the details surrounding Riggs's prior offense demonstrated that Riggs and Woolsey had the unique opportunity and knowledge needed to smuggle a large amount of methamphetamine into Ketchikan from out-of-state and make a profit. The prosecutor also contested Riggs's and Woolsey's assertion that the drugs were Arrington's alone — arguing that, given their experience selling and distributing methamphetamine, it was unlikely that Arrington would hide his own drugs, worth approximately $100,000, in Riggs's shop.
Prior to the admission of evidence of Riggs's prior offense, and again at the end of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence only "as circumstantial evidence on the limited case-specific issues of whether the defendants planned with each other and had the opportunity to commit the offense with which they are charged, including whether any possession that either had of the controlled substance alleged in this case was 'knowing.'" The jury instruction also stated that it would be "improper and unfair" for the jurors to "consider this evidence for any other purpose," including "that either defendant has a general character trait of being involved with unlawful controlled substances" or that either defendant was guilty "simply because he had been previously convicted of a drug offense."
The jury found Riggs and Woolsey guilty as charged.
Why we uphold the trial court's decision to admit evidence of Riggs's prior conduct
Under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), evidence of a defendant's other acts is not admissible to prove the defendant's character for committing such acts and to show that, on the occasion in question, the defendant acted in conformity with that character. But the rule allows evidence of other acts to be admitted for non-propensity purposes.
See Willock v. State, 400 P.3d 124, 127 (Alaska App. 2017).
On appeal, Riggs argues that evidence of the 2014 offense was impermissible propensity evidence under Rule 404(b)(1) — i.e., that the only relevance of the evidence was to show that, because Riggs attempted to deliver methamphetamine in the past, he was more likely to have possessed the 200 grams of methamphetamine found in his shop.
In support of his argument that the prior act evidence was improper propensity evidence, Riggs points to several federal circuit courts that apply a "propensity-free chain of reasoning" test to determine if other act evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has stated that the analogous Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) "is not just concerned with the ultimate conclusion, but also with the chain of reasoning that supports the non-propensity purpose for admitting the evidence." Accordingly, the court cautioned "that it's not enough for the proponent of the other-act evidence simply to point to a purpose in the 'permitted' list and assert that the other-act evidence is relevant to it." Rather, the proponent of the evidence must establish that it is relevant to a non-propensity purpose "through a chain of reasoning that does not rely on the forbidden inference that the person has a certain character and acted in accordance with that character on the occasion charged in the case." Riggs argues that the prior act evidence admitted in this case fails this test.
See State v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that Rule 404(b) "allows the use of other-act evidence only when its admission is supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning" (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 880 F.3d 1151, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[W]here the defendant's knowledge is contested, . . . the government must prove a logical connection between the knowledge gained as a result of the commission of the prior act and the knowledge at issue in the charged act" and this logical connection "must be supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he government must identify each proper purpose for which it will use the other acts evidence and explain how that evidence 'fits into a chain of inferences — a chain that connects the evidence to [each] proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden propensity inference.'" (quoting United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013))); United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2014) ("In proffering [prior act] evidence, the government must explain how [the evidence] fits into a chain of inferences — a chain that connects the evidence to a proper purpose, no link of which is forbidden propensity evidence." (alterations in Caldwell) (quoting Davis, 726 F.3d at 442)).
Gomez, 763 F.3d at 856 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 860.
The test articulated by these federal cases is consistent with the analysis we already apply. In Willock v. State, we advised that, when confronted with a request to introduce evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), a trial court must evaluate whether the proposed other-acts evidence "truly has a case-specific relevance other than proving the defendant's general desire or willingness to engage in the kind of criminal behavior at issue in the case," and we cautioned against "generalized assertions" about how a person's past acts show a non-propensity purpose. In Berezyuk v. State, we reiterated that "simply using one of the words listed in Rule 404(b)(1) does not mean that the evidence is actually relevant for a non-propensity purpose." Ultimately, the trial court must "subject the government's offer of proof to rigorous examination," considering "both the evidence presented and the way in which the case is being argued by the parties."
Willock v. State, 400 P.3d 124, 127 (Alaska App. 2017) (emphasis in original).
Berezyuk v. State, 407 P.3d 512, 516 (Alaska App. 2017).
Belcher v. State, 372 P.3d 279, 285 (Alaska App. 2016); see also Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498, 506 (Alaska App. 1985) ("When the prosecutor seeks permission to utilize . . . evidence [under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(1)], the trial court should carefully scrutinize the proffered reasons for the use of the evidence.").
In this case, the central disputed issue at trial was whether Riggs knowingly possessed the methamphetamine that the officers found in his shop. Both Riggs and Woolsey defended against the charge by pointing solely at Arrington, and by denying any knowledge of the drugs. Evidence that Riggs had recently engaged in the importation and intended sale of methamphetamine, with Woolsey as his buyer, was therefore relevant to several non-propensity purposes.
In particular, the evidence had a tendency to rebut Riggs's defense that the methamphetamine found in his shop was Arrington's alone. As the trial court found, the evidence tended to show that Riggs and Woolsey had "a 'business' relationship beyond being partners in the shop" — a business relationship selling drugs. A reasonable juror could find — and the prosecutor argued — that Riggs's knowledge about, and experience with, the sale of methamphetamine made it less likely that Arrington would unilaterally hide drugs in Riggs's shop.
Moreover, evidence that Riggs previously attempted to smuggle a commercial quantity of methamphetamine into Ketchikan to distribute through his co-defendant, Woolsey, was relevant to show that he had the know-how and capacity to obtain a large quantity of methamphetamine. The State elicited testimony from two police officers that methamphetamine is not manufactured locally in Ketchikan, and that it is instead smuggled into Ketchikan from out-of-state. The officers' testimony suggested that it would be difficult for a typical person to obtain 200 grams of methamphetamine in Ketchikan, and that prior connections were essential for obtaining such a large quantity. Evidence of the events in 2014 tended to show that Riggs had the ability and the opportunity to possess such a commercial amount: he knew where to obtain it out-of-state, how to transport it to Ketchikan, and how to distribute it within Ketchikan.
See McDonald v. State, 2015 WL 1881591, at *7 (Alaska App. Apr. 22, 2015) (unpublished) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant, who was charged with selling drugs to a confidential police informant, had recently made large drug purchases from another person because the evidence was relevant to show that the defendant had a source for commercial quantities of heroin a short time before the charged sales).
Riggs contends that he never disputed that he knew how to obtain a commercial quantity of methamphetamine in Ketchikan, and he therefore argues that opportunity was not actively contested at trial. But in this context, opportunity — Riggs's ability to obtain a large quantity of methamphetamine and find a distributor for it — was directly relevant to whether Riggs was the one who possessed the methamphetamine, the primary issue disputed at trial.
Moor, 709 P.2d at 506 (noting that while the issue upon which the evidence is offered must be "truly disputed" in the case, the prior act evidence need not "be strictly necessary to the prosecution's case in the sense that failure to admit the evidence would leave the case subject to a motion for directed judgment of acquittal"); see also Miller v. State, 866 P.2d 130, 134 (Alaska App. 1994) (holding that, where the robber's identity was the key issue at trial, proof of motive and common scheme or plan — i.e., evidence of the defendant's prior drug trafficking and intent to bankroll a larger drug enterprise through the charged robbery — were "crucial and legitimate components of the prosecution's case," notwithstanding the fact that they were not formal elements).
In Smithart v. State, we stated that "if there is no connection between [the] prior acts and the episode being litigated other than the assumption that people of a certain character would act the same way on both occasions," then the evidence is barred under Rule 404(b). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that a logical connection aside from propensity exists in this case.
Smithart v. State, 946 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Alaska App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 988 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1999).
Given this non-propensity relevance, the remaining question is whether the evidence should have been excluded under Alaska Evidence Rule 403. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the prior act evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice. The court acknowledged the real potential for prejudice to Riggs given the similarity of the past conduct, but the court also found that the evidence had "significant probative value," given that Riggs, Woolsey, and Arrington all had access to the shop, and all were disclaiming knowing possession. The trial court gave the jury a strong limiting instruction, directing the jury that the prior act evidence could only be used for particular non-propensity purposes, and that it would be "improper and unfair" for the jurors to "consider this evidence for any other purpose," including that Riggs had a general propensity to deal drugs or that he was guilty "simply because he had been previously convicted of a drug offense."
See Conley v. Alaska Commc'n Sys. Holdings, Inc., 323 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 2014).
See Howard v. State, 239 P.3d 426, 429 (Alaska App. 2010) ("When we review a trial judge's weighing of probative value versus potential for unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403, we review the judge's ruling under the 'abuse of discretion' standard.").
We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Riggs's prior conduct.
Why we uphold the trial court's decision to admit evidence of Riggs's probation status and no-contact condition
Riggs separately argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his probation status and the probation condition prohibiting him from having contact with Woolsey. The trial court ruled that Riggs's probation status was relevant to explaining the probation officers' presence on the scene and the reason for the search of Riggs's car. Riggs argues that, even if the evidence had some tendency to provide context for the searches, any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice given his willingness to stipulate at trial that the search was lawful.
We affirmed the admission of a defendant's probation status for similar reasons in Luckett v. State. We need not decide whether Riggs's willingness to stipulate to the lawfulness of the search of his car alters our conclusion, because any error in admitting this evidence is harmless given our decision upholding the introduction of Riggs's underlying prior offense.
Luckett v. State, 2016 WL 3033861, at *2 (Alaska App. May 25, 2016) (unpublished) (where probation officers conducted a routine search of Luckett's person before searching his home and finding cocaine, admission of evidence of Luckett's probation status was proper because excluding the evidence would have deprived the jury of a coherent explanation of the events and required the probation officers to conceal their identities).
For similar reasons, we reject Riggs's challenge to the admission of evidence of his no-contact condition. We acknowledge that, given the eventual testimony at trial, it is not clear that this evidence was properly admitted for the purpose identified by the court. Prior to trial, the State argued that this evidence was relevant to show the risks that Riggs was willing to take in order to engage in an unlawful, but highly profitable, joint enterprise. But at trial, the probation officer who supervised both Riggs and Woolsey acknowledged that she knew that Riggs and Woolsey — who had been close friends for decades — were having contact (albeit without her permission), and she had not filed a petition to revoke Riggs's probation. Therefore, it appears that the contact between Riggs and Woolsey was not as risky as the State initially portrayed.
But Riggs did not renew his objection to the introduction of evidence regarding the no-contact provision following the probation officer's testimony at trial, and we have already concluded that evidence of Riggs's prior offense was admissible. We therefore conclude that any additional evidence regarding the no-contact condition did not appreciably affect the jury's verdict.
See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 634 (Alaska 1969).
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.