Opinion
No. 99-CV-6479.
March 31, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
Preliminary Statement
Pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket #43), and plaintiff's cross-motion seeking an order compelling further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). (Docket #50). Also pending before the Court is plaintiff's motion to obtain transcripts from other proceedings. (Docket #53). In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for all dispositive matters, including trial. (Docket #28). For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety is granted and plaintiff's motions are denied.
Factual and Procedural Background
On or about September 20, 1995, plaintiff was convicted of multiple murders and was committed to the custody of the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") for a period of 203 years. See Amended Complaint (Docket #18) at ¶ 27, 28. There can be no real dispute that plaintiff's crimes and trial garnered substantial publicity and notoriety. Upon his entry into DOC's custody at the Downstate Correctional Facility, plaintiff was placed in protective custody. Between September 20, 1995 and February 7, 1996, plaintiff was twice transferred to the Riker's Island Correctional Facility. While at Riker's plaintiff was assaulted on three different occasions. See Plaintiff's Rule 56 Statement at ¶¶ 2-6 (Docket #52). On February 9, 1996, plaintiff was transferred to the Attica Correctional Facility and was immediately placed into administrative segregation. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.4(b) (inmate may be placed in administrative segregation if his presence in the general population would pose a threat to the safety or security of the facility).
On February 21, 1996, a hearing to determine the need to place plaintiff in administrative segregation was commenced. The hearing concluded on March 8, 1996. At the conclusion of the hearing, Hearing Officer Gail Hallerdin determined that plaintiff should be maintained in administrative segregation because of the notoriety of his crimes and the fact that he had been attacked by other inmates. See Plaintiff's Rule 56 Statement at §§ 8-9 (Docket #52). Plaintiff appealed, but the hearing officer's decision was affirmed. Plaintiff remained in administrative segregation for over four years. Pursuant to 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.4(d), plaintiff's designation to administrative segregation was periodically reviewed.
The regulations provided that the inmate is entitled to a due process hearing which "shall be conducted within 14 days of an inmate's admission to administrative segregation." 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.4(a). The hearing decision must "set forth specific reasons why administrative segregation is warranted."Id. The regulations further provided that "[i]nmates assigned to administrative segregation status shall have such status reviewed every seven days for the first two months, and every 30 days thereafter by a three member committee, consisting of a representative of the facility executive staff, a security supervisor, and a member of the guidance and counseling staff." 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.4(d). The committee's recommendation on continued confinement of the inmate in administrative segregation is then "forwarded, in writing, to the superintendent for final determination." Id.
As plaintiff correctly notes, the harsh conditions of administrative segregation confinement in Attica are described in detail in my decision in an unrelated case. See McClary v. Kelly, 4 F.Supp.2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
After more than two years of being confined in administrative segregation, plaintiff, through counsel, commenced a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules in Wyoming County challenging "the legality and constitutionality of [plaintiff's] continued status as an Administrative Segregation inmate." See Article 78 Petition annexed as Exhibit "B" to Docket #45. See also Plaintiff's Rule 56 Statement at ¶ 14 (Docket #52). The Article 78 Petition alleged, inter alia, violations of plaintiff's federal constitutional right to: (1) procedural due process, (2) substantive due process, (3) equal protection and (4) plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The Respondent in the Article 78 proceeding answered and denied violating any of plaintiff's federal constitutional rights.
On October 20, 1998, Acting Supreme Court Justice Mark H. Dadd denied the Article 78 petition and specifically determined that plaintiff failed to show that New York's regulations pertaining to administrative confinement were unconstitutional or that "the procedures applied in this case violated his constitutional rights." See October 20, 1998 Decision of Acting Supreme Court Justice Mark H. Dadd, annexed as "R-52-54" to Docket #45. With the assistance of assigned counsel, plaintiff appealed Judge Dadd's decision to the Appellate Division's Fourth Department. On June 16, 2000 the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Judge Dadd's denial of the Article 78 Petition. In the Matter of Joel Rifkin, 273 A.D.2d 878 (4th Dep't. 2000). The Court explicitly rejected plaintiff's contention that his confinement in administrative segregation violated his constitutional right to equal protection or his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 879-880. As to plaintiff's procedural due process rights, the Court held:
[W]e reject the contention of petitioner that his due process rights have been violated because he is subject to the same restrictions as those inmates placed in the special housing unit for disciplinary purposes. With respect to petitioner's substantive due process rights, petitioner's placement in administrative segregation does not "trigger due process protection" because that "segregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest" (Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472, 485-486). With respect to petitioner's procedural due process rights, the administrative segregation was imposed and continues with the proper exercise of procedural due process; the placement of petitioner was the subject of an administrative hearing and his status is subject to review every 30 days by a three-member committee, the results of which review are forwarded to the prison's superintendent for a final determination (see, 7 NYCRR 301.4 [a], [d]).Id. at 880 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff did not seek leave to appeal the Appellate Division's decision to the New York Court of Appeals. See Plaintiff's Rule 56 Statement at ¶ 17 (Docket #52).
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff commenced the instant civil rights action on October 8, 1999. (Docket #1). On December 18, 2000 plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint (Docket #18). His motion to amend was opposed by the defendants who argued that the amendment was futile because the claims sought to be asserted were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In a detailed Report and Recommendation dated November 29, 2001, Magistrate Judge William G. Bauer found that the claims plaintiff sought to litigate in his amended complaint were "exactly the same as the ones the Appellate Division specifically rejected." (Docket #23). Judge Bauer also determined that plaintiff had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the constitutional issues in state court and, therefore, the proposed amendment was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Docket # 23). On de novo review, District Judge David G. Larimer modified Judge Bauer's decision and allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint. (Docket #25). Based on the record then before him and relying on Rule 15(a)'s admonition that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," Judge Larimer determined that the defendants had not met their burden of establishing the identity of issues in the prior Article 78 petition and the instant federal court action. Judge Larimer noted, however, that he was making his determination on a limited record and invited the defendants to file for summary judgment on the collateral estoppel issue "on a more complete record."
After Judge Larimer's decision, the parties consented to magistrate jurisdiction, thereby causing defendants' renewed collateral estoppel argument to be determined by this Court.
In support of their renewed collateral estoppel argument, defendants attach the record on appeal from plaintiff's state court action to the instant motion (See Affidavit of Charles D. Steinman, Exhibit "B") (Docket #45). Based on this record, defendants submit that the issues set forth in plaintiff's amended complaint have already been decided in state court and thus, plaintiff is precluded from re-litigating them in this federal court action.
According to defense counsel, the official record on appeal of plaintiff's Article 78 proceeding "has been lost or misplaced by the Appellate Division" and thus, the record submitted to this Court was the archived appellate file maintained by the Office of the New York State Attorney General. See March 12, 2004 Affidavit of Charles D. Steinman, Esq., annexed as Exhibit "1" to Docket #45.
Discussion
1. Collateral Estoppel: The principles underlying the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to plaintiff's federal court complaint were set forth in Judge Bauer's Report and Recommendation and Judge Larimer's subsequent Decision and Order and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that collateral estoppel applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and under the Full Faith and Credit Statute "federal courts must give a prior state court judgment the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged." Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1996). In New York, the doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars a party from relitigating in a subsequent proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior proceeding and decided against that party where the party to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Weiss v. Manfredi, 83 N.Y.2d 974, 976 (1994).Two requirements must be met before the doctrine of collateral estoppel will prevent a party from asserting an issue in a proceeding: (1) the issue has necessarily been decided in a prior proceeding and is decisive of the present action, and (2) there has been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling. Giakoumelos, 88 F.3d at 59, citing Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 73 (1969). The moving party has the initial burden to establish that the prior litigated issues are identical to those in the pending action. Then, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that collateral estoppel should not be applied because he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues in the prior action.Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 73. As Magistrate Judge William G. Bauer noted in his Report and Recommendation, it is "incumbent on this Court to examine the state court proceedings closely to determine what was decided in that forum." (Docket #23, page 9).
Here, based on a review of the record of the state court proceedings, I find that defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that plaintiff's current claims "were raised, decided and essential to the decision in the Article 78 Proceeding."Giakoumelos, 88 F.3d at 59. The gist of plaintiff's Article 78 petition was that DOCS should have placed him in the less restrictive conditions of involuntary protective custody (IPC) instead of administrative segregation. Plaintiff claimed that his placement in administrative segregation violated his constitutional right to due process, equal protection and further, that the conditions of confinement in administrative segregation constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The pleadings and memorandum submitted by plaintiff's counsel in the Article 78 proceeding cited to and relied not only on specific provisions of the federal constitution but also federal court decisions evaluating the constitutionality of administrative segregation, including this Court's decision in McClary v. Kelly, 4 F.Supp.2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), which specifically addresses an inmate's due process rights when being placed and maintained in administrative segregation. In affirming the denial of plaintiff's Article 78 Petition, the Fourth Department explicitly ruled that: 1) his placement in administrative segregation as opposed to IPC did not violate his equal protection rights because prison authorities demonstrated a rational basis for the more restrictive classification; 2) his placement did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment; 3) his substantive due process rights were not implicated or violated; and 4) his procedural due process rights were not violated because his segregation was imposed based on an administrative hearing and his ongoing status as a segregated prisoner was subject to review every 30 days. Rifkin v. Goord, 273 A.D.2d 878 (4th Dept. 2000).
Like his Article 78 Petition, plaintiff's federal court complaint similarly alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights by placing him in the restrictive administrative segregation confinement instead of the less restrictive protective custody confinement status. His amended complaint contains six causes of action. The first four causes of action allege that plaintiff's procedural due process rights were violated because: 1) his initial administrative segregation placement hearing was "merely perfunctory" and denied him due process; 2) he was deprived of the opportunity to show that less restrictive confinement would have produced the same result; 3) he was not notified of any periodic review of his confinement; and 4) the mandatory monthly review of his status was not meaningful and denied him due process. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action asserts that the length and restrictions placed on his confinement amounted to "an atypical prison environment," which subjected him to "undue pain and suffering." Plaintiff's sixth cause of action asserts that his right to equal protection was violated in that his confinement was more severe than that of other inmates. (Docket #18).
Plaintiff concedes that this sixth cause of action is "repetitive" of a claim he made in his Article 78 petition and would be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Therefore, plaintiff withdraws this sixth cause of action. See Plaintiff's Response, Point III (Docket #52).
It seems apparent that plaintiff's federal court claims are "not different in any significant way" from the claims he asserted in his prior state court proceeding. See Giakoumelos, 88 F.3d at 59 (collateral estoppel applicable where plaintiff's claims were "not different in any significant way" from claims made in prior Article 78 Proceeding); Caserta v. Selsky, 2002 WL 1359727, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2002) (court compared plaintiff's Article 78 petition and prior state court decisions to federal complaint and pending motion and held that the issues had already been decided); Yusov v. Martinez, 2000 WL 1593387, *3 (S.D.N.Y. October 24, 2000) (constitutional issues raised in § 1983 action were "obviously identical" to those decided in earlier state court action).
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish his Article 78 proceeding from his federal court action by arguing that the former concerned the constitutionality of his initial placement into administrative segregation and the latter concerns the constitutionality of the procedures used to retain him in administrative segregation is unpersuasive. First of all, the Article 78 Petition was not filed until plaintiff had spent over two years in administrative segregation. By that time the propriety of his continued confinement in administrative segregation had been reviewed and approved numerous times. It simply defies common sense to argue that the Article 78 Petition was filed by plaintiff only to challenge the initial decision to place him in administrative segregation and not the constitutionality of the review hearings that had kept him in administrative segregation for over two years. Moreover, plaintiff's argument is belied by (1) his own description of the claims being asserted in the Article 78 proceedings and (2) the specific language contained in the Appellate Division's decision. Paragraph "1" of plaintiff's Article 78 Petition is denominated "Nature of the Action" and recites that plaintiff was commencing the action "to challenge the legality and constitutionality of Petitioner's continued status as an Administrative Segregation inmate." (Emphasis added). Similarly, the Appellate Division's decision affirming denial of the Petition explicitly ruled that "the administrative segregation was imposed and continues with the proper exercise of procedural due process." Matter of Rifkin, 273 A.D.2d at 880 (emphasis added). It is clear that plaintiff's constitutional claims regarding his continued confinement in administrative segregation were actually and necessarily decided in the state court action.
Having determined that defendants have met their burden of proving that the issues raised in plaintiff's federal court complaint were decided on the merits in the prior state court proceeding, the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that he was denied the opportunity to fully litigate these issues in the prior action. Plaintiff is unable to satisfy his burden. The constitutional issues raised in the Article 78 were fully litigated and were decided on the merits as opposed to being denied on procedural grounds. Plaintiff was vigorously represented by competent counsel at both the trial level and before the Fourth Department. There simply is no evidence in this record to suggest, let alone find, that plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest the constitutionality of his assignment to and retention in administrative segregation in the Article 78 proceeding in state court. Accordingly, "having chosen to fully litigate those issues in the Article 78 proceeding, plaintiff is estopped from re-litigating those claims here." Yusov, 2000 WL 1593387 at *4. See Giakoumelos, 88 F.3d at 61 (collateral estoppel in a subsequent § 1983 action is "one of the risks attendant" to plaintiff's decision to first bring an Article 78 action).
2. Plaintiff's Motions: Given that the Court has granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel, plaintiff's motions to compel further discovery and obtain transcripts from another case are denied. None of the items plaintiff seeks to obtain through discovery would have any bearing on the question of whether the issues in this action were already decided in the state court proceeding. Therefore, the discovery issues raised by plaintiff are moot in light of the fact that the entire action is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Conclusion
The issue presented is not whether this Court would have ruled as the state court did on the merits of plaintiff's constitutional claims. Rather, the issue is whether plaintiff chose to pursue those same claims in state court and was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate them on the merits in the state court. I find that he was given that opportunity and, therefore, the state court judgment must be given preclusive effect. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket #43) is hereby granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) (Docket #50) and his request for transcripts (Docket #53) are denied.
SO ORDERED.