Opinion
No. 3-416 / 02-1711
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forBlack Hawk County, Jon Fister, Judge.
Defendant appeals following a jury verdict finding it at fault for plaintiff's injuries and awarding $162,700 in damages to the plaintiff. REMITTITUR ORDERAFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Jennifer Rinden and Nancy Penner of Shuttleworth Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Karla Shea and Gene Yagla of Yagla, McCoy Riley, P.L.C., Waterloo, and Ed Bowden of Orbock Bowden Ruark Dillard, Winston Salem, North Carolina, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Robert Ridge sued Omega Cabinets, Ltd., for injuries sustained in an accident at Omega's facility. A jury returned a verdict for Ridge. On Omega's motion, the court ordered a new trial unless Ridge accepted a remittitur of the damages. Omega appealed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Robert Ridge and his wife Nancy are the officers of a subchapter "S" corporation, RidgeTec, Inc. ("RidgeTec"). In May of 1999, RidgeTec was hired to install equipment and various platforms at an Omega Cabinets ("Omega") facility in Waterloo. Ridge was injured when he was struck by a portion of a maintenance platform that Omega employees were disassembling. In the accident Ridge sustained an injury to his right arm, ribs, groin, and a finger. After returning to his home state of North Carolina, Ridge continued to experience weakness and numbness in his hand, and he was diagnosed with an entrapped nerve in the elbow of his right arm, for which Dr. Warburton recommended surgery.
Based on his injuries, Ridge and RidgeTec filed a lawsuit against Omega Cabinets, alleging negligence which resulted in personal injuries and lost wages. RidgeTec later dismissed its claim. The matter proceeded to a jury trial after which the jury entered a verdict in favor of Ridge for total damages of $162,700. That award included $16,700 for past medical expenses, $7,000 for future medical expenses, $100,000 for past loss of wages, $12,000 for past loss of function of the body, $12,000 for future loss of function of the body, $12,000 for past pain and suffering, and $3,000 for future pain and suffering. Omega made a motion for new trial, or in the alternative a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the lost wages claim and remittitur on past and future medical expenses. The court conditionally granted Omega's motion for new trial unless Ridge agreed to a reduction in the judgment to $133,375. In reaching this figure the court found that the evidence only supported $4,375 in past medical expenses, $5,000 in medical expenses, and $85,000 in past lost wages. Ridge agreed to the reduced judgment of $133,375.
Omega filed a timely notice of appeal. It contends the court erred in denying its motion for new trial and its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Alternatively, it requests that damages be reduced to an amount supported by the evidence.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our scope of review is for corrections of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. We review a ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996). We may find an abuse of discretion if the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and fails to effectuate substantial justice. See Bredberg v. PepsiCo, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa 1996). In reviewing claims of excessive damages, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Iowa 1994). A court must not "disturb a jury verdict for damages unless it is flagrantly excessive or inadequate, so out of reason so as to shock the conscience, the result of passion or prejudice, or lacking in evidentiary support." Id.
Because Omega has appealed following a remittitur, the original judgment is reinstated. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.1010(3); Larsen v. United Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Iowa 1981) (based on former rule 250). Thus we review the denials of the motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in light of the sufficiency of evidence to support the original verdict of $162,700.
III. Motion for New Trial. Omega's overarching claim is that because the jury awarded damages in two areas, past and future medical expenses, that Ridge concedes were not supported by the evidence, and a third area, past lost wages, which Omega claims is purely speculative, the entire damage award is suspect and the likely product of passion or prejudice. We begin by reviewing those separate awards.
A. Past and Future Medical Expenses. Regarding past medical expenses, the record only establishes Ridge sustained $4,426 in expenses as opposed to the $16,700 set by the jury. Likewise, the record shows that Ridge would incur $5,000 in future medical costs for an ulnar nerve decompression surgery, thereby rendering the jury's award of $7,000 as clearly excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Even Ridge concedes remittitur was appropriate and should be ordered on these awards. We conclude the amount of damages for past and future medical expenses established by the court's posttrial remittitur order, as corrected later in this opinion, was appropriate. See Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Iowa 1999).
B. Past Lost Wages. The parties, however, differ as to the jury's award of $100,000 in past loss of wages, and the court's subsequent remittitur to $85,000. Omega's primary complaint is the award for lost wages is too speculative for submission to the jury. See Renze Hybrids, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 418 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1988) (noting that overly speculative damages cannot be recovered). In the alternative, Omega contends the evidence does not support more than $57,000 in lost wages.
Ridge testified he had bid for and received a job at Mills Pride, Pennsylvania, during the time he was recuperating from the injuries sustained in Iowa. However, he was unable to take the job because his workers' compensation insurance had required him to be at a doctor's appointment at a time which conflicted with the Pennsylvania job. Nancy Ridge served as the bookkeeper for RidgeTec. She calculated, based on her years of bidding and working on projects, that Robert suffered an $85,000 loss in profit on the Mills Pride job. She reached that figure by comparing the Pennsylvania job to a similar job RidgeTec had done in the past, the "Aristokraft job," basing it specifically on the number of workers, their wages, RidgeTec's rate of charging, and the similar layout and machinery at the two jobs. There was a dispute as to whether this anticipated profit would have been solely Robert's loss or whether it would have been diminished by the portion attributable to Nancy's salary. Exhibit 38, which Nancy offered to establish predicted profits from the Mills Pride job, purports to account for both "Office salary" and "R's salary" as "Overhead" before arriving at the net unrealized profit to RidgeTec of $85,272.99. This is supported by Nancy's testimony that "$85,000 would have been the profit that would have gone on Robert's tax return and then plus he had a salary." Nancy also testified that Robert suffered a separate loss of a $1600 weekly salary from the company and Robert testified he lost income from what he described as very lucrative "field work."
While the evidence was not clear on Ridge's loss of income, we conclude the trial court's order remitting the award for past loss of wages to $85,000 is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence as a whole regarding lost income was far from mathematically certain but it was not "overly speculative" such that recovery should be denied. See Conrad v. Dorweiler, 189 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1971) (mathematical precision in damages not required). Ridge established his claim for past loss of wages of $85,000 within a reasonable degree of certainty. See Oak Leaf Country Club, Inc. v. Wilson, 257 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Iowa 1977). For this reason, we also affirm the district court's denial of Omega's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this claim.
C. Entirety of the Award. Omega asserts that because, in its estimation, at least three items of damage are unsupported by the evidence, the entirety of the award is tainted and a new trial must be ordered on the entire verdict, including liability. It argues the jury must have totally disregarded the jury instructions, such that its decision was a result of passion or prejudice.
As we have determined, three particular items of damages were unsupported by substantial evidence. The jury's award for future medical costs was only $2000 in excess of what the evidence supported, while its award for past medical expenses was approximately $12,000 over the amount reasonably supported by the evidence, and its award for past loss of wages was excessive by $15,000. Considering the size of the total award, these figures do not shock the conscience so much as to invalidate the total damage award nor cast doubt on liability. See Class v. Whylie, 526 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Iowa 1994) (noting a judgment may be set aside when it is the result of passion, prejudice, or ulterior motive). Substantial justice was effectuated by the district court's remittitur order.
Conclusion. It is within this court's power to affirm the trial court's order of remittitur on appeal. See Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (citing Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 1314, 147 N.W.2d 824, 837 (1967) (reducing a $75,000 award to a seventeen-year old boy's estate to $50,000)). Accordingly, the plaintiff shall accept the judgment as remitted by the district court's order within twenty days of the issuance of the procedendo or the case shall be set for a new trial. See Miller v. Young, 168 N.W.2d 45, 53 (Iowa 1969) (noting an appellate court has the inherent right to order a remittitur and modify the award).
The trial court's order calculated past medical bills totaling $4,375. However, on appeal the parties agree this was a miscalculation, and note the true measure of past medical bills is $4,426. We adopt this amount, and accordingly modify the trial court's post-trial ruling in this regard.