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Richerson v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jul 23, 2003
No. 05-02-00261-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 23, 2003)

Opinion

No. 05-02-00261-CR

Opinion Filed July 23, 2003 Do Not Publish

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-59130-MI. AFFIRM

Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and FITZGERALD.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


In a single point of error, William Earl Richerson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from a car in which Richerson was a passenger. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The court of criminal appeals articulated the standard we use in reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the suppression of evidence in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Under Guzman, we give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts, especially the court's findings based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of witnesses, and we review de novo its application of law concerning searches. Id.; Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The trial court found the following facts. Dallas police officers Bruce Chamberlain and Oscar Araiza went to a hotel in response to a call from their dispatcher stating that two black males in a blue or grey four-door Chevy or Buick appeared to be selling drugs behind the building at that location. When the officers arrived at the hotel they saw two black males walk up to, and get in, a blue car parked at the rear of the parking lot. The parking lot was fairly well lit. As the officers' vehicle approached the blue car, Chamberlain saw Richerson put something under the front seat of the car; Richerson was still trying to put something under the front seat as Chamberlain got out of the patrol car and approached the blue car on foot. Chamberlain ordered Richerson to put his hands up and, after some delay, Richerson did so. Chamberlain asked Richerson to step out of the blue car, and Richerson complied. At that point, Chamberlain saw a gun sticking out from under the passenger seat. Chamberlain directed Araiza — who was on the driver's side of the vehicle — to handcuff the driver. Then Richerson said, "He had nothing to do with it. That's my gun." Chamberlain seized the gun. Finally, the trial court made a specific finding that both officers and their testimony were "reliable and credible." Our review of the record confirms that each of the trial court's findings is supported by the evidence. A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The State must demonstrate the reasonableness of the stop. Aviles v. State, 23 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). The trial court evaluates the reasonableness of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances. Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. In this case, Chamberlain and his partner located a car matching the description of the one identified by the dispatcher, in the precise location identified by the dispatcher. The occupants of the car also matched the description from the dispatcher. Chamberlain saw Richerson make a furtive gesture, and Richerson responded slowly to Chamberlain's directive to raise his hands. Given the totality of the circumstances, these facts sufficed to give Chamberlain reasonable suspicion that Richerson was or had been engaged in criminal activity. See id.; see Crooks v. State, 821 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (investigative detention justified when officer testified he approached appellant's vehicle in high-crime area and observed appellant ducking down in seat and acting "nervous and jittery"); see Kelley v. State, 807 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd) ("Furtive gestures can be a valid indicia of mens rea when coupled with reliable information or other suspicious circumstances."); see also Zone v. State, 84 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. granted) (officer had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant based on informant's accurate tip and and appellant's conduct at scene, including attempted evasion). We conclude the officers' detention of Richerson was reasonable. Once Richerson was detained, the gun sticking out from the passenger's seat was in plain view. Because Chamberlain had properly detained Richerson and it was apparent the gun constituted evidence, Chamberlain was authorized to seize the gun without a warrant. See Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We conclude the seizure of the gun was lawful. The State presented evidence that the officers had specific, articulable facts reasonably warranting the detention of Richerson and the resultant seizure of the gun. We overrule Richerson's point of error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.


Summaries of

Richerson v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jul 23, 2003
No. 05-02-00261-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 23, 2003)
Case details for

Richerson v. State

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM EARL RICHERSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jul 23, 2003

Citations

No. 05-02-00261-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 23, 2003)