Opinion
Civil Action No. 97-2778 (NHP).
January 27, 1999
Mr. Arthur Richardson, #207880, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Arthur S. Safir, Deputy Attorney General, Division of Criminal Justice, Appellate Section, Trenton, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Arthur Richardson's motion to dismiss the Answer submitted by respondents William E. Morton and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey in connection with a pending habeas corpus petition. For the purpose of judicial efficiency, this Court will also address Arthur Richardson's outstanding petition for habeas corpus relief. This matter was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated herein, petitioner's motion to dismiss respondents' Answer is DENIED. Furthermore, petitioner's petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Arthur Richardson's (hereafter "petitioner") petition forhabeas corpus arises from a conviction in a New Jersey state court. After his direct appeal in the state courts, petitioner commenced post-conviction relief. Petitioner's post-conviction proceedings were concluded on May 23, 1996, upon the denial of his petition for certification by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See (Ra8).Petitioner contends that he handed the petition for habeas corpus to a corrections officer at the New Jersey State Prison for processing and mailing on May 23, 1997, exactly one-year from the denial of his petition for certification by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Memoranda in Response to Correspondence Dated November 18, 1998, page 1.
Petitioner's New Jersey State Prison Inmate Account, however, reflects that the postage for the habeas corpus petition was posted to petitioner's inmate account on May 27, 1997. See New Jersey State Prison Inmate Account Statement, Entry dated May 27, 1997. Petitioner's habeas petition was received by the Clerk of the District Court on May 30, 1997.
On August 26, 1997, respondents William E. Morton and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey (hereafter "respondents") filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. On September 19, 1997, this Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss on the ground that it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitation authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
On January 9, 1998, the Third Circuit decided the case of Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998). In light of that decision, this Court forwarded a letter to the Third Circuit on January 26, 1998 requesting that the Third Circuit summarily remand the matter to this Court so that a decision, comporting with the Third Circuit's pronouncement in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998), could be issued. Subsequently, the Third Circuit entered an Order granting this Court's request.
On November 19, 1998, this Court, having once again gained jurisdiction over this matter, requested that both petitioner and respondents submit memoranda of law only on the applicability of the Third Circuit's decision in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998) to the facts presented in the present matter. Petitioner's memorandum of law was to be filed by December 18, 1998. Respondent's memorandum of law was to be filed by January 18, 1999.
Although the November 18, 1998 Order correctly states the citation to the relevant case, the title of the relevant case was mistakenly referred to as Burns v. Barbo . However, both parties complied with this Court's request and did, in fact, address the correct case.
On December 10, 1998, petitioner complied with this Court's request and timely filed the requested memoranda of law. Also on December 10, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss respondents' "Answer." On December 15, 1998, respondents filed an opposition brief to petitioner's motion to dismiss respondents' Answer. On January 13, 1999, respondents timely filed a memoranda of law in response to this Court's request.
DISCUSSION
I. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Answer
As aforementioned, this Court requested that both petitioner and respondents file memoranda of law on the applicability of the Third Circuit's decision in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998) to the facts presented in the present matter. Petitioner's memorandum of law was to be filed by December 18, 1998. Respondent's memorandum of law was to be filed by January 18, 1999. A careful review of the relevant dates indicates that both petitioner and respondents complied with this Court's request by submitting their respective memoranda before the designated date.
However, on December 10, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss respondents' "Answer." Petitioner's memorandum of law was carefully reviewed but his arguments were quite unclear. Therefore, liberally construing petitioner's memorandum, the Court will address a few variations of what it believes to be petitioner's arguments on this issue. First, it appears that petitioner may erroneously be referring to the memorandum of law requested by the Court as an "Answer." If petitioner is, in fact, referring to the "untimeliness" of the requested memorandum of law, said motion was clearly premature at the time that petitioner filed his motion to dismiss since respondents' had until January 18, 1999 to submit the memorandum.
Alternatively, if petitioner is arguing that respondents' should have filed an Answer in lieu of filing the requested memorandum, the Order is clear that the Court only requested memorandum of law on the limited issue set forth in the Third Circuit's decision in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998) and was not requiring respondents to submit an additional Answer.
Finally, if petitioner is arguing that respondents never should have filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an Answer, this Court finds that respondents' submission was entirely appropriate, especially in light of the fact that respondents forwarded all relevant legal documents to the Court and properly set forth their legal arguments in opposition to the petition in the motion instead of an Answer.
Therefore, based upon the fact that respondents' filed their memoranda within the appropriate time period and according to this Court's mandate, petitioner's motion to dismiss respondents' "Answer" is DENIED.
II. Habeas Corpus Petition
The threshold issue before this Court in connection with petitioner'shabeas corpus petition is whether petitioner failed to comply with the one-year filing limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 2254 in light ofBurns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") contains substantive reforms to habeas corpus practice in both capital and non-capital cases. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 655-56, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2336 (1996). The AEDPA was signed into law on April 24, 1996.
Among other things, the AEDPA shortened the time for filing a federal habeas petition to one year:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The one-year period of limitations set forth in this section is indeed a statute of limitations, which are "expressions of important legislative policies and should not be judicially abrogated without due consideration of those policies." F.D.I.C. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1205 (1994); see also Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998). The AEDPA "incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus. . . . It sets a one year limitation on an application for a habeas writ." H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-518, at 111, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944.
Recently, the Third Circuit has opined that pro se petitions filed on or before April 23, 1997 may not be dismissed for failure to comply with the one-year limitations period set forth in § 2244(d)(1). Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1998). Petitions filed after April 23, 1997, however, must comply with the one-year limitations period. See Turner v. Keller, 994 F. Supp. 631, 633 (W.D.Pa. 1998).
Notably, the AEDPA's one-year period of limitation is subject to equitable tolling. See Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998). It will be tolled, however, only if extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner make it impossible to file his or her petition within the limitations period. Id.; Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 60 (1997).
In this matter, petitioner contends that he filed the subject habeas corpus petition on May 23, 1997. If this is true, the petition would be deemed timely and within the one-year limitations period. Respondents assert that, notwithstanding the Burns decision, petitioner's habeas petition is barred because petitioner's Inmate Statement Account reveals that the postage regarding the petition was posted to the inmate's account on May 27, 1997, which is outside the one-year limitations period.
This Court is not persuaded by petitioner's mere self-serving statement that he delivered the petition to a corrections officer on May 23, 1997. Unlike the factual scenario in Burns, where the petitioner produced a copy of a receipt from the prison officials that he delivered the petition for mailing on the earlier date, petitioner here has failed to substantiate his blanket statement that he delivered the petition on May 23, 1997. Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 110 n. 1. The Third Circuit's decision does not appear to articulate a ruling which would allow pro se litigants to allege, without further evidentiary proof, that a petition was, in fact, delivered. Moreover, it is noteworthy that petitioner coincidentally pinpoints the exact date which would place him within the one-year limitations period as the date of delivery. Finally, respondents have supplied the Court with the only real evidence that the petition was mailed beyond the one-year limitations period. See (Ra10). This Court finds such evidence persuasive.
Therefore, since petitioner has failed to file the habeas petition in a timely fashion and there is nothing in the record to suggest that equitable tolling is applicable in this matter, petitioner's petition forhabeas corpus relief is out of time and must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, petitioner Arthur Richardson's motion to dismiss the Answer submitted by respondents William E. Morton and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey in connection with a pendinghabeas corpus petition is DENIED. Furthermore, Arthur Richardson's petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.
As petitioner has not made a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right, and for the reasons stated more fully in the accompanying Letter Opinion, a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
NICHOLAS H. POLITAN, U.S.D.J.