Opinion
67299.
DECIDED MARCH 8, 1984.
Libel. Mitchell Superior Court. Before Judge Culpepper, Senior Judge.
G. Michael Agnew, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In this libel action, appellant-plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant.
Appellee was granted summary judgment on the basis that his alleged libel was a conditionally privileged communication. "`To make the defense of privilege complete, in an action of slander or libel, good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons must all appear. The absence of any one or more of these constituent elements will, as a general rule, prevent the party from relying on the privilege.'" Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 649 ( 92 S.E.2d 581) (1956). We have reviewed the evidence of record and, after construing it most strongly in favor of appellant, we find that appellee met the burden of proving that his communication was conditionally privileged. See generally Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga. App. 104 ( 279 S.E.2d 259) (1981). Compare Melton v. Bow, 145 Ga. App. 272 ( 243 S.E.2d 590) (1978), aff'd 241 Ga. 629 ( 247 S.E.2d 100) (1978). Appellee's evidence also demonstrated that the communication had not been "used merely as a cloak for venting private malice . . ." OCGA § 51-5-9. See generally Morton v. Gardner, 155 Ga. App. 600, 604 (4) ( 271 S.E.2d 733) (1980). Appellant's evidence failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact remained for jury resolution. The trial court did not err in granting appellee summary judgment. See generally McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga. App. 59 ( 220 S.E.2d 63) (1975).
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.