Opinion
CR13272145T
01-08-2018
Jermaine RICHARDS v. STATE of Connecticut
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: January 24, 2018
OPINION
RICHARDS, J.
Before the court is a motion for new trial filed by the defendant, Jermaine Richards, on the ground that he was denied a fair trial based on juror misconduct. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion on December 18, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the court held a hearing and oral arguments on the motion and took the matter under advisement. For the reasons detailed below, the defendant’s motion for new trial is denied.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following factual and procedural history is relevant to the defendant’s motion. On May 18, 2013, the defendant was arrested for the April 20, 2013, murder of his girlfriend Alyssiah Wiley. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and elected to be tried by a jury. The first two trials in 2015 and 2016 ended in hung juries. Tamara Warren, the mother of the defendant’s first cousin’s children, testified as a defense witness in the first two trials. In July 2017, the court commenced jury selection for a third trial, and R.B. was called as a venireman. R.B. did not serve as a juror in the first two trials. During voir dire, the state asked R.B. whether he knew the defendant or any potential witness in this case. R.B. answered in the negative.
R.B. is referred to by his initials to protect his privacy. See State v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 229 n.25, 726 A.2d 531, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 969, 120 S.Ct. 409, 145 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999).
The defendant was present at all times during voir dire, and Warren’s name was included in the witness list as a potential state witness. R.B. further testified that he previously served on a criminal jury, there was nothing about the nature of the case that would impair his ability to be fair and impartial, he could follow the judge’s instructions, and he had a positive experience as a prior juror. At the conclusion of voir dire, R.B. was accepted as a juror.
In September 2017, the court commenced a five-day jury trial. The state subpoenaed Warren for this trial, but she was never called as a witness. On September 15, 2017, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54(a). Following the jury trial, the defendant filed this motion for new trial on October 19, 2017. The substance of the defendant’s position is that he was denied a fair trial due to R.B.’s acquaintance with him and Warren. According to defense counsel, Warren also claimed that R.B. made social media posts about this case. In response, the state asserts that the defendant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of juror misconduct to warrant a new trial, and that Warren and R.B.’s attenuated relationship is insufficient to show prejudice. Both Warren and R.B. testified at the hearing.
DISCUSSION
It is well established that a criminal accused is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. See State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 522, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995). " Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution ... In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors ... The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 522-23.
In Connecticut, " where ... the trial court was in no way responsible for the juror misconduct ... a defendant who offers proof of juror misconduct bears the burden of proving that actual prejudice resulted from that misconduct." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 628, 682 A.2d 972 (1996). To succeed on a claim of juror misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate that: " (1) misconduct occurred; and (2) misconduct resulted in actual prejudice." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Berrios, 320 Conn. 265, 277-78, 129 A.3d 696 (2016). The determination of juror impartiality turns on " whether or not the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial ... The defendant has been prejudiced if the misbehavior is such to make it probable that the juror’s mind was influenced by it so as to render him or her an unfair and prejudicial juror." (Citation omitted.) State v. Newsome, supra, 238 Conn. 628. In assessing juror impartiality, the court is mindful of the fact that " [n]ot every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial." State v. Sims, 12 Conn.App. 239, 245, 530 A.2d 1069, cert. denied, 206 Conn. 801, 535 A.2d 1315 (1987).
A pair of cases are instructive on the issue of whether juror acquaintance with a witness is considered a form of jury misconduct, sufficient enough to grant a motion for new trial. In State v. Sims, supra, 12 Conn.App. 239, the defendant appealed a trial court’s decision to deny his motion for mistrial, which argued that a juror was acquainted with the state’s principal witness. Id., 244. During a hearing, the juror testified that he did not initially recognize the witness’ name, they were not friends, and that he did not personally know the witness, but met him at his sister’s home on several occasions. Id., n.1. The Appellate Court held that the fact that a juror was acquainted with a state’s principal witness was not reversible error. Id., 246. In its view, the trial court appropriately determined that the juror was capable of being fair and impartial, and exercised its discretion in assessing the credibility of the juror’s statements. Id.
Likewise, in State v. Benedict, 323 Conn. 654, 148 A.3d 1044 (2016), the defendant appealed the Appellate Court’s judgment, which concluded that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s principal challenge. Id., 656. The defendant challenged a juror’s selection on the ground that he had a direct relationship with the state police who investigated his case, and several of whose officers were on the witness list. Id., 656-57. The juror, however, was a police officer for the town of Southbury. Id., 657. The only connection between the juror and the state police was through his supervisor, who was a state police sergeant and worked under the agency. Id. The juror testified that he did not personally know any of the officers on the witness list, and that he had no direct relationship with the state police or any officers involved in the investigation. Id., 658.
The Benedict court held that the defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing a close relationship between the juror and a party or witness that would warrant juror disqualification. Id., 667. More importantly, the Supreme Court emphasized that " a potential juror’s employment relationship as a police officer, standing alone, is not a ground to remove that juror under a principal challenge. [H]owever, if a defendant establishes that under the circumstances of a particular case, the specific relationship between the challenged juror and the investigating authority is ... so close ... that it is likely to produce, consciously or unconsciously, bias on the part of the juror, then the court should grant the defendant’s motion to remove that juror ..." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 666.
The above cases demonstrate that a mere or attenuated relationship between a juror and a potential party or witness is not enough to find juror misconduct. To successfully show that a juror’s acquaintance resulted in actual prejudice, the defendant must establish that a close relationship between the juror and the potential party or witness, is likely to produce, consciously or unconsciously, bias on the part of the juror. Contrast State v. Berrios, supra, 320 Conn. 275 (" a juror is sufficiently impartial ... if he or she can set aside that opinion and render a verdict based on evidence in the case ... It is enough if a juror is able to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the case on the evidence presented and the instructions given by the court" ).
In this case, the defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing juror misconduct. During direct and cross examination, Warren testified that she had no recollection of when she informed defense counsel about whether R.B. made social media posts about this case. She also testified that she is not friends on Facebook with R.B., and through a mutual friend, she found that R.B. did not submit any posts. In fact, defense counsel conceded to this argument because his private investigator’s investigation also yielded no result.
Furthermore, the defendant was present at all times during jury selection and the third trial in which R.B. served as a juror; yet he never raised an issue. Moreover, he failed to address the issue or even inquire Warren as to whether R.B. knew him at the hearing. R.B. later testified that he did not personally know the defendant, and that he never met him. The record unequivocally shows no acquaintance between the defendant and R.B. As such, the remaining issue before the court is whether R.B.’s possible acquaintance with Warren is enough to grant a motion for new trial.
On this issue, the court also finds that the defendant has failed to meet its burden. The following record reveals that either Warren did not personally know R.B. or, they had an attenuated relationship. Warren testified that a week before the defendant’s conviction, she sat outside the courtroom and recognized R.B as one of the jurors. She did not, however, immediately notify the court, defense counsel or the state until after the jury rendered a verdict. She further testified that R.B. was an in-law because R.B. is her sister’s boyfriend’s sister’s husband. She testified that they met at family functions and spoke with him, but they never discussed this case. She also testified that she could not recall their last encounter, whether it was weeks, months, or a year or two ago, and that she never had any interaction with R.B. during the trial. Following her testimony, R.B. testified that he did not personally know Warren.
Even if the court is satisfied with Warren’s testimony, the defendant has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to show that a close relationship between Warren and R.B. prejudiced his case. There is no blood relation between Warren and R.B., and like Sims, supra, the contacts between them are minimal. Not to mention, unlike Sims where the defendant argued that the juror was acquainted with the state’s " principal witness," Warren is a non-witness because she never testified in the third trial during which R.B. served as a juror. In sum, the court is satisfied with R.B.’s testimony that he considered all the evidence presented by the state, all the arguments presented by both parties, followed the law and instructions given by the court, and rendered a fair and impartial verdict.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for new trial is denied.