Opinion
Civil No. 1:20-CV-1473
12-22-2020
DANA L. RICE-SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MISERICORDIA CONVALESCENT HOME, Defendant.
(Judge Conner)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This workplace discrimination lawsuit comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss one count of the plaintiff's amended complaint, which alleges race-based discrimination. (Doc. 12). With respect to this motion, the well-pleaded facts in Rice-Smith's amended complaint, which guide our consideration, identify Ms. Rice-Smith as an African-American female, (Doc. 9, ¶ 6), who was employed by Misericordia Convalescent Home. The amended complaint then sets forth the following factual narrative in support of Rice-Smith's legal claims:
15.Misericordia provides nursing home services and care to older adults who require skilled nursing care.
16.In or about August of 2016, Ms. Rice was hired by Misericordia for the position of Registered Nurse Supervisor in its York, Pennsylvania, facility.
17.On or about October 7, 2016, Ms. Rice was injured at work and filed a Workers' Compensation claim.(Id., ¶¶ 15-26).
18.On or about October 7, 2016, Ms. Rice was treated by a physician who required Ms. Rice to wear a knee brace and take medication for her injury. It became necessary for Ms. Rice to become dependent on the use of a cane.
19.On or about November 23, 2016, Ms. Rice began to feel ill and requested time off from work.
20.On or about November 26, 2016, Ms. Rice returned to work, but due to the fact that she was feeling ill, a charge nurse at the facility suggested that she return home.
21.On or about December 1, 2016, Ms. Rice was advised by her supervisor, Michael Urban, that she could return to work on December 5, 2016.
22.During her absence, Misericordia hired a secretary as well as several Nurse Assistants.
23.Upon her return to work on December 6, 2016, Ms. Rice found myriad scheduling issues with the nursing staff.
24.On December 9, 2016, Misericordia wrongfully discharged Ms. Rice.
25.Misericordia's stated reason for the discharge was Ms. Rice's allegedly sitting in a secretary's chair, being dismissive of an LPN, made a personal phone call while on duty and was told by Defendant that Director of nursing Urban that she "had just come off a lengthy illness and he was concerned about [her] health."
26.Misericordia's stated basis for the discharge was clearly a pretext.
While this factual narrative plausibly alleged facts that suggest that Rice-Smith's termination was related to her medical conditions in a way that may implicate federal disability discrimination laws, notably missing from this factual narrative were any well-pleaded facts describing acts of race-based workplace discrimination. Despite this spare manner of pleading, Count I of the amended complaint alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA"). (Id., ¶¶ 32-36). However, these race discrimination claims in Count I are set forth in a wholly conclusory fashion with Rice-Smith broadly alleging race discrimination without any further supporting factual averments. (Id.) Thus, in its current form, this count of Rice-Smith's amended complaint consists of little more that the talismanic recital of the elements of a race-based workplace discrimination claim.
Citing this paucity of pleading, Misericordia has moved to dismiss Count I of this complaint, the race-based discrimination allegation. (Doc. 12). This motion is fully briefed by the parties, (Docs. 13, 14, and 16), and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted, but that Rice-Smith be afforded one final opportunity to further amend her complaint state a claim of workplace race discrimination upon which relief may be granted.
The amended complaint also alleges disability discrimination (Count II), and retaliation claims. (Count III). (Doc. 9). Misericordia does not challenge the legal sufficiency of these counts of Rice-Smith's amended complaint.
While this motion is fully briefed, we note that the plaintiff's response to this motion may miss the point of the defense motion. Misericordia has moved to dismiss this count of Rice-Smith's complaint due to the lack of any well-pleaded facts in the complaint supporting her claim of race-based discrimination. As we construe it, Rice-Smith's response to this motion argues issues of administrative exhaustion, matters that are not the subject of the instant motion to dismiss.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, —U.S.—, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id., at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.' "Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment"). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. This Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted.
The legal sufficiency of Rice-Smith's race-based workplace discrimination claims are judged against familiar benchmarks. In order to state a Title VII claim based upon race:
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by proving that: (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she suffered some form of adverse employment action; and (3) this action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when a similarly situated person not of the protected class is treated differently. Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir.1999). The elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the facts and context of the particular situation. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir.1999).Knight v. Delaware Econ. Dev. Office, 83 F. Supp. 3d 606, 613 (D. Del. 2015).
The analysis of the plaintiff's Title VII claim is identical to the plaintiff's claim brought under the PHRA. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) ("The proper analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably").
Yet, while facts and context place a pivotal role in defining a Title VII claim, one recurring theme is clear. Such a claim must be supported by well-pleaded facts. On this score, mere conclusory statements do not suffice. Nor can a plaintiff sustain a Title VII race discrimination claim through a "complaint [that] consists of generalized grievances, lacking the requisite specificity to 'allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' " Holmes v. Gates, 403 F. App'x 670, 673 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, when a complaint fails to set forth well-pleaded facts describing racial discrimination, a complaint grounded on general conclusory allegations of racial workplace bias fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. See e.g., Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, No. 5:19-CV-5275, 2020 WL 4013409, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2020); Dickerson v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech., No. 19-8344-KM-MAH, 2019 WL 6032378, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2019); McKinney v. Supreme Mid-Atl. Corp., No. 1:17-CV-2024, 2018 WL 6182058, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2018); Thomas v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:10-CV-1946, 2011 WL 2471532, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (dismissing complaint which alleges no facts which would permit the court to infer of discrimination); Abdallah v. Allegheny Valley Sch., No. CIV. A. 10-5054, 2011 WL 344079, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2011).
Judged by these legal guideposts, Rice-Smith's race discrimination claim fails as it is currently pleaded. Here, Rice-Smith's amended complaint sufficiently alleges that she was the member of a protected class and suffered some adverse employment action. Moreover, in its present form, this amended complaint contains a factual recital that permits an inference that Rice-Smith was subjected to workplace disability discrimination. However, the amended complaint states no well-pleaded facts relating to discrimination based upon race. (See Doc. 9, ¶¶ 15-26). This factual insufficiency is not saved by the sweeping but generalized language charging race discrimination set forth in Count I of the amended complaint. While Count I of the amended complaint is captioned "Race Discrimination," it contains little more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions," a form of pleading that "will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Recognizing that a "complaint [that] consists of generalized grievances, lacking the requisite specificity to 'allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged' " is subject to dismissal, Holmes, 403 F. App'x at 673, we find that this amended complaint simply does not allege sufficient well-pleaded facts at this juncture to state a claim of workplace racial discrimination.
Having determined that this amended complaint fails to state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, we acknowledge that in civil rights cases, plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). While Rice-Smith has already once amended her complaint to no avail, acting out of an abundance of caution, we recommend that she be afforded one final opportunity to state a claim of race discrimination that meets federal pleading standards. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the amended complaint by dismissing Count I of the amended complaint without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to comply with the rules governing civil actions in federal court by filing an amended complaint which states a claim of workplace race discrimination upon which relief may be granted.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be GRANTED and Count I of the plaintiff's amended complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 21 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 22d day of December 2020.
/s/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge