Opinion
No. 1D22-551
06-29-2022
Vanessa D. RHODY, Petitioner, v. Walter A. MCNEIL, in his official capacity as Leon County Sheriff, Respondent.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jahnee M. Todman, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jahnee M. Todman, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Nordby, J. This habeas petition tests the propriety of "pre-bond mental health screening" procedures set forth in a local administrative order. Petitioner Vanessa Rhody argues that she was unlawfully detained when the trial court "denied bond" at first appearance and ordered the screening. We find, under recent guidance from the Florida Supreme Court, that Rhody's detention was lawful.
I
To give some context, the Chief Judge of Florida's Second Judicial Circuit recently enacted Administrative Order 2021-06 regarding "Pre-bond Mental Health Screening Assessment." The Order provides for mental health screening assessments for detainees deemed to show signs of mental illness. Under the Order, "[t]he Pretrial Release Officer, Second Circuit criminal case manager, or Booking officer" has authority to request a screening before first appearance. Then at first appearance, counsel for the State or the detainee may request a screening. The judge can grant this request or order the screening on his or her own initiative. Finally, and most relevant to this petition, the judge "may order a brief continuance of the first appearance hearing to permit time to complete the mental health screening assessment."
Now the facts. Earlier this year, officers arrested Rhody for possession of another person's identification without consent and for giving a false identification to law enforcement officers. Rhody had her first appearance the next morning. At the hearing, the judge quickly recognized that Rhody potentially had some mental health issues. The court ordered the screening and that Rhody "be held pending the pre-bond screening" over counsel's objection. The hearing picked back up the next day, at which the court released Rhody on her recognizance. A few days later, the State dropped her charges.
Between the two hearings, Rhody filed this petition for habeas relief. She then moved to voluntarily dismiss the case as moot after the second hearing. This Court ordered briefing on the mootness issue, then ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
II
Before we reach the merits, a brief word on justiciability. Respondent argues this case is moot because Rhody's charges were dropped. Rhody counters that this case meets a mootness exception by being capable of repetition, yet evading review. Rhody is right.
Florida courts reserve the judicial power granted under Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution for cases involving actual controversies. Casiano v. State , 310 So. 3d 910, 913 (Fla. 2021). The mootness doctrine logically follows that end. Id. In line with the doctrine, courts will generally dismiss a case when the controversy ceases to exist, and a judicial determination will have no effect. Id. (citing and quoting Godwin v. State , 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992) ).
Of course, there are exceptions, and a narrow one exists for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Morris Publ'g Group, LLC v. State , 136 So. 3d 770, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 448 U.S. 555, 563, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) ). That exception applies when (1) the challenged action was too short-lived to be completely litigated in time, and (2) there is a reasonable chance that the same party will face the same action again. Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) ); see also Roe v. Dep't of Health , 312 So. 3d 175, 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (rejecting a case as moot because there was no reasonable expectation that the same party would face the same harm again). This case presents a textbook example of the mootness exception.
The first prong is easily met. Several "pre-bond screening" cases have popped up in the last few months, but the Court has never had the time to resolve one before voluntary dismissal. The Court has now seen nine other nearly identical petitions: 1D21-3242, 1D21-3369, 1D21-3479, 1D21-3713, 1D22-1073, 1D22-1074, 1D22-1075, 1D22-1184, 1D22-1689. None have reached the merits. The screening typically lasts no more than a day, so there is effectively no chance. In short, resolving one of these cases has proven to be an impossible game of Whac-A-Mole.
This case meets the second prong too. Respondent correctly points out that the same complaining party must face the same problem again. But Respondent reads this requirement way too narrowly. In its view, Rhody will not have another first appearance in this case , so there is no expectation that she will face the same harm again. There is no requirement that the harm must happen in the same case or else the exception would not exist. Rhody has been charged with nearly fifty crimes in over thirty separate cases in the last three years. And as Respondent highlights, courts have found Rhody incompetent to proceed in fourteen recent misdemeanor cases, as recently as a month before this petition. It is safe to say there is a reasonable expectation that Rhody will face the screening issue again.
Rhody has shown that this case meets both prongs of the mootness exception. "Pre-bond screening" is fast, much too fast for a case to ever beat it to the finish line. Rhody and others have repeatedly faced this issue with new emergency petitions steadily trickling in and quickly being voluntarily dismissed. Thus, we have jurisdiction.
III
We now turn to whether mental health screening without determining pretrial release conditions at first appearance constitutes an illegal detention. The Florida Supreme Court recently decided a similar issue. See Thourtman v. Junior , 47 Fla. L. Weekly S85 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2022) reh'g denied , SC19-1182, 2022 WL 1422878 (Fla. May 5, 2022). Guided by Thourtman ’s reasoning, we conclude the screening does not necessarily amount to an illegal detention.
A full recap of the court's decision in Thourtman helps show why it is instructive here. Thourtman was arrested for armed robbery, a crime punishable by life imprisonment. Id. at S85. At his first appearance, the trial court announced, "no bond" which "deferred" a decision on pretrial release until a full Arthur hearing if Thourtman requested one. Id. A few weeks later, he did. Id. Right before the hearing, he petitioned for habeas relief to challenge his pretrial confinement. Id. The Third District denied Thourtman's petition. Id. at S85–86. The court held that "upon a finding of probable cause" that a defendant committed a capital offense, a trial court has discretion to "defer ruling on bail and to detain the defendant for a reasonable time" until the court can hold a full bond hearing. Id. at S86. (quoting Thourtman v. Junior , 275 So. 3d 726, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ).
State v. Arthur , 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980).
The Arthur hearing went forward, and the trial court granted pretrial release. Id. Although this grant rendered the habeas petition moot, the Third District found that the case presented a question capable of repetition, yet evading review. Id. The Supreme Court took note but never analyzed the mootness issue. See id.
The Supreme Court agreed. Id. The court shot down Thourtman's argument that the right to pretrial release is lost if the court fails to set conditions of such release at first appearance. Id. "We find no basis in the constitutional text or elsewhere in the law to support Thourtman's view that detaining a defendant beyond first appearance and deferring a ruling on pretrial release ... is tantamount to a loss of the right to pretrial release." Id. To the contrary, the right to pretrial release remains until a court definitively rules on the issue. Id. Any other rule, the court found, would be impractical because the State could rarely muster the evidence in time for first appearance. Id. at S86–87. Repeating the Third District's conclusion, the court ultimately held that a trial court can defer ruling on bail and detain a defendant for a reasonable time without violating Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at S87. Translation: the trial court can punt the issue past first appearance without drawing a foul under the constitution.
Back to Rhody's petition. She argues that Thourtman does not control because that case dealt with a capital crime exception. True, but she never explains why this distinction makes a difference. The upshot of Thourtman is that a court can "delay" a pretrial release determination without technically "denying" it. We see no way around that holding because that is exactly what the trial court did in this case.
Parsing out the language in Thourtman reveals some limitations, however. A trial court, and the court alone, can decide whether to defer ruling on bail. Under the Administrative Order, a laundry list of officials each have the power to request a mental health screening. This wide-spread authority should not be confused with the power to delay a defendant's first appearance to seek the screening. And the trial court must actually exercise its discretion. That is, the judge must make a reasoned decision based on personal judgment and the case's circumstances. See Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) (quoting 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 804 (8th ed. 1914) (defining judicial discretion)). By doing so, the trial court will at least create a record for potential review.
We find that these conditions were met in Rhody's case. At the first appearance hearing, the trial court quickly recognized that Rhody may have some mental health issues based on her erratic behavior. Given that behavior, the court then made a well-reasoned decision to delay the proceedings while Rhody completed a mental health screening. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion, and Rhody has not shown her confinement to be unlawful.
We recognize that there is some daylight between our decision and the full extent of the Administrative Order. Any of the enumerated officials can request a screening and potentially complete it before a defendant's first appearance. Neither our decision nor Thourtman precludes that result.
Rhody mentions some of these problems in passing, and she claims that any "pre-bond screening" violates her due process rights by giving a compelled interview without counsel. Yet Rhody waived these issues by failing to fully brief them. Parties have a duty to "acquaint the Court with the material facts, the points of law involved, and the legal arguments supporting the positions of the respective parties." B.T. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 300 So. 3d 1273, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distributors, Inc. , 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) ). It is insufficient to "merely pos[e] a question with an accompanying assertion that it was improperly answered in the court below and then dump[ ] the matter into the lap of the appellate court for decision." Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955). Rhody pays lip service to some basic due process rules and gives only a conclusory statement to say that the screening process breaks those rules. She never even touches the right to counsel or why it was violated here. Because Rhody merely dropped these issues in our lap expecting us to do the rest, we will not address these issues at this time.
In sum, Thourtman all but bars relief for Rhody. The court there held that a defendant has no constitutional right to set pretrial release conditions at first appearance. As a result, a trial court has discretion "to defer ruling on bail and to detain the defendant for a reasonable time," say, long enough to complete mental health screening. See Thourtman , 47 Fla. L. Weekly at S87 (quoting Thourtman , 275 So. 3d at 739 ). Whether the screening itself is legal is not properly before us. Thus, Rhody's petition is denied.
DENIED.
Roberts and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.