Opinion
No. C7-03-80.
Filed June 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Hennepin County District Court, File No. 99006006.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge, Anderson, Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for a reduction in the conditional-release term following his prison sentence. Because we hold that appellant's motion to modify his conditional-release term was timely and that the district court abused its discretion by adding a five-year period of conditional release to his sentence, we reverse.
FACTS
On September 20, 1998, appellant Johnnie Lee Rhodes walked through a park with two males and a female. One male pushed the female to the ground and appellant engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with her. The court certified appellant as an adult to stand trial for one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subds. 1(f)(i), 2 (1998). On May 19, 1999, the court accepted appellant's plea of guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The plea agreement contemplated an executed 105-month sentence. On June 17, 1999, the court sentenced appellant to the 105 months negotiated by the parties and to a five-year period of conditional release. Neither appellant nor his attorney inquired into or objected to the five-year conditional release.
In a petition for postconviction relief filed August 14, 2002, appellant sought modification of his sentence to delete the conditional-release term or withdrawal of his plea. In an order and memorandum filed November 18, 2002, the court denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief because
[a]lthough the conditional-release term may have been absent in the plea petition itself, it was incorporated into Petitioner's sentence at the sentencing hearing as required by law.
The court also noted that the five-year conditional-release term was outlined in the presentence investigation report and was requested by the state at the sentencing hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that he is entitled to have his conditional-release period modified because he was not informed about the mandatory period of conditional release at the time that he entered his guilty plea. Appellant contends that although the conditional-release term was imposed at sentencing, it was not fully explained then, and appellant's lack of knowledge of it at the time he pleaded guilty entitles him to relief.
"The decisions of a postconviction court will not be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion." Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted). What the parties agreed to in a plea agreement involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). The interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements are issues of law, reviewed de novo. Id.
Once a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the defendant retains no absolute right to withdraw the plea. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). But
[i]t is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.
State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).
The court shall allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05, subd. 1. A finding of manifest injustice is proper when "a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). A plea is not considered intelligent if the defendant does not understand the charges against him, his legal rights, and the direct consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999). A conditional-release term is considered a direct consequence of pleading guilty. State v. Henthorne, 637 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Minn.App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2002). Where a sentence exceeds the upper limit established by a plea agreement because of the imposition of a mandatory conditional-release term, the sentencing court must allow the defendant to withdraw his plea or must modify the sentence so that the sentence does not exceed the agreed upon upper limit of the plea. State v. Wukawitz, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2003 WL 21231999, at *7 (Minn. May 29, 2003); State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Minn. 2000).
1. Timeliness
The state contends that because appellant waited three years to bring his motion, it is untimely and, therefore, the district court's denial of appellant's postconviction petition must be denied on that ground. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be made in a timely manner. See Smith v. State, 596 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Minn.App. 1999) (citing State v. Searles, 274 Minn. 199, 200, 142 N.W.2d 748, 749-50 (1966) (affirming denial of postconviction relief, noting three years had elapsed since conviction), review denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1999). Minnesota courts disallow untimely motions because the withdrawal of a plea after conviction would likely seriously prejudice the state's ability to reprosecute the charge due to changes in evidentiary circumstances. Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16-17, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700-01 (1968).
Here, the court sentenced appellant in June 1999 and appellant brought a postconviction motion three years later in August 2002. The court denied appellant's postconviction motion but not as untimely. Moreover, appellant does not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, but instead he asks only for a modification of his sentence. Because we find that the policy reasons for a timely withdrawal motion would not extend to a request for a modification of sentence because reprosecution is not at issue, we hold that appellant's motion was timely. See Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 45 (holding that state must have opportunity to demonstrate that a retrial would prejudice the state); see also Chapman, 282 Minn. at 16-17, 162 N.W.2d at 700-01 (holding that withdrawal of plea after conviction should not be allowed without "strongest of reasons" where effect would be to seriously prejudice state's ability to reprosecute charge due to changes in evidentiary circumstances and warning against use of guilty plea as tactical device to frustrate prosecution).
2. Manifest Injustice
Appellant contends that his plea was not intelligently entered because he learned of the conditional-release period only at sentencing and the term was not properly explained to him. Courts will look at the time a plea is entered into to assess its validity. State v. Nace, 308 Minn. 170, 170-71, 241 N.W.2d 101, 102 (1976). The mere reference to conditional release at the sentencing hearing does not make appellant's guilty plea knowing and intelligent. See, e.g., United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant may withdraw guilty plea where state's first reference to mandatory minimum sentence is at the sentencing hearing); United States v. Padilla, 23 F.3d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that court must look to the record to learn "what the defendant actually knows when he pleads guilty").
Moreover, appellant suggests that this lack of explanation does not comply with Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 2 (1998), which requires a sentencing court to explain the amount of time a defendant would serve on supervised release and that an extension of time by the commissioner of corrections could result in the defendant spending his entire executed sentence in prison. The court explained none of this to appellant.
The record reveals that the conditional-release period was not discussed during his plea hearing, and is not referenced in appellant's plea petition. In its order and memorandum, the court noted that "the five-year conditional release term was specifically outlined in the presentence investigation." When the sentence was discussed during the plea hearing, the state commented only that,
we've had extensive conversations in chambers * * * and the expected sentencing in this matter will be for a period of 105 months, to be served with the commissioner of corrections.
Appellant's attorney explained that the "result of [pleading guilty] is that you are going to prison for a hundred and five months * * * [l]ess good time and time served." At sentencing, the state requested from the court that, "along with a prison sentence, [appellant] would be sentenced to a five-year period of conditional release." A short time later, when sentencing appellant, the court made the second reference to the conditional-release period. The court stated that under the law appellant was subject to things such as sex-offender registration and
a five-year conditional release period upon your parole or release from custody. So you'll be on the five-year supervised conditional release after you get out of prison.
The court then asked appellant if there were any questions or anything that the court missed. Appellant's attorney answered, "No, Your Honor." The judgment roll included the five-year conditional-release term.
Minnesota courts have concluded that the addition of a conditional-release term, above and beyond the maximum sentence agreed upon in the defendant's court-accepted plea petition, can be grounds for the defendant to withdraw his plea or for the court to modify his sentence. See Wukawitz, 2003 WL 21231999, at *10 (holding that district court may impose a conditional-release term of less than five years or withdraw a plea where the conditional-release period pronounced after plea and sentencing caused the sentence to exceed the maximum sentence agreed upon in the defendant's court-accepted plea petition); Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 45 (holding that court must allow defendant to withdraw a plea or modify a sentence where defendant did not learn of mandatory conditional-release period until after both plea and sentencing, and the conditional-release period caused the sentence to exceed the maximum sentence agreed upon in the defendant's court-accepted plea petition); Garcia, 582 N.W.2d at 880 (holding that the "post-sentencing addition of a conditional release term to plea-bargained sentence" is unauthorized).
Although this court has reached the opposite conclusion in two recent unpublished decisions where the conditional-release term was included in appellant's original sentence and neither appellant nor his attorney objected to the term, unpublished opinions have no precedential value and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002). See Buford v. State, No. C4-01-2137, 2002 WL 31013691, at *3 (Minn.App. Sept. 10, 2002) (holding that because appellant was present at sentencing and agreed to the conditional-release period postconviction relief should be denied); State v. Norris, No. CX-01-1834, 2002 WL 485292, at *2 (Minn.App. Apr. 2, 2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion where defendant learned of conditional-release period at sentencing and did not object).
We hold the district court abused its discretion by not modifying appellant's sentence. Appellant did not intelligently enter his plea because he did not know all the direct consequences of his plea.
Under Wukawitz, appellant requests that the conditional release be modified so that it is concurrent and coterminous with supervised release, but so that appellant would remain incarcerated until the normal supervised release date. See Wukawitz, WL 21231999, at *10 (allowing the district court to impose a conditional-release term that begins once appellant's incarceration ends and terminates on the same day as the original sentence). We grant this request.
Reversed.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I believe that the postconviction court properly denied appellant's request for a modification of his sentence. This case is distinguishable from State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000), and State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998), where plea withdrawal was permitted. In both cases, the supreme court ordered plea withdrawal on the ground that the plea was not intelligent because the appellant did not learn of the conditional-release term until after sentencing and the conditional-release term was not included in the original sentence. Id.
Unlike Jumping Eagle and Garcia, the record here shows that the conditional-release term was referenced in the presentence investigation and was mentioned twice at the sentencing hearing. After the second reference to the conditional-release term at the sentencing hearing, the court asked appellant if there were any questions or anything that the court missed. Appellant's attorney answered, "No, Your Honor." The judgment roll also included the five-year conditional-release term. On this record, appellant understood the consequences of pleading guilty at sentencing, the concluding phase of the guilty plea process. See Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (holding that a guilty plea is intelligent if the defendant understands the charges, his rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty).
Because appellant knew of the conditional-release term at the time that he was sentenced and was represented by a lawyer at that time, appellant's plea was intelligent and manifest injustice did not occur. Therefore, I believe that the postconviction court acted within its discretion.