Opinion
Civil No. 03-6452 ADM/AJB.
July 13, 2004
Sonja D. Kerr, Esq., Kerr Law Office, Inver Grove Heights, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.
Martha J. Casserly, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, appeared for and on behalf of State of Minnesota, Department of Education.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant State of Minnesota, Department of Education's ("MDE") Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5] was argued before the undersigned United States District Judge on May 14, 2004. By and through his parents Dan and Patti Renollett, Plaintiff Joshua Renollett ("Plaintiff") appeals a special education administrative due process decision under the Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), and alleges that the MDE denied him a timely and fair hearing as required by IDEA.See 20 U.S.C. § 1400-87. The MDE moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim on the grounds that it is an improper party to this action. For the reasons explained below, the MDE's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to receive federal funding for educational programs under the IDEA, states must provide disabled children with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18), 1412(a)(1)(A). To satisfy this requirement, a disabled child's school must formulate an individualized education plan ("IEP") designed to meet the child's specific needs. Id. § 1412(a)(4). A school meets this obligation if the disabled student's IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).Parents who are dissatisfied with a school district's implementation of the IDEA may contest the district's actions through impartial due process hearings and complaint resolution procedures. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.660;see also Megan v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 57 F. Supp.2d 776, 780-81 (D. Minn. 1999). Either a disabled child's parents or the school district may request a due process hearing to address the child's IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1); Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subds. 6, 9 (2002). Minnesota had a two-level administrative hearing process at the time of this case's underlying dispute, which divided hearings into "Level I" and "Level II." In presenting claims at Level I hearings before an independent hearing officer ("IHO"), parties could obtain legal assistance, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and demand a written record of the proceedings. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h); 34 C.F.R. § 309.509. A party unsatisfied with a Level I hearing result could request a Level II review before an independent hearing review officer ("HRO"). Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subds. 6, 9 (2002).
Plaintiff, a disabled minor child who resides within the boundaries of Defendant Independent School District No. 11 ("ISD 11"), is entitled to an IEP under the IDEA. Compl. ¶ 3; see also Ans. of Def. ISD 11 ¶ 2 [Docket No. 4]. In February 2003, ISD 11 proposed a new IEP for Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 6. After Plaintiff's parents rejected the proposed IEP, ISD 11 requested a special education due process hearing on March 5, 2003 concerning the IEP and a Behavior Intervention Plan ("BIP") for Plaintiff ("Level I Hearing").Id. ¶ 7.
The Level I Hearing process was delayed as the result of requests from both parties. During a pre-hearing conference on March 24, 2003, the Level I IHO asked the parties to request an extension. See MDE Complaint Resolution Procedures Decision No. 1932 at 2 (Casserly Aff. Ex. B) ("1932 Decision"). ISD 11 then requested and was given one. Id. On April 9-10, 2003, ISD 11 was granted a second continuance of the hearing date. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Decision In re ISD No. 11, Anoka-Hennepin v. Renollett, MDCFL Case No. 533 ("Level I Decision") ¶¶ 24-26 (Casserly Aff. Ex. A). The IHO also granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file a brief. Id. ¶ 29.
The Level I IHO conducted evidentiary hearings on fourteen nonconsecutive days in May through July 2003, and issued the Level I Decision approving both the IEP and the BIP on August 18, 2003. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10; see also Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Decision In re ISD No. 11, Anoka-Hennepin v. Renollett, MDE Case No. 533-2 at 1 ("Level II Decision") (Compl. Ex. A).
Plaintiff appealed the Level I Decision on September 8, 2003 ("Level II Review"). Compl. ¶ 11; see also Level II Decision at 1. A Level II HRO affirmed the Level I Decision on November 10, 2003. Compl. ¶ 12; see also Level II Decision at 9. On December 19, 2003, Plaintiff appealed the Level II Decision in federal court, and included MDE as a defendant.
During the Level I Hearing process, Plaintiff's counsel complained to the MDE about delays in obtaining a decision from the IHO. On June 18, 2003, Plaintiff's counsel requested the MDE to investigate the IHO's failure to issue a decision within forty-five days of receiving the request for the Level I Hearing. The request was based on IDEA regulations that authorize state educational agencies, like MDE, to examine complaints about education law violations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.660-662. These regulations also require that the public agency responsible for overseeing due process hearings "ensure that not later than 45 days after the receipt of a request for a hearing, a final decision is reached in the hearing." 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(a)(1). However, a "hearing or reviewing officer may grant specific extensions of time . . . at the request of either party." Id. § 300.511(c); see also Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 7 (2002).
After investigating Plaintiff's complaint, Assistant Commissioner Chas Anderson ("Anderson") determined the MDE and ISD 11, "as the responsible agencies," violated federal and state law because the IHO had not set a specific decision date or issued a decision within the forty-five day deadline. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511; Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 7 (2002); 1932 Decision at 5. Additionally, Anderson concluded that these agencies erred in failing to ensure that the IHO granted extensions only for good cause at the request of either party.Id. Anderson ordered MDE to implement corrective actions based on her findings. 1932 Decision at 5-6.
In adjudicating the MDE's Motion to Dismiss, the Court will consider relevant provisions of the Level I and Level II Decisions and the 1932 Decision because they are "necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Compl. ¶¶ 5-15.
III. DISCUSSION
The MDE now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim that it violated the IDEA.A. Dismissal Standard
The MDE seeks dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b), 20 and 21. A party may move to dismiss if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering motions to dismiss, courts construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and view the facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994). Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See United States v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003). A claim should be dismissed only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
The MDE argues that it is not a proper or necessary party to this action under Rule 20(a), and that it should be dismissed from this action under Rule 21. Rule 20(a) allows permissive joinder of defendants where the plaintiff seeks relief from multiple defendants based on the same underlying transaction or occurrence, and where a common question of law or fact exists among all defendants in the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). Rule 21 establishes that parties "may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. Courts may properly dismiss parties under Rule 21 if they do not satisfy Rule 20(a), or if no claim for relief is stated against them. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enters., 353 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1965).
B. Claims asserted against the MDE
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against the MDE. First, Plaintiff avers that the MDE denied him FAPE as required by the IDEA. See Compl. ¶ 13. Second, Plaintiff contends that the Level I Decision was untimely and procedurally flawed. Id. ¶ 14. Finally, Plaintiff claims that both the Level I and Level II Decisions contained substantive errors. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. In response, the MDE argues that it is not a proper party to any of these claims. 1. Plaintiff's Denial of FAPE Claim
In his Memorandum in Response to Defendant MDE's Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 21], Plaintiff asserts that authority granted to independent hearing officers under two state laws in effect at the time of the Level I Hearing and Level II Review conflicted with the IDEA. See Mem. in Response at 19-20. However, these allegations are absent from the four corners of the Complaint, contrary to Rule 8's requirements. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Because Plaintiff did not provide the MDE with fair notice of these claims, they are not properly before the Court and will not be considered. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 89 F.3d 1339, 1350 (8th Cir. 1996); Seasongood v. K K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1977).
The MDE argues that it is not a necessary defendant to Plaintiff's denial of FAPE claim because Plaintiff has not alleged how the MDE contributed to the alleged infraction. As the state agency that receives federal funding and is responsible for general supervision of education, the MDE must provide FAPE to disabled children who reside in Minnesota. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11). However, to avoid dismissal of his FAPE claim against the MDE, Plaintiff must set forth some facts showing that the MDE shared substantial responsibility with ISD 11 in denying him FAPE. See Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp.2d 577, 585 (D. Md. 2000); Yamen v. Bd. of Educ., 909 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
While courts accept a complaint's allegations as true when reviewing motions to dismiss, "complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations" cannot withstand dismissal. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 188 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff's conclusory allegations lacked a sufficient factual basis to survive a motion to dismiss). Therefore, Plaintiff's FAPE claim must be dismissed against the MDE unless the Complaint includes the requisite factual support.
Under this standard, Plaintiff has failed to state a denial of a FAPE claim against the MDE. The Complaint states that the MDE "denied Plaintiff Josh a free appropriate public education," but contains no other facts explaining the MDE's role in the alleged failure. Compl. ¶ 13. While the Complaint alleges that the MDE "knew or should have known" about the Level I IHO's untimely decision, it does not link this timeliness concern to the denial of a FAPE, or suggest that the MDE was responsible for any delays. Id. ¶ 14. Because Plaintiff has not provided a factual basis for the FAPE claim beyond conclusory allegations, the claim must be dismissed against the MDE. See Springdale Educ. Ass'n, 133 F.3d at 651; Morton, 793 F.2d at 188 n. 2;Carnwath, 115 F. Supp.2d at 585.
2. Plaintiff's Timeliness Claim
Plaintiff's claim that the MDE denied him a timely and procedurally fair Level I Decision suffers the same fate because Plaintiff lacks standing. To establish standing, a plaintiff must "allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered personal injury because the IHO did not issue the Level I Decision within the forty-five day deadline. Compl. ¶ 14. Additionally, he traces the injury to the MDE because the MDE is responsible for ensuring that hearing officers meet deadlines. See Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 7 (2002); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511; Letter to Kerr, 22 IDLER 364 (OSEP, Sept. 6, 1994) (Kerr Aff. Ex. A); see also 1932 Decision at 5 (explaining that the MDE violated federal and state law because the Level I IHO did not set a specific decision date or issue a decision within the forty-five day deadline).
While the Complaint alleges that there were several procedural infirmities in the Level I Hearing, the sole allegation specific to the MDE is that it did not ensure compliance with the forty-five day deadline. See Compl. ¶ 14. The remaining allegations concern mistakes made by the IHO. Id. ¶ 14. As the delay is the only procedural flaw attributable to the MDE in the Complaint, Plaintiff has not traced the other alleged procedural errors to the MDE's conduct and established the causation prong of standing. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
However, Plaintiff lacks standing because he has not identified any relief likely to remedy the alleged personal harm he suffered from the delay. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. In paragraph two of the Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff specifies the remedies sought from flaws in the hearing process. There, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that the hearing delay violated the IDEA, and to order the MDE to return federal funds received on his behalf to Washington. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff additionally requests "corrections to the standards and procedures for due process hearings in the State of Minnesota." Id.
This relief will not redress Plaintiff's injuries. First, while Plaintiff seeks a judgment that the Level I delay violated the IDEA, Plaintiff has previously secured a state administrative order that granted this relief. See 1932 Decision at 5-6. The 1932 Decision determined that the MDE's failure to ensure adherence to the forty-five day Level I Hearing timetable violated the IDEA. See id. It ordered the MDE to inform hearing officers about timeline and extension requirements and to improve training. Id. Additionally, the 1932 Decision mandated that hearing officers file all orders with the MDE, including those concerning extensions of final deadlines. Id. Plaintiff does not suggest that the MDE disputed the 1932 Decision or failed to implement the required changes. Consequently, judicial affirmation of the 1932 Decision's uncontested conclusions will not remedy any remaining injuries from the delay.
Second, Plaintiff's request that the Court order the MDE to return federal funding is unrelated to the Level I Decision delay. Compl. at 5. Sending educational funds to the federal government will not help Plaintiff secure a more timely hearing process, or facilitate the MDE's implementation of the IDEA in Minnesota. Plaintiff cites no authority under the IDEA to support the appropriateness of this relief. Further, how this form of relief would redress the alleged wrongs suffered by Plaintiff eludes this Court's understanding. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
Finally, Plaintiff's personal injuries from receiving a delayed Level I Decision do not support his demand for system-wide changes in due process hearings in Minnesota. See Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F. Supp.2d 236, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). First, the Complaint provides the Court with scant guidance of the changes sought because Plaintiff does not attribute the timeliness problem to a specific statute or regulation. See Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has not specified any concrete system-wide changes, or explained how this undefined relief would compensate Plaintiff. Id. Additionally, the Complaint is devoid of allegations indicating system-wide delays in due process hearings or rampant violations of the IDEA, a fact that undermines Plaintiff's assertion that system-wide changes will redress his injury. See Engwiller, 110 F. Supp.2d at 250. Therefore, Plaintiff has not established standing for his timeliness claim.Id.; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Heldman, 962 F.2d at 157.
Plaintiff's reliance on the Engwiller decision as a basis for avoiding dismissal is unavailing. See 110 F. Supp.2d at 250. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that the school district and state education department had violated her due process rights under the IDEA because the independent hearing officer had never issued a decision concerning the plaintiff's IEP challenge. Id. at 242. Thus, the Engwiller court properly ordered the state education department to ensure that the hearing officer produced an opinion within ten days. Id. at 251. Here, the IHO issued an opinion three days after Assistant Commissioner Anderson filed the 1932 Decision. See 1932 Decision at 1; Level I Decision at 70. Thus, providing Engwiller-type relief in this case would not rectify any remaining injuries Plaintiff presently maintains from the delay. 3. Plaintiff's Claim that the Decisions are Substantively Flawed
Plaintiff's reliance on the reasoning in Brantley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 625, 936 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1996) is also misplaced, because the Brantley court did not address whether the plaintiff's requested relief likely redressed his injuries from a delay in receiving his due process hearing decision. In fact, in Brantley the court stated that the plaintiff's claim would fail if the relief sought were unavailable under the IDEA.Id. at 661.
Plaintiff's final claim against the MDE is that the Level I and Level II Decisions are substantively flawed. See Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. The MDE argues that it is not a proper party to this claim because it cannot dictate the outcome of due process hearings. Plaintiff asserts that the MDE should not be dismissed until the Court reviews the Level I and Level II Decisions.
Plaintiff's argument lacks merit because the MDE could not legally alter the Level I and Level II Decisions. Due process hearings must be impartial and independent from state educational agencies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), (g). State educational agencies "may not intercede in administrative hearings or overturn the decision of the [hearing officer] because doing so would undermine the goal of impartial hearings." Carnwath, 115 F. Supp.2d at 584. Similarly, state educational agencies are bound by hearing officers' conclusions, and cannot order school districts to act contrary to the officers' decisions. See Lillibask v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp.2d 182, 198-99 (D. Conn. 2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.661(c)(2). States must implement the final decisions of hearing officers. See Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002); Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 n. 13 (3rd Cir. 1996);Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1987).
Given state agencies' inability to control hearing decisions, the MDE is not liable for the content of the Level I and Level II Decisions. The MDE is not a proper defendant to this claim because "[l]iability may not flow from decisions over which State Defendants have no control and cannot legally influence." Fetto v. Sergi, 181 F. Supp.2d 53, 72 (D. Conn. 2001) (internal quotation omitted); Fritschle v. Andes, 25 F. Supp.2d 699, 705 (D. Md. 1998). Because the MDE cannot unilaterally overturn the Level I and Level II Decisions and offer Plaintiff the relief he seeks, it is not a proper party. See Great Am. Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 1001. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged any claims which justify retaining the MDE as a defendant in this matter. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Defendant State of Minnesota, Department of Education's Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5] is GRANTED,
2. All claims asserted against Defendant State of Minnesota, Department of Education are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.