Opinion
No. CV 07 4001970 S
July 22, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The petitioner, Ronald Reiske Jr., filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 8, 2007, challenging the legality his "sexual treatment needs" classification of level 2V. The petitioner claims that this classification is false and unwarranted, and that it has both stigmatized him within the prison community, made him ineligible for parole or community release, and required him to undergo unnecessary and repugnant sex offender treatment. In a return filed on February 25, 2008, the respondent denied the material allegations of the petition and raised the affirmative defense that the petitioner has no liberty interest in his inmate classification and has failed to state a claim for relief. In his reply to the return, the petitioner alleges that the respondent so classified the petitioner to stave off liability for its own misconduct.
The case came to court on July 1, 2008 for a trial on the merits. Testifying were the petitioner and his father, Ronald Reiske, Sr. The petitioner submitted fifteen exhibits and the respondent submitted one.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
At all times relevant to this case, the petitioner was serving a five-year sentence with the department of correction. In March 2004, he was residing at Renaissance East, a halfway house in Waterbury. Around this time, he began a relationship with a fourteen-year-old minor child who would visit him in the halfway house. Although she was a minor, the staff either did not check her identification or otherwise did not ascertain that she was a minor, as they were required to do. There were typically others in the room when the petitioner and minor girl met. After approximately a month of talking on the telephone and periodic visits, the petitioner called the minor child and her father answered. He informed the petitioner of the minor child's age. Soon after, the directors of the Renaissance East found and confiscated a sexually explicit letter the petitioner had written to the minor child, addressed in a sealed envelope but not yet sent to the minor. Consequently, the petitioner's "sexual treatment needs" score was raised from level 1 to level 2, and assigned a subcode of "V" indicating that the information used in the classification was verified and considered accurate. As a result of this classification the petitioner became ineligible for parole unless he completed a sex offender treatment program. He enrolled in and began attending such a program, but was prevented from completing it when he was moved to Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, which does not offer a similar program. He has also been denied access to job training programs, community release programs and other rehabilitative services for which he would otherwise be eligible. Finally, he has been stigmatized among other inmates and correctional staff. He was never charged, tried or convicted for any sexual offenses, and does not have to register as a sex offender if he completes his sentence.
The petitioner was sentenced to two years imprisonment for several violations of probation from a prior conviction; see General Statutes § 53a-32; and three years for burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103, to be served consecutively.
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
The petitioner argues that an inmate has a liberty interest in not being falsely labeled as a sex offender. He claims that because he was reclassified falsely and without any formal hearing or process, he was deprived of his due process rights under the United States constitution. The respondent counters that inmate classifications, being within the ambit and discretion of the department of correction ("department"), implicate no such liberty interest.
Connecticut courts have repeatedly held that a prisoner has no liberty interest in parole, rehabilitative programs or other such potential amenities while incarcerated. See, e.g., Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 241, 251-53, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007); Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, 105 Conn.App. 65, 76-77, 936 A.2d 665 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 917, 943 A.2d 475. As such, courts do not typically grant habeas relief to petitioners complaining of the internal actions of the department in denying parole eligibility or classification of prisoners. "[I]n order to invoke successfully the jurisdiction of the habeas court, a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief . . .
"[T]o qualify as a constitutionally protected `liberty,' [however,] the interest must be one that is assured either by statute, judicial decree, or regulation . . . In denying an inmate's due process claim based on a state's prisoner transfer procedure, the United States Supreme Court has explained: `The [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause by its own force forbids the [s]tate from convicting any person of crime and depriving him of his liberty without complying fully with the requirements of the [c]lause. But given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the [s]tate may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the [c]onstitution . . . [T]o hold . . . that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts . . . [T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the `weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake . . .
"[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence . . . A state may . . . establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so." Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 281 Conn. 251-53.
The petitioner relies primarily on a Superior Court case, Thomas v. Warden, 49 Conn.Sup. 416, 891 A.2d 1016 (2005). In Thomas, the petitioner had been charged in an underlying criminal case with, inter alia, a sexual offense, and was convicted of another offense but acquitted as to the sexual offense. Nevertheless, after he was incarcerated, the department assigned him a sexual treatment needs score of 3 based on the bare allegations of the indictment. The habeas court granted relief, ordering the department to purge its records labeling the petitioner as a sex offender and to reduce his sexual treatment needs score accordingly. The court's decision relied heavily on Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), a ninth circuit case holding that an inmate may have a liberty interest in not being classified as a sex offender and being required to complete treatment before being parole eligible without due process. Such process includes notification of the reasons for the decision and a hearing at which the inmate is afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence in support of his cause. Id., 830-31.
Thus, Thomas is also distinguishable on this basis from the present case, wherein the alleged sexual misconduct was unrelated to the crimes for which the petitioner was serving time, and was never adjudicated in court.
Neal, however, was an action arising from Title 42, § 1983 of the United States Code, not a habeas corpus petition. While implicating due process rights, the body of law that gave rise to Neal is rooted more in quasi-tort defamation than in the sort of conditions of confinement cases that are properly the subject of a habeas petition. Indeed, the court in Neal specifically considered whether the action before it was better brought under § 1983 or as a habeas corpus action and decided CT Page 12062 in favor of the former, reasoning that "[b]ecause the inmates' challenge in this case does not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or continuing confinement, it is properly brought under § 1983." Neal v. Shimoda, supra, 131 F.3d 824. Federal cases seeking relief for similar claims in the form of habeas petitions have been denied. E.g., Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980).
Although ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), correctly noted that the line of cases recognizing liberty interest in prisoners' internal department of correction classifications stems all the way back to the seminal case of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), which, while denying the respondent employee's § 1983 claim, implied that a governmental employee may be entitled to due process if they are somehow defamed or stigmatized in the course of employment termination. Id., 573-74. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 2194, 48 L.Ed.2d 811 (1976), held that in order to succeed on a claim of defamation against a government official or entity a plaintiff must show both that the statement is significantly damaging to his reputation and that it has altered their legal status in some way or impinges upon some legal right; id., 701-02; establishing what later became known as the "stigma plus" test for certain due process violations. This test has been applied to prisoners challenging their internal classification or other conditions of confinement, but only in the context of § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (granting relief to petitioners classified as "mentally ill" and subjected to psychiatric treatment without a hearing); Rice v. Department of Corrections, United States District Court, Case No. 1: 07-CV-578 (W.D.Mich., October 10, 2007, Carinody, J.) (denying relief to plaintiff allegedly stigmatized from classification as mentally ill).
The petitioner also points to Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), for the proposition that being forced to register as a sex offender on the state's registry implicates due process rights. Doe, however, dealt not with internal department of correction classifications, but registry as a sex offender on a website available to the public that implied that those registered had a much higher potential of being "currently dangerous"; a situation patently distinguishable from the present case. Cf. Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1221-24, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 860, 125 S.Ct. 181, 160 L.Ed.2d 100 (10th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing internal classification while incarcerated as sex offender from forced registration as a sex offender post-release). More importantly, the second circuit's decision in Doe was reversed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, although on an issue distinct from the petitioner's liberty interest, which the court expressly did not reach. Department of Public Safety v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. 3 ("due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme"; court noted that petitioner was only challenging registration on procedural and not substantive due process grounds and so left open issue of whether registration violated substantive due process). At any rate, Doe was also a § 1983 action, not a habeas corpus petition.
Ultimately, the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding in Wheway v. Warden, 215 Conn. 418, 576 A.2d 494 (1990), is controlling. Wheway, a habeas corpus action, established that parole eligibility and security classification are entirely within the discretion of the prison officials and, therefore, are not a protected liberty interest warranting relief. Id., 430-32; see also Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 281 Conn. 251-53; Tart v. Commissioner of Correction, 46 Conn.Sup. 546, 548, 759 A.2d 546 (2000), appeal dismissed, 94 Conn.App. 134, 892 A.2d 298, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 904, 896 A.2d 106 (2006) ("an inmate has no liberty interest in a particular security classification"). The principle that internal department of correction actions, such as transferring a prisoner; see General Statutes § 18-86; or denial of parole; Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn.App. 132, 142-43, 599 A.2d 31 (1991); are discretionary and not protectable interests under the constitution has been borne out many times in this state. See also Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916, 923 (2d Cir. 1980) ("no due process protections [are] required upon the discretionary transfer of state prisoners to a substantially less agreeable prison, even where that transfer visited a `grievous loss' upon the inmate. The same is true of prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal system"). (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
It is true that the petitioner in the present case has alleged more than simply an incorrect classification and resulting change in legal status, but that he has been defamed and stigmatized as a result. Nevertheless, this claim, whatever its ultimate merit in another context, is not properly addressed via a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, his petition is DENIED. Should the petitioner wish to appeal, the clerk shall submit a judgment file to the court within thirty days.
Cf. Ricketts v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 05 4000675 (March 29, 2007, Fuger, J.), where the court ruled, from the bench, that internal department classification as sex offender "is not a suitable issue for a habeas petition. The Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus. That is not to say there is not some other mechanism by which you might be able to obtain relief in a civil proceeding, in a federal proceeding, or some other proceeding."