Opinion
No. HHD CV 10 6016353S
September 7, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
In this case, plaintiffs Antonio and Maria C. Reis, a married couple, seek money damages from defendants Steven Hendel and his employer, Dalene Hardwood Flooring, Inc. ("Dalene"), for alleged negligence, loss of consortium and violation of General Statutes § 14-295 in connection with a June 1, 2010 collision in Glastonbury, Connecticut, between a vehicle owned by Dalene and operated by Mr. Hendel and a vehicle owned and operated by Mr. Reis. As alleged in the plaintiffs' six-count revised complaint dated January 11, 2011, the collision occurred when Mr. Hendel drove the Dalene vehicle into the rear of the Reis vehicle at a high rate of speed, destroying the Reis vehicle after causing it to turn over several times, and thereby causing Mr. Reis to suffer serious physical injuries, including broken bones and paralysis from the neck down.
In count one of the revised complaint, Mr. Reis alleges that the collision and his resulting injuries and losses were caused by Mr. Hendel's negligence in the operation of the Dalene vehicle while acting within the scope of his employment for Dalene. He complains that Mr. Hendel was negligent in operating the Dalene vehicle by failing to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles upon the highway at the time of the collision, failing to keep the Dalene vehicle a safe distance from the rear of his vehicle, failing to warn him of the approach of the Dalene vehicle to the rear of his vehicle, and operating the Dalene vehicle at an excessive rate of speed. He claims that Dalene is vicariously liable for the negligence of Mr. Hendel, its employee.
In counts two and three of the revised complaint, Mr. Reis alleges that Mr. Hendel also violated § 14-295 at the time and place in question by violating several motor vehicle statutes listed in § 14-295, either deliberately or with reckless disregard, and thereby proximately causing the collision and his complained-of injuries and losses. The specific motor vehicle statutes Mr. Hendel is claimed to have violated in this manner are General Statutes § 14-218a, traveling at an unreasonable speed, § 14-219, speeding, and § 14-240a, failure to keep a reasonable distance apart. In count two, Mr. Reis seeks double or treble damages from Mr. Hendel for his alleged violation of § 14-295. In count three, he seeks such multiple damages from Dalene based upon Mr. Hendel's alleged violation of that statute while operating the Dalene vehicle within the scope of duties as a Dalene employee.
In count four of the revised complaint, Mrs. Reis seeks money damages from both defendants for loss of consortium based upon Mr. Hendel's alleged negligence in causing her husband's injuries, as alleged in count one, and her own resulting loss of her husband's consortium. In counts five and six of the revised complaint, she seeks double or treble damages against Mr. Hendel and Dalene, respectively, based upon Mr. Hendel's alleged violation of § 14-295, as alleged in counts two and three, her husband's resulting injuries, and her resulting loss of his consortium.
Now before the Court for decision is Dalene's motion to strike counts three and six of the revised complaint, which was filed on January 19, 2011. Dalene asks this Court in that motion to strike the challenged counts on the ground that they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted under § 14-295, because that statute, as amended, assertedly did not abrogate the common-law rule disallowing the awarding of punitive damages against a defendant whose liability for another person's deliberate or reckless conduct is only vicarious. The motion is accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law.
On February 3, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to strike, accompanied by an opposing memorandum of law. On February 28, 2011, Dalene submitted a reply memorandum in support of its motion to strike. The motion was heard on the short calendar on April 18, 2011. At oral argument the Court offered the parties a further opportunity to brief certain issues raised at oral argument regarding the legislative history of the 2003 amendment to § 14-295. On April 20, 2011, Dalene filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion to strike. On April 27, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the motion. Finally, on May 12, 2011, Dalene filed a response to the plaintiffs' supplemental brief.
ANALYSIS
"A motion to strike attacks the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading . . . In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, courts are to assume the truth of the facts pleaded therein and to determine whether those facts establish a valid cause of action . . . If the pleading fails to establish a valid cause of action, a court shall grant a motion to strike the offending claims." (Citations omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). In reviewing a trial court's order striking a challenged complaint, our Appellate Court has explained that, "We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kumah v. Brown, 127 Conn.App. 254, 259, 14 A.3d 1012 (2011).
In the present case, defendant Dalene has moved this Court to strike counts three and six of the revised complaint on the ground that they fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted under § 14-295. Specifically, Dalene argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable under that statute for the deliberate or reckless conduct of its employee, Mr. Hendel, or thus be made to pay double or treble damages for any of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries or losses. On this score, Dalene argues principally that the common-law rule in Connecticut prohibits the awarding of punitive damages against any defendant who is only vicariously liable for another defendant's conduct, and that the legislature did not abrogate that rule by the passage of § 14-295.
The plaintiffs oppose Dalene's motion to strike, arguing that § 14-295 did indeed abrogate the common-law rule against awarding punitive damages based upon vicarious liability by implying that, except for the owners of leased or rented vehicles, any owner of a motor vehicle which is operated by another in violation of the statute may indeed be held vicariously liable for a plaintiff's resulting injuries, and thus be required to pay the plaintiff double or treble damages for those injuries. The parties acknowledge that there is a split of authority among the judges of this Court on this issue. The plaintiffs argue that their approach is the majority approach, while the defendant argues that its approach represents the recent trend.
"[A]t common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages . . . and . . . under that common-law doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle." (Citations omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 837, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). However, "[t]here is no question that the legislature may abrogate the common law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Andy's Oil Service, Inc. v. Hobbs, 125 Conn.App. 708, 714, 9 A.3d 433 (2010). The question before this Court is thus whether § 14-295 abrogated the common-law rule with respect to the non-operator owners of non-leased and non-rental motor vehicles, such that double or treble damages may indeed be awarded against such non-operator owners when the operators of their vehicle violate that statute. In answering this question, the Court must consider that, "[a]lthough the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 137, 2 Conn. 859 (2010).
At all times relevant to this case, § 14-295 has provided as follows: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs argue that the final, italicized sentence of § 14-295, which was added to the statute in 2003 by the passage of Public Act 03-250, requires the Court to conclude that multiple damages may indeed be awarded against the non-operator owner of any non-rental or non-leased motor vehicle which is operated in violation of the statute. The plaintiffs contend that, in enacting CT Page 19060 Public Act 03-250, the legislature could have added language excluding all non-operator owners from the operation of the statute, but they did not do so. On that basis, they claim that the legislature clearly intended to allow for the awarding of multiple damages against the non-operator owner of any vehicle other than a rental or leased vehicle that is operated in violation of the statute. The plaintiffs also rely on the legislative history of Public Act 03-250 to demonstrate that the legislature specifically intended to provide an exception to vicarious liability only for the owners of leased or rented vehicles. They argue that, if the legislature had not intended § 14-295 to apply to all other non-operator owners, then the final sentence of the statute would have been superfluous.
Defendant Dalene rejects the foregoing arguments, contending that the statute unambiguously fails to abrogate the common-law rule. The defendant argues principally that the final sentence of § 14-295, exempting the owners of leased and rented motor vehicles from liability thereunder, was added to the statute to abrogate the rule of Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent-a Car, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 285-89, 472 A.2d 306 (1984), in which our Supreme Court had held that a different statute — General Statutes § 14-154a, which makes the owners of leased and rented motor vehicles vicariously liable to third parties "to the same extent as" the operators of such motor vehicles — made the owners of leased and rented motor vehicles operated in violation of § 14-295 vicariously liable to pay multiple damages to persons injured by such statutory violations. See. Absent any analogous provision in the General Statutes imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages upon the owners of non-leased or non-rented motor vehicles, Dalene argues that the common-law prohibition against imposing such liability upon them had never been abrogated, and thus remained intact, without need of confirmation by legislative enactment. The defendant claims that this conclusion is so clearly and unambiguously supported by the language of the amended statute as to not to require any further exploration of its legislative history. Even, however, if this Court determines that further construction of the statute is appropriate, the defendant claims, under the analysis of Mathiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. at 837 (rejecting a claim that General Statutes § 52-183 imposed vicarious liability for punitive damages upon non-operator owners under the family car statute), that such construction will lead inexorably to the same conclusion, for here as in Mathiessen, there is assertedly nothing in the legislative history to suggest that, by passing the amendment in question, the legislature sought to abrogate the common-law prohibition against imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages.
In response to the defendant's argument, the plaintiffs argue that the split among judges of this Court alone gives ample evidence of the ambiguity of the statute on this issue, thus making a review of its legislative history appropriate. There is, indeed, a split of authority in the superior court as to whether this statute abrogates the common-law rule against punitive damages for vicariously liable parties. In Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001164 (March 15, 2006, Lopez, J.) [40 Conn, L. Rptr. 882, 883], for example, the Court held that, "if the legislature intended to include all owners of motor vehicles in the category of exempted drivers, it would have done so. Furthermore, General Statutes § 52-183 provides that the owner of a motor vehicle may be liable for the reckless operation of that vehicle, by one operating it with the owner's permission. Reading § 52-183 and § 14-295 together, the court agrees with those decisions which have imposed liability on an owner pursuant to § 14-295, if one of the enumerated statutes is violated `with reckless disregard.'"
For cases sharing this conclusion see, e.g., Hollis v. Alamo Financing, L.P., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 08 5024043 (October 7, 2009, Rittenband, J.) [ 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 620], Otis v. Montesi, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 07 5002196 (January 25, 2008, Jones, J.), Comerford v. Beaulieu, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 03 0082216 (June 1, 2004, Robinson, J.), Batchelor v. Veliz, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0185583 (March 31, 2003, Lewis, J.).
A contrary conclusion was reached in Moncrieffe-West v. Transportation General, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No, CV 10 6012915 (December 6, 2010, Burke, J.) [ 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 96], where the Court ruled that § 14-295 does not provide for multiple damages against a party who is only vicariously liable. Id., 98. In that case, the plaintiff was the estate of a decedent who, while a passenger in a taxi cab, was killed in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the cab driver's violation of a motor vehicle statute listed in § 14-295 either deliberately or with reckless disregard. Id., 96-97. The plaintiff filed suit against the taxi cab owner, seeking double or treble damages under § 14-295 based on the acts of that company's employee. Id., 97. The defendant filed a motion to strike on the same theory as that presented on this motion. Id. The Court there granted the motion to strike, stating that, "the plaintiff does not point to any legislative history of § 14-295 that indicates the legislature's intent to abrogate the common-law rule against vicarious liability for punitive damages. The plain language of the statute does, however, [state] unequivocally that only one who `deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [one of the statutorily enumerated traffic laws]' may be subjected to § 14-295 punitive damages. Furthermore, despite the split of authority on the lower courts, the recent trend favors precluding the recovery of punitive damages under § 14-295 against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 98.
Similarly, in Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Sup.2d 139, 140-41 (D.Conn. 2009), the federal district court noted that, "[s]ince Matthiessen, numerous Connecticut Superior Courts have considered whether . . . § 14-295 makes owners or employers vicariously liable for double and treble damages, and the results are mixed . . . Having considered those opinions, this Court is persuaded by those courts that have held that § 14-295 does not abrogate the common-law doctrine prohibiting vicarious liability for punitive damages such as that imposed by § 14-295. The Court [so concluded] for two reasons, each of which is founded on the holding in Matthiessen. First, there is nothing in the language of § 14-295 that suggests that the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule or impose vicarious liability on owner/employers for the conduct of reckless employees. [B]y its plain language, § 14-295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner . . . The last sentence of § 14-295, concerning the owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle, does not change this analysis . . . Indeed, § 14-295 by its own terms applies only to vehicles operated by a defendant. Second, neither party has directed the Court to any legislative history of § 14-295 that indicates the legislature intended to impose vicarious liability for punitive damages or to abrogate the common-law rule against such liability. As the Connecticut Supreme Court held in Matthiessen, `Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed.'" (Emphasis in original.) (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Before the Court may turn to the legislative history, it must consider that General Statutes § 1-2z states that, "[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
For opinions sharing this conclusion see, e.g., Welton v. Ferrara, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5014334 (March 18, 2008, Bellis, J.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 211], and Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket. No. CV 07 5008853 (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 9].
Presently, the federal Graves Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 30106(a), preempts state law and precludes the imposition of vicarious liability on the owners of leased or rented vehicles based solely on their ownership. See Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 26, 993 A.2d 955 (2010). However, this was not the case in 2003. At that time, as previously noted, General Statutes § 14-154a governed this area of the law in Connecticut. Section 14-154a provided, in relevant part, that "(a) Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." (Emphasis added.) Id. There was no analogous statute at the time for non-rental or non-lessor owners. In fact, if such a statute had existed, it would have rendered Section 14-154a duplicative. As noted in, Matthiessen v. Vanech, "[t]he legislative genealogy of General Statutes § 14-154a, which renders the owner-lessor of a motor vehicle vicariously liable for damages, including punitive damages, arising out of the tortious conduct of the operator-lessee . . . also provides support for our contrary determination with respect to § 52-183." (Emphasis in original.) (Citation omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 841. See also Washburn v. Potter, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 02 0515312 (January 6, 2003, Bryant, J.) [ 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 662, 663-64]. ("Although both General Statutes §§ 14-154a and 52-183 impose vicarious liability upon the owners of vehicles driven by others, General Statutes § 14-154a goes one step further, making the owner liable `to the same extent as the operator.' This legislative expression of public policy . . . necessarily displaces and overrides common law presumptions . . . The legislature did not express a public policy displacing and overriding the common law rule against vicarious exemplary and punitive damage when it enacted [§ 52-183]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Therefore, if the legislature desired to exempt rental or lessor owners of vehicles from multiple damages, it needed to address the issue specifically; the same was not true, however, for the owners of vehicles that were neither leased nor rented.
42 U.S.C. 30106(a) states, in the relevant part, "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if-(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."
The plaintiffs argue that in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., supra, 192 Conn. at 280, the Supreme Court premised its decision that the owner of a rented or leased vehicle could be held vicariously liable for multiple damages on the language of § 14-154a. Thus, they claim, if the legislature believed that only rental or lessor owners were liable for multiple damages, they could have changed the rule simply by amending that statute. Again, although the legislature could have taken that approach, it was not required to do so. In Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was liable for multiple damages because it was liable to the same extent as the operator under § 14-154a, and the driver was held liable for multiple damages under § 14-295. Id., 283, 290. Therefore, to reiterate, an amendment to § 14-295 was a no less effective way of changing this result than an amendment to § 14-154a. Since the Court must assume that, without a clear statement to the contrary, the legislature did not intend to abrogate common law; see Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, supra, 298 Conn. 137; § 14-295, as amended, cannot be held to have abrogated the common-law principle that punitive damages are not available in cases of vicarious liability. The Court thus need not turn to the legislative history to discern the true meaning of the statute.
Even if the Court were to find that the statute was ambiguous on this issue, however, and thus turned to the legislative history for interpretive guidance as to the meaning of the statute, it would find that the legislative history is of no help to the plaintiffs on this claim. When Public Act 03-250 was introduced on the floor of the Senate, one of its main proponents stated: "[T]he issue of vicarious liability has been one that has permeated this legislative session . . . The need to address the issue has arisen recently because there was an experience in Rhode Island where a very large jury verdict resulted in numerous leasing companies exiting the leasing market of Rhode Island and frankly, threatening to exit other states where there continued to be unlimited liability for lessors of motor vehicles . . . [W]e in the Judiciary Committee and other members of the General Assembly have struggled over the last several months, to balance the need of individuals who are victims of accidents with the need to provide alternate ownership mechanisms for motor vehicles. And I suggest to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the circle that the amendment before us this morning achieves just that." 14 Sen. Proc., Pt. 14 2003 Sess., p. 4163, remarks of Senator Andrew J. McDonald. Similarly, when the amendment was introduced in the House of Representatives, its chief proponent stated, "[The amendment] makes an exception to the vicarious liability statute, 14-154a. And the primary exception is for the situation . . . where we're dealing with the lessors of private passenger motor vehicle with a lease term of one year or more . . . It also eliminates a requirement for owner of rental/leased truck for treble damages." 46 H.R. Proc., Pt. 21, 2003 Sess., p. 6819, remarks of Representative Paul Doyle.
The plaintiffs argue that the foregoing statements imply that the legislature intended that the owners of leased and rented vehicles were exceptions to the general rule that non-operator owners of motor vehicles could, in the ordinary course, be made liable for multiple damages under § 14-295 when the operators of such motor vehicles operated them in violation of the statute. The Court disagrees. These comments are all directed to the singleminded objective of immunizing the owners of rented and leased motor vehicles from paying multiple damages based vicariously upon the conduct of those who leased or rented their motor vehicles. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the owners of other non-leased or non-rented vehicles had ever been or should ever be subject to such vicariously liability based for violations of the statute by the operators of their motor vehicles. The legislative history does not provide support for the plaintiffs' argument.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that a side-by-side analysis of the present and prior versions of § 14-295 supports their claim. Prior to 1988, the statute stated: "Each person who, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 14-230 to 14-242, inclusive, or section 14-245, or 14-247, causes any injury to the person or property of another, shall be liable to the party injured in double or treble damages if, in the discretion of the court in which any action is pending, double or treble damages are just, with the costs of such action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person licensed under section 14-15." General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 14-295. The plaintiffs argue that the updated version of the statute, which states in the relevant part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [motor vehicle statutes]. . ." takes away the first-party language and makes any party subject to liability for double or treble damages. § 14-295. This is unpersuasive. The updated statute still requires that the liable party "operated a motor vehicle" in violation of the statute, and thus the change in language does not appear to reflect the impact the plaintiffs' claim. Further, as previously stated, the Court must assume that, without a clear statement to the contrary, the legislature does not intend to abrogate the common law. See Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, supra, 298 Conn. at 137. The above-described change in statutory language change is insufficient to overcome the caution with which the Court must approach this issue.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle that is neither leased nor rented may not be held liable for double or treble damages under § 14-295 for another operator's violation of the statute. Thus, taking the facts alleged in counts three and six of the revised complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining their sufficiency, the plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Court must grant defendant Dalene's motion to strike those counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of September 2011.