Opinion
G043684 Super. Ct. No. RIC453004
09-30-2011
DONNA CARLSON REEVES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Wagner & Pelayes, Brandi L. Harper and Dennis E. Wagner for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ronald W. Beals, Jeffrey R. Benowitz and Julie E. Saake for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Paulette Durand-Barkley, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Wagner & Pelayes, Brandi L. Harper and Dennis E. Wagner for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ronald W. Beals, Jeffrey R. Benowitz and Julie E. Saake for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Donna Carlson Reeves appeals from the judgment entered in this wrongful death action after the trial court granted defendant Department of Transportation's (the Department) summary judgment motion. Reeves's husband died in a traffic collision that occurred as he attempted to turn left from a commercial driveway onto a four-lane road owned, designed, maintained, and controlled by the Department. Reeves's complaint alleged the road presented a dangerous condition because a curve near the driveway impaired the ability of drivers to see one another and the Department failed to post any signs warning of this hazard.
The Department moved for summary judgment on the ground the curve did not create a dangerous condition because the sight distances for drivers exiting the driveway and drivers traveling on the road exceeded all recommended design standards. Reeves argued triable issues existed on whether the median in the road and lane configuration directly in front of the driveway created a dangerous condition. The trial court, however, refused to consider whether the median or lane configuration created a dangerous condition and granted the Department's motion.
We agree the median and lane configuration cannot be considered in ruling on the Department's motion because Reeves's complaint failed to allege that these features contributed to the dangerous road condition. We affirm the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment because Reeves failed to present any evidence creating a triable issue on the dangerous condition she alleged in her complaint.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Reeves's husband, Dr. Robert Reeves, sought to turn left from a commercial driveway and head west on the Ramona Expressway in San Jacinto, California. At the same time, Clinton Scott Brown approached the driveway traveling east on the Ramona Expressway at approximately 50 miles per hour.
Dr. Reeves began his left turn by pulling out across the Ramona Expressway's eastbound lanes. While still blocking part of the eastbound lanes, Dr. Reeves either slowed or stopped in front of Brown to allow the westbound lanes to clear. Brown applied his brakes, but could not avoid colliding with Dr. Reeves's vehicle. Dr. Reeves suffered fatal injuries in the collision.
At the accident's location, the Ramona Expressway has two westbound lanes and two eastbound lanes divided by a raised center median. An opening in the median directly in front of the commercial driveway allows drivers traveling west on the Ramona Expressway to turn left into the driveway and also allows drivers to turn left from the driveway onto the Ramona Expressway's westbound lanes. An acceleration lane allows drivers turning left from the driveway to build speed before entering the westbound traffic lanes.
The driveway is nearly 400 feet west of the Ramona Expressway's intersection with State Street. For eastbound traffic, the Ramona Expressway makes a sweeping curve to the left beginning approximately one-tenth of a mile west of the driveway and ends east of the driveway. The curve sweeps to the right for westbound traffic. The speed limit in this area is 55 miles per hour.
Reeves filed this wrongful death action against the Department and others to recover damages for her husband's death. The sole cause of action against the Department is for "Dangerous Condition and Design of Public Property/Roadway." Reeves alleges the Department "negligently, carelessly, recklessly, wantonly, and unlawfully operated, maintained, designed, and controlled the roadway where this accident happened so as to contribute to the aforementioned accident. Plaintiff alleges that, among other things, the roadway was designed with a curve resulting in a vision obstruction for motorists attempting to enter Ramona Expressway. The curve also made it difficult for vehicles traveling on Ramona Expressway to anticipate traffic entering from private driveways, side streets, or other points of access. The area was inadequately signed with no proper warnings."
The Department moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the curve in the road did not create a dangerous condition and (2) the Department had no duty to provide signs warning drivers of the curve. In opposing the motion, Reeves abandoned her theory the curve created a dangerous condition that allegedly contributed to her husband's accident and, instead, offered evidence regarding other allegedly dangerous features of the Ramona Expressway. Specifically, Reeves offered her traffic engineer's expert declaration opining that the road's raised median prevented drivers from seeing the westbound lanes' configuration, including the acceleration lane. Her expert further opined that the configuration of the westbound lanes confused drivers exiting the driveway because the acceleration lane was too short to serve its purpose and coincided with westbound lanes merging from two lanes down to one. Finally, Reeves's traffic engineer concluded these features combined to create a dangerous condition because they forced drivers exiting the driveway to pull into the eastbound traffic lanes to see the configuration of the westbound lanes, which confused drivers about where to safely enter westbound traffic.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the Department's motion and took the matter under submission. The court explained Reeves's counsel could put the matter "back on calendar" to discuss the Department's evidentiary objections after receiving the court's ruling. A few days later, the trial court issued its ruling granting the Department's motion and sustaining all objections the Department lodged regarding Reeves's evidence. In ruling on the motion, the court refused to consider Reeves's evidence regarding the median and lane configuration because her complaint failed to allege those features created a dangerous condition that contributed to the accident.
After receiving the trial court's ruling, Reeves filed a reconsideration motion to put the matter "back on calendar" to contest the Department's evidentiary objections. The trial court denied Reeves's reconsideration motion and entered judgment in the Department's favor. Reeves timely appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Summary Judgment Standards
"'"The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute." [Citation.]'" (Affholder, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 510, 516 (Affholder).) A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show the plaintiff's action has no merit. (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 168-169 (Teselle).) The defendant can meet that burden by either showing the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of his or her cause of action or there is a complete defense to the claim. (Id. at p. 169; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To meet this burden, the defendant must present evidence sufficient to show he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 847-848 (Eriksson).)
Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence establishing a triable issue exists on one or more material facts. (Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 168-169; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff opposing the motion has no burden to present any evidence until the defendant satisfies his or her initial burden. (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 940 (Hawkins).)
We review a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939-940.) "'Our review of the summary judgment motion requires that we apply the same three-step process required of the trial court. [Citation.] "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. [Citations.] [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. [Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Eriksson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 848.)
"'A different analysis is required for our review of the trial court's . . . rulings on evidentiary objections. Although it is often said that an appellate court reviews a summary judgment motion "de novo," the weight of authority holds that an appellate court reviews a court's final rulings on evidentiary objections by applying an abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Miranda v. Bomel Construction Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335.) B. The Department Met Its Initial Burden and Reeves Failed to Present Admissible Evidence Creating a Triable Issue
Reeves asserted a single cause of action for dangerous condition of public property against the Department. Her complaint alleges the curve in the Ramona Expressway created a dangerous condition that contributed to her husband's death because it impaired the ability of drivers exiting the driveway to see vehicles approaching on the Ramona Expressway, and vice versa. The complaint also alleges the Department failed to provide proper warnings about this dangerous condition. The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) the curve did not create a dangerous condition because all drivers had adequate sight distances and (2) the Department had no duty to provide warning signs because no dangerous condition existed.
Government Code section 835 provides the sole statutory basis for public entity liability as a property owner. Under that statute, a public entity is liable for any injury caused by its property if (1) a dangerous condition existed on the property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) a public employee negligently or wrongfully created the condition, or the entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition in sufficient time to take measures to protect against it. (Gov. Code, § 835; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251 (Laabs).)
A "dangerous condition" is any "condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).) "Property is not 'dangerous' within the meaning of the statutory scheme if the property is safe when used with due care and the risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care." (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439 (Brenner).) "A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of [the statutory scheme] if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used." (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
A public entity cannot be held liable for "an injury caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices described in the Vehicle Code . . . [unless a signal, sign, marking, or device is] necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care." (Gov. Code, § 830.8.) "Thus the simple absence of a warning sign cannot create liability unless there is a hidden dangerous condition." (Weinstein v. Department of Transportation (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 52, 61 (Weinstein).)
Here, the Department met its initial burden to demonstrate Reeves's dangerous condition of public property claim lacked merit by presenting evidence showing the curve in the Ramona Expressway and the lack of warning signs did not create a dangerous condition. Specifically, the Department presented a traffic engineer's expert declaration opining the curve did not constitute a dangerous condition because it did not impair the ability of drivers exiting the driveway to see approaching traffic or the ability of approaching traffic to see vehicles exiting the driveway. The Department's expert explained the sight distances both from the driveway to approaching traffic and approaching traffic to the driveway exceeded all of the Caltrans Highway Design Manual's recommended standards. He also explained the driveway and approaching traffic were visible features that did not require warning signs.
Reeves's opposition failed to present any evidence showing the curve in the road created a dangerous condition. Her opposing separate statement objected to the Department's facts regarding the curve and sight distances as irrelevant. The only evidence Reeves presented related to the median and lane configuration directly in front of the driveway, but, as explained below, we may not consider that evidence because Reeves did not seek to amend her complaint to allege that those features created a dangerous condition. Moreover, because she failed to establish a triable issue regarding whether the curve created a dangerous condition, Reeves also failed to establish a triable issue on whether the lack of signs warning about the curve created a dangerous condition. (Weinstein, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 [no warning signs are required if no dangerous condition exists].) C. Reeves May Not Defeat Summary Judgment by Relying on a Dangerous Condition She Failed to Allege in Her Complaint
Reeves opposed the Department's summary judgment motion by arguing a triable issue existed on whether the median and lane configuration in front of the driveway created a dangerous condition that contributed to the accident. The trial court, however, refused to consider whether this created a triable issue of fact because Reeves's complaint failed to allege these features created a dangerous condition. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to consider this new factual basis that Reeves failed to allege.
"'"The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings." [Citations.] The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's cause of action.' [Citation.]" (Affholder, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.) "Thus, a 'defendant moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.' [Citation.]" (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.)
"'To create a triable issue of material fact, the opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] If the opposing party's evidence would show some factual assertion, legal theory, defense or claim not yet pleaded, that party should seek leave to amend the pleadings before the hearing on the summary judgment motion. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.) "'"Declarations in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 'are no substitute for amended pleadings.' . . . If the motion for summary judgment presents evidence sufficient to disprove the plaintiff's claims . . . the plaintiff forfeits an opportunity to amend to state new claims by failing to request it."' [Citations.]" (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1254 (Conroy) [plaintiff could not rely on university's negligent failure to return her husband's ashes because she failed to allege this theory in her complaint].)
In Laabs, the plaintiff sued the City of Victorville for dangerous condition of public property to recover for injuries she suffered in an automobile collision. (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1248.) The plaintiff's complaint alleged the intersection where the accident occurred presented a dangerous condition because of inadequate sight distances and the lack of warning signs. (Id. at pp. 1249-1250.) The city sought summary judgment on the ground the intersection did not present a dangerous condition as a matter of law. In opposing the motion, the plaintiff argued the location of a streetlight she struck after colliding with the other vehicle created a dangerous condition that contributed to her injuries. The trial court, however, refused to consider whether the streetlight's location created a dangerous condition and granted the city's motion. (Id. at p. 1250.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed because the plaintiff based her summary judgment opposition on an allegedly different condition than the one she alleged in her complaint. (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1257-1258.) Factually, the plaintiff's complaint alleged the two vehicles collided in the intersection because the drivers could not see each other in time to avoid the collision. As for the basis for liability, the complaint alleged the city negligently "'creat[ed] and fail[ed] to correct dangerous road conditions due to inadequate sight distance and lack of warning signs, devices and signals.'" (Id. at pp. 1250, 1258.) The complaint did not mention the streetlight's location, nor did it allege any object the plaintiff struck after colliding with the other vehicle contributed to the dangerous condition: "In the amended complaint, there is no explicit or implicit involvement of the [streetlight]. The additional fact [regarding the streetlight's location] shifts the alleged dangerous condition to a portion of public property not remotely referenced in the amended complaint. It attempts to predicate liability on a totally different condition, not the least bit involved with the intersection or inadequate sight distance." (Id. at p. 1258.)
Here, Reeves also opposed the Department's summary judgment motion based on new factual issues not encompassed in her complaint. Factually, Reeves's complaint alleged the collision occurred when Dr. Reeves exited the driveway. The complaint based liability on the Department's negligence in operating, maintaining, designing, and controlling the Ramona Expressway. The only specific dangerous condition Reeves alleged was that the curve impaired the ability of drivers to see one another and the Department failed to post warning signs.
Reeves's summary judgment opposition, however, abandoned the theory that the curve and the inability of drivers to see one another was the dangerous condition that caused her husband's accident. Instead, she argued the median and lane configuration directly in front of the driveway created a dangerous condition by making it difficult and confusing for drivers exiting the driveway to see where to safely turn before entering westbound traffic. Reeves's complaint did not refer to the median, lane configurations, or any other feature of the Ramona Expressway except the curve. The complaint also is silent about conditions causing driver confusion. As in Laabs, Reeves's summary judgment opposition improperly relies on a different dangerous condition unrelated to the condition alleged in her complaint. Whether the curve impaired drivers' ability to see one another bears no relation to whether the median and lane configuration directly in front of the driveway confused drivers as they exit the driveway.
Nothing in Reeves's complaint gave the Department any warning that she based her claim on the median or the lane configuration. Moreover, in responding to the Department's discovery requests seeking the facts regarding the dangerous condition that contributed to her husband's accident, Reeves failed to refer to the median or lane configuration in any way. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly refused to consider at the summary judgment motion Reeves's evidence and argument that the median and lane configuration created a dangerous condition.
Reeves contends the issues regarding the median and lane configuration are "implicit" in her complaint's "general allegations" that the Department's design, maintenance, operation and control of the Ramona Expressway contributed to her husband's accident. In effect, Reeves contends a conclusory allegation that a roadway presents a dangerous condition puts in play every aspect of the roadway's design and permits a plaintiff to oppose summary judgment based on a specific roadway feature without a corresponding duty to previously identify that feature in the complaint.
To support this contention, Reeves relies on Blair v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 221 (Blair). Blair, however, addressed whether a government tort claim the plaintiff submitted before commencing litigation encompassed new factual issues the plaintiff alleged in his judicial complaint. Blair did not address whether a judicial complaint encompassed new factual issues the plaintiff relied on to oppose a summary judgment motion. As we explain, a government tort claim is evaluated under a different standard because it serves a different purpose than a judicial complaint.
In Blair, the plaintiff asserted a claim for dangerous condition of public property against the state after his vehicle slid off an icy highway and collided with a tree. The state moved to strike allegations regarding the highway's design and surrounding conditions that the plaintiff did not include in his government tort claim. The plaintiff's claim form alleged the state negligently maintained and constructed the highway and failed to sand and care for the highway to make it safe for automobiles. The state argued these allegations limited the plaintiff's judicial complaint to a claim for dangerous condition of public property based on the state's failure to prevent or remedy ice accumulation on the highway. The trial court agreed and struck allegations regarding the highway's slope, the lack of guard rails and warning signs, and the proximity of trees to the highway as dangerous conditions contributing to the accident. (Blair, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224.) The Court of Appeal reversed because "[a] charge of negligent construction may reasonably be read to encompass defects in the placement of highway guard rails, slope of the road, presence of hazards adjacent to the roadway or inadequate warning signs." (Id. at p. 226.)
The Blair court read the plaintiff's government tort claim broadly based on the policies and purpose of the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). (Blair, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 226.) "The purpose of the claim is to present sufficient detail 'to reasonably enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 225.) The Tort Claims Act merely requires the claimant to provide the date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence giving rise to the claim and a general description of the injury or loss suffered. "As long as these general elements are present, it is not necessary that the claim comply with formal pleading standards." (Id. at p. 224.) For example, "[w]hile an allegation as to the legal cause of an accident may be an element of the tort which must be pled in a complaint, [the Tort Claims Act] does not impose upon an injured claimant an obligation to include it in the claim." (Id. at p. 225.)
Unlike a government tort claim, a judicial complaint against a public entity must be specifically pleaded. (Brenner, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 439; see also Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 ["a claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only 'fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done'"].) A judicial complaint "alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized allegations [citation] but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition." (Brenner, at p. 439.) A judicial complaint's purpose is to limit the litigation's scope and provide the public entity with notice regarding the precise issues it must confront in the litigation. (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485-1486 (Dept. of Transportation).)
This heightened pleading standard for judicial complaints distinguishes Blair and prevents Reeves from opposing the Department's summary judgment motion based on a dangerous condition she did not specifically allege in her complaint. As explained above, the complaint defines the issues to which a defendant must respond in seeking summary judgment. (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.) A defendant need not address issues the plaintiff did not identify in his or her pleading and "'the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Laabs explains the rationale for the rule: "To allow a party to expand its pleadings by way of opposition papers creates, as it would here, an unwieldy process" and "allows nothing more than a moving target. For Code of Civil Procedure section 437c to have procedural viability, the parties must be acting on a known or set stage." (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258 & fn. 7.) Accordingly, we must reject Reeves's contention her general allegation that the Ramona Expressway presented a dangerous condition permits her to oppose the Department's summary judgment based on the median and lane configuration, or any other feature she failed to allege.
The foregoing does not mean a plaintiff is limited to the dangerous conditions alleged in their pleading once a public entity defendant files a summary judgment motion. "Upon a motion for summary judgment, amendments to the pleadings are readily allowed. [Citation.] If a plaintiff wishes to expand the issues presented, [however,] it is incumbent on the plaintiff to seek leave to amend the complaint either prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, or at the hearing itself." (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258.) A plaintiff forfeits the opportunity to amend his or her pleading by failing to request it. (Conroy, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1254.) Here, Reeves never sought to amend her complaint to allege the median or lane configuration as dangerous conditions contributing to her husband's accident.
Reeves also contends the Department waived any objection to the adequacy of her government tort claim or complaint by failing to raise the defect earlier. The Department, however, does not contend Reeves's claim or complaint is defective. Indeed, both identify a specific dangerous condition Reeves alleges contributed to her husband's accident — the curve in the road and the lack of warning signs. The Department instead argues Reeves's complaint limits her liability theory to the specific dangerous condition she alleged in her complaint. The Department did not challenge Reeves's failure to allege the median and lane configuration earlier because it had no notice Reeves intended to argue those features contributed to the accident. The Department, therefore, did not waive its objection that Reeves's summary judgment opposition improperly sought to argue an unpleaded dangerous condition.
Finally, Reeves argues the Department's motion put the median and lane configuration at issue because the Department's traffic engineering expert discussed those features in his declaration. That declaration, however, merely discussed those features as part of its overall description of the accident and roadway. The declaration did not address whether the median and lane configuration created a dangerous condition because Reeves's complaint did not allege those features created a dangerous condition.
Limiting plaintiffs to the facts and theories they allege in their complaint is a matter of due process. ""'[T]he essence is fairness in pleading in order to give the defendant sufficient notice of the cause of action stated against him so that he will be able to prepare his case [citations]. . . ."' [Citation.]" (Dept. of Transportation, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.) Laabs and numerous other cases consistently refuse to consider theories offered in a summary judgment opposition that are not alleged in the pleadings. (See, e.g., Conroy, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1254; Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 182; Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1201-1202, fn. 5; Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98-99, fn. 4.) Accordingly, we are compelled to ignore Reeves's unpleaded dangerous condition theories and affirm the trial court judgment because Reeves failed to create a trial issue of material fact on the theory alleged in her complaint. D. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Sustaining the Department's Evidentiary Objections or Denying Reeves's Reconsideration Motion
Reeves argues the trial court erred in sustaining the Department's evidentiary objections because the court (1) improperly made a blanket ruling on the objections, (2) erroneously excluded admissible evidence, and (3) denied Reeves's reconsideration motion despite instructing her to put the matter "back on calendar" if she wanted to argue the court's rulings on the evidentiary objections. We find no error in how the trial court handled the evidentiary objections.
First, the trial court did not make a blanket ruling sustaining the Department's evidentiary objections. Rather, the court signed a separate order that addressed each individual objection. On that order, the court separately initialed each objection to indicate whether it sustained or overruled the objection. The order followed the format required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(c).
Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objections because the evidence it excluded related to dangerous conditions Reeves failed to allege in her complaint. As explained above, Reeves cannot defeat the Department's motion by presenting evidence regarding dangerous conditions she did not allege in her complaint (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253) and therefore evidence regarding unpleaded conditions is irrelevant and inadmissible.
Moreover, assuming the trial court erred by sustaining some or all of the evidentiary objections, that error does not require us to reverse the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment motion. An erroneous evidentiary ruling requires reversal only if "there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 815; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.) Here, any error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings could not change the outcome on the summary judgment motion because Reeves failed to present any evidence creating a triable issue on the dangerous condition alleged in her complaint.
Finally, the trial court did not err in denying Reeves's reconsideration motion. A trial court may not grant a party's motion for reconsideration unless the party makes the showing required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a). (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108-1109 (Le Francois).) That subdivision requires the party seeking reconsideration to establish (1) new or different facts, circumstances, or law the trial court did not consider when making its original ruling and (2) a valid reason for not presenting the new or different facts, circumstances, or law when the trial court made its original ruling. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 211-212.) Here, Reeves makes no attempt to establish new or different facts, circumstances or law and therefore the trial court properly denied the reconsideration motion.
Reeves argues the trial court erred in denying the reconsideration motion because the court told her to put the matter "back on calendar" to argue the court's rulings on the evidentiary objections. The trial court made that statement to Reeves at the summary judgment hearing and the court had the inherent power to reconsider its rulings on the evidentiary objections and summary judgment on its own motion regardless of whether Reeves made the showing required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a). (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1108-1109.)
Nonetheless, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to reconsider its earlier rulings. As explained above, the trial court did not err in sustaining the Department's evidentiary objections and, assuming it did, any error would not support reversing the summary judgment ruling. At the hearing on Reeves's reconsideration motion, the trial court stated it need not reconsider the evidentiary objections because Reeves's summary judgment opposition improperly relied on unpleaded dangerous conditions and therefore could not defeat the Department's motion regardless of the evidentiary rulings.
Reeves suggests the trial court improperly denied her the opportunity to argue the Department's evidentiary objections, but the record does not support that suggestion. The Department timely filed and served its objections more than a week before the summary judgment hearing. At the hearing, the trial court declined to issue a tentative ruling on the objections, but stated it would serve the parties with its final ruling. The trial court did nothing to prevent Reeves from arguing the merits of her objections at the hearing. The offer to allow Reeves to put the objections "back on calendar" did not prevent her from arguing the objections.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Department shall recover its costs on appeal.
ARONSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
MOORE, J.