Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-6539.
October 21, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, George P. Reed, filed this action against Defendants Springfield Police Department, Patrolman David Welsh, and Sergeant Michael Vaughan. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f) (Docket No. 9).
I. BACKGROUND
As this is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all "well pleaded" facts alleged in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
The events underlying Plaintiff's cause of action took place on or about November 10, 2002 when Defendants Welsh and Vaughan entered Plaintiff's home. Defendants entered Plaintiff's bedroom and "aroused Plaintiff by placing a gun to his head and shining flashlights in his eyes." Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Defendants then "threw the Plaintiff" on the floor of his bedroom and placed him in wrist restraints. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Once Plaintiff was on the floor, Defendant Vaughan kneeled on Plaintiff's back to keep Plaintiff on the floor. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff then heard a third voice over a two-way radio or cell phone instructing Defendants to leave the premises. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12. At this point, Defendants asked Plaintiff if he had been drinking and for identification. Id. ¶ 14. After reviewing Plaintiff's identification, Defendant Vaughan released Plaintiff from the wrist restraints and removed himself from Plaintiff's back. Id. ¶ 16. Defendants then left Plaintiff's home.
The next day, Plaintiff visited the Springfield Police Department in an attempt to obtain a copy of the relevant police report. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff was denied access to any police reports. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27. Plaintiff filed this claim against the Springfield Police Department, Patrolman David Welsh, and Sergeant Michael Vaughan on December 3, 2003 alleging violations of his civil rights.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001). A court may only dismiss a complaint where plaintiff can prove no set of facts, consistent with his allegations, which justify relief. See ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. Motion to Strike
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to strike "from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." To succeed on this motion, Defendants must show that the "allegations being challenged are so unrelated to the plaintiff's claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that the moving party is prejudiced by the presence of the allegations in the pleading." Great West Life Assurance Co. v. Levithan, 843 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Count One — Conspiracy Claim
Defendants move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of conspiracy under § 1983 and § 1985(3).
1. Section 1983 Claim
Section 1983 imposes civil liability on any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create a substantive right, but provides a remedy for the violation of a federal Constitutional or statutory right. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979). To establish a violation of § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the defendant deprived him of that right acting under color of law.See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982).
The first step in this Court's analysis is to identify the specific Constitutional right infringed. Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions deprived him of his rights under the "First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Based on the facts set forth in the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegation sufficiently establishes a claim for deprivation of a Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. Under the Fourth Amendment, a "seizure" occurs when a government actor, "by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrain[s] the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Here, Plaintiff repeatedly states that he was "intentionally assaulted" and placed in "wrist restraints." As such, Plaintiff was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and has satisfied part one of the test to state a claim under § 1983.
Additionally, Plaintiff must show Defendants deprived him of that right acting under color of state law. Under § 1983, persons act under color of state law if they are state actors or if they exert "power 'possessed by virtue of state law and . . . possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.'" Abbot v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, both Defendants are clearly state actors, as both are police officers employed by the Springfield Police Department. See id.
Although Plaintiff has met the 12(b)(6) requirements to state a claim under § 1983, he must also meet the standard for a conspiracy under § 1983. See Marchese v. Umstead, 110 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (requiring the elements of both a § 1983 violation and a conspiracy to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion). A complaint alleging a conspiracy under § 1983 must "contain sufficient information for the court to determine whether or not a valid claim for relief has been stated and to enable the opposing side to prepare an adequate responsive pleading." Loftus v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Further, the court held in Loftus that to plead a conspiracy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a plaintiff must "plead with particularity the circumstances . . . such as . . . the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose." Loftus, 843 F. Supp. at 986-87.
In count one of his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "conspired to violate the civil rights of the Plaintiff under the color of state law by intentionally entering his home without cause and without authority in law." Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 30. The complaint identifies the two officers who are alleged to have entered into the conspiracy, addresses the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve the purpose of the conspiracy. Additionally, Plaintiff discusses acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy after the events of November 10, 2002. Therefore, Plaintiff has met the burden under Rule 12(b)(6) and Defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim in count one is denied.
2. Section 1985(3) Claim
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997). As Plaintiff has not alleged any racial or class-based discrimination behind the alleged conspiracy, his allegations do not state a claim under § 1985. See Stouch v. Williamson Hospitality Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim in count one is granted.
B. Motion to Dismiss Count Two — Respondeat Superior Claim
Defendants ask the court to dismiss count two of Plaintiff's amended complaint because there is no basis for respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 8. Count two of Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the Springfield Police Department is liable for the acts and omissions of Defendants Vaughan and Welsch under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 50. In his response, Plaintiff concedes that count two of his complaint should be stricken. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss count two of the complaint is granted.
C. Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Three — Negligence Claims
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's civil rights claims to the extent that they are based on negligent conduct. The Supreme Court has held that negligent conduct alone is not sufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a § 1983 case. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986).
As discussed above, count one of Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's civil rights in violation of § 1983. The Court finds that most of count one discusses intentional acts by Defendants. However, paragraph 42 of count one refers to the "gross negligence" of the Springfield Police Department. See Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-46. Additionally, count three of Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Plaintiff's injuries were "the direct result of all of the actions and/or omissions of the Police Department of the Township of Springfield including the negligence and/or their negligent violation of the rights and interests of Plaintiff." Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 53 (emphasis added).
To the extent that count one discusses intentional acts and violations under the Fourth Amendment, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. However, to the extent that paragraph 42 of count one and count three attempt to impose liability based on negligence under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are dismissed and Defendants' motion is granted. See Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1143 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that "conduct amounting to no more than simple negligence cannot constitute a violation of the constitutional right to due process"). D. Motion to Dismiss Portions of Complaint Under 12(f)
The Court is not dismissing paragraph 42 of count one and count three in their entirety, but only to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment by asserting negligent conduct.
Defendants have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike portions of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as "being impertinent, repetitive and/or redundant." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 9. This Court has held that the "standard for striking under Rule 12(f) is strict." Lakits v. York, 258 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2003). Furthermore, motions to strike will "generally be denied unless the material bears no possible relation to the matter at issue and may result in prejudice to the moving party." Brooks v. Sys. Mfg. Corp., 2003 WL 23023826, *4 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
Defendants move to strike three separate portions of Plaintiff's amended complaint. First, Defendants move to strike all references to the insurance representative of the Springfield Police Department. Defendants argue that the insurance representative has nothing to do with the events of November 10, 2002. They further argue that references to the insurance representative could potentially prejudice Defendants in front of a jury. Plaintiff argues that the references to the insurance representative are necessary to state "the source of a libel or slander claim." Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 10. The Court finds that the two references to the representative are not prejudicial to Defendants at this point and may bear a possible relation to Plaintiff's conspiracy claim. Therefore Defendant's motion to strike the references is denied.
Next, Defendants move to strike references to criminal charges in Plaintiff's complaint. Neither Plaintiff's amended complaint nor its response describes how Plaintiff would have standing to bring criminal charges against Defendants. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert criminal charges against Defendants, Defendants' motion is granted and those portions of paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's complaint are stricken.
Finally, Defendants move to strike count five of Plaintiff's complaint because it is repetitive of count one of the complaint. Plaintiff has not responded to this argument. After reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that count five of Plaintiff's complaint is identical to the conspiracy claim in count one. Therefore, Defendants' motion is granted and count five is stricken.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants motion is granted in part and denied in part.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of October, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants Sergeant Michael Vaughan and Springfield Police Department's Motion to Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 9), and Plaintiff's Response thereto (Docket No. 10, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
(1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Conspiracy Claims is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
(2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff's Complaint arguing respondeat superior liability for the Springfield Police Department is GRANTED;
(3) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss all claims based on negligent conduct is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
(4) Defendant's Motion to Strike certain portions of Plaintiff's Complaint as impertinent, repetitive and redundant under Rule 12(f) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.