Opinion
No. 98 C 4934
May 26, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action concerns the proper educational placement for Rachel Reed ("Rachel") a disabled individual, eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., ("IDEA"). Thomas Reed ("Mr. Reed"), Rachel's father, and Vanessa Reed ("Ms. Reed"), Rachel's mother and legal guardian, filed a complaint seeking review and reversal of an administrative decision finding that a residential school placement provides Rachel with a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") consistent with IDEA and the regulations thereunder. Mr. and Ms. Reed ask this Court to receive further evidence in support of their position, order Defendants to locate or develop a program that meets Rachel's needs in the least restrictive setting possible, award Rachel compensatory education, and award Mr. and Ms. Reed $10,932.89 for costs and attorney's fees.
This lawsuit was originally assigned to Judge Ann C. Williams and was recently transferred to this Court on 4/12/00 upon her appointment to the Court of Apeals.
Plaintiffs have dismissed counts II and III of their complaint, which alleged civil rights violations.
Ms. Reed and Defendants Lincoln-Way Community High School District No. 210 ("School District") and Lincoln-Way Special Education District No. 843 ("Special Ed. District"), (collectively "Defendants") have filed cross motions for summary judgment on the merits of the administrative decision. Furthermore, the Special Ed. District asks this Court to dismiss it as a party to this action and to sanction Ms. Reed for asserting frivolous claims and contentions in her summary judgment motion.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In addition, the Court grants Defendants School District's and Special Ed. District's motions for summary judgment, and denies as moot Special Ed. District's motion to dismiss it as a party defendant to this action. Finally, the Court denies Defendant Special Ed. District's motion to sanction Plaintiffs.
RELEVANT FACTS
Rachel was born on December 21, 1979, and is eligible for special education services under IDEA. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 1.) Her primary disabling characteristic is a behavior/emotional disorder. Her secondary disabling characteristics are speech and/or language impairment and mental impairment; and her tertiary disabling characteristic is a health impairment resulting from her allergies. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 2.) Rachel's academic functioning remains at the first or second grade level. Her primary difficulty during her enrollment in the School District has been her inability to act in a socially acceptable manner and refrain from insubordinate, aggressive, and sometimes uncontrollably violent conduct. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4.)
Ever since Rachel entered the School District during the 1993-94 school year, the School District has used the Special Ed. District as its agent to provide Rachel with special education services. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 7-8.) The Special Ed. District is a legal entity created by the joint agreement of several school districts, including Defendant School District, for the purpose of providing special education services. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 8.)
The School District has developed at least fourteen separate Individual Education Programs ("IEPs") for Rachel during her five years in the School District, and Ms. Reed attended each of the first thirteen IEP conferences. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 9.) An IEP is a comprehensive statement of a disabled individual's educational needs and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. Rachel's IEPs have included two basic sets of goals: (1) to exhibit appropriate behavior in her interactions with students and staff; and (2) to achieve a functional level of understanding in both academic and vocational areas. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 10.) Rachel, however, has not achieved either of these goals in any of her three different therapeutic day school placements since she entered the School District. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 11-12.)
Rachel attended the Beacon Therapeutic Day School ("Beacon") from November 15, 1993 until her discharge in July 1996. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 15-16, 39.) Then Rachel underwent psychiatric in-patient treatment at the Rock Creek Center in Lemont, Illinois from September 24, 1996 until October 16, 1996. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 49-50.) Ms. Reed thereafter refused to consent to a placement at the Park Forest Academy day program and kept Rachel out of school until Rachel was placed at the Camelot Care Center's ("Camelot") therapeutic day program in Palatine, Illinois, where she participated from March to July 1997. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 40-44, 54.) Rachel next attended Chileda Habilitation Institute ("Chileda") in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, a residential treatment center for students with developmental disabilities and significant behavioral problems, from July 17, 1997 through August 22, 1997, when Ms. Reed terminated Rachel's placement and brought her back home. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 69-74.) Rachel was then placed at Independence High School ("Independence"), a therapeutic day school in Flossmoor, Illinois in mid-November 1997. However, Ms. Reed removed her from Independence on January 14, 1998. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 98-102.)
At each therapeutic day school placement, Rachel exhibited disruptive, often violent behavior, which, in the opinion of all the educational staff, prevented her from receiving a FAPE and jeopardized the safety of students and staff. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 13.) Rachel's violent and insubordinate behavior during her three different day school placements included: (1) biting her teacher's arm; (2) slapping one staff member in the face and biting another when they tried to calm her down; (3) punching a staff member in the jaw; and (4) trashing the school cafeteria and attacking people. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 22, 63.) Rachel has also engaged in screaming episodes, acts of indecent exposure, profanity, fabrication, provocation of other students/patients, and destruction of property. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 23, 25, 32, 52, 79, 90-91, 103-106.)
The staff of all three day school placements and one residential placement primarily attributed Rachel's lack of behavioral progress to the fact that Ms. Reed undermined staff efforts by not holding Rachel accountable for her behavior, as well as Rachel's ability to manipulate her mother against school staff. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 31, 33, 62-63, 75-76, 122-124.) Ms. Reed however attributed much of Rachel's behavior to food allergies. The staff at the schools detected no correlation between Rachel eating food she was allergic to and her violent episodes. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 28-30, 61-63, 86-87.)
On December 18, 1997, Rachel was arrested after kicking, resisting, and assaulting Independence staff members who attempted to restrain her after she threw a book and began ripping up papers from a teacher's desk. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 115, 117.) One of these staff members subsequently filed battery charges against Rachel. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 116.) Later, on January 6, 1998, Rachel attacked an Independence bus driver, who also filed battery charges against Rachel. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 118.) Rachel's last day at the Independence day school program was January 14, 1998. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 120.) Since then, Ms. Reed has withheld Rachel from school. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶ 121.) Thereafter, the School District recommended that Rachel be placed in a residential placement; Ms. Reed disagreed with this recommendation. On March 5, 1998, the School District requested a due process hearing before an impartial hearing officer. (R. 26, School District's Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 3.)
At the due process hearing held before Hearing Officer Dr. James Wolter ("Wolter") on April 6 and 7, 1998, the School District argued that, given Rachel's lack of progress toward the IEP goals at her three therapeutic day program placements, she would need a residential school placement in order to have any chance of receiving a FAPE. ( Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) At the hearing, educational staff members from Rachel's day school placements, the School District's special education coordinator, and the Special Ed. District's director and psychologist unequivocally testified that Rachel would not only benefit from, but required residential placement in order to have any chance of achieving her IEP goals and receiving a FAPE. (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. ¶¶ 14, 36-38, 64-67, 95, 98, 126.)
In his April 14, 1998 decision, Wolter concluded that Rachel would need a residential program to receive a FAPE. He rejected Plaintiffs' request to order the School District to place Rachel in a program designed for students with communications disorders. Wolter also denied Plaintiffs' request for compensatory education and attorney's fees. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal before this Court.
Plaintiffs, do not dispute the above description of Rachel's school placements and her conduct during that time. In fact, Ms. Reed failed to comply with Local Rule 12(M) by not filing a statement of material facts to which she contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle her to a judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, Defendants did not file a responsive statement of facts pursuant to Local Rule 12(N). Ms. Reed also failed to comply with Local Rule 12(N)(3) because she did not file a response to the School District's and Special Ed. District's 12(M) Statement. This Court, therefore, deems the material facts set forth in the School District's and the Special Ed. District's 12(M) Statement admitted. See Tobey it Extel/JWP, Inc., 985 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1993). This Court however is not relieved of its obligation to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994).
STANDARD
The standard of review to be applied in this case differs from the standard governing a typical motion for summary judgment. IDEA provides that the Court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). If neither party presents additional evidence, then a motion for summary judgment is treated as a procedural vehicle for asking the Court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record. Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997). The party challenging the administrative record bears the burden of proof. See id.
In reviewing the administrative record, the Court must give due weight to the findings of the hearing officer and may not substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities whose decision it is reviewing. See id. at 1052-53. The due weight the Court must give to the prior administrative proceedings is not directed to the testimony of witnesses or to the evidence — both of which the Court must independently evaluate — but instead to the hearing officer's decision as a whole. See id. Essentially, the Court's task is to conduct a bench trial on the papers. Patricia P. v. Board of Ed. of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 466-67 (7th Cir. 2000) (instructing district court judges to apply preponderance standard when reviewing administrative record and placing burden of proof on party challenging record).
ANALYSIS
Ms. Reed's motion for summary judgment asks this Court to review Wolter's April 14, 1998 decision and enter an order scheduling submission of evidence regarding Rachel's educational need and Ms. Reed's claims for compensatory educational time and compensatory damages. The School District and Special Ed. District ask this Court to affirm Wolter's decision in its entirety and enter summary judgment in their favor.
The Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for courts to use to determine whether a disabled child is receiving a FAPE: (1) does the state comply with IDEA's administrative procedures, and (2) did the state develop an IEP reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits to a disabled student. Hendrick Hudson Dist, Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982); Patricia P., 203 F.3d at 476. If the state satisfies these two requirements, a court cannot require more. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Because Plaintiffs do not assert and the record does not support a finding that the School District failed to comply with the procedures set forth in IDEA, this Court will focus on whether the School District's proposed IEP is reasonably calculated to enable Rachel to receive educational benefits.
The issue is whether the School District's proposal to place Rachel in Chileda's residential program affords her an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment, as required under IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) and (5). IDEA contains a well-established preference for main streaming, or educating disabled students alongside their nondisabled peers in the same classroom. See id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300, 550; MR by RR v. Lincolnwood Bd. of Educ., 843 F. Supp. 1236, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Rheinstrom it Lincolnwood Bd. of Educ., 56 F.3d 67 (7th Cir. 1995). Main streaming, however, is inappropriate if it costs disabled students their own minimum educational opportunities. See LaGrange Sch. Dist. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1999); Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1056-57. The appropriate concern is finding a program that will be of educational benefit to the child. Board of Educ. of Community Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1991).
A. Procedural Issues
Before proceeding to analyze the administrative record in this case it is appropriate to decide two threshold procedural issues raised by Ms. Reed.
1. The Illinois Probate Act Agreement
Ms. Reed initially asserts that Wolter's decision, that a residential placement provides Rachel with a FAPE, is illegal under the Illinois Probate Act, which requires a state judge to issue an order authorizing Rachel's residential placement. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-14.1. Ms. Reed, however, failed to raise this argument during the due process hearing before Wolter and thereby forfeited her opportunity to present it here. See Bruschini v. Board of Educ. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 911 F. Supp. 104, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (opportunity to present additional evidence to the federal court does not extend jurisdiction to matters not raised at the administrative level); Howell v. Waterford Pub. Sch., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (refusing to consider sub-issues not presented at the administrative hearing below); David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Committee, 775 F.2d 411, 424 (1st Cir. 1985) (issues must first be presented to the administrative hearing officer in order to preserve the issues for judicial review).
Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Ms. Reed's Illinois Probate Act argument, it would be denied. The Illinois Probate Act neither increases nor alters the School District's obligations under IDEA. The Illinois Probate Act merely requires Ms. Reed to obtain an order if she chooses to consent to placing Rachel in the residential program. Moreover, any probate court costs associated with Rachel's residential placement do not violate the School District's obligation to provide special education and related services at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, ( see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(A): the IDEA does not require states to offer probate services for disabled students at public expense. No case law supports Ms. Reed's argument that any probate costs incurred in accepting a residential placement fall under the School District's obligation to pay for special education related services. And, in any event, Ms. Reed refused to comply with the School District's plan to place Rachel in a residential program. Thus, she has not (and probably will not) incur probate costs associated with obtaining an order under § 5/11a-14.1. We must therefore reject Ms. Reed's arguments under the Illinois Probate Act.
2. Ms. Reed's Request for this Court to Receive Additional Evidence
Ms. Reed urges this Court to receive additional evidence and complains that Wolter's decision is based on evidence that, by now, is stale. She has not, however, specified what additional evidence she wants this Court to consider. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)(2)(B)(ii) authorizes the Court to hear additional evidence at the request of a party, but the word "additional" is construed to mean "supplemental" and thus does not authorize witnesses at trial to merely repeat or embellish prior administrative hearing testimony. Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). The Burlington Court specifically noted:
[T]he reasons for supplementation will vary; they might include gaps in the administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion of evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing. The starting point for determining what additional evidence should be received, however, is the record of the administrative proceeding.Id. The Burlington Court's determination of what is appropriate "additional" evidence in IDEA cases has been expressly adopted in this Circuit. See Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L., 102 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Patricia P., 203 F.3d at 470.
In this case, Ms. Reed has made it extremely difficult to assess the need for additional evidence. She has not indicated exactly what additional evidence is necessary to supplement the extensive administrative record. Further, Ms. Reed does not allege any "procedural infirmaries" in the administrative proceedings warrants submission of evidence as to her substantive arguments. Compare Monticello, 102 F.3d at 902. Moreover, the Court's own independent review of the administrative record does not reveal any infirmities in the proceedings that might justify additional evidence. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion under the IDEA, concludes that additional evidence is not necessary to review Wolter's decision given the issues and facts involved in this lawsuit. Consequently, Ms. Reed's general request to supplement the administrative record is denied.
B. Substantive Claims
We proceed to address the substantive claims involved in this lawsuit. The parties vigorously litigated the issue of whether the School District's proposal to place Rachel in Chileda's residential program affords her an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment during the two-day administrative hearing before Wolter. The bottom line is that every educator familiar with Rachel from her placements at Beacon, Camelot, Chileda, and Independence testified unequivocally that Rachel requires special education in a residential setting. Rachel's IEP goals throughout her enrollment in the School District have focused on her need to learn how to control her behavior and accept responsibility for her actions by achieving basic, short-term objectives like raising her hand to get her teacher's attention, remaining seated for ten minutes without disturbing other students, and respecting school property and the property of other students. Meanwhile, her academic objectives have remained very rudimentary: identifying and counting money using pennies, nickels, dimes and quarters; identifying fractions so that she can measure appropriately for cooking activities; and learning to tell time by thirty, fifteen, and five-minute intervals. Rachel's struggle to master these skills for everyday living supports the witnesses' testimony that her chronic and severe misconduct interferes with her academic progress.
For example, Rachel's teacher at Beacon, Diane Kush, testified that Beacon is a very good school and about as restrictive as a school can get without residential treatment, but even Beacon's staff could not curb Rachel's behavior problems so that she could benefit academically. Moreover, Kimberly Dryler, the Special Educ. District's psychologist, testified that she has followed Rachel's case for over 2 1/2 years and opined that constantly moving Rachel from one day school to another is a disservice to Rachel because she is not making any progress and does not have much time left in the School District's educational system. Rachel's failure to benefit from her placements in three different therapeutic day programs was starkly revealed by her arrests for a December 1997 attack on Independence personnel and a January 1998 attack on a school bus driver.
Educators from Beacon, Camelot, Chileda, and Independence all testified that whatever progress Rachel would make in school toward improved self-control was undermined at home because Ms. Reed would not hold Rachel responsible for her own behavior. Amy Carollo, Rachel's teacher at Independence, testified that any gains made at school were washed away at home. Moreover, Ms. Dryier testified that Rachel needs the structure, positive reinforcement and peer interaction of a residential placement, and explained that the only documentation of growth during Rachel's several years in the School District occurred during her residential placement at Chileda for a few weeks.
Ms. Reed, on the other hand, vehemently opposes the Chileda residential placement option and argues that it is not the least restrictive environment for Rachel because it moves her 300 miles from home, places her in a program her neurologist disapproved, and cuts her off from verbal communication with her parents and access to her own doctors. Ms. Reed adds that this form of "solitary confinement" will not benefit Rachel educationally, but will only "warehouse her far from her home" and tear apart her family. (R. 33, Pl.'s Mem. Supporting Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ A.) Apparently, Ms. Reed is alluding to the conditions contained in Chileda's behavioral management plan and Wolter's order that Ms. Reed cooperate fully with that plan. (Def.'s Mem., Ex. B, Ex. G.)
Chileda's behavioral management plan was outlined by Lynn Kay, the Chileda Director of Family Services, on February 17, 1998. This plan allows Rachel to return to Chileda provided that she have no contact with her family for the first two months of her placement. other than by written correspondence. Furthermore, Rachel's parents are required to submit any concerns to Chileda in writing, and Chileda will respond in writing. Chileda will send the Reeds weekly written progress reports for the first three months of Rachel's placement. Additionally, Chileda's physicians will monitor and provide Rachel with necessary medical care as her primary care physicians during her placement, and all her treatment, medications, vitamins, etc. will come from these primary care physicians' orders, and Rachel's parents will be notified regarding medication changes. Chileda will also provide free transportation for Rachel to return home to Rockford for visits during the regular vacation schedule, and her family may begin visiting her at Chileda in six months, at their own expense. Finally, Chileda will cooperate with visits by a designated advocate for Rachel at anytime, and Chileda agrees that either a third party approved by the School District and Rachel's parents, or Chileda's external human rights committee may review Rachel's behavior program on a biyearly basis upon request.
Ms. Reed argues that a residential placement at Chileda, under the above conditions violates IDEA because it will prevent the Reeds from making decisions about Rachel's education and medical treatment. This Court finds that the limitations on Ms. Reed's ability to contact Chileda staff directly are necessary, given her past frequent, negative discussions with staff, which interfered with Rachel's treatment. Specifically, Rachel was able to pit her mother and Chileda staff against each other, and thus avoid facing any consequences for her misconduct.
Moreover, Chileda's weekly written progress reports and Ms. Reed's opportunity to submit any concerns to staff in writing afford Ms. Reed an adequate means of input and will help deter negative entanglements with Chileda's staff down the road. In addition, Ms. Reed's ability to request that a third party review Rachel's behavior program and Chileda's agreement to cooperate with visits by Rachel's designated advocate allow a neutral third party to monitor and protect Rachel's best interests. Furthermore, Ms. Reed may send Rachel cards and notes as often as she wishes and may telephone Rachel after her first two months of placement.
Ms. Reed lastly asserts that Wolter's decision is not supported by medical evidence because Plaintiffs' witness Charles N. Swisher, M.D., Acting Division Head of Neurology, Children's Memorial Hospital, gave a medical opinion advising against a residential placement for Rachel and was not rebutted by any other medical professional. Although Dr. Swisher did not testify at the hearing, Wolter admitted into evidence Dr. Swisher's written testimony, despite the School District's objection that it would not be able to cross-examine Dr. Swisher. This testimony consists of letters Dr. Swisher wrote, dated March 31, 1998, January 21, 1998, April 10, 1996, August 10, 1994, and April 14, 1993.
Dr. Swisher's letters explain that he has followed Rachel since 1982 when she was 2 1/2 years old. He states that Rachel's diagnosis is pervasive developmental disorder, and her communication disorder involves both difficulty with language and some hearing loss. Dr. Swisher asserts that Rachel's behavior and emotional difficulties are secondary to frustrations related to her communication disorder. He admits that he is not an educator and thus not able to recommend a specific educational program for Rachel, but he opines that Rachel should be in a classroom that focuses on improved communications and socialization and adds that a residential placement is too restrictive for her.
The record shows, however, that other medical evidence rebuts Dr. Swisher's testimony. Specifically, after Rachel's psychiatric treatment in October 1996, medical staff at Rock Creek Medical Center recommended the most restrictive environment possible for Rachel to ensure the safety of other students, staff, and Rachel herself. Further, after Rachel's psychiatric assessment in April 1996, Christ Hospital and Medical Center staff described Rachel as one of the most violent patients they had ever seen.
The School District also correctly notes that Dr. Swisher knows nothing about Rachel's educational history because he never attended any of Rachel's thirteen IEP conferences, never visited any of Rachel's educational placements at the School District, and never requested information regarding the nature of Rachel's placements or her performance. See Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1057-58 (courts should defer to trained educators familiar with the student, not to outside medical professionals). Special Educ. District's psychologist Kimberly Dryier phoned Dr. Swisher numerous times without success to discuss his August 10, 1994 letter, wherein he recommended education for a communication disorder. Ms. Dryier testified that she wanted to clarify exactly what he meant by a communication disorder. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that both the extensive record and overwhelming testimony by the parties support Wolter's finding that Rachel needs a residential placement at Chileda to provide her a FAPE despite the written testimony of Dr. Swisher.
The record also supports Wolter's finding that the communication disorder program Mr. and Ms. Reed want for Rachel is not an appropriate placement for her. Testimony from Special Educ. District's Director, Rebecca Fries, Psychologist Kimberly Dryier, and the School District's special education placement coordinator, Jane Lewellyn, establish that Rachel does not meet any of the required characteristics for the Special Educ. District's communication disorder program. First, students in this program are all of average intelligence and study an age-appropriate ( i.e. high school) curriculum, whereas Rachel's IQ is less than sixty-nine and she remains at about a second-grade academic level. Second, students in this program must exhibit language skills that are not commensurate with their cognitive abilities. Rachel, however, is just the opposite — her intellect has not kept pace with her verbal skills. Third, students in the program must be able to comply with school rules and behavior guidelines, whereas Rachel's behavior, however, is uncontrollable and violent.
After reviewing all of the evidence presented in this case, and giving due weight to the administrative proceedings, this Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the School District and Special Educ. District have complied with IDEA, and Wolter's decision should be affirmed in its entirety. This Court empathizes with Rachel's parents and acknowledges that a temporary separation from their daughter will no doubt be difficult. Watching a child struggle as she learns how to stand on her own two feet can be one of parenthood's more painful yet rewarding experiences. Although the conditions Chileda places on Rachel and her family are unusual, the record establishes that Rachel, her family, and the School District's past interactions warrant them. Hopefully, Ms. Reed will follow Chileda's recommendation to seek structured support from a counselor who would become familiar with this matter and be willing to work with Chileda staff.
C. Defendant Special Educ. District's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
"Rule 11 prohibits the filing of pleadings that are not reasonably based in the law or in fact and forbids the filing of pleadings that are interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increased cost of litigation." Kapco Mfg. Co. v. Enterprises, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing, Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987)).
The Court does not believe that Ms. Reed or her attorney's failure to withdraw the motion for summary judgment against Special Educ. District constitutes a Rule 11 violation. Although Ms. Reed may not have had a strong case to reverse Wolter's decision, and summary judgment for the School District and the Special Educ. District is appropriate, this does not automatically warrant Rule 11 sanctions against Ms. Reed or her attorney. Rather, Rule 11 sanctions are only appropriate when a party has some improper purpose in refusing to withdraw a summary judgment motion. The record in this case reveals no improper purpose or intent to prolong the litigation in Ms. Reed's attorney's refusal to withdraw the summary judgment motion. Rather, it appears that Ms. Reed and her attorney merely pursued a claim they reasonably believed has some legitimate basis in fact and law. Accordingly, the Court denies Special Educ. District's motion to impose sanctions on Ms. Reed or her attorney under Rule 11.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons contained herein, Defendants School District and Special Educ. District's respective motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' IDEA claim, (R. 23-1 and 24-1), are both granted. Ms. Reed's motion for summary judgment, (R. 26-1), is denied. The Special Educ. District's motion to dismiss, (R. 21-1), is denied as moot, and its motion for sanctions, (R. 41-1), against Ms. Reed is denied.
Finally, the Court also grants appointed counsel Joseph Lulves' motion, (R.58-1), to be excused from his appointment to represent the Reeds with the Court's thanks for his services in this case.