Opinion
C.A. No. 98-582-GMS
January 12, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, P. Robert Reed ("Reed"), filed suit against his former employer, Hewlett-Packard, Inc. ("Hewlett-Packard"), alleging that Hewlett-Packard violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) et seq. (1994) when it fired him. Presently before the court is Hewlett-Packard's motion to dismiss. The court will deny Hewlett-Packard's motion to dismiss because Reed timely filed his charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.
I. FACTS
Reed was employed as an executive at Hewlett-Packard. He worked there for over twenty years before he was fired on April 23, 1997. According to Reed, over this time, he consistently received excellent reviews from his superiors. In essence, Reed claims that he was fired when he would not accept a promotion to a better position out of state in order to let a minority applicant who, in Reed's opinion, was less qualified take his job.
After being fired from Hewlett-Packard, Reed presented a written Charge of Discrimination to the Philadelphia District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or about February 11, 1998. The Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") form includes a box that must be checked if plaintiffs are also filing the Charge form with a state agency. Reed did not check this box. The Charge form provides another space to indicate whether a claimant wishes to initiate proceedings with a state agency. Reed's form also failed to indicate whether he wished to file his Charge with a state agency in this space as well.
Reed then filed this action within ninety days of receiving a Right to Sue Letter. Reed claims that Hewlett-Packard engaged in employment discrimination by firing him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and that Hewlett-Packard breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing with him. Reed seeks declarative, injunctive, and monetary relief. In its answer, Hewlett-Packard raised a number of affirmative defenses. The one most relevant to the motion before the court is whether Reed filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in a timely manner.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc. 113 F. Supp.2d 777, 780 (W.D. Pa 2000). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and view the complaint's averments in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A complaint may be dismissed only where no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
In Title VII cases, claims are properly presented to the court only after administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Anjelino v. New York Times, 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999). In particular, if a plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies before bringing suit, then a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 87; Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, the statute of limitations may be the basis of a motion to dismiss, provided the complaint on its face shows noncompliance with the applicable limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading. Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc. 113 F. Supp.2d 777, 780-81 (W.D. Pa 2000) (citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Before addressing the merits of Hewlett-Packard's motion, the court must determine whether any extrinsic documents may be properly considered in deciding this motion to dismiss. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, any exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). If a court considers extrinsic matters outside of the pleadings, the motion must be converted to a summary judgment motion and the parties must be given notice of this conversion in order to conduct discovery. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989). There is an exception to the general rule, however, which is premised on the theory that when a complaint relies on a document, the plaintiff is clearly on notice as to its contents and the need for an opportunity to refute the evidence is diminished. Pension Benefit, 998 F.2d at 1196-97. Here Reed's Charge of Discrimination form is both integral to his complaint and a matter of public record. Because a discrimination plaintiff cannot "sustain a court claim without showing resort to the avenue of administrative relief," this court will consider the Charge of Discrimination form filed by Reed. Arizmendi v. Lawson, 914 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1384, n. 2; Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (considering EEOC charge and related EEOC documents).
The court now turns to the substance of Hewlett-Packard's motion to dismiss.
III. DISCUSSION
In this case, there is no factual dispute regarding Reed's actions in filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). According to Reed's complaint, he was fired on April 23, 1997, and filed his Charge with the EEOC on February 11, 1998. Based on these dates, Reed filed his Charge 294 days after he was terminated. In filing the Charge, Reed did not check the box referring the Charge to the State nor did he indicate that he wanted to file the Charge with the State in another space provided for that purpose. Despite Reed's failure to designate that his Charge be sent to the State, the EEOC still forwarded a copy of Reed's Charge to the state in accordance with its own procedures.
Hewlett-Packard argues that because Reed did not indicate his intent to file the Charge with the State, he only filed with the EEOC. Thus, Hewlett-Packard contends that because Reed actually failed to initiate proceedings with the State within 180 days of his termination, he should not receive the benefit of the 300 day filing period.
In contrast, Reed argues that based on his residence in a deferral state, he is either automatically entitled to the 300 day deadline, or that by filing a Charge with the EEOC, he automatically filed a Charge with the State as well. In the alternative, Reed argues that if he is not entitled to the 300 day deadline, his claim should be equitably tolled because he did not actually know he was discriminated against until after his termination. The court will first address whether Reed is entitled to the 300 day deadline.
Reed also contends that, as a layperson, he should not be penalized by Title VII's complex procedural requirements. The court is aware of the intricacies of Title VII litigation. See Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 F.2d 674, 676 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing Title VII as a "statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process"). Although Reed's argument is not without merit, the court must also consider the purpose of Title VII filing deadlines. The "statutory period is designed to protect individuals' civil rights and at the same time ensure employers will not be burdened by defending claims arising from employment actions that occurred in the distant past." Parker v. State of Delaware Dept. of Pub. Safety, 11 F. Supp.2d 467, 472-73 (D. Del. 1998) (citations omitted). After considering the purpose of the statute and the facts of this case, the court concludes that Reed's status as a lay person is, by itself, an insufficient basis upon which to find that he is entitled to the benefit of the 300 day filing period. The conclusion that Reed's lay status alone does not dictate a different result is further supported by the Supreme Court's observation in Mohasco Corporation v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980), that "[w]e believe that a lay person would be more apt to regard the general obligation of filing within 180 days as the standard of diligence he must satisfy, and that one who carefully read the entire section would understand it to mean exactly what it says."
A. Appropriate Filing Deadline
As a general matter, a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1994). There is, however, an exception to this 180 day filing period. If the charging party "initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency" the party will be entitled to a 300 day filing period. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) states, in pertinent part: "A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except that in a case of unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e).
Title VII provides a deferral period that provides authorized state or local agencies time to remedy the alleged violations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c) (1994). Specifically, no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days after the initial filing with an authorized state or local agency. Thus, a charge must be filed with, or referred by the EEOC to, an authorized state or local agency within 240 days of the last alleged discriminatory act. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814, n. 16 (1980); see also EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 111 (1988). In addition, even if the charging party fails to file within 240 days, the party's charge may still be timely filed if the state or local agency terminates its proceedings before 300 days. Id. at 111-12.
In this case, it is not disputed that Delaware is a deferral state that is authorized to remedy violations under Title VII. See Berry v. E.L Dupont de Nemours Co., 625 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (D. Del. 1985). A deferral state is a state or subdivision "which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing the state or local authority to grant or seek relief' from practices prohibited under Title VII. Serendinski v. Clifton Precision Products, Co., 776 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1985.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (d)). In Delaware, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate charges of discrimination under Title VII is the Delaware Department of Labor (DDOL). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74. Under a Worksharing Agreement between the DDOL and the EEOC, the DDOL has waived its right of exclusive jurisdiction for charges originally received by the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a)(3)(iii)..
29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 reads in pertinent part: "Where the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the FEP agency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive processing, . . . the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a)(4)(ii)(A).
In this case, the parties do not dispute these general guidelines for filing discrimination charges. Here, the parties disagree as to whether Reed is entitled to the 300 day filing period where he did not initiate proceedings with the DDOL, and the DDOL did not expressly terminate its jurisdiction over Reed's claim. The plaintiff maintains that under the worksharing agreement, the DDOL has appointed the EEOC as its agent for the filing of complaints, and under that same agreement, the DDOL has waived its initial jurisdiction. Hewlett-Packard maintains, however, that the waiver under the worksharing agreement does not automatically entitle Reed to the longer filing period. The defendant asserts this position in the face of clear Third Circuit case law that seems to compel the court to apply the 300 day filing period.
In a per curiam decision, the Third Circuit adopted a blanket 300-day rule, stating that a "plaintiff in a deferral state is entitled to the extended period [300 days] regardless of whether he has filed a state administrative complaint with 180 days after the alleged discrimination occurred." Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Bean v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 757-59 (9th Cir. 1979)). Although the plaintiff in Davis filed his complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq (1994), the appellate court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in a Title VII case, Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 814, for guidance. See Davis, 627 F.2d at 677.
The First Circuit also applied a blanket 300 day filing deadline in light of Mohasco stating that "Mohasco strongly suggests, if it does not compel," that the "300- day filling period is to be allowed regardless of a claimant's failure to seek a state administrative remedy within 180 days." Ciccone v. Textron, Inc., 651 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1980).
Although Hewlett-Packard attempts to argue that ADEA cases like Davis are inapposite to the present case, the court is not persuaded by this argument. In Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman the court noted that "[w]hile Davis was brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Title VII and the ADEA have been given parallel constructions due to their similarities in purpose and structure." 38 F.3d 1380, *1385 n. 4 (citing Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) and Kocian v. Getty Refining Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 752 n. 3 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1983)). See also EEOC v. Commercial Products Co., 486 U.S. at 123 ("filing provisions of the ADEA and Title VII are "virtually in haec verba"); Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1979).
In 1991, the Third Circuit affirmed the Davis decision in Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). "Thus, we adhere to our holding in Davis v. Calgon Corp. . . . in which in an ADEA case we held that "a plaintiff in a deferral state... is entitled to the extended period [of 300 days]... regardless of whether he has filed a state administrative complaint within 180 days after the alleged discrimination occurred." Id. Colgan also expressly overruled Kocian v. Getty Refining Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 752 (3d Cir. 1983), which held that the 300-day limitations period is available to a litigant in a deferral state only when the EEOC or the litigant has instituted state or local proceedings. See 935 F.2d at 1414. The court overruled Kocian because that case had been decided prior to the adoption of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a)(4), which provides for deferral of an EEOC complaint to an authorized state agency. Id. at 1415.
The Supreme Court has also addressed this issue in E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988). Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether "a state agency's waiver of the 60-day deferral period, pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, constitutes a "termination' of its proceedings so as to permit the EEOC to deem a charge filed and to begin to process it immediately." 486 U.S. at 112. The Court held that a waiver pursuant to a worksharing agreement does terminate proceedings and thus, the EEOC can deem the charge filed. Id. at 125.
Although Hewlett-Packard attempts to distinguish the present case from E.E.O.C. by pointing out factual distinctions between the cases, the defendant's argument is not persuasive. The E.E.O.C. Court expressly stated that it was guided by the purpose and legislative history of Title VII in holding that when a deferral state waives its right to exclusive jurisdiction under a worksharing agreement, the waiver constitutes a termination of state proceedings and the 300 day filing period applies. Id. at 116-121 (discussing the legislative history and purpose of the deferral provisions of Title VII). In fact the Court states that not applying the 300 day filing period to claims like Reed's, that is claims filed more than 240 days but less than 300 days in worksharing states, would lead to "absurd or futile results... "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.'" Id. (citations omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
After having carefully considered the submitted materials, the appropriate principles of law, and the contentions of the parties, the court will deny Hewlett-Packard's motion to dismiss because Reed is entitled to the 300 day filing period under Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. Because the court rules that Reed is entitled to the longer filing period, it will not address Reed's equitable tolling argument.
For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.