Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Frank Gafkowski, Judge. Petition granted., Super.Ct.No. SCVSS123769
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons, Derek R. Havel and Daniel J. McQueen for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Coughlin & Conforti and Frank J. Coughlin for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
GAUT J.
In this matter we have reviewed the petition, the response filed by the real parties in interest and the reply. We have determined that the resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
FACTS
The plaintiffs (real parties in interest) sued defendant (petitioner), their employer for wage and hour violations. Real parties in interest moved for summary adjudication of their fourth and fifth causes of action for restitution and injunctive relief. The trial court granted the motion only as to the cause of action for injunctive relief, finding that petitioner had violated state overtime law. The trial court then granted real parties in interest’s motion to limit the trial to the question of damages and restitution only on the first and fourth causes of action for failure to pay overtime and restitution, based upon its earlier finding that petitioner had violated state overtime law.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts that the trial court was not authorized to limit the trial of the remaining causes of action based upon any alleged finding that it may have made in conjunction with an earlier ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Raghavan v. Boeing Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1134-1139 (Raghavan).)
All further statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 437c, subdivision (n)(2), provides “[i]n the trial of the action, the fact that a motion for summary adjudication is granted as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within the action shall not operate to bar any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty as to which summary adjudication was either not sought or denied.” Real parties in interest never moved for adjudication of the first cause of action and it was specifically denied as to the fourth cause of action. However, the effect of the trial court’s order challenged here is to summarily find in favor of the real parties in interest on the issue of liability on each of these causes of action. This it may not do.
In Raghavan, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pages 1134-1139, the court held that the amendments to section 437c that began in 1990 and continued through 1994, and which are still in effect, preclude the trial court from making any finding of fact in conjunction with deciding a motion for summary adjudication. Section 437c specifically allows for adjudication of causes of action, defenses, damages or issues of duty, not issues of fact. Thus, in concluding that real parties in interest were entitled to summary adjudication of their fifth cause of action for injunctive relief, the trial court was not authorized to make a finding that petitioner had violated state overtime law.
Real parties in interest’s assertion that section 437c allows for the summary adjudication of a theory of liability is not supported. As held in Raghavan, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pages 1134, 1136, the granting of a summary adjudication does not “establish” any fact in the case. The function of the trial court in deciding a summary adjudication is to determine whether or not a triable issue exists, not to determine how that issue should be resolved. In this case, the trial court determined that there was no triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action for an injunction. Under section 437c, it was not proper for the trial court to also determine that the facts supported a conclusion that petitioner had violated overtime laws. Therefore, it does not matter, as real parties in interest claim, that there was only one theory of liability to be determined in this action.
The case cited by the trial court for the proposition that the purpose of summary judgment and adjudication is to dispose of issues, Conway v. Bughouse (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 194, 202, is no longer persuasive given the subsequent changes to section 437c (as was pointed out by the court in Raghavan, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137-1138). Thus, the trial court cannot treat as “established” the fact that petitioner violated state overtime law so as to preclude it from defending itself at trial on the issue of liability as to the remaining causes of action. The only thing that petitioner should be precluded from litigating at trial is the cause of action for injunctive relief.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to vacate its order limiting the scope of the trial to the question of damages and restitution only, and to enter an order denying real parties in interest’s motion to limit the trial, except that petitioner may not relitigate the cause of action for injunctive relief.
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties. Petitioner to recover its costs.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., RICHLI J.