Opinion
AANCV116008116S
11-22-2019
RECYCLING, INC. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF MILFORD
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STEVENS, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Recycling, Inc. (Recycling), instituted this administrative appeal against the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Milford (Board) through an amended complaint filed on November 28, 2011. The appeal seeks to reverse the Board’s decision upholding two cease and desist orders issued on August 11, 2011, and August 12, 2011, by Milford’s assistant city planner. The cease and desist orders state that "Recycling is in violation of the Regulations by operating the limited processing facility without obtaining signage permits, coastal area management review and a zoning permit and required that Recycling cease and desist all of its DEEP Permitted uses on the Property." The property is located at 990 Naugatuck Avenue, Milford, Connecticut (subject property).
The original plaintiff was Recycling, Inc. On July 15, 2019, this court granted the amended motion to substitute party plaintiff. The plaintiff is now JRB Holding Co., LLC.
On June 7, 2019, the Board filed a special defense alleging res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Board then filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2019, on the ground that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Recycling’s claims. Recycling filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2019. The court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and the objection on July 15, 2019. The court ordered the Board to file a reply to Recycling’s objection two weeks from the date of oral argument. The Board filed a timely reply on July 29, 2019.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
"[S]ummary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata ..." (Citations omitted.) Joe’s Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n.8, 675 A.2d 441 (1996). "Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action [between the same parties or those in privity with them] on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose ... The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it ... In order for res judicata to apply, four elements must be met: (1) the judgment must have been rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent actions must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have been an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully; and (4) the same underlying claim must be at issue." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 332 Conn. 67, 75, 208 A.3d 1223 (2019).
"Furthermore, the doctrine of claim preclusion ... bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 596, 804 A.2d 170 (2002).
"To determine whether claims are the same for res judicata purposes, this court has adopted the transactional test ... Under the transactional test, res judicata extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose ... What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage ... [E]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several different kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action ... In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the [present] action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, 320 Conn. 146, 159-60, 129 A.3d 677 (2016).
"The fundamental principles underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well established ... The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiltzius v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn.App. 1, 16, 940, A.2d 892, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 907, 950 A.2d 1284 (2008). "Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim ... For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R&R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 466, 778 A.2d 61 (2001).
"An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined ... An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered ... If an issue has been determined, but the judgment is not dependent upon the determination of the issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent action." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R&R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 257 Conn. 466.
The Board argues that this court’s decision in Recycling, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV-15-6019430-S (January 26, 2018, Stevens, J.) (2015 case), bars Recycling’s claims and issues in the present case on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The 2015 case involved an application filed by Recycling seeking a certificate of zoning compliance determining that recycling was a preexisting, nonconforming use on the property and, therefore, was not prohibited by a recent amendment to the zoning regulations. The Zoning Enforcement Officer (ZEO) initially granted this application and issued a certificate of zoning compliance, but limited this approval to Recycling’s operation of a "limited processing recycling facility." Recycling appealed this decision to the Board arguing that the nonconforming uses were broader than just a limited processing recycling facility. The Board voted to uphold the ZEO’s decision, and Recycling filed an administrative appeal seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. Thus, the question presented in the 2015 case was "whether the Board’s affirmance of the ZEO’s decision limiting the nonconforming use to a limited processing recycling facility [was] unsupported by substantial evidence or [was] otherwise an abuse of discretion." Recycling, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 5. In the 2015 case, the court dismissed Recycling’s appeal and affirmed the Board’s decision based on the conclusion that the Board’s decision was reasonable and sufficiently supported by the record. Recycling filed a petition to appeal the court’s ruling and this petition was denied by the Appellate Court.
In relying on the 2015 case to support its motion for summary judgment, the Board argues that in this decision the court upheld "a finding by the Board that any prior non-conforming recycling uses had been abandoned." (Emphasis added.) Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., 2-3. This argument is wrong. As just explained, the issue before the court in the 2015 case was whether Recycling was correct in its contention that the Board erred by not authorizing uses on the property that were broader or more intensive than a limited processing recycling facility. The court rejected this contention, but by doing so, only held that the Board correctly found that uses beyond a limited processing recycling facility were prohibited uses. The court did not address whether the use of the property for a limited processing recycling facility was a proper or improper nonconforming use as that question was not before the court because that use had been approved by the ZEO and affirmed by the Board. In short, the use of the property for a limited processing recycling facility was not a contested issue adjudicated in the 2015 case and, therefore, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply to preclude consideration of the propriety of this activity as a prior, nonconforming use in the present case.
The court notes that after issuing the certificate of zoning compliance authorizing use of the property as a limited processing recycling facility, the ZEO revoked this authorization. Although the existence of this revocation was considered relevant in evaluating the issues presented in the 2015 case, the propriety or impropriety of this revocation was not before the court at that time.
Therefore, for these reasons, the Board’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to any claim that the use of the property as a limited processing recycling facility is a prior nonconforming use, and is otherwise granted as to any claims that recycling uses more extensive than this use are authorized, nonconforming uses on the ground that this latter issue was fully adjudicated in the 2015 case. So ordered.