Opinion
C.A. No. 02C-01-016.
Date Submitted: September 16, 2002.
Decided Date: March 5, 2003.
David A. Boswell, Esquire, Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A.
Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, Heckler Fabrizzio
Sean A. Dolan, Esquire Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman Goggin
Dear Counsel:
This is my decision on Joseph E. Langston, Rodney D. Briddell and Mountaire Farms, Inc.'s ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion is granted for the reasons set forth herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2000, Jaimey W. Showell ("Showell") was employed by Mountaire Farms, Inc. ("Mountaire") as a chicken catcher. On that morning, Showell reported to Mountaire's processing plant to pick up his work orders for the day. Showell left the plant for his first assignment in a truck driven by Rodney D. Briddell ("Briddell") and owned by Joseph E. Langston ("Langston"). Briddell and Langston were agents of Mountaire. Showell was seated in the rear body cab of the truck with five other workers. Briddell first drove the truck to Selbyville Shell ("Shell").
At Shell, Briddell exited the vehicle and was provided an empty propane tank by Langston. An employee of Shell filled the empty propane tank. Briddell opened the rear cab of the vehicle and the employee placed the filled propane tank in a crate next to where Showell was seated. Showell was seated closest to the propane heater on the driver' side of the vehicle. The truck was equipped with outside rear brackets capable of holding the propane tank. At that time, a propane heating unit was operating in the rear cab of the truck in front of the rear door. The propane heating unit was visible to the employee of Shell. Briddell and Langston were aware that the propane heating unit was located in the rear cab of the truck and that the heating unit had been leaking.
After filling the propane tank, Briddell and the occupants of the truck proceeded to drive toward their first assignment. En route, there was a propane gas explosion in the rear of the vehicle causing Showell to catch on fire. In order to escape, Showell jumped out of the back of the moving vehicle and landed on the roadway. Upon hearing the explosion, Briddell stopped the truck and attempted to extinguish the fire. Showell sustained a number of injuries as a result of this incident.
Subsequently, Showell filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits with the Industrial Accident Board ("Board"). Showell also advised the Board that Mountaire denied benefits on the grounds that Showell was not within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident. Showell requested a hearing on this issue.
Thereafter, on January 16, 2002, Showell filed the present complaint with this Court seeking tort recovery at common law for his injuries arising out of the same incident. By notice dated February 14, 2002, the Board scheduled a hearing on the course and scope of employment defense for April 10, 2002. Mountaire filed a pre-trial memorandum with the Board on March 7, 2002, which again stated that the accident was outside the course and scope of employment. On March 19, 2002, Mountaire filed an answer to Showell's complaint and raised the defense that the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act barred Claimant's personal injury claims.
By letter dated April 4, 2002, Mountaire advised the Board that it was withdrawing the course and scope of employment defense. The Board cancelled the April 10 hearing and scheduled a hearing on the merits for May 31, 2002. At the hearing, Showell sought recovery of the medical expenses incurred. By decision dated June 12, 2002, the Board held that Mountaire was relieved of any obligation regarding Showell's medical expenses, since the bills had been paid by the PIP insurer. Showell appealed the decision of the Board. Mountaire filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on September 16, 2002. Langston and Briddell filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 27, 2002. On December 9, 2002, this Court reversed the decision of the Board and ordered the payment of medical expenses.
The PIP policy was taken out by Langston for his carpentry business and covered the truck driven by Briddell.
ISSUE
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56, should summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Mountaire, Langston and Briddell on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of 19 Del. C. § 2304?
DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review
This Court will grant summary judgment only when no material issues of fact exist, and the moving party bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of material issues of fact. Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Id. at 681. Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, the nonmoving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If, after discovery, the nonmoving party cannot make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of his or her case, summary judgment must be granted. Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 (1992); Celotex Corp., supra. If, however, material issues of fact exist or if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the law to the facts before it, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962).
B. Exclusivity provision of 19 Del. C. § 2304.
The motion for summary judgment is granted since the action is barred by the exclusivity provision of 19 Del. C. § 2304. The worker's compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy for claimants for work-related injuries. See 19 Del. C. § 2304 ; Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1981). In order to recover, a claimant must establish that his or her injury resulted from an accident arising out of and within the course and scope of his or her employment. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d 340, 343 (Del. 1993). The course of employment refers to the "time, place and circumstances" of the injury, while arising out of the employment refers to the "origin and cause of the injury." Tickles v. PNC Bank, 703 A.2d 633, 637 (Del. 1997). The course of employment includes those things that an employee may reasonably do or be expected [to do] within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time." Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 45 A.2d 542, 543-44 (Del.Super. 1945). An injury arises out of employment when "it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment, or has a reasonable relation to it." Id. at 544. Thus, a causal connection between the injury and the employment must be established. Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Ctr. Prop. Inc., 668 A.2d 782, 786 (Del.Super. 1995).
Section 2304 provides: "Every employer and employee, adult and minor, except as expressly excluded in this chapter, shall be bound by this chapter respectively to pay and to accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of the question of negligence and to the exclusion of all other rights and remedies. 19 Del. C. § 2304.
One of the purposes of the act is to promptly compensate an injured employee, irrespective of fault and without the necessity of litigation. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d at 343. Under the Worker's Compensation scheme, the employee loses the right to sue at common law for his or her work-related injuries, in exchange for the benefit of prompt compensation without the necessity of litigation. Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 165 A.2d 447, 451 (Del. 1960). Accordingly, an employee's action against an employer "for work-related injuries based on any degree of negligence, from slight to gross, are within the exclusive coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law and may not be maintained under common law." Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d at 231. See also Rafferty v. Hartman Walsh Painting Co., 760 A.2d 157, 158 (Del. 2000) (holding that an employee may not maintain a tort action against an employer absent a showing of an intent of the employer to injure the employee).
However, under the "going and coming" rule, an employee may not recover for injuries occurring in the course of an employee's regular travel to and from work. Tickles v. PNC Bank, 703 A.2d at 636. An employee may still be entitled to compensation for such injuries if the special errand exception applies. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d at 343. This exception applies when an employee with identifiable time and space limitations on his or her employment makes a journey under circumstances of special inconvenience, hazard or urgency. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d at 343. The key factors to consider in making this determination are whether the travel is outside of the employee's normal routine or involves an increased risk. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d at 344-45. In contrast, travel is likely outside of this exception when the employee is paid an identifiable amount as compensation for time spent traveling to and from work. Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d 340 at 345.
Under the exclusivity provision of Section 2304, an employee is barred from suing his employer for injuries resulting from the negligence of fellow employees. Rock v. Del. Elec. Coop., 328 A.2d 449, 452 (Del.Super. 1974). However, an employee may recover in a common law tort action from a third person whose negligence injures the employee. Id. See also 19 Del. C. § 2363. This section preserves "the right of action of the injured party against a negligent third party." Dickinson v. Eastern R.R. Builders, 378 A.2d 650, 653 (Del.Super. 1977). One is immune from suit as a co-employee, when employed by the same employer and acting within the course of employment at the time of the injury. Groves v. Marvel, 213 A.2d 853, 855 (Del. 1965). Generally, an employee acts within the course of employment when the act is in furtherance of the employer's business. Id. at 856.
Section 2363 provides in part: "Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies, but such injured employee or the employee's dependents or their personal representative may also proceed to enforce the liability of such third party for damages in accordance with this section. 19 Del. C. § 2363.
In the present matter, it is undisputed that Mountaire is the employer of the plaintiff. It is also undisputed that Briddell and Langston were employees of Mountaire at the time of the incident. Thus, under Sections 2304 and 2363 Showell is barred from maintaining a common law tort claim against his employer, Mountaire and his co-employees, Briddell and Langston. See 19 Del. C. § 2304, 2363. However, these sections only operate to bar such an action if a causal connection between the injury and the employment is established. Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Ctr. Prop. Inc., 668 A.2d at 786. The injury must both arise out of and occur within the course of employment. Tickles v. PNC Bank, 703 A.2d at 637.
Based upon the facts before the court, it is unclear whether or not both of these prongs have been satisfied. However, it is unnecessary for the Court to resolve this issue, as Mountaire has conceded that the accident occurred within the course and scope of employment. In the workers' compensation action, Mountaire withdrew its defense and conceded that the accident occurred within the course and scope of employment. Thus, the exclusivity provision of Section 2304 bars Showell's common law suit for negligence against Mountaire. 19 Del. C. § 2304. It follows that Langston and Briddell, as employees of Mountaire were also acting within the course and scope of their employment, at the time of Showell's accident. Showell may not maintain an action against his co-employees, since they were acting within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the incident. Groves v. Marvel, 213 A.2d at 855. Accordingly, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Showell, defendants' Mountaire, Briddell and Langston's motions for summary judgement is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Mountaire, Briddell and Langston's motions for summary judgment are granted since the action is barred by the exclusivity provision of 19 Del. C. § 2304.
IT IS SO ORDERED.