Opinion
2d Civil No. B191891
5-3-2007
RDPH PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TYLER J. SCHAEFFER, as Personal Representative, etc., Defendant and Appellant. TYLER J. SCHAEFFER, as Personal Representative, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RDPH PROPERTIES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
James P. Ballantine for Defendant, Plaintiff and Appellant Tyler J. Schaeffer. Richard A. Lefkowitz for Plaintiff, Defendant and Respondent RDPH Properties, Inc.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Tyler J. Schaeffer, as personal representative of the Estate of Richard T. Manuzak, appeals from orders vacating a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement and denying his motion for attorney fees under the Mobilehome Residency Law, Civil Code section 798 et seq. (MRL). We affirm the order denying attorney fees. The appeal from the order vacating the judgment is dismissed as moot.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent RDPH Properties, Inc. owns the Santa Barbara Mobilehome Park (Park). Schaeffer is the personal representative and heir of a deceased resident of the Park, Richard T. Manuzak.
Manuzak lived in a mobile home on Space 31 in the Park until his death in 2003. After Manuzaks death, a dispute arose between Schaeffer and RDPH concerning ownership of the leasehold interest in Space 31. Schaeffer and RDPH filed complaints against each other that were consolidated in the trial court. The litigation concluded with a settlement agreement filed with the court. The parties agreed RDPH would place a new mobile home on Space 31, Schaeffer would assign his leasehold interest in Space 31 to the buyer of the mobile home, and the parties would divide the proceeds of the sale. The agreement states that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement under Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6. The agreement also states that each party would bear its own attorney fees.
Two years later, the mobile home placed in Space 31 had not been sold. Schaeffer filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the agreement. Schaeffer asserted that RDPH was refusing to sell to qualified buyers in violation of the MRL and the settlement agreement. RPDH opposed the motion. After protracted proceedings, involving at least seven hearings and multiple pleadings, the trial court ruled for Schaeffer finding that prospective purchasers were qualified buyers under the MRL and RDPH was not entitled to reject them. The court also found that RDPH attempted to overcharge Schaeffer for the costs of the transaction. The court ordered the parties to close the pending escrow. Pursuant to the courts order, the mobile home was sold and the net proceeds were distributed to the parties in accordance with the settlement agreement.
After judgment was entered, RDPH filed a motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that the courts order was not a judgment but only an order to close escrow. The court granted the motion, but no written order was entered.
Schaeffer filed a motion for attorney fees under Civil Code section 798.85 of the MRL. The court denied the motion on the ground that, because the judgment had been vacated, there was no prevailing party and the settlement agreement provided that each party would bear its own attorney fees.
On appeal, Schaeffer contends he is entitled to attorney fees because the judgment was improperly vacated and he succeeded in obtaining a favorable judgment within the meaning of Civil Code section 798.85. In the alternative, Schaeffer argues that even if the judgment was properly vacated, he obtained dismissal in his favor and the attorney fee waiver in the settlement agreement does not apply because he is seeking fees for work done after judgment was entered on the settlement agreement.
DISCUSSION
An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Where, as here, the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law reviewed de novo. (Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 664, 669.)
The attorney fee provision in the MRL states: "In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise." (Civ. Code, § 798.85.)
In denying Schaeffers motion for attorney fees, the trial court reasoned: "Here there is no judgment rendered in any partys favor, as the judgment was vacated. While the litigation was in fact dismissed pursuant to the parties settlement, the parties otherwise agreed that each party will bear their own attorney[] fees and costs. They agreed in effect that each party would bear the risk that additional fees and costs would be incurred. If they did not wish to bear that risk, they could easily have stipulated to different terms in their settlement agreement."
We agree with the trial court that Schaeffer is not entitled to fees because the fee shifting provision in the MRL was expressly waived in the settlement agreement. (See, e.g., Vaillette v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 680, 690 ["If [plaintiff] intended to reserve the right to recover attorney fees, he should have said so . . . . The true, subjective, but unexpressed intent of a party is immaterial and irrelevant"].)
Attorney fees are not available for the further reason that the MRL is not applicable to the litigation between these particular parties. In MHC Financing Ltd. Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372 (MHC ), a limited partnership that owned a mobile home park sued a city, and succeeded in obtaining a judicial declaration that a mobile home rent control ordinance enacted by initiative was void based on noncompliance with the Elections Code. The partnerships request for attorney fees under the MRL was denied.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in part and affirmed in part. The court also affirmed denial of attorney fees, concluding that "the phrase any action arising out of the provisions of [the MRL] in Civil Code section 798.85 encompasses only those actions directly involving the application of MRL provisions in specific factual contexts addressed by the MRL, such as actions by mobile home park residents against management for failing to maintain physical improvements in common facilities in good working order. (See Civ. Code, §§ 798.84-798.88.)" (MHC, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398.)
The court reasoned: "Although MHCs declaratory relief claims—that the MRL preempts certain provisions of Ordinance 412—relate to the MRL, they do not arise out of the MRL because they do not involve application of MRL provisions to a particular factual context addressed by the MRL." (MHC, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398.)
The reasoning and conclusion of the MHC court were followed in the recently decided case of SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663 (SC Manufactured Homes). In that case, a mobile home dealer alleged it was denied the right to sell mobile homes in certain parks as a result of a kickback scheme between defendant mobile home park owners and other mobile home dealers. After plaintiff dismissed most of the defendants, the dismissed defendants filed motions for attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85. The court denied attorney fees on the ground that the action must arise out of the provisions of the MRL rather than merely being related to it.
The court explained: "The MRL regulates conduct between tenants and landlords—mobilehome owners and residents and mobilehome management (owners and owners agents). [Citation.] However, the case here does not involve a landlord/ tenant dispute. It does not involve a lawsuit brought by a park manager to protect its rights as against its homeowners and residents. It does not involve a lawsuit brought by residents arising from their tenancy. . . . Regardless of how plaintiff framed its complaint, regardless of the titles of the three specified causes of action, and even though plaintiff cited sections of the MRL in articulating the alleged conspiratorial and tortious conduct of the defendants, plaintiff sought to protect its own pocketbook—not the rights of tenants. . . . The case before use does not involve the direct application of MRL provisions in the context for which the MRL was designed." (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.)
"[The park owner] is correct when it notes that the allegations against it in the operative complaint dealt with purported wrongful activity that affected park residents and homeowners. These allegations included that [the park owner] conspired to illegally evict park tenants and unlawfully obtain mobilehomes as pull-outs so that new mobilehomes could be sold on those spaces. . . . [The park owner] is also correct when it states that plaintiff sought to stop these practices by requesting an injunction. But, plaintiff designed these allegations and its relief request to protect itself and not the park tenants. . . . The relief requested was to protect plaintiffs market share and pocketbook, which would incidentally prevent harm to park residents and homeowners. . . . Thus, while plaintiffs allegations and [the park owners] defenses relate to the MRL, they do not arise out of the MRL." (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 678-679, fn. omitted.)
As the parties did not cite MCH in the trial court or in their briefs in this court, and because SC Manufactured Homes was decided after the parties appellate briefs were filed, we requested supplemental briefing. Schaeffer contends the MHC and SC Manufactured Homes cases do not apply here because (1) his complaint expressly pleads a cause of action under the MRL; (2) he is an heir of a former tenant who was evicted from the Park; (3) RDPHs action to evict asserted its rights and requested attorney fees under the MRL; (4) the trial court judgment enforced his right to sell a mobile home on the space to a qualified buyer pursuant to Civil Code section 798.74 and prevented RDPH from refusing the buyer tenancy rights in the Park; and (5) because RDPH filed its action specifically alleging that Civil Code section 798.85 applied, it is estopped from arguing that section 798.85 does not apply in this action.
On facts similar to the instant case, claims for attorney fees relying on the MRL were rejected in MHC and SC Manufactured Homes. Simply pleading a claim under the MRL is not enough. Schaeffers complaint was filed to obtain money for the estate of a deceased resident who had not resided in the Park since 2003. Schaeffer and RDPH are in positions similar to the parties in MHC and SC Manufactured Homes with similar monetary objectives. Through the lawsuit, Schaeffer was not asserting rights as a current or future Park resident or mobile home owner. His claim only tangentially related to the MRL by reason of decedents prior residency in the Park. Any benefit to Park tenants was incidental. As in MHC and SC Manufactured Homes, we conclude that this case does not involve parties or claims the MRL was enacted to protect.
The order denying attorney fees is affirmed. The appeal from the order vacating the judgment is dismissed as moot. Respondent is to recover costs on appeal.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P.J.
COFFEE, J. --------------- Notes: Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 states: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement."