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recognizing that " court's jurisdiction to render judgment is invoked by pleadings" (quoting Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass'n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh'g))
Summary of this case from Landers v. LandersOpinion
No. 02-19-00477-CV
07-09-2020
SYDNEY RAYM f/k/a SYDNEY DETHLOFF, Appellant v. TUPELO MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. C2019119 Before Gabriel, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises out of a dispute between Appellant Sydney Raym f/k/a Sydney Dethloff and Appellee Tupelo Management, LLC, over residential property that was purchased with Tupelo's funds and remodeled under Dethloff's oversight. In three issues, Dethloff challenges the trial court's granting of Tupelo's traditional motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the trial court's judgment is partially in error, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
We will refer to Appellant as Dethloff because that is the name used in the trial court's record.
II. BACKGROUND
Dethloff and Tupelo's agent, Claire Coggins, entered into an agreement in late 2018 to acquire, renovate, and resell a single-family residence in Granbury, Texas (the "Property"). While Coggins says that she agreed "[o]n behalf of Tupelo" to provide the funds to acquire and to renovate the Property, Dethloff contends that Coggins agreed to fund the project with money from her family's trust. In exchange for providing the funds to acquire and renovate the Property, Coggins believed that Tupelo would receive "50% of the net proceeds from the sale of the Property, after the reimbursement of [Tupelo's] out of pocket costs."
A contract for the sale of the Property, with Dethloff listed as the buyer, was entered into in November 2018. Later that month, Dethloff closed on the Property, with the general warranty deed listing Dethloff as the grantee. The settlement statement also lists Dethloff as the borrower and states that $21,530.78 is the gross amount due from the borrower. However, according to Coggins, Tupelo paid $21,530.78 of its own funds to acquire the Property. The "wiring instructions" show that Tupelo sent $21,530.78 to Texas Title Escrow on the day of closing.
During the course of the work on the Property, disagreements arose concerning the renovation costs. Coggins states that she "offered to relieve [Dethloff] of our prior verbal agreement to split the net sale proceeds of the Property after the reimbursement of [Tupelo's] out of pocket costs." Although Coggins asked Dethloff to execute a note and deed of trust to ensure that Tupelo would recoup its investment, Dethloff refused. According to Coggins, Tupelo paid $47,165.00 to DNA Construction for renovations on the Property. Dethloff asserts that "[t]he fact the $47,165 was paid to the contractor for renovations is a major fact being disputed."
In May 2019, Tupelo filed an Affidavit Claiming Constitutional Lien in the sum of $59,338.50. According to Coggins, Dethloff has failed and refused to reimburse Tupelo for "any and all monetary contribution it made to the acquisition and renovation of the Property."
In June 2019, Tupelo sued Dethloff for breach of contract, imposition of a purchase money resulting trust or a constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and foreclosure of its statutory and constitutional mechanic's lien. Dethloff filed a pro se answer. Tupelo later amended its pleadings to add a claim for trespass to try title. In its prayer, Tupelo specifically asked for a
judgment declaring that a purchase money resulting trust or, alternatively, a constructive trust exists on the Property with [Dethloff] as Trustee to preserve [Tupelo's] interest in the Property and prevent unjust enrichment; that [Dethloff] be ordered to convey legal title to the Property to [Tupelo]; or alternatively, that the Court enter a judgment awarding [Tupelo] damages in a sum exceeding the minimum jurisdictional limits of the Court, and foreclosing the mechanic's lien against the aforesaid Property and permitting [Tupelo] to obtain an order of sale and writ of possession on such Property.
At the same time it amended its pleadings, Tupelo filed a traditional motion for summary judgment alleging that it was entitled to summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract; the imposition of a purchase money resulting trust, or alternatively, a constructive trust; declaratory judgment; and foreclosure of its constitutional lien. In addition, Tupelo sought to recover its attorney's fees under Sections 38.001(8) and 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 38.001(8), 37.009. It did not seek summary judgment on its trespass-to-try-title claim. The summary judgment evidence consisted of Coggins's affidavit with attached and incorporated documents, Dethloff's deemed admissions to Tupelo's requests for admission, and attorney George A. (Tony) Mallers's attorney's fee affidavit. Dethloff filed a combined first amended answer, summary judgment "answer," special exceptions, and "motion for involuntary defendant Claire Coggins."
The trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the summary judgment and signed an order (1) finding that Tupelo is owed $81,415.78 "for its investment in the acquisition and improvement of the Property"; (2) imposing a purchase money resulting trust against the Property in Tupelo's favor; (3) declaring that "since November 21, 2018, [Dethloff] has held title to the Property in trust for [Tupelo] as beneficiary"; (4) ordering that Dethloff "shall convey fee simple title to the Property to Tupelo Management, LLC by executing and delivering a Special Warranty Deed (conveying the entire Property without reservation)"; (5) ordering that Dethloff is permanently enjoined and restrained "from selling, transferring, conveying, leasing, renting, borrowing against, or encumbering the Property in any manner whatsoever at any time"; and (6) awarding attorney's fees, interest, and court costs against Dethloff. The order states that it "disposes of all claims and parties in this suit and is appealable." Dethloff filed a notice of appeal from this order.
Thereafter, Tupelo moved to modify the judgment. In its motion, Tupelo asserted that "the Order presented to the Court mistakenly left out language foreclosing the mechanic's lien and finding that [Dethloff] breached the contract, which were clearly within the requests contained in the Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment." The motion to modify also claimed that the judgment "contained language purporting to dispose of all claims not specifically mentioned in the Order (i.e., breach of contract and foreclosure of the constitutional mechanic's lien) when neither party requested a summary judgment denying those claims." Tupelo's motion added that
if the Court grants this Motion to Modify Judgment, it is [Tupelo's] intention to non-suit without prejudice its breach of contract and foreclosure of constitutional mechanic's lien claims against [Dethloff], and proceed with a final judgment granting a declaratory judgment that there is a purchase money resulting trust imposed on the property, with [Dethloff] as Trustee and [Tupelo] as beneficiary, with a definitive deadline for [Dethloff] to convey the property to [Tupelo]; an injunction against alienation or encumbrance of the property in the meantime; and attorney's fees as originally awarded.
At the hearing on the motion, Tupelo's counsel again urged the trial court to modify the judgment "to grant only the purchase money resulting trust, the declaratory judgment[,] and the attorney's fees[,] and then I want to non-suit the breach of contract, foreclosure of mechanic's lien[,] and trespass to try title." In response, Dethloff's counsel argued,
While Dethloff initially appeared pro se, she retained counsel shortly before the summary judgment hearing.
[A] motion for declaratory judgment is improper in this matter. It should be a - - a suit for quiet title, and under the suit for quiet title, attorney's fees are not recoverable. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]he declaratory judgment action is to determine a party's rights and interest in property. . . . It is not to assign the ownership or transfer the ownership interests in real property from one party to another. That proper suit would be for a suit to quiet title, not a declaratory judgment.
So under the rules of declaratory judgment, the Court can say that their party has an interest in the property and rights in the property but doesn't have the authority to - - to transfer the ownership of that property to the other party on a declaratory judgment action.
The trial court granted the motion to modify and signed a "modified order" that (1) granted a nonsuit without prejudice of Tupelo's claims for breach of contract, foreclosure of the constitutional mechanic's and materialmen's lien, and trespass to try title; (2) granted Tupelo's motion for traditional summary judgment; (3) ordered that Tupelo is entitled to a declaratory judgment that it is owed $81,415.78 "for its investment in the acquisition and improvement of the Property"; (4) granted a declaratory judgment that "by reason of [Tupelo's] payment of the entire consideration to acquire the [P]roperty, a purchase money resulting trust is hereby imposed against the Property" in favor of Tupelo as beneficiary as of November 21, 2018; (5) granted a declaratory judgment "that since November 21, 2018, [Dethloff] has held title to the Property in trust for [Tupelo] as beneficiary"; (6) ordered that Dethloff "shall convey fee simple title to the Property to [Tupelo] by executing and delivering a Special Warranty Deed (conveying the entire Property without reservation) and delivering same to Tupelo" by and through its attorney; (7) ordered that, with the exception of the conveyance of the Property to Tupelo, Dethloff is "permanently enjoined and restrained from selling, transferring, conveying, leasing, renting, borrowing against, or encumbering the Property in any manner whatsoever at any time"; (8) ordered that Tupelo recover $19,035.64 in attorney's fees from Dethloff; and (9) assessed conditional appellate attorneys' fees, interest, and court costs against Dethloff. Thereafter, Dethloff amended her notice of appeal.
The judgment reflects that the $81,415.78 consisted of $21,530.78 for the "acquisition of the Property," $47,155.00 for the "renovation of the Property," $4,370.00 for the amount "still due to DNA Construction," and $8,000.00 for the amount due for "construction management." We note that the total of these items is actually $81,055.78.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Dethloff raises three issues complaining of the trial court's granting Tupelo's traditional motion for summary judgment. Central to Dethloff's first and third issues is whether seeking a purchase money resulting trust through a claim for declaratory relief entitles Tupelo to all of the relief granted in the judgment. We conclude that it does not. Dethloff's second issue addresses whether Tupelo has standing to assert the claims in this lawsuit. We conclude that it does have standing.
Dethloff phrases her issues as follows: (1) "Was it proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of [Tupelo's] causes of action for Declaratory Judgment against [Dethloff]?"; (2) "Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the claims made by [Tupelo] against [Dethloff]?"; and (3) "Was Tupelo's claim(s) for declaratory judgment and subsequent monetary and equitable awards permissible under The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act . . . ?"
On appeal, we must address "every subsidiary issue that is fairly included" within the legal and factual theories which were presented to the trial court, which are fully briefed on appeal, and which are necessary to final disposition of the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), 38.9, 47.1; Lee v. Rogers Agency, 517 S.W.3d 137, 164 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied).
A. Standing
Because it is potentially dispositive, we begin by addressing Dethloff's second issue, which challenges Tupelo's standing. Dethloff argues that she "entered into a contract with Coggins, an individual d/b/a Charming Texas Homes and not with Tupelo," and therefore, Tupelo does not have a "live controversy" with Dethloff. Tupelo responds that because it paid the purchase price and all renovation costs, it has standing to bring the suit.
Standing is a necessary component of subject-matter jurisdiction and is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Standing is a question of law. Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). To satisfy the test for standing, there must be a real controversy between the parties, and the controversy must be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. The issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a justiciable interest in its outcome. Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005).
This case is based on the equitable theory of a purchase money resulting trust. The undisputed evidence, as detailed below, establishes that Tupelo paid the money to purchase the Property. In a similar case involving the equitable theory of a purchase money resulting trust, one of our sister courts held that this was a "sufficient relationship with the lawsuit [for a party] to have a justiciable interest in its outcome." Monroe v. Goff, No. 11-10-00102-CV, 2012 WL 1494802, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). We agree. We overrule Dethloff's second issue.
B. Declaratory Judgment
In her first and third issues, Dethloff argues that "the declaratory action is not permitted as it is duplicative with Tupelo's other remedies," that a trespass-to-try-title claim is the exclusive method for adjudicating claims of title to real property, that a declaratory judgment action is not an action for affirmative relief, and that attorney's fees were not recoverable under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Tupelo responds that "this was not a dispute over title to real property," and therefore, its case was appropriately brought as a declaratory judgment action. Based on the relief requested in the pleadings and in the motion for summary judgment, as well as the relief granted in the trial court's judgment, we agree in part with Dethloff.
1. Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a cause of action if it conclusively proves all essential elements of the claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (c); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986).
A trial court cannot grant summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011); see also State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Tex. 2010) (stating that a "[s]ummary judgment may not be affirmed on appeal on a ground not presented to the trial court in the motion"). In determining whether grounds are expressly presented, reliance may not be placed on briefs or summary-judgment evidence. McConnell v. Southside ISD, 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993). "Granting a summary judgment on a claim not addressed in the summary judgment motion therefore is, as a general rule, reversible error." G & H Towing, 347 S.W.3d at 297.
2. Applicable Law
Under the Declaratory Judgments Act, a party can receive "a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations" under certain instruments such as a deed or contract. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a). The Act is a remedial statute designed "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b)).
The Act does not enlarge a trial court's jurisdiction, and a litigant's request for declaratory relief does not alter a suit's underlying nature. Id. Declaratory judgments are reviewed under the same standards as other judgments and decrees. Roberts v. Squyres, 4 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied). Attorney's fees cannot be awarded under the Act if the claim for relief is duplicative of another claim for which recovery of attorney's fees is not allowed. MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Oper. Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669-70 (Tex. 2009).
The issue of whether a claimant must seek relief related to property interests through a trespass-to-try-title action, as opposed to a suit under the Act, has been the source of some confusion. Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018). The Texas Property Code states that a "trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.001(a). Actions under this statute "involve detailed pleading and proof requirements." Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 783-809). The statute "is typically used to clear problems in chains of title or to recover possession of land unlawfully withheld from a rightful owner." Id. The trespass-to-try-title statute "only applies when the claimant is seeking to establish or obtain the claimant's ownership or possessory right in the land at issue." Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 736.
3. Application of Law to Facts
To properly analyze this issue, we must first look at the claims made in the pleadings and in the motion for summary judgment. In its first amended petition, Tupelo alleged claims for breach of contract; imposition of a purchase money resulting trust or, alternatively, a constructive trust; declaratory judgment; foreclosure of its constitutional lien; and trespass to try title. In its motion for summary judgment, Tupelo moved for summary judgment on all of its claims except its trespass-to-try-title claim. The trial court initially granted summary judgment on all of Tupelo's claims. But Tupelo later nonsuited all of its causes of action except for its request for a declaratory judgment imposing a purchase money resulting trust on the Property.
There is no motion for nonsuit in the record. However, the motion to modify stated that "it is [Tupelo's] intention to non-suit without prejudice its breach of contract and foreclosure of constitutional mechanic's lien claims against [Dethloff], and proceed with a final judgment granting a declaratory judgment that there is a purchase money resulting trust imposed on the property." In addition, the modified judgment reflects that a nonsuit was granted.
A trial court must render a summary judgment on the pleadings on file at the time of the hearing. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Savannah Props. Assocs., Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). Where there is no live pleading urging a cause of action, there can be no summary judgment. Daniels v. Daniels, 45 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). A trial court cannot grant summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); G & H Towing, 347 S.W.3d at 297; see also State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Tex. 2010) (stating that a "[s]ummary judgment may not be affirmed on appeal on a ground not presented to the trial court in the motion").
Similarly, a trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings and the nature of the case proved. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. "A court's jurisdiction to render judgment is invoked by pleadings, and a judgment unsupported by pleadings is void." Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass'n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte Fleming, 532 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1975, no writ)). A party may not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings to support that relief. Lile v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.).
As noted, after the summary judgment motion was granted, the trial court signed a modified order granting a nonsuit without prejudice of Tupelo's claims for breach of contract, foreclosure of the constitutional mechanic's and materialmen's lien, and trespass to try title. After the nonsuit, Tupelo's motion to modify the judgment made clear that Tupelo intended to limit its claim for relief to a declaratory judgment imposing a purchase money resulting trust on the Property. However, the "modified" order granted relief beyond this limited declaratory relief. Therefore, we must decide whether the summary judgment can be affirmed on the basis of this declaratory relief alone.
While there is no issue complaining of the trial court's granting of the nonsuit, we note that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 permits a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss or nonsuit a case "[a]t any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence." Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. "Once a judge announces a decision that adjudicates a claim, that claim is no longer subject to the plaintiff's right to nonsuit." Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995).
An appellate court may review any ground the movant presented to the trial court in its motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether the trial court identified the ground relied on to grant the summary judgment. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996). However, any issues not expressly presented to the trial court by motion or response cannot be considered by the appellate court as grounds for reversing a summary judgment ruling. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP, 511 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. 2017).
Tupelo relies on our recent case of Estate of Gibbs to argue that "when a party needs to ascertain the nature of an equitable interest in real property, that is the proper subject of a declaratory judgment claim, rather than a trespass to try title action." Estate of Gibbs, No. 02-18-00086-CV, 2019 WL 2293172 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Gibbs, we stated:
A person "interested under" a written contract, including a contract involving real property, may seek a declaration of her rights or status vis a vis the contract. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a). But a claimant seeking to establish or obtain ownership of, or a possessory right in, real property must file a trespass to try title action. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.001(a); Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735-36 (Tex. 2018).Id. at *4. After examining the pleadings in Gibbs, we held that the appellant was entitled to bring her claim seeking clarification of her equitable status under a trust agreement as a declaratory judgment claim. Id. at *5. Importantly, Gibbs did not involve a transfer of title. Rather, as we noted, "Although the petition refers repeatedly to [Appellant's] property 'interest,' that interest is her alleged equitable interest under the Trust Agreement to half of the Real Property's net proceeds, not a present possessory interest." Id. at *4.
Here, as in Gibbs, the parties dispute the nature of the claim. Dethloff argues that this case "involves a breach of contract claim in a business dispute." Tupelo responds that it is a "declaratory judgment case in which the relief given was declaration of a purchase money resulting trust." But Tupelo's petition additionally asserts that it is "the rightful owner in fee simple of the Property," and it "seeks to establish or recover an interest in real property." And despite how its suit is labeled, Tupelo's argument also ignores the fact that its pleadings requested, and the judgment ordered, the additional relief of transfer of title, imposition of an injunction, and assessment of attorney's fees. By seeking and obtaining this additional relief, Tupelo exceeded the relief afforded by the Declaratory Judgments Act. And, as we explain below, even though a declaration imposing a purchase money resulting trust was appropriate here, the judgment improperly granted greater relief.
A purchase money resulting trust is implied by operation of law when someone other than the person in whose name title is taken pays the purchase price of the property. In re Estate of LaValle, 218 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). "The parties are presumed to have intended that the grantee hold title to the use of him who paid the purchase price and whom equity deems to be the true owner." Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960). A purchase money resulting trust is an equitable remedy primarily involving consideration. Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Generally, the law is suspicious of resulting trusts, and a heavy burden of proof is placed on the party attempting to establish the existence of one. Id.
Tupelo's motion for summary judgment included evidence establishing a resulting trust for the consideration paid for the Property. In her affidavit, Coggins—Tupelo's agent and records custodian—states that Tupelo "paid $21,530.78 of its own funds for the acquisition of the Property." Attached to the affidavit is the settlement statement showing that $21,530.78 was owed at closing. In addition, the wiring instructions reflect that Tupelo wired $21,530.78 to Texas Title for payment of the consideration. Coggins's affidavit further states that she "was personally involved in the arrangements to wire the funds in the sum of $21,530.78 to the title company in order to fund the purchase price of the Property." Dethloff offered no summary judgment evidence disputing any of these facts. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the payment of the consideration paid for the Property, summary judgment was appropriate on Tupelo's declaratory judgment claim seeking the imposition of a resulting trust in the amount of $21,530.78.
However, the trial court's judgment went further and found that "Dethloff would be unjustly enriched in the amount of $81,415.78 unless a purchase money resulting trust is imposed upon the [Property]." According to the judgment, this higher amount represents not only the amount paid for acquisition of the Property, but also includes the amount paid for the renovation of the Property, the amount "still due to DNA Construction," and the amount due for "construction management." In its motion for summary judgment and on appeal, Tupelo provides no support for including these additional damage elements in the amount of a purchase money resulting trust.
After declaring a purchase money resulting trust, the judgment then ordered Dethloff to convey fee simple title to the Property to Tupelo. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to declare existing rights, status, or other legal relations. Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. 1993). It cannot be invoked as an affirmative ground of recovery to revise or alter such rights or actions. Id. Where the issue is one of title, the action cannot be prosecuted as a declaratory judgment action, but must, instead, have been the subject of a suit in trespass to try title. Lile, 291 S.W.3d at 78.
Finally, Tupelo argues that because a declaratory judgment is the proper vehicle through which to obtain the imposition of a purchase money resulting trust, its attorney's fees were properly awarded under the Declaratory Judgments Act. However, its argument presupposes that attorney's fees were appropriate under the Act. But a party cannot use the Act as a vehicle to obtain otherwise impermissible attorney's fees. MBM Fin. Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 669. And to the extent that this action should have been brought as a trespass-to-try-title action or one to quiet title, attorney's fees are unavailable. Gutierrez v. Lorenz, No. 14-18-00608-CV, 2020 WL 1951606, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Generally, each party must pay his own attorney and can recover attorney's fees from opposing parties only when authorized by statute or when an agreement between the parties provides for the recovery of attorney's fees. Monroe, 2012 WL 1494802, at *6. A purchase money resulting trust is a creature of equity; the relationship is implied and does not arise from any agreement of the parties, but as a matter of law. Id. "Because it is a resulting trust, it cannot also be a contract case, and appellees cannot recover their attorney's fees because they are neither provided for by statute nor by agreement." Id. Here, Tupelo made clear that this was a purchase money resulting trust case. As such, attorney's fees were not recoverable, and Tupelo cannot use the Act to recover them. See id.; MBM Fin. Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 669.
In summary, after the nonsuit, Tupelo's pleadings and motion for summary judgment were limited to a request for a declaration imposing a purchase money resulting trust and for attorney's fees. While the uncontradicted summary judgment evidence supports the existence of a purchase money resulting trust for the $21,530.78 paid for the Property, the judgment improperly ordered the imposition of a purchase money resulting trust that included those amounts paid for renovations, still owed to a contractor, and due for "construction management." In addition, the judgment improperly ordered transfer of title, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Because these parts of the judgment were not supported by the pleadings, evidence, or law, they cannot stand. Accordingly, we overrule that part of Dethloff's first and third issues complaining of imposition of a purchase money resulting trust in the amount of $21,530.78 but sustain the remainder of her first and third issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the part of the trial court's modified summary judgment order imposing a purchase money resulting trust in the amount of $21,530.78, and we reverse the remainder of the trial court's order and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Morrison v. Farmer, the court held that there was no resulting trust. 213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948). While the court concluded that respondent was entitled to compensation for the improvements to the property, it did not award the compensation because "the case was tried on another theory and the facts as to the reasonable value of the property contributed by her were not fully developed." Id. Therefore, the court remanded the case "in order that respondent by proper pleadings and proof may assert and establish a claim for reimbursement." Id.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice Delivered: July 9, 2020