Opinion
NO. 2013 CA 0017
2013-09-13
JEANNE RAY v. JAMES LEBLANC, SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, WARDEN JAMES LEBLANC, LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN & TRACY DIBENEDETTO, ADULT SERVICES
Jeanne Ray St. Gabriel, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant, In Proper Person Debra A. Rutledge Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
19 Judicial District Court,
In and for East Baton Rouge Parish,
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 606,266
The Honorable William Morvant, Judge Presiding
Jeanne Ray
St. Gabriel, Louisiana
Plaintiff/Appellant,
In Proper Person
Debra A. Rutledge
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee,
James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and
Corrections
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CRAIN, JJ.
CRAIN, J.
Petitioner, Jeanne Ray, an inmate at the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women, appeals the dismissal of her petition for judicial review. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was assigned the job of "counsel substitute," an inmate not admitted to the practice of law but who aids and assists other inmates in the preparation and presentation of a defense or appeal. See La. Admin, Code 22, Pt. I, § 345. While assisting an inmate who was allegedly sexually assaulted by a prison employee, petitioner accessed and reviewed departmental regulations that prohibited sexual assault and misconduct by employees. In violation of a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from reproducing prison employee regulations, she reproduced the regulation by typing it. Petitioner had been previously instructed not to type, copy or write any employee regulations and policies. In disciplinary proceeding LCIW-2011-121, she was found guilty of a disciplinary infraction and was removed as counsel substitute, assigned 90 days of administrative segregation, and transferred from minimum to maximum security II status. Her appeals to the warden and the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections were denied. See La. Admin. Code 22, Pt. I, § 361.
During the pendency of her appeal of the disciplinary ruling, petitioner filed an administrative claim pursuant to the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedures ("CARP"), set forth at Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1171-1179, asserting that the disciplinary proceeding was pursued as retaliation against her for serving as counsel substitute for the inmate who was allegedly sexually assaulted. The CARP claim was rejected because it failed to comply with requirements governing the caption and length of the claim. A re-submitted claim was rejected for the same reasons and because it was untimely. See La. Admin. Code 22, Pt. I, §§ 325D.4 and 3251.1.
Petitioner then filed a "Petition for Judicial Review" with the district court, however it is not clear from the pleading whether she sought review of the disciplinary proceeding or the CARP claim Although the petition initially identifies the number of the disciplinary proceeding as the relevant matter under review, the number is entered in a blank labeled "ARP No." instead of the blank for "Disciplinary Board Appeal No." Both the disciplinary report and the CARP claim are attached to the petition along with the appeal of the disciplinary ruling and the rejections of the CARP claim. The lengthy petition addresses both proceedings, but the thrust of the document is that petitioner believes the disciplinary proceeding and resulting punishment were retaliation for her assisting the alleged victim of the sexual assault and that her constitutional rights to free speech and due process were violated. She requested declaratory relief and a return to her prior job, housing assignment, and security status.
Following an initial screening by the commissioner, all parties were dismissed except the Department in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177A(1)(b). The Department then filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that petitioner's suit does not allege the violation of a substantial right and should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1177A(9). The commissioner recommended that the exception be granted. After the timely filing of a traversal by petitioner, the district court then signed a judgment granting the exception and dismissing the suit with prejudice. Petitioner now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues on appeal that the district court misconstrued her petition as an appeal of the disciplinary proceeding instead of a request for judicial review of her CARP claim, which she asserts is not subject to the "substantial right" analysis required by CARP at Section 1177A(9). This argument has no merit. Regardless of whether the petition is construed as a request to review the disciplinary proceeding or a request to review the CARP retaliation claim, the suit is subject to the same legal standard of review required by CARP at Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177A, which we find was properly applied by the district court. See Madison v. Ward, 00-2842 (La. App, 1 Cir. 7/3/02), 825 So. 2d 1245, 1254 (en banc) (CARP is exclusive remedy for disciplinary actions where punishment concerns a condition of confinement that does not involve a liberty interest or vested property right); Lightfoot v. Stalder, 00-1120 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So. 2d 710, 716, writ denied, 01-2295 (La. 8/30/02), 823 So. 2d 957 (applying CARP, trial court properly dismissed inmate's suit claiming that disciplinary proceeding was retaliation where no substantial rights were at issue); Peterson v. Austin, 36,365 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 836 So. 2d 235, 238, writ denied, 03-0510 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So. 2d 70 (CARP governed inmate's claim of retaliation that arose out of disciplinary proceeding and concerned conditions of confinement).
Under CARP, an inmate aggrieved by a disciplinary decision by the Department may seek judicial review of that decision pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177. According to Section 1177A(9), the court can reverse or modify the Department's decision only "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Plaisance v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 10-1249 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11), 57 So. 3d 593, 594-595. A substantial right has been defined as a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. Giles v. Cain, 99-1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So. 2d 734, 738-739.
Following a conviction, a criminal defendant is constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). Liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint that imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484(1995).
The commissioner and district court correctly recognized that petitioner's job as counsel substitute was not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. A prisoner has no constitutionally protected interest to a specific work assignment, and counsel substitutes may be removed from their positions at the discretion of the warden. Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5 Cir. 1995); La. Admin. Code. 22, Pt. I, §347C. Likewise, the administrative segregation and change in security status did not prejudice protected liberty interests. The Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226-227 (transfer from medium-security facility to maximum-security facility did not invoke Due Process Clause); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation creating a liberty interest). Consequently, because petitioner failed to allege a substantial right prejudiced by the Department's disciplinary decision, the district court could not modify or reverse the Department's decision under Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1177A(9).
For these same reasons, petitioner's CARP claim asserting that the disciplinary proceeding and punishment were retaliation does not involve a substantial right and was properly dismissed. The CARP claim arose out of the same facts and circumstances and complains of conditions of confinement imposed through a disciplinary proceeding that do not rise to the level of a substantial right. See Lightfoot, 808 So. 2d at 716; Peterson, 836 So. 2d at 238. In a retaliation claim arising out of disciplinary action, the inmate must allege a violation of a specific constitutional right and establish that the filing of a disciplinary report would not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive. Lightfoot, 808 So. 2d at 716; Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). The focus of petitioner's claim is that she was wrongfully removed from her counsel substitute job, however she had no constitutional right to serve as a counsel substitute. See La. Admin. Code. 22, Pt. I, §347C; Tighe, 100 F. 3d at 42-43 (inmate who claimed his removal as counsel substitute was retaliation for providing legal assistance to fellow inmates failed to demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right). As in Tighe, petitioner did not allege that she or her fellow inmates were denied access to the courts; instead, she argues that another inmate was deprived of her legal assistance. Inmates have no right to a particular inmate's help in legal matters as long as the putative recipient's constitutional right of access to courts is not infringed. Tighe, 100 F. 3d at 43.
The petition and attachments thereto establish that petitioner was punished for violating a disciplinary rule because she wrongfully typed an employee policy. The right she was exercising at the time (serving as counsel substitute) was not a constitutional right; and the punishment she received (loss of her job, administrative segregation, and a change in security status) did not prejudice a substantial right. Whether styled as a disciplinary appeal or a request for review of a CARP claim, the petition failed to set forth a complaint that entitled petitioner to relief. The petition was properly dismissed by the trial court. La. R.S. 15:1177A(9).
The district court did, however, err in dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1177A(9) does not divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, but limits the available remedies if the court determines that the matter does not involve any violation of or prejudice to substantial rights of the inmate. Plaisance, 57 So. 3d at 595; Anderson v. LeBlanc, 11-1800 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12) (unpublished opinion), 2012 WL 1550529. Nevertheless, the failure to allege facts upon which relief can be granted results in a failure to state a cause of action, which this court can notice on its own motion. La. Code of Civ. Pro. art. 927A(5) and B; Plaisance, 57 So. 3d at 595. The district court had the authority to review the petition for judicial review but could provide no relief because the petition did not allege facts showing a violation of substantial rights. See Plaisance, 57 So. 3d at 595. For that reason, the petition fails to state a cause of action.
We further find that the grounds for objection cannot be removed by an amendment under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934. The extensive allegations in the petition and numerous attachments present the full scope of petitioner's claim and the alleged supporting factual basis. We find that any attempted amendment would be a vain and useless act. See Mercan, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 00-0600 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 797 So. 2d 722, 724, writ denied, 01-1685 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So. 2d 676.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the petition for judicial review with prejudice. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Jeanne Ray.
AFFIRMED.