Opinion
No. 01-05-00460-CR
Opinion issued March 23, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 971299.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HIGLEY, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Johnny William Rawls, of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The trial court assessed punishment at seven years in prison. We determine whether appellant preserved his complaint that the trial court erred in allowing testimony, during the guilt — innocence stage of the trial, about the impact of his conduct on the complainant's life and her mental health. We affirm.
Factual Background
For approximately one year, A.G., who was 10 years old, lived with her mother, Angelique Cherry, and appellant, Cherry's boyfriend. During that time, appellant sexually assaulted A.G. numerous times. At trial, Cherry testified about changes in A.G.'s behavior after the sexual assault. For example, A.G. threatened Cherry with a knife, was admitted to a psychiatric hospital because she was suicidal, skipped school, slept with older men, and stole money. In addition, Cherry testified that, at the time of trial, A.G. was having nightmares about appellant's sexually assaulting her. A.G. also testified about her admission to the psychiatric hospital and her nightmares.Failure to Preserve Error
In his sole point of error, appellant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in allowing extensive testimony during the guilt stage of the trial about the impact of the alleged conduct on [A.G.'s] life and her mental health." Specifically, appellant argues that testimony by Cherry and A.G. constituted victim-impact evidence, as described in Cantu v. State, and was, therefore, irrelevant and inadmissible. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 635-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The State argues that appellant failed to preserve this challenge for appeal. Testimony about the results of an attack on a victim is inadmissible at the guilt — innocence phase of a trial, because such testimony has no tendency to make more or less probable the existence of any fact of consequence at that stage of the proceedings. Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). However, rule 33.1 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party have "state[d] the ground for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint." Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Appellant's point of error on appeal must comport with his objection at trial. See Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (holding that appellant failed to preserve any error regarding victim-impact evidence's admission because his objection at trial did not comport with complaint raised on appeal). Generally, a party's failure timely and specifically to object at the trial-court level waives error. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). An accused may waive even constitutional rights. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). At trial, the State questioned Cherry about A.G.'s behavior after the alleged incident, including violence towards her mother and two visits to a psychiatric hospital. Appellant objected to the State's questioning of Cherry as being leading:[STATE]: Now, you said you didn't believe your daughter at that point in time. How did your relationship with your daughter turn after you didn't go to that meeting at the Children's Assessment Center.
[APPELLANT]: I want to object, Your Honor, as leading.
. . .
[THE COURT]: Objection overruled.Furthermore, when A.G. took the stand, the State questioned her about how appellant's sexual abuse had affected her life. Appellant did not object to A.G.'s testimony. Appellant did not object to either Cherry or A.G.'s testimony as being irrelevant or prejudicial, which is his complaint on appeal. Thus, the claimed error is waived. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d at 583. We overrule appellant's sole point of error.