Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0225-14T3
01-31-2017
MARIA J. RASLOWSKY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RONALD RASLOWSKY, Defendant-Appellant.
Emery Z. Toth, attorney for appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Messano and Suter. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FM-15-814-12. Emery Z. Toth, attorney for appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Ronald Raslowsky (defendant) appeals from a Final Judgment of Divorce (FJOD) entered on August 21, 2014, which incorporated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that he signed with plaintiff Maria Raslowsky, and from an August 1, 2014 Family Division order, which found the MOU to be binding on the parties, and incorporated it into the FJOD. On appeal, defendant claims the Family Division judge erred in finding the MOU was a binding agreement and incorporating it into the FJOD without a hearing. Additionally, he contends the trial court erred by enforcing his agreement to pay plaintiff $50,000 instead of conditioning that obligation on his ability to conduct a walk-through of the marital residence. We affirm Judge Sheldon R. Franklin's orders.
Defendant and plaintiff were married on November 1, 1998. Plaintiff filed for divorce in December 2011 on grounds of irreconcilable differences. Plaintiff obtained a final restraining order against defendant on August 15, 2013. The FJOD was entered on August 21, 2014.
With the case listed for trial in June 2014 and economic mediation having failed, the parties agreed to participate in the Intensive Settlement Program (ISP). A retired Superior Court judge conducted three days of negotiations with the parties in February 2014, during which they both were represented by counsel.
On February 28, 2014, the retired judge advised the court that the parties had reached an agreement. That agreement was handwritten by counsel for plaintiff, with at least one change made by defendant's counsel that all parties initialed. The document, entitled MOU, was organized in paragraphs with headings that included "Alimony," "Businesses," "Marital Residence," "Personalty," "Life Insurance," "Credit Cards" and "Attorney Fee." Pursuant to the MOU, defendant was to pay plaintiff $600 per week in alimony for six years through the Probation Department. Under the Businesses paragraph, he was to pay a total of $85,000 to plaintiff over four years in specified dollar amounts per year. Defendant was to maintain a $300,000 life insurance policy with plaintiff as the beneficiary until the alimony obligation was completed and financial obligations under the agreement were satisfied. Each party agreed to pay their credit card obligations. Defendant agreed to pay for the unsuccessful economic mediation. The parties were each to pay their own attorney's fees.
Of relevance here are the paragraphs captioned Marital Residence and Personalty. These paragraphs provided as follows:
Marital Residence: Husband shall pay $35,000 to Wife within 30 days of this date. The husband shall be granted sole and exclusive possession of the marital residence 30 days from the date of payment and Wife shall return Lexus to Husband on that date. Husband responsible for any cost. Wife agrees to sign mortgage modification papers and documents that may be necessary from the bank, Husband shall have two (2) years to refinance and remove Wife's name from all mortgages and or line of credit. (If Husband is late on Mortgage for 2 months during the 2-year modification period, the house shall be listed for sale).
Husband to defend and indemnify Wife for any and all claims or actions related to marital residence including payment of any fees. The
Husband shall be entitled to a walk-through of the marital residence within ten (10) days for a time not to exceed (1) hour. Husband shall pay for police escort to be present. Wife may have someone present on her behalf. Cameras at the residence shall be returned by the Wife to her brother.
Personalty: The husband shall retain all personalty, vehicles, assets listed on Case Information Statements with the exception that the Wife shall retain her personal clothing and property including the marital dogs. In consideration the Husband shall pay to the Wife $50,000 payable at a rate of $800.00 per month until paid with Husband having the right to pre-pay at any time.
The parties signed the MOU on February 28, 2014 as did their attorneys. Shortly thereafter, counsel for plaintiff requested dates for defendant's walk-through that was referenced in the Marital Residence paragraph. The walk-through occurred at the end of March 2014. Defendant complained he was not afforded adequate time for the walk-through. In April 2014, the parties met again with the retired judge on that issue. At that time, defendant expressed that he wanted additional time to consider the terms of the MOU.
In June 2014, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the provisions of the MOU, to set a date for the parties to finalize their divorce and requested counsel fees. Defendant opposed the requested relief, contending that the MOU was "conditioned on the fact that personalty existed that I would be entitled to for the lump sum that I was tendering for all the personalty. That sum was $85,000." Additionally, defendant contended that when he did his walk-through "it came to my attention that a lot of the property that I allegedly bargained for was missing. I was concerned with this fact and let the retired judge know I would not enter into the agreement if the property I was paying $85,000 for did not exist." Defendant said he signed the MOU in haste at the end of the court day and "did not look at the document carefully." He asserted that he believed the document was not a binding property settlement agreement but more of a letter of intent, that the MOU "was conditioned upon my confirmation that the property I was bargaining for existed," and that the judge did not take testimony from him about whether the MOU was binding. He requested that the MOU be vacated.
On August 1, 2014, the return date of plaintiff's motion to enforce, defendant's counsel responded to Judge Franklin's question that, contrary to defendant's certification, the MOU was not conditioned on whether certain personalty existed. Additionally, counsel did not recall his client taking the position before the retired judge that he would not enter into an agreement to pay $85,000 if the personalty did not exist. However, counsel asserted the retired judge amended the restraining order so that defendant could go into the house to "look for the first time at some personalty," the majority of which consisted of automobiles.
Judge Franklin found the MOU was an enforceable settlement that was binding on the parties. His August 1, 2014 order incorporated the MOU into the FJOD, and scheduled a hearing date for the divorce. The order provided that the walk-through provision "did not negate the defendant's responsibility to tender the [$]50,000 for personalty since the assets were essentially the high value assets [such as] motor vehicles, motorcycles, etc." The FJOD was entered on August 21, 2014, based on plaintiff's unopposed testimony.
On appeal, defendant raises that the MOU "contemplated an inspection of the personalty before any agreement to purchase the property for $50,000" and that the MOU was not final nor should it have been incorporated into the FJOD. Defendant also contends that disputes about the MOU should not have been resolved without a plenary hearing.
Plaintiff did not file a brief, having had her ability to file a brief suppressed by our order dated March 29, 2016. --------
We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges," Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citations omitted), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Our analysis begins with the recognition that "[p]ublic policy favors the settlement of disputes." Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave. LLC, 215 N.J. 242, 253 (2013). Our courts acknowledge a "'strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements' in matrimonial matters." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016) (quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)) (other citations omitted). Marital settlement agreements "which are fair and just" are enforceable in equity. See Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981) (providing that settlement agreements in matrimonial matters are "entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability in equity," provided they are "fair and just"). "A narrow exception to the general rule of enforcing settlement agreements as the parties intended is the need to reform a settlement agreement due to 'unconscionability, fraud, or overreaching in the negotiations of the settlement[.]'" Quinn, supra, 225 N.J. at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 419 (1999)).
An enforceable matrimonial agreement "need not necessarily be reduced to writing or placed on the record." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 46 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 (1995). The question is whether the parties "agree on the essential terms of a settlement." Ibid. "In order for a contract to form . . . there must be a 'meeting of the minds.'" State v. Ernest & Young, L.L.P., 386 N.J. Super. 600, 612 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 538 (1953)). A "meeting of the minds" means there is "a common understanding and mutual assent of all the terms of a contract." Knight v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 560, 565 (App. Div. 1987) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 184 (1988).
Here, the parties and their counsel signed a comprehensive written document entitled MOU that resolved all of the key areas in dispute in the divorce. The MOU resulted from three days of negotiation before a retired Superior Court judge, during which both parties were represented by counsel. Once the agreement was reached, the retired judge announced to the trial judge that the parties had reached as settlement. Defendant does not identify any material issues that were omitted from the agreement. He does not assert that the MOU was unfair, or that it resulted from fraud or overreaching. Therefore, we do not discern error by Judge Franklin in concluding the parties agreed to the essential terms of the MOU, which then became a contract binding on the parties.
Defendant contends the MOU contemplated an inspection of the personalty before he was required to pay $50,000 and that the judge should have held a plenary hearing. However, "not every factual dispute that arises in the context of matrimonial proceedings triggers the need for a plenary hearing." Harrington, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 47 (citing Adler v. Adler, 229 N.J. Super. 496, 500 (App. Div. 1988)). A plenary hearing is not needed where there are no disputed material issues of fact. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980).
Defendant's contentions are not supported by this record. The walk-through provision was not a part of the paragraph that addressed personalty; it was in the Marital Residence paragraph. His counsel advised the trial judge that the MOU was not conditioned on whether certain personalty existed or was present at the marital residence. His client did not advise the retired judge he would not enter into the agreement unless certain personalty were present at the marital residence. Defendant's conclusory and self-serving allegations about the MOU, therefore, were not supported by the record, nor did they create a disputed factual issue. See Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005) (providing that "conclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome the motion" for summary judgment).
We agree there was no basis to revise the MOU by conditioning any of the provisions on the walk-through. Defendant apparently had second thoughts after he signed the agreement. However, "a court should not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained." Quinn, supra, 225 N.J. at 45 (citing Solondz v. Kornmehl, 317 N.J. Super. 16, 21-22 (App. Div. 1998)).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION