Opinion
Civil Action No. 20-232
11-23-2020
ABDUL RASHEED Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE DANIEL MAYER, ORLANDO HARPER, SERGEANT RANDACI, SAM PASTOR, ACJ Investigator, SERGEANT RANDY JUSTICE, and C.O. John/Jane Does 1-3 Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
ECF No. 32
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper, Sergeant Randy Justice, Daniel Mayer, Sam Pastor and Sergeant Randaci (ECF No. 32) be granted and that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. II. REPORT
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper ("Harper"), Sergeant Randy Justice ("Justice"), Daniel Mayer ("Mayer"), Sam Pastor ("Pastor") and Sergeant Randaci ("Randaci") (collectively "Defendants").
Apparently, Plaintiff has misidentified the Sergeant in the caption as "Randaci." Throughout the body of this Report and Recommendation, the Court will use the correct spelling: "Radaci."
A. Facts
Plaintiff Abdul Rasheed ("Plaintiff" or "Rasheed"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Allegheny County Jail ("ACJ") residing in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") for an unrelated 30-day disciplinary infraction. Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14 ¶ 16. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained in the RHU under Administrative Custody ("AC"). Plaintiff complained to Defendants Radaci, Harper and others about this continued confinement. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant Radaci stated to Plaintiff that he was being confined in the RHU pursuant to a captain's orders. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff also alleges that he complained to Defendant Harper about his confinement in the RHU, his lack of adequate legal assistance and the emotional stress and depression from his RHU placement, and that he "never had a drug misconduct his entire time while in ACJ. Defendant Harper only stated he'll look into it." Id. ¶ 19.
Sometime in February or March 2018, Plaintiff asked a captain whether he could be released from the RHU. The captain indicated that he couldn't release Plaintiff because Internal Affairs ("IA") was keeping Plaintiff confined in the RHU. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to grieve what he perceived to be his illegal confinement, but he received no responses from any of his grievances. Id. ¶ 21.
On April 20, 2018, Plaintiff was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. See Criminal Docket Sheet for United States District Court, W.D.N.Y., 6:16-cr-6109, ECF No. 33-1 at 1-17 (hereinafter "W.D.N.Y. Docket Sheet"). On April 26, 2018, Plaintiff, along with his legal material, returned to the ACJ after being held in federal custody. Id. ¶ 22. His legal material was given over to the ACJ intake officers. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff asked Defendant Radaci about his legal material and Radaci responded that IA requested it and the legal materials were being given to IA. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff complained to Radaci that his actions violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and that Plaintiff's legal mail was already searched by federal transporters and ACJ intake officers. Id. ¶ 25. Defendant Radaci responded that he would return his legal material after IA had finished with it. Id. ¶ 26. On April 30th or in May 2018, while still housed in the RHU under AC status, Sergeant Doe came to Plaintiff's cell door to return what Plaintiff alleges appeared to be copies of his legal materials. Plaintiff refused to accept them. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff complained to Defendant Harper about Defendant Radaci "and at the time the unknown acts and omissions of Defendant(s) Mayer, and Pastor" and the relevance of the confiscated materials to Plaintiff's state and federal cases. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff also complained of the emotional distress the confiscation caused Plaintiff. Defendant Harper responded to Plaintiff that "I am not bigger than Internal Affairs . . . ." Id.
On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff pled guilty to third degree homicide and other charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at CP-02-CR-0013839-2016. See Docket Sheet at Commonwealth v. Rasheed, CP-02-CR-0013839-2016 at p.3 (hereinafter "Commonwealth Docket Sheet"). On June 18, 2018, when returning to the ACJ from state court sentencing proceedings (Commonwealth Docket Sheet at 3-4), he was arrested, charged and allegedly prosecuted by Defendant Mayer. ECF No. 14 ¶ 29. In his responsive submissions to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff submitted the Police Criminal Complaint prepared by Defendant Detective Mayer while assigned to the Allegheny County Jail Internal Affairs Unit. The Complaint contains Detective Mayer's affidavit of probable cause for the arrest alleged by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint. Exhibits in Support of Abdul Rasheed, ECF No. 41 at 3. Therein, Defendant Detective Mayer sets forth the following:
On April 26, 2018 Inmate Abdul Rasheed DOC 182714 returned to the Allegheny County Jail from temporary federal custody. Rasheed has been the subject of previous synthetic narcotic contraband investigations at the Allegheny County Jail in December 2017 and 2018. ACJ Investigator Sam Pastor was aware of Rasheed's return to the Allegheny County Jail and had placed an alert on his movement profile. Rasheed was searched and was in possession of paper documents including a 9" x 12"
manila envelope containing several sheets of his personal handwritten notes that were damp and appeared to be saturated with a liquid substance. Investigator Pastor contacted Sgt. Randy Justice of the ACJ training Unit. Sgt. Justice obtained two independent swabbings of the suspected contraband papers which he then tested utilizing a Rapiscan Itemiser Ion detection system. Both samples tested positive for the controlled substance MDEA.ECF No. 41 at 3. Bail was set in the amount of $500.00 for state drug offenses. ECF No. 14 ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that he never received a preliminary hearing or any other court proceeding for this alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff states in his responsive brief that the state proceedings "were abandoned." ECF No. 42 at 19; see also Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 44 ¶ 15.
The contraband papers were entered into evidence utilizing property control number 18-0613 and will be forwarded to the Allegheny County Medical Examiner's Office Forensic Laboratory pending further investigation.
Based on the aforementioned information your affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Abdul Rasheed DOB 11-07-1981 for violations of the PACS, Title 18 and Title 35 as enumerated in this complaint and affidavit.
On November 13, 2018, Plaintiff was sentenced to 5 years, and 3 years post release in the federal case in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York at Case No. 6:16-cr-06109. ECF No. 33-1 at 14. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff on the state drug charges was a factor that resulted in the enhancement of Plaintiff's federal sentence. ECF No. 14 ¶ 32.
Plaintiff states the following claims against all Defendants: Count 1 for False Arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania state law—Plaintiff also appears to be alleging an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to intervene, and a First Amendment Access to the Courts claim for confiscation of his legal materials; Count II for Malicious Prosecution and failure to intervene against all Defendants pursuant to Pennsylvania state law and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count III for violation of Due Process pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in that he was denied a trial by jury for the alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution. As a result of all these alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks in excess of one million dollars in damages as compensation for his federal sentence being enhanced as a result of the alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution, mental distress, psychological injuries, and defamation of character.
B. Legal Standards
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the "notice pleading" standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a "plausible" claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Although "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff "need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court may also consider indisputably authentic documents. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Golden v. Cook, 293 F. Supp.2d 546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ("[C]ourts are permitted to consider matters of which they may take judicial notice, including records and reports of administrative bodies, and publicly available records and transcripts from judicial proceedings 'in related or underlying cases which have a direct relation to the matters at issue.'") (citations omitted).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution."). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
Finally, the Court recognizes that it must permit a curative amendment by a plaintiff in a civil rights action before dismissing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be "inequitable or futile." Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), the district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile). The Court will remain cognizant of its obligation as it proceeds through its analyses below.
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ..42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
Affording the pro se Plaintiff every favorable inference and relying on his responsive brief (ECF No. 42), submitted exhibits (ECF No. 41) and response to the motion (ECF No. 44) for assistance, the Court identifies Plaintiff's legal claims as follows:
1. Fourth Amendment False Arrest, Seizure of Documents, and Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff attempts to allege several Fourth Amendment violations. When ACJ personnel refused to return Plaintiff's legal papers upon his return from federal custody (April 26, 2018), and at the time that he was arrested and allegedly prosecuted for the state drug charges (June 18, 2018), Plaintiff had already been convicted after a jury trial on April 20, 2018 in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. See W.D.N.Y. Docket Sheet, ECF No. 33-1 at 11-12. After that jury trial conviction, he was returned to the ACJ until his sentencing in November 2018, where he was sentenced to five (5) years imprisonment to run consecutively with his sentence for Third Degree Homicide in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on June 18, 2018 as a result of his guilty plea on May 29, 2018. See Commonwealth Docket Sheet.
a. Fourth Amendment Seizure of Legal Papers
Plaintiff attempts to make out a Fourth Amendment claim for the illegal search and seizure of his legal documents. A prison inmate, however, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) ("[T]he prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security.") In fact, the Hudson court noted that the "random searches of cells renders these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the prison administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of . . . illicit drugs, and other contraband." Id. at 528. Here, where Plaintiff's search and seizure of his legal papers were due to suspicion of possession of illegal contraband within the prison system, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527- 28. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to dismiss this claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile in light of the facts alleged and the public documents submitted by Plaintiff.
b. Fourth Amendment False Arrest
Plaintiff also attempts to state a claim for false arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. In order to support this claim, Plaintiff must allege that there was an arrest and that the arrest was made without probable cause. See James v. City of Wilkes Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995)). Probable cause to arrest exists "whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person arrested." United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91 (1964)). The test is an objective one based upon "the facts available to the officers at the moment of arrest." Beck, 379 U.S. at 96; Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 571 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff submits the Police Criminal Complaint indicating that Detective Mayer of the ACJ Internal Affairs Unit and ACJ Investigator Sam Pastor were in possession of facts indicating that Plaintiff's personal paper documents were damp and appeared to be saturated with a liquid substance that tested positive for the controlled substance MDEA. Defendant Mayer swore out the Criminal Complaint to this effect and a warrant was issued by a magisterial district justice to support Plaintiff's arrest for Possession of Prison Contraband (Felony) and Possession of a Counterfeit Substance. Even though these charges were later withdrawn, the withdrawal of charges will not invalidate an arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ("Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary."). That is, as long as the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Plaintiff had committed a crime, which Defendants did here, the arrest itself is justified as being based on probable cause. See id. Any attempt to amend under these facts would be futile.
c. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution. In order to state a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege plausible facts to suggest the following:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007).
Construing Plaintiff's allegations liberally, Plaintiff is unable to allege plausible facts to meet the third and fifth elements of a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. As discussed above, the proceeding against Plaintiff was initiated with probable cause in that the magisterial district judge issued an arrest warrant based upon the affidavit of Defendant Detective Mayer. That affidavit described that Plaintiff's personal documents were saturated with a liquid substance that tested positive for MDEA. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971) ("Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements before a warrant for arrest or search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.") And as to the fifth element, post-conviction incarceration cannot be a seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997), cited in, Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 381 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment must necessarily fail. Any attempt to amend would be futile.
2. First Amendment Access to the Courts
Liberally construing Plaintiff's allegations, it appears that he is attempting to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment right of Access to the Courts in that he complains of the confiscation of his legal materials and the importance, generally, of these materials to his state and federal cases. Plaintiff offers no specific details as to the relevance of these documents to the state and federal cases. ECF No. 14 ¶ 28.
Since 1977, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). As the Supreme Court initially observed, this right of access to the courts is satisfied when corrections officials facilitate "meaningful" access for those incarcerated, either through legal materials or the assistance of those trained in the law. Id. at 827-28. Two decades later, in 1996, the Supreme Court provided further definition and guidance regarding the scope and nature of this right in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). In Lewis, the Court eschewed efforts to define this right in abstract, or theoretical terms, but rather cautioned courts to focus on concrete outcomes when assessing such claims. As the court observed:
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's . . . legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense . . . . Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, "meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone," id., at 823, 97 S. Ct., at 1495 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the . . . legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. Although Bounds itself made no
mention of an actual-injury requirement, it can hardly be thought to have eliminated that constitutional prerequisite. And actual injury is apparent on the face of almost all the opinions in the 35-year line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied, see id., at 821-825, 97 S. Ct., at 1494-1497. Moreover, the assumption of an actual-injury requirement seems to us implicit in the opinion's statement that "we encourage local experimentation" in various methods of assuring access to the courts. Id., at 832, 97 S. Ct., at 1500.Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52.
Thus, following Lewis, courts have consistently recognized that access-to-courts claims by prisoners require some proof of an actual, concrete injury in the form of direct prejudice to the plaintiff in the pursuit of some legal claim. See, e.g., Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997); Demeter v Buskirk, No. 03-1005, 2003 WL 22139780 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2003); Castro v. Chesney, No. 97-4983, 1998 WL 150961 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1998).
"[P]risoners may only proceed on access-to-courts claims in two types of cases, challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and conditions of confinement." Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). As noted in Monroe:
Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an "actual injury"—that they lost a chance to pursue a "nonfrivolous" or "arguable" underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other "remedy that may be awarded as recompense" for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.Id. (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Importantly, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence to show that the underlying arguable claim is "more than hope," and he must also describe the "lost remedy." See Harbury, 536 U.S. at 416-17.
Plaintiff is thus required to allege plausible facts that he was actually injured by Defendants' alleged interference with his right to access the courts when they withheld his documents on April 26, 2018 after he was returned to the ACJ from federal custody. Plaintiff offers no details as to how the withholding of his legal documents caused him to suffer an actual injury—that is, that he lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim. See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. Public documents relating to Plaintiff's state and federal criminal cases, however, reflect that by April 26, 2018, Plaintiff had already been convicted in his federal case, and had pled guilty to third degree homicide and other charges in his state case. Consequently, the withholding of these documents on April 26, 2018, would have held no relevance in opposing his state and federal criminal convictions. Moreover, Plaintiff's refusal to accept copies of his documents belies their importance in any post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiff is unable to state a plausible claim for violation of his First Amendment right to access the courts. Any attempt to amend his allegations of the Amended Complaint would be futile.
3. Fifth Amendment
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no claim against them pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because it only applies to actions by the federal government. The Court agrees. The law in this area is clear that only the actions of federal government officials, and not the acts of the State or state officials comes under the auspicious of the Fifth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 26 (1964), cited in, Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 178 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is therefore recommended that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Fifth Amendment be dismissed with prejudice.
4. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment for Extended Stay in the RHU
Plaintiff appears to be complaining of his extended stay in the RHU, at first for a disciplinary infraction, and subsequently, for his continued stay in AC status. Here, however, it is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner during the times he complains of his RHU/AC confinement—December 18, 2017 and intermittent periods through March/April 2018. Thus, it is also unclear whether the protection of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to his conditions of confinement claim. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard I) (stating that claims that arose while a plaintiff was a pretrial detainee must be prosecuted under the Due Process Clause, while claims that arose after he was sentenced are analyzed under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). While recognizing that the case law is unclear as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides some measure of additional protections for pretrial detainees above what the Eighth Amendment affords convicted prisoners, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's claim under the Due Process Clause because the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has hinted that a pretrial detainee's "due process rights are at least as broad, if not broader, than his rights under the Eighth Amendment." Tapp v. Proto, 404 F. App'x 563, 566 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The Eighth Amendment "was designed to protect those convicted of crimes and consequently the Clause applies only after the State has complied with constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (citation and internal quotations omitted). It imposes a duty on prison officials to provide "humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment while addressing non-medical conditions of confinement. The Court held that the prisoner must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference that deprived him of "'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Id. at 298-99, 301-05 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
The standard to apply when evaluating conditions of confinement imposed on pretrial detainees is not clear and has been the subject of scholarly debate. Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013). However, the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have unequivocally held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard is at least as protective as the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard when analyzing conditions of confinement. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) ("pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners"); Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2007) ("the protections due to sentenced inmates provide a floor for what pretrial detainees may expect"). --------
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, when a pretrial detainee complains about the conditions of his confinement, courts are to consider whether the conditions "amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with law." Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 158. When evaluating whether such conditions violate due process, "we must ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by these conditions, and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes." Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hubbard II) (quoting Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)). "In assessing whether the conditions are rationally related to the assigned purposes, we must further inquire as to whether these conditions cause inmates to endure such genuine privation and hardship over an extended period of time that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them." Di Buono, 713 F.2d at 992 (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
As to the first inquiry, Defendants had a legitimate interest in segregating Plaintiff if, as set out in the Criminal Complaint, he had "been the subject of . . . synthetic narcotic contraband investigations at the Allegheny County Jail in December 2017 and 2018." Criminal Complaint, ECF No. 41 at 3. And second, keeping Plaintiff separated from the ACJ's general population was rationally related to keeping contraband out of the ACJ until ACJ Investigator Sam Pastor concluded his investigation of Plaintiff when he placed an alert on his movement profile. See ECF No. 41 at 3. Consequently, Plaintiff is unable to state a plausible due process conditions of confinement violation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberally construing Plaintiff's allegations and in light of the public documents in issue, any attempt to amend would be futile.
5. Violation of Due Process for Failure to receive a Preliminary Hearing/Trial
In his responsive brief, Plaintiff clarifies his due process claim. He states that he is claiming a procedural due process violation for deprivation of liberty where he did not receive a preliminary hearing and/or trial relating to the June 18, 2018 drug charges. ECF No. 42 at 12. Plaintiff's submissions reflect, however, that these state charges were withdrawn. Consequently, no jury trial was necessary on the withdrawn charges.
In addition, Plaintiff is claiming a due process violation for the deprivation of his property. Plaintiff's submissions reflect, however, that Defendants had probable cause to suspect that Plaintiff's documents were contraband. Importantly, copies of Plaintiff's documents were returned but he refused to accept them. Plaintiff, therefore, was not deprived of his property. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile.
6. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process violation for Loss of Liberty
Plaintiff appears to argue that he sustained a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation of his liberty interest when his federal sentencing was enhanced due to the alleged malicious prosecution. ECF No. 44 ¶ 18. Public documents reflect that Plaintiff's sentencing in the federal case occurred on November 13, 2018. By that time, Plaintiff had already been sentenced for his guilty plea to third degree homicide and various other state charges in his state criminal case. It is simply implausible that withdrawn charges for prison contraband would have had any significant impact on Plaintiff's federal sentencing in light of his sentencing on the state court charges for third degree homicide and other serious charges including aggravated assault, possession of prohibited firearm, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of controlled substance, and false identification to law enforcement officer. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (The "plausibility" determination will be "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."). See also Commonwealth Docket Sheet at 3-4. Therefore Plaintiff's attempt to state a claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest should be dismissed. Any attempt to amend would be futile.
7. Eighth Amendment Failure to Intervene
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment for failure to intervene. He alleges that when the above alleged constitutional violations occurred, the remaining Defendants had a duty to intervene so as to prevent the violations. Again, Plaintiff's claim must fail. Rasheed cannot state a claim against any individual Defendant for failure to intervene where he cannot state an underlying constitutional claim. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). Any attempt to amend would be futile.
8. Pennsylvania State Law Claims for Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
In light of the fact that all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed, the Court recommends that the district court choose not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c) (3) as to Plaintiff's state law claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest. III. CONCLUSION
In light of the above analyses, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper, Sergeant Randy Justice, Daniel Mayer, Sam Pastor and Sergeant Randaci (ECF No. 32) be granted and that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: November 23, 2020
BY THE COURT
s/Lisa Pupo Lenihan
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
United States Magistrate Judge Abdul Rasheed
NL-1346
SCI FAYETTE
48 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450