Opinion
3:10-cv-01285-AC
09-14-2021
LOREDANA RANZA, Plaintiff, v. NIKE, INC., an Oregon corporation, NIKE EUROPEAN OPERATIONS NETHERLANDS, B.V., a foreign corporation, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN V. ACOSTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Introduction
Plaintiff Loredana Ranza (“Ranza”) filed this lawsuit asserting age and sex discrimination claims against her prior employer, defendant Nike European Operations Netherlands, B.V. (“NEON”), a foreign corporation doing business in Europe and a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Nike, an Oregon corporation (“Nike”) (collectively “Defendants”). (Compl. ¶ 4.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed this court's dismissal of the lawsuit on various grounds, including the doctrine of forum non conveniens with respect to Nike. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1076-1079 (9th Cir. 2015) cert denied, 577 U.S. 1104 (2016). Currently before the court is Ranza's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60(d)(3)”) based on allegations Defendants committed fraud on the court (“Motion”).
The court finds the alleged misrepresentations or false arguments were not dispositive of, or even relevant to, the issue of forum non conveniens as addressed by the court and also finds that Ranza was aware of the alleged fraud at the time judgment was entered in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Motion is without merit and should be denied.
Preliminary Procedural Matter
Ranza asks the court to take “judicial notice of events that have occurred in the Netherlands and Oregon subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of her Title VII case on forum non conveniens (and other) grounds to the Netherlands.” (Pl.s' Mot. to Take Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201, ECF No. 172 (“Request”), at 4.) Additionally, Ranza requests the court “take judicial notice of events generally known within its territorial jurisdiction, namely, that Nike Inc. has recently undergone a management shake up that has seen several top executives depart the company following wide[-]spread allegations of abuse and discrimination and that these allegations [are] currently the subject matter of a Title VII lawsuit that Nike Inc. is currently defending in Federal court.” (Request at 5.)Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 201”) provides courts may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201. “Facts contained in public records are considered appropriate subjects for judicial notice.” Santa Monica Food not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006). “When a court takes judicial notice of a public record, ‘it may do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the [record], which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.'” Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Mgmt. Ltd., 129 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1021 (D. Or. 2015) (quoting Klein v. Freedom Strategic Partners, LLC, 595 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1157 (D. Nev. 2009) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original)).
Nike does not object to the court taking judicial notice of the opinions of the Dutch courts found at 97-108 of Ranza's motion for judicial notice. (Def. Nike Inc.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Relief from Judgment and to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 183, at 6.) Additionally, publicly available filings, including transcripts, from court proceedings are properly the subject of judicial notice under Rule 201. Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 964 (1995) (court took judicial notice of an order from a different proceeding); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (court took judicial notice of a transcript from defendant's hearing before the Board of Prison Terms and held “[m]aterials from a proceeding in another tribunal are appropriate for judicial notice.”). In light of the lack of objections and the existence of clear case law allowing courts to take judicial notice of complaints, briefs, and opinions filed in another case to determine what issues were before that court and were actually litigated, the court granted Ranza's motion for judicial notice of the Dutch court opinions in a Findings and Recommendation dated December 10, 2020 (the “Second F&R”). Ranza v. Nike, Inc., CIV No. 3:10-cv-01285-AC, 2020 WL 883607 (D. Or. Dec. 10, 2020).
The court declines to take judicial notice of the remaining documents primarily because they are not relevant to the issues currently before the court. Ranza asserts Defendants committed fraud on the court by making misrepresentations with regard to the availability and/or ease of obtaining requested travel records and other discovery, as well as the location of witnesses. Evidence of the inadequacy of her alternative forum in the Netherlands or subsequent litigation against Nike in the United States does not relate to or further the court's determination of the issues presented in the Motion. Moreover, emails, correspondence, data tables, and other documents that appear to support Ranza's legal position are not public records, do not contain facts that are generally known, and do not offer information that can be readily determined to be accurate. Finally, Ranza references news publications that establish an environment of discrimination and retaliation at Nike. “Courts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to ‘indicate what is in the public realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in fact true.'” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010). Ranza clearly offers the publications to provide factual support for her claim and relies on the truth of the contents of the articles. The court denies the remainder of Ranza's request for judicial notice.
Background
Defendant Nike European Operations Netherlands, B.V., a foreign corporation doing business in Europe (“NEON”), terminated Ranza's employment on October 1, 2008. (Compl. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 7.) Ranza was a citizen of the United States, a resident of the Netherlands, a female, and forty-five years old at the time of her termination. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 8, 14.)
As required under Dutch law, NEON sought approval to terminate Ranza from the Court of Hilversum. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1066. After a hearing, at which Ranza was represented by legal counsel, the court found Ranza's proposed termination was “'neutral,' i.e., that no party was at fault, ” granted NEON permission to terminate Ranza's employment, and awarded Ranza approximately $205,000 in severance pay. Id. The court declined Ranza's request to determine if she had a valid claim of discrimination, stating that “such a claim should be brought before the Dutch Equal Treat Commission (ETC) or a court in the United States.” Id.
Ranza then pursued claims for age and sex discrimination with the ETC. The Ninth Circuit summarized the authority of the ETC and its resolution of Ranza's discrimination claims in the following manner:
According to an English translation of an ETC publication, the ETC is a “special ‘enforcement institution [ ]'” established by the Dutch government to help implement the country's equal treatment laws. It is separate from the judiciary but shares some features in common with a judicial tribunal: its nine commissioners have salary protections, decisional independence and insulation from firing by the government. It “provides easy access to an independent and expert judgement in matters of alleged unequal treatment and/or discrimination, both for individuals and for private and public organisations and institutions.” Its proceedings are “less formal than a court procedure, ” but litigants are permitted to submit evidence, present witnesses and argue their case at a hearing. When investigating a complaint, the ETC can make direct inquiries of the parties and call on independent experts to evaluate the facts.
The ETC does not provide direct relief, however; its power is in its ability to persuade the parties or a court of law to act in accordance with its conclusions and recommendations. It determines whether unlawful discrimination has occurred and publishes reasoned opinions applying the law to the facts of a case. It can also make recommendations to prevent future discrimination. But it has no authority to enforce its judgments or recommendations. After the Commission issues a judgment finding discrimination, it follows up with the parties to determine whether the defendant has taken remedial actions and to encourage compliance. Although the ETC cannot impose penalties or other sanctions on a defendant who fails to remedy discrimination, a complainant may try to persuade a court of law to enforce an ETC judgment, either through money damages or injunctive relief. In such a case, the Commission's determination that discrimination has occurred “can be of great value, ” according to the Commission, in part because the ETC takes considerable effort in drafting its judgments to make them persuasive to the parties and the courts. Additionally, the ETC itself may bring legal action in Dutch courts to enforce its judgments.
Here, the ETC held a hearing on Ranza's claims of discrimination in June 2009. Ranza and NEON representatives were present at the hearing (along with English translators) and were represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ETC initiated an investigation and requested further information from the parties. The ETC also asked its independent job evaluation expert to investigate Ranza's claims and provided the expert's findings to the parties to give them an opportunity to respond. After concluding its investigation, the ETC issued a thorough opinion in June 2010, finding NEON “ha[d] not discriminated [against] L. Ranza during her work on the basis of sex or age, nor ha[d] [it] acted in violation of the victimization prohibition [under Dutch law].” The opinion addressed each of Ranza's allegations, including her claims that NEON discriminated against her when it promoted a younger, less qualified male instead of her; that NEON paid Ranza less than her more junior male coworkers; and that NEON fired her because
of her sex, age and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. The opinion presented the facts, law and positions of the parties on each of Ranza's claims before concluding they lacked merit.Id. at 1066-67.
The Ninth Circuit noted in a footnote that “Dutch law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and age, among other protected statuses.” Id. at 106 n.1.
Having received a negative ruling from the ETC on her discrimination claims, Ranza decided to file this lawsuit rather than continue to pursue her claims in the Netherlands. On October 18, 2010, she filed a complaint in which she alleged NEON and Nike discriminated against her on based on her sex and age in violation of federal statutes. (“Complaint”). On March 3, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, arguing: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over NEON; (2) Nike lacked control over NEON sufficient to subject NEON to liability under relevant federal statutes; (3) Ranza did not timely exhaust her administrative remedies; (4) the proper forum was the Netherlands and the doctrine of forum non conveniens barred Ranza's claims; and (5) Ranza had not met the applicable pleading standard.
In a Findings and Recommendation filed January 4, 2013 (the “F&R”), this court found: “it lacks personal jurisdiction over NEON, there are no genuine issues of fact regarding whether Nike controls NEON sufficient to hold NEON liable under Title VII and the ADEA, Ranza exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to both NEON and Nike, and Oregon is an improper venue for Ranza's claims.” (Ranza v. Nike, Inc., CIV No. 3:10-cv-01285-AC, Findings and Recommendation dated January 4, 2013, ECF No. 130 (“F&R”), at 2.) As a result, this court recommended the lawsuit be dismissed. (F&R at 83.)
On the issue of improper venue and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, this court rejected Ranza's claim the Netherlands did not provide an adequate alternative forum due to the lack of an appropriate remedy and found public and private factors weighed in favor a dismissal. (F&R at 75-83.) This court explained: “Ranza presents no evidence that she pursued relief in the courts of the Netherlands and presents no evidence tending to show that such pursuit would have been fruitless or would have resulted in relief dissimilar from that afforded by Title VII and the ADEA. Rather, the evidence presented supports the opposite contention. As such, the court concludes that the Netherlands provided an adequate alternative forum for the present claims.” (F&R at 79.)
Judge Anna Brown adopted the F&R in an Amended Order dated March 7, 2013 (“Order”), relying solely on this court's finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over NEON and Ranza failed to state a claim against Nike for violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-01285-AC, 2013 WL 869522, at *2 (D. Or. March 7, 2013) (“Because this court concludes it lacks personal jurisdiction as to NEON and that Plaintiff cannot under any set of facts state a claim against Nike for violation of Title VII or the ADEA, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider the Magistrate Judge's alternative recommendations regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies or forum non conveniens.”) Judge Brown issued a Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice on March 8, 2013 (“Judgment”). (Judgment, ECF No. 143.)
Ranza appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an opinion dated July 16, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction over NEON and the existence of a more convenient forum for litigating Ranza's claims against Nike. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1079. On the issue of forum non conveniens, the Ninth Circuit found “the district court properly dismissed Ranza's claims against Nike, albeit for a different reason than the district court cited. Under the circumstances, the Netherlands provided an adequate and more convenient alternative forum in which to litigate Ranza's claims, thus justifying Nike's dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged Judge Brown declined to address the issue of forum non conveniens but found it had discretion to address the issue as it was raised in the district court, presented and argued to the Ninth Circuit, sufficiently developed, and fairly supported by the record. Ranza, 793 F. at 1076.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Ranza's argument the “Netherlands is an inadequate forum under the second prong because it cannot provide her with a satisfactory remedy” based, in part, on Ranza's choice “to litigate her discrimination claims before the ETC, which thoroughly reviewed those claims.” Id. The Ninth Circuit noted a foreign forum need not offer the same remedy as the United States, but must merely provide “some” remedy, and a forum will typically “‘be inadequate only where the remedy provided is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory, that it is no remedy at all.'” Id. (quoting Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1266 (9th Cir. 2011)). It then explained Ranza took advantage of the opportunity to litigate her claims for violation of Dutch equal protections laws before the ETC, have the ETC investigate her claims and employ an expert to evaluate NEON's employment practices, and present evidence and witnesses at a hearing. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1078.
While acknowledging the ETC did not have the authority to award damages or enforce its judgments based on findings of discrimination, the Ninth Circuit reasoned the ETC:
publishes its findings, coordinates with both governmental and non-governmental bodies and “actively follow[s] up” with employers to ensure compliance with its findings and to remedy any discrimination. The ETC publication Ranza provided states that a prevailing claimant can ask a Dutch court to enforce an ETC judgment, through damages and injunctive relief, and the Commission may pursue claims on behalf of claimants. Had Ranza prevailed before the ETC, these remedies would have been available to her. Even if these remedies proved less generous than those available to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII and ADEA action in the United States, they nevertheless represent “some remedy” and are therefore adequate under the forum non conveniens inquiry.Id. at 1077-78. The Ninth Circuit further determined the private and public interest factors in the forum non conveniens inquiry also favored dismissal. Id. at 1078-79.
On March 20, 2020, Ranza, now appearing pro se, filed the Motion asking the court to set aside the Judgment, reopen this lawsuit, and allow her to proceed with her claims against Nike. Specifically, Ranza seeks:
relief from the [forum non conveniens] decision pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) because Defendants committed multiple instances of fraud on the court in an attempt to manipulate it into dismissing Plaintiff's case. Defendants were thus ineligible for the equitable remedy of [forum non conveniens] by virtue of the Unclean Hands Doctrine. The original decision of [forum non conveniens] should be set aside and Plaintiff's case be allowed to proceed against Nike Inc.[, ] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c).(Pl.'s Rule 60 Mot. for Relief from Final Judgment, ECF No. 173 (“Mot.”) at 7.)
Ranza also moved for relief from judgment Rule 60(b)(6), arguing Neon's “refus[al] to cooperate in the Dutch forum by objecting to the court's jurisdiction and raising multiple defenses to her suit . . . left Plaintiff in the extraordinary circumstance of having no forum capable of providing her with a remedy to hear her claims.” (Mot. at 6.) In the Second F&R, this court found Ranza failed to seek relief for judgment within a reasonable time as required under Rule 60(b)(6) and recommended Ranza be allowed to proceed with the Motion only under Rule 60(d)(3). Ranza, 2020 WL 883607, at *6. Judge Simon adopted the Second F&R in an Order dated February 3, 2021 Ranza v. Nike, Inc., CIV No. 3:10-cv-01285-AC, 2021 WL 374966 (D. Or. Feb. 3, 2021.)
Legal Standard
Rule 60(d)(3) allows the court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3) (2020). A court's power to grant relief from judgment for fraud on the court stems from “a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 332 U.S. 239, 244 (1944). The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[o]ut of deference to the deep-rooted policy in favor of the repose of judgments . . ., courts of equity have been cautious in exercising this power.” Id. As a result, relief from judgment for fraud on the court is “available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). “The relevant inquiry is not whether fraudulent conduct ‘prejudiced the opposing party,' but whether it ‘“harm[ed]” the integrity of the judicial process.'” United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246.)
The Ninth Circuit has clearly recognized “not all fraud is fraud on the court.” Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444 (quoting In Re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999)). For example, “[m]ere nondisclosure of evidence is typically not enough to constitute fraud on the court, and ‘perjury by a party or witness, by itself, is not normally fraud on the court' unless it is ‘so fundamental that it undermined the workings of the adversary process itself.'” United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444, Levander, 180 F.3d at 1119). Rather, fraud on the court requires an “intentional, material misrepresentation” and “must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court it is decision.” Sierra Pac., 862 F.3d at 1168 (quoting In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007), Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The “relevant misrepresentations must go ‘to the central issue in the case' and ‘must affect the outcome of the of the case.'” Garcia v. United States, No. 20-55670, 2021 WL 3202164, at * 2 (9th Cir. July 28, 2021) (quoting Sierra Pac., 862 F.3d at 1168-69). Moreover, “relief for fraud on the court is available only where the fraud was not known at the time of settlement or entry of judgment.” Sierra Pac., 862 F.3d at 1168; Garcia, 2021 WL 3202164, at *2 (quoting Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“When the moving party ‘through due diligence could have discovered the non-disclosure' or alleged misrepresentation, such fraud does not ‘disrupt the judicial process' and does not amount to fraud on the court.”). The party seeking to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(d)(3) must prove fraud on the court by clear and convincing evidence. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 445.
Discussion
Ranza argues Defendants defrauded this court by misrepresenting their ability to track travel, the expense and undue burden to comply with discovery requests, and the location of witnesses, as well as falsely arguing the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (“DPDPA”) prevented NEON from participating in discovery. (Mot. at 10.) Ranza asserts Defendants' “fraud on the court in violation of the Unclean Hands Doctrine [renders] Defendants ineligible for the equitable remedy of [forum non conveniens] that they ultimately received.” (Mot. at 10.)
Even assuming Defendants intentionally engaged in the fraudulent conduct identified by Ranza as part of an “unconscionable” plan or scheme, Ranza is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(d)(3) for at least two reasons. First, Defendants' alleged misrepresentations with respect to travel, burdens relating to discovery requests, witness locations, and restrictions imposed by the DPDPA are not relevant to the issue of forum non conveniens and did not affect the outcome of the case on that issue. Neither this court, nor the Ninth Circuit, relied on the alleged misrepresentations in finding the existence of an adequate alternative forum to address Ranza's discrimination claims or that public and private factors weighed in favor of dismissal. Rather, both courts relied, primarily, on evidence from court records, declarations, and exhibits in finding the Netherlands provided adequate relief for Ranza's claims of employment discrimination.
Second, Ranza was, or could have been, aware of the alleged misrepresentations and false arguments prior to the entry of the Judgment. Ranza admits “she knew from weekly reports that she received” as early as 2006 that Nike had a sophisticated system of tracking travel which Ranza contends would allow Defendants to easily compile and produce discovery on travel by NEON employees to Oregon during a specific period. (Mot. at 32-35.) Similarly, Ranza was aware of Defendants' alleged false argument with respect to the DPDPA in March 2011 and had ample opportunity to respond to such false arguments in her opposition to the motion to dismiss and briefing on discovery disputes. Finally, Ranza had access to information about the location of other employees or prospective witnesses while employed by Defendants, well before she filed this lawsuit, and could have sought such information through discovery before the Judgment was entered.
Ranza has not offered clear and convincing evidence that Defendants committed fraud on the court. The misrepresentations or false arguments relied on by Ranza in support of the Motion were not dispositive of, or even relevant to, the issue of forum non conveniens as addressed by the court and Ranza was, or could have been, aware of the alleged fraud when the Judgment was entered. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied.
In their opposition brief, Defendants move for sanctions under Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 11(c)”) in the form of attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to Ranza's “untimely and meritless” motion. Nike alternatively moves for similar sanctions under the inherent authority of the court to fashion an appropriate remedy for bad faith conduct.
Rule 11(c) provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Sanctions.
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for the motion.Nike moved for sanctions in its opposition briefs, not in a separate motion as required under Rule 11(c)(2). The court recommends Nike's motion for sanctions under Rule 11(c) be denied.
A federal court may levy sanctions under its inherent power for willful disobedience of a court order; when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; and against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)) (internal quotations omitted). The inherent power “extends to a full range of litigation abuses, ” but the litigant must have “engaged in bad faith or willful disobedience of a court's order.” Id. at 992 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46-47 (1991)) (emphasizing the continuing need for resort to the court's inherent power). Accordingly, “[a]n award of sanctions under . . . the district court's inherent authority requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith.” Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998). The inherent power to sanction “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
This court found the Motion was filed untimely with respect to Rule 60(b) and now recommends the Motion be denied based on fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3), because the alleged misrepresentations were not relevant to or dispositive of the issue of forum non conveniens and because Ranza was aware of the alleged fraud prior to entry of the Judgment. While the Motion, and Ranza's arguments contained therein, are not successful, this court is not convinced Ranza's actions in this district were reckless or in bad faith. While Ranza may have been over-zealous in her attempt to hold Defendants liable for the alleged discriminatory conduct through litigation in this district, her arguments could be viewed as supported, to at least some degree, by statute and existing case law and not necessarily vexatious, wanton, or oppressive. Consequently, the court recommends Nike's request for sanctions under the inherent authority of the court be denied as well.
Conclusion
Ranza's motion (ECF No. 172) for judicial notice, previously granted with respect to the opinions of the Dutch courts found at 97-108 of the motion, is DENIED in all other respects. Ranza's motion (ECF No. 173) for relief from final judgment under Rule 60(d)(3), and Nike's motion for sanctions, should be DENIED.
Scheduling Order
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge for review. Objections, if any, are due within seventeen (17) days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.