Summary
affirming dismissal of petitioner's claims that he was entitled to compassionate release because an assertion that officials failed to follow state law is not cognizable in federal court
Summary of this case from Woolery v. Shasta Cnty. JailOpinion
No. 07-15431.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed February 26, 2009.
Bryan E. Ransom, Corcoran, CA, pro se.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-05-01379-AWI.
Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
California state prisoner Bryan E. Ransom appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, and the district court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Ransom contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition as procedurally defaulted because he presented evidence that he was actually innocent of a serious rules violation which he contends resulted in his placement in a Security Housing Unit ("SHU"). Because the record reflects that Ransom was placed in SHU as a result of safety concerns, and not as a result of a rules violation, Ransom cannot overcome procedural default based upon actual innocence. Cf. Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In addition, Ransom has failed to raise "specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy" of the procedural basis relied on by the California Supreme Court. See Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Ransom further contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing as non-cognizable his claim that he is entitled to release under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3076(d). To the extent that this claim rests on the contention that prison officials declined to follow state law, we conclude it is not cognizable. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). To the extent that Ransom contends that his detention in SHU violated due process, we conclude that Ransom received the due process protections to which he was entitled. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005).