Opinion
No. CV00 07 28 99S
May 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
On April 4, 2002, the plaintiff, Michael Ranilla, filed a one-count revised complaint seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained while employed by the defendant, Milford Mechanical, LLC. The plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally and/or willfully caused him injuries by having the plaintiff operate a machine from which a safety device had been removed.
On May 15, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to strike and a corresponding memorandum of law claiming that the cause of action alleged in the complaint was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-284 (a).
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides:
An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.
On October 23, 2002, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike claiming that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action under the substantial certainty exception to the exclusivity provision as set forth in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994) ( Suarez I), and further clarified in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255, 698 A.2d 838 (1997) ( Suarez II). The defendant has filed a reply memorandum of law.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). "The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading; it admits all facts well pleaded . . . [T]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).
The defendant argues that the court should strike the plaintiff's revised complaint as it fails to allege sufficient facts under the substantial certainty exception. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not alleged an affirmative act on the part of the defendant. Alternatively, the defendant contends that the allegations, assuming they do allege an affirmative act, do not demonstrate that there was a substantial certainty that the defendant's act would cause the plaintiff's injuries. Finally, the defendant argues that the allegations failed to demonstrate that the defendant believed its act was substantially certain to produce the plaintiff's injury.
The plaintiff counters that he has alleged sufficient facts under the substantial certainty exception. This court agrees.
"Connecticut first adopted a statutory scheme of workers' compensation in 1913. The purpose of the [act] . . . is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault . . . Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount . . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability . . . In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation . . . The intention of the framers of the act was to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 672, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).
General Statutes § 31-284 (a), commonly referred to as the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, exempts employers from liability for civil damages "on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . ." Our Supreme Court has explained that the exclusivity afforded by § 31-284 (a) "manifests a legislative policy decision that a limitation on remedies under tort law is an appropriate trade-off for the benefits provided by workers' compensation." Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 220-21, 752 A.2d 1059 (2000). The statute reflects a compromise of the right to common-law remedies for work place injury in exchange for "relatively quick and certain compensation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 222.
Nevertheless, the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act is not without exception. There is "one narrow exception that exists when the employer has committed an intentional tort or where the employer has engaged in wilful or serious misconduct." Suarez I, supra, 229 Conn. 106. Our Supreme Court has explained that "to escape the exclusivity of the act, the victim of the intentional injury must rely on the intended tort theory or the substantial certainty theory." Suarez II, supra, 242 Conn. 280.
The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts under the substantial certainty theory. The Supreme Court devised the substantial certainty test because it recognized that "[t]he problem with the intentional tort test . . . appears to be that it allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers' compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the worker . . . Prohibiting a civil action in such a case would allow a corporation to cost out an investment decision to kill workers." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez I, supra, 229 Conn. 109.
Under the substantial certainty test, the employer "must have intended the act and have known that the injury was substantially certain to occur from the act." Suarez II, supra, 242 Conn. 280. "The substantial certainty test provides for . . . a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez I, supra, 229 Conn. 109-10. In other words, "the substantial certainty standard requires a showing that the act producing the injury was intentional or deliberate and the resulting injury, from the standpoint of the employer, was substantially certain to result from the employer's acts or conduct." Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn. App. 671, 680, 778 A.2d 972 (2001). The Appellate Court explained that under this test, "[a] wrongful failure to act to prevent injury is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." Melanson v. West Hartford, 61 Conn. App. 683, 689 n. 6, 767 A.2d 764 (2001); see also Ramos v. Branford, supra, 63 Conn. App. 685.
In this case, the plaintiff in paragraph three of his revised complaint alleges: "On or about December 22, 1998 the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, Milford Mechanical, LLC, and while using a Rigid power drive machine to cut a pipe in the course of his employment, his hand became stuck causing an amputation to his right index finger, and other serious and violent injuries . . ." In paragraph four of the revised complaint, the plaintiff further alleges: "The aforesaid occurrence and the injuries resulting therefrom were substantially certain to follow from the defendant's conduct, which conduct was intentional and/or wilful, in one of the following ways: a. in that the defendant required the plaintiff to use said power drive machine; b. in that the defendant removed the safety device/foot switch from said machine, while continuing to require the plaintiff to utilize the same . . .; d. in that the defendant was aware of the condition of said machine, yet nonetheless directed and required the plaintiff to use the same; and e. in that the defendant intentionally, wilfully, and/or recklessly modified the machine and rendered its operation inherently dangerous."
The court finds that these allegations, if true, are sufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty exception. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant removed a safety device from the power drive machine, that the defendant directed and required the plaintiff to use the machine, and that the defendant knew that the condition was substantially certain to cause the plaintiff's injuries. At least two other Connecticut courts, when presented with similar allegations, have come to the same conclusion. See Sypher v. Getty Granite Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560350 (October 22, 2002, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 305); Dakers v. Danaher Tool Group, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 079186 (October 16, 2002, Sferrazza, J.) ( 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 310); but see Bourne v. Mori Seiki USA, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 382138 (July 12, 2002, Gallagher, J.).
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.
MORAN, J.