Opinion
9:19-cv-1161 (DNH/TWD)
01-19-2021
EDWARD RANDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. LISA KALIES and STEPHANIE AGOSH, Defendants.
APPEARANCES: EDWARD RANDOLPH Plaintiff, pro se 12639161 CNY PC PO BOX 300 Marcy, NY 13403 HON. LETITIA JAMES Attorney General for the State of New York Counsel for Defendants The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 DAVID C WHITE, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General
| APPEARANCES: | OF COUNSEL: |
| EDWARD RANDOLPHPlaintiff, pro se12639161CNY PCPO BOX 300Marcy, NY 13403 | |
|---|---|
| HON. LETITIA JAMESAttorney General for the State of New YorkCounsel for DefendantsThe CapitolAlbany, New York 12224 | DAVID C WHITE, ESQ.Assistant Attorney General |
Pro se Plaintiff Edward Randolph ("Plaintiff" or "Randolph") commenced this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims arising from his incarceration at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn") while in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). (Dkt. No. 1.) The Honorable David N. Hurd, United States District Judge, reviewed the amended complaint, the operative pleading, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and found Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims against Defendants Stephanie Agosh ("Agosh"), a Senior Social Worker/Therapist, Office of Mental Health ("OMH"), Lisa Kalies ("Kalies"), the Unit Chief, OMH, and Jane Doe ("Jane Doe"), a Therapist/Social Worker, OMH, required a response. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 23.)
Presently before the Court for a Report and Recommendation is Defendants' motion, brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claim against Defendant Kalies. (Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiff elected not to respond to Defendants' motion. (Dkt. No. 40; see also Dkt. Nos. 43, 38, 49.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion be denied. I. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
Although Defendants' motion identifies Kalies as "Kaelin," (Dkt. No. 35), Defendants' counsel represents such identification was in error, and her surname is Kalies. (See Dkt. No. 53.) The Court notes the pending motion was filed on behalf of both Defendants Agosh and Kalies, even though Agosh filed an answer to the amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 39.) To date, Jane Doe has not been identified. (See generally Dkt. Report.)
The following relevant facts are drawn from Plaintiff's amended complaint (Dkt. No. 19) and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant motion. For a more complete summary of Plaintiff's factual allegations, the Court refers to the amended complaint, as well as the initial screening in this action, conducted by Judge Hurd. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 23.)
Plaintiff has a documented history of depression, mental distress, and suicidal thoughts throughout his incarceration in DOCCS' custody beginning in 2016. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3-5.) On August 24, 2017, Plaintiff was confined in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at Auburn. Id. at 3. After reporting that he was depressed and feeling suicidal, Plaintiff was referred to the Residential Crisis Treatment Program ("RCTP"). Id. at 3-8. Plaintiff was escorted to the RCTP, strip frisked, and given an "MHU Smock". Id. at 8. Plaintiff remained in the RCTP until September 5, 2017. Id. at 8.
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the page numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office. Paragraph numbers are used where documents identified by the CM/ECF docket number contain consecutively numbered paragraphs. Unless noted, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Although not defined in the amended complaint, the Court assumes "MHU" refers to Auburn's mental health unit.
On September 5, 2017, after meeting with Agosh, Plaintiff was discharged from the RCTP. Id. at 11-13. Plaintiff refused to leave his RCTP cell and was forcibly removed by an extraction team and transferred to the SHU. Id. at 15. Later that day, after threatening to hang himself using ripped threads from his SHU mattress, Plaintiff was admitted to the MHU on suicide watch. Id. at 16.
On September 7, 2017, Plaintiff was discharged from the MHU and escorted back to the SHU. Id. When he was locked in the cell, Plaintiff began to rip his sheets and fashion a noose while "making statements" that he wanted to kill himself. Id. at 19. Plaintiff was then escorted to another SHU cell under a "cell property deprivation order" instead of being placed on suicide watch. Id. Before Randolph was escorted to the new SHU cell, officers cleared the cell of all property but overlooked a "stereo head phone jack" that was in the radio outlet in the wall. Id. at 20. Plaintiff found the adapter, broke it apart, and used pieces of metal to cut his wrist "viciously." Id. An officer noticed blood and immediately contacted his supervisor. Id. Officers attempted to persuade Plaintiff to surrender the adapter. Id. at 20-21. When they were unsuccessful, the extraction team and facility chaplain were summoned. Id. at 21. The chaplain was able to persuade Randolph to voluntarily leave the cell for a medical examination. Id. However, before he did, Plaintiff swallowed the items he used to cut himself. Id.
Randolph was escorted to the infirmary, examined, and placed in Isolation Room 8 on a contraband suicide watch. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff remained on suicide watch until Septmeber 25, 2017. Id. at 22. While on suicide watch, Plaintiff was visited daily by "OMH staff," including Agosh. Id. Plaintiff's request for "special mental health treatment" and an appointment with a psychiatrist were denied. Id. On Septmeber 26, 2017, Randolph was extracted from his cell, with force and four applications of a chemical agent. Id. at 23. Plaintiff was placed in Isolation Tank 4 in the infirmary. Id.
On October 24, 2017, Randolph was "cleared" and scheduled to be transferred to the MHU. Id. at 25-26. Plaintiff felt that he should not be released because he was still in possession of pieces of the wall adapter and, in fact, he had used small pieces of metal to continue to harm himself while he was on suicide watch. Id. at 26. Plaintiff claims that he would defecate and retrieve the metal from his stool. Id. When Randolph refused to voluntarily leave his cell, the extraction team was called and, after four applications of a chemical agent, Plaintiff was "forced to the cell door" and handcuffed. Id. Plaintiff was transferred to the MHU for observation. Id. A report dated October 24, 2017, attached to the amended complaint, states "MHU Unit Chief [name redacted] determined that inmate Randolph [] would need to be moved to MHU-OBS-04 Cell." (Dkt. No. 19-1 at 33.)
On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff was "cleared and discharged" from the MHU by Agosh "having gotten approval from the MHU unit chief defendant L. Kalies and the treatment team." (Dkt. No. 19 at 27.) Randolph personally spoke with Kalies on "at least three separate occasions throughout the time that he was in the RCTP." Id. at 28. One of these occasions took place right after Plaintiff "was extracted and being escorted back to his SHU cell following decontamination" and was recorded by a hand held video recorder. Id. Randolph informed Kalies that he was "really depressed and wanted to kill himself" because he "did not feel he had anything to live for." Id. Kalies "only managed to upset [Randolph] further by not taking the time to listen to him, as she was only concerned with getting [him] to leave the RCTP unit and return to his cell in the SHU, and had only come to tell [Plaintiff] that she herself agreed that he was fit to be discharged." Id.
The chaplain and other facility staff attempted to persuade Randolph to leave his MHU cell voluntarily. Id. at 29. Plaintiff explained to the chaplain that he had not received any assistance from the MHU staff and that the medications he was being given were not working and were "making him feel worse." Id. He further explained that "on numerous occasions" he tried to get Agosh and Kalies to "schedule him to see a doctor so his medication could be changed, and or, adjusted." Id. When Plaintiff refused to leave, the extraction team was assembled and gave him the final order to "cuff up." Id. at 30. After one application of chemical agents by a sergeant, Plaintiff went to the cell door. Id.
Randolph was then escorted to the MHU shower area for decontamination. Id. Plaintiff was transferred to the SHU and interviewed by a sergeant. Id. When Plaintiff "failed" the "suicide prevention/mental health questionnaire," OMH staff was alerted. Id. at 30-31. Jane Doe arrived at Plaintiff's cell and "cleared" him "on the spot" and informed security staff that Plaintiff was "discharged and cleared by mental health." Id. Plaintiff told Jane Doe that he had a piece of copper "secreted" in his body. Id. A hand-held monitor detector did not reveal any such substance. Id.
On November 17, 2017, Randolph used a piece of metal to cut his wrists and forearms. Id. at 32. When Plaintiff refused to come out of his cell for medical treatment, a lieutenant extracted Plaintiff with three applications of chemical agents. Id. at 32-33.
On November 20, 2017, while Randolph was in the infirmary on suicide watch, Plaintiff used a piece of metal to cut his inner arm. Id. at 34. The medical staff responded and asked Plaintiff to leave his cell voluntarily for medical attention. Id. at 35. As Plaintiff began to lose consciousness, someone "smash[ed] his face hard against the ground[.]" Id. 36. When Plaintiff regained consciousness, he was in the hospital. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether it conforms to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense [and] where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears there are not "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. While Rule 8(a)(2) "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a complaint which "tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" does not suffice. Id. (citation omitted).
"In reviewing a complaint for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Where a party is proceeding pro se, the court is obliged to "read [the pro se party's] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (courts remain obligated to construe pro se complaints liberally even after Twombly). Where a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "[t]he problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Id.
B. Plaintiff's Deliberate Medical Indifference Claim against Defendant Kalies
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, Defendant Kalies was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights during his confinement at Auburn. (Dkt. No. 19.) Defendant Kalies moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. No. 35.)
"[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff's claim must satisfy both objective and subjective elements. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
Under the objective element, the inmate's medical need or condition must be "a serious one." Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). Factors relevant to the seriousness of a medical condition include whether "a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it] important and worthy of comment," whether the condition "significantly affects an individual's daily activities," and whether it causes "chronic and substantial pain." Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Cases from within this circuit have observed that mental disorders can represent serious medical needs, particularly when those disorders are accompanied by suicidal ideations and attempts. See Loadholt v. Lape, No. 09-CV-0658, 2011 WL 1135934, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011); Zimmerman v. Burge, No. 9:06-CV-0176 (GLS/GHL), 2009 WL 3111429, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (collecting cases); Allah v. Kemp, No. 9:08-CV-1008 (NAM/GHL), 2010 WL 1036802, at *6 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2010); Hamilton v. Smith, No. 06-CV-805, 2009 WL 3199531, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (plaintiff's claimed history of suicidal thoughts were sufficient to raise a question of fact as to serious medical need).
Under the subjective element, the defendant must act "with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm." Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66 (citation omitted). "Prison officials are not obligated to provide inmates with whatever care the inmates desire. Rather, prison officials fulfill their obligations under the Eighth Amendment when the care provided is 'reasonable.'" Jones v. Westchester Cty. Dept. of Corr., 557 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280) (other citation omitted). An "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" does not constitute "deliberate indifference." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
Additionally, "[i]t well-settled in this circuit that 'personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)). In order to state a cause of action under § 1983 against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must plausibly allege some tangible connection between the alleged unlawful conduct and that defendant. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
If the defendant is a supervisory official, a mere linkage to the unlawful conduct through the chain of command, i.e., under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is insufficient to show his or her personal involvement in that unlawful conduct. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). In other words, supervisory officials may not be held liable merely because they held positions of authority. Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Here, assuming arguendo Plaintiff has adequately plead a sufficiently serious medical need, Defendants argue Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Kalies was deliberately indifferent. (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 6.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff's allegations against Kalies are conclusory and vague and there is "nothing" in Plaintiff's amended complaint indicating that Kalies "ever consciously and intentionally disregarded his need for mental health treatment." Id. Defendants further contend Plaintiff has failed to allege personal involvement with respect to Kalies. Id. at 7.
With respect to the subjective prong and suicide, "deliberate indifference may exist pursuant to one of two broad fact scenarios." Kelsey v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-5978, 2006 WL 3725543, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006) (citation omitted). The defendant "could be deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide by failing to discover an individual's suicidal tendencies[,]" or defendants "could have discovered and have been aware of the suicidal tendencies, but could be deliberately indifferent in the manner by which they respond to the recognized risk of suicide." Id.
Upon review, accepting the material facts alleged in the amended complaint as true and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court finds the amended complaint states a plausible claim that Kalies was deliberately indifferent towards Plaintiff's mental health needs.
As set forth above, the amended complaint describes several incidents, over the course of a few months at Auburn, of Plaintiff engaging in multiple acts of self-harm and suicidal statements. (Dkt. No. 19.) On October 24, 2017, following such an incident, Kalies, alleged to be the Unit Chief of the OMH, determined Plaintiff would need to be moved to an observation cell in the MHU. (Dkt. Nos. 19 at 28, 19-1 at 33.) Plaintiff spoke with Kalies, on three separate occasions, one of which was recorded as he was escorted back to his SHU cell following decontamination from a cell extraction. (Dkt. No. 19 at 28.) Plaintiff told Kalies that he was really depressed and wanted to kill himself. Id. Kalies told Plaintiff that he was fit to discharged from the RCTP unit. Id. at 28.
According to Defendants, presuming Kalies is the "MHU Unit Chief" referenced in the October 24, 2017, report, such actions to move Plaintiff to an observation cell in the Auburn MHU would not demonstrate that Kalies acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's mental health needs. (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 6-7; citing Robinson v. Taylor, No. 9:16-cv-285 (DJS), 2019 WL 1429592, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (Inmate-plaintiff failed to raise a triable question of fact regarding the deliberate indifference claim against defendant where defendant placed "Plaintiff for observation in the OBS Unit.").) However, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, at this juncture, the Court finds that contrary to Defendants' assertion, this report lends support that Kalies was aware of Plaintiff's serious medical needs, not that she was deliberately indifferent on that date.
On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff was discharged from the mental health unit by Aogsh, who received "approval" from Kalies. Id. The next day, Randolph used a piece of metal to cut his wrists and forearms, and on November 2, 2017, while on infirmary suicide watch, Plaintiff used a piece of metal to cut his inner arm. Id. at 32.
While the amended complaint lacks facts related to when the aforementioned conversations occurred, the Court cannot say that these allegations, if true, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiff's favor, do not amount to deliberate indifference. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing the dismissal of a prisoner's complaint that sufficiently alleged that defendants ignored his serious medical needs despite being made aware of them). Additionally, because the Court construes the amended complaint to allege personal involvement on behalf of Kalies, "there is no cause to consider other grounds for supervisory liability under § 1983 at this juncture." Case v. Anderson, No. 16 Civ. 983 (NSR), 2017 WL 3701863, at *13 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017).
Therefore, the Court recommends denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims against Kalies. It bears repeating that this recommendation is based on the relatively lenient standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. It remains to be seen whether, after discovery, summary judgment may be appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 35) be DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Dated: January 19, 2021
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge