Opinion
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4:99-CR-082-G, (CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:02-CV-469-G)
August 21, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a motion to vacate by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
B. PARTIES
The Movant, Ronnie Gene Randles, Reg. No. 25047-177, is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center located in Fort Worth, Texas. The Respondent is the United States of America.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 13, 1999, Randles was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of a cocaine-base mixture and with carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (1 R. on Appeal at 1.) On February 11, 2000, Randles filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence seized as a result of his April 24, 1999 arrest. (Id. at 66.) On March 7, 2000, Randles pleaded guilty to the possession offense under a plea agreement entered into with the government. (Id. at 75.) As part of the plea agreement, Randles agreed to waive his right to appeal:
[Randles] hereby waives any right to pursue any appeal or post-conviction writs from any sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines if that sentence is within or below the Guideline range as determined by the Court. This waiver does not apply to appeal rights from a sentence in excess of the Guidelines range as determined by the Court. [Randles] understands and agrees that this waiver does not create any right to be sentenced within or below any particular punishment range, and fully understands that determination of the sentencing range or Guideline level, as well as actual sentence imposed, is solely in the discretion of the Court. This waiver includes, but is not limited to, waiving of [Randles's] right to file any motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or applications for writ of habeas corpus or of coram nobis, or other pleading seeking to vacate, modify, reduce, or in any manner amend the sentence imposed in this case. (Id. at 83-84.)
He also confirmed that his guilty plea was voluntary: "This plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from those set forth in this plea agreement. There have been no representations or promises from anyone as to what sentence this Court will impose." (Id. at 83.)
On May 17, 2000, the Court sentenced Randles to 188 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release. (Id. at 91-93.) Randles appealed. (Id. at 102.) The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, and the Supreme Court denied Randles's petition for writ of certiorari. United States v. Stovall, No. 00-10657, 250 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2001) (unpublished table opinion), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1045 (May 21, 2001). On May 19, 2002, Randles executed, and thus filed, a motion for post-conviction relief in this Court. United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2000).
D. ISSUES
Randles raises the following claims for relief:
1. Counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
2. The evidence used to convict Randles was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
3. His guilty plea was coerced.
4. The government breached the plea agreement.
E. DISCUSSION 1. Voluntary Guilty Plea
Randles argues that his guilty plea was coerced and involuntary because counsel told Randles that he would get a lengthy sentence if he went to trial and that there would be no plea agreement if he pursued the suppression motion. (Mot. to Vacate at 5, 5(f); Am. Mot. to Vacate at 10.) Because Randles pleaded guilty, he may only challenge the voluntary character of his guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985).
If a challenged guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, it will be upheld on federal habeas review. United States v. Hemandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). Although a defendant's attestation of voluntariness at the time of the plea is not an absolute bar to later contrary contentions, it places a heavy burden upon him. United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1979). He must show such a strong degree of misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others that his plea would become a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)). Before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, the court must ensure that the defendant "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence," but not that he understood the "technical legal effect" of the charges. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). In other words, a defendant need only understand the direct consequences of the plea and not every consequence that, absent a plea of guilty, would not otherwise occur. Hernandez, 234 F.3d at 255. A plea is involuntary, and thus insufficient to support a conviction, if the defendant "has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976). Absent supporting evidence in the record, a court cannot consider a habeas petitioner's mere assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition to be of probative evidentiary value. United States v. Stracener, 959 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1983)).
In the plea agreement, Randles affirmed that his plea was voluntary and that, as part of the plea agreement, he waived his rights to appeal and to file any post-conviction attacks. (1 R. on Appeal at 83-84.) At the guilty-plea hearing, Randles stated that he understood the sentencing range for the offense, he had waived his appellate rights, he was satisfied with counsel's representation, and his guilty plea had not been coerced. (2 R. on Appeal at 4, 6-11.) FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)-(d). Further, the plea-agreement documents reflect that he was "fully satisfied" with counsel's representation, that his plea was voluntary, and that he waived his rights to appeal and to file post-conviction writs. (1 R. on Appeal at 82-83.) Randles has offered nothing more than his self-serving allegation that his plea was involuntary and coerced, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity of the court records or the presumption of veracity of his sworn declarations in open court. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74; Bonvillian v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1143 (1986); Webster v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 (1975); Babb v. Johnson, 61 F. Supp.2d 604, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1999). Thus, Randles's guilty plea was voluntary.
2. Waiver
As discussed above, Randles waived all rights to appeal his sentence and waived any post-conviction relief available under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A defendant may waive the right to post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as part of a plea agreement if the waiver is informed and voluntary. United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). While it is the duty of the trial court to ensure that the defendant understands his right to appeal and the consequences of waiving that right, after the defendant states that his plea is made knowingly and voluntarily, the defendant bears a heavy burden of later proving otherwise. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.
In the instant proceeding, Randles has no right to challenge his sentence under § 2255 because he waived that right when he entered into the plea agreement with the government. Randles's sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum term of life imprisonment, nor does it constitute an upward departure from the applicable guideline range as determined by the District Court. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c), ch. 5, pt. A (2001). (1 R. on Appeal at 95.) Further, as pointed out above, the record indicates that the plea agreement was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. There is no demonstration by Randles that he did not fully comprehend both his rights and the waiver of those rights by entering into the plea agreement. Also, Randles was represented by counsel when he entered into the plea agreement who fully explained the consequences of his plea. (Id. at 82; 2 R. on Appeal at 4.) Because Randles was sentenced within the guidelines range as authorized by statute and because the plea agreement was entered knowingly and voluntarily with the aid of competent counsel, under the plea agreement, Randles waived his right to challenge his sentence.
Randles argues that counsel was ineffective for (1) withdrawing the motion to suppress and urging Randles to plead guilty and (2) failing to enforce the plea agreement regarding a downward departure for his cooperation. Because Randles pleaded guilty, he may only challenge the voluntary character of his guilty plea in raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57; Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984). As discussed above, Randles has failed to show that his plea was involuntary. Thus, he has failed to overcome the presumption that he was properly admonished and that his pleas were voluntary. Randles's guilty plea waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Beasley v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1039 (1987); see also Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (stating guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects occurring before entry of plea). Even if Randles's claim regarding counsel's inaction regarding the downward departure was not waived because it occurred after he pleaded guilty, counsel was not ineffective because, as discussed below, the government was not required to file such a motion. See United States v. Preston, 209 F.3d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise issue that would have resulted in no relief).
Randles argues that his guilty plea did not waive these claims because the government breached its plea agreement by not seeking a downward departure based on Randles's cooperation; thus, his waiver is invalid. (Movant Reply at 12-13.) As part of the plea agreement, the government conditionally agreed to seek a downward departure for Randles's sentence:
Also, the United States agrees to file a motion for a downward departure from the guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 in the event [Randles] provides substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of other persons who have committed criminal offenses. [Randles] understands that it is within the province of the United States Attorney to determine if said cooperation or future cooperation rises to the level of substantial assistance. (1 R. on Appeal at 82.)
At sentencing, the government stated that although Randles attempted to cooperate and provide information on other drug offenders, he was unable to produce any information that would allow the government to file a motion for downward departure. (3 R. on Appeal at 10.) Because the government retained the discretion to move for a downward departure, Randles is not entitled to relief, especially given that he has not argued that the government's inaction was based on an unconstitutional motive. United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the plea agreement was not breached. Accordingly, Randles's remaining claims have been waived, and Randles is not entitled to seek relief in this post-conviction proceeding. Wilkes, 20 F.3d at 653; accord Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2001).
F. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
In his amended motion to vacate and his reply, Randles requests an evidentiary hearing, with appointment of counsel, on trial counsel's ineffectiveness and the government's breach of the plea agreement. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8(a)-(c). (Am. Mot. to Vacate at 18-19; Movant Reply at 13.) Based on the fact that Randles's claims either have no merit or are waived, neither an evidentiary hearing nor appointment of counsel is warranted. Id. 8(a).
II. RECOMMENDATION
Randles has failed to make a showing of the denial or infringement of his constitutional rights. The motion to vacate should be denied.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is hereby extending the deadline within which to file, not merely place in the mail, specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until September 11, 2002. Failure to file specific written objections within the specified time shall bar a de novo determination by the district court of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any unobjected to, proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See Douglass v. United Seris. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until September 11, 2002 to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.