Opinion
CV146043436S
03-23-2016
Edward Ramsey v. Brandon Bullock
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
William J. Wenzel, J.
This civil action came on for trial before the court. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Mr. Bullock, stabbed him in the chest on December 22, 2013 causing significant physical injuries and damages. The court, having heard the evidence and testimony in this case, makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law. Unless otherwise stated, the court applied the preponderance of evidence standard and imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove all the essential elements of his claim.
On December 22, 2013 at approximately 10:30 PM, plaintiff was returning to his family's home on Victory Avenue in Bridgeport when he learned that the defendant was already there causing a disturbance. When Mr. Ramsey arrived, he went to his grandmother's home which is immediately next door to that of his parents. He saw the defendant who began to accuse him of taking certain property. The defendant approached Mr. Ramsey and stabbed him in the chest with a sharp object. Mr. Ramsey suffered significant bleeding and there was air bubbling from the wound. He was taken to St. Vincent's Medical Center in Bridgeport where he was diagnosed with a trauma stab wound to the chest, some injury to the lung and related injuries. He was told the stab wound was close to his heart and he underwent immediate surgery. This surgery included not only repairs to the obvious injuries, but also significant exploratory surgery to rule out several other life threatening possible injuries. Mr. Ramsey remained in the hospital for approximately three days. During the period he reported moderate to significant levels of pain.
Following his discharge, Mr. Ramsey was restricted in his activities and continued to suffer some pain and discomfort during his period of recuperation. He complains that he still has some lingering effects from the stabbing, including shortness of breath, trouble sleeping, discomfort on one side and post-traumatic stress in the form of dreams where he relives the attack. Photos showing the extent of the abdominal incision were entered into evidence and the court viewed the current scarring from such incision.
There was no real dispute during the trial that plaintiff suffered a potentially life threatening assault which has left continuing symptoms and scarring. While ultimately Mr. Ramsey has recovered well and appeared to be in relative good health at the time of trial, there was no attempt to question the nature and extent of his injuries and suffering. Plaintiff entered into evidence a copy of the billing statement summarizing the services and charges associated with his care and treatment as a result of this assault. The court finds these were all proximately caused by the assault and stabbing as alleged in the complaint and proven at trial. The total amount of such charges was $23, 738.10 which the court finds were fair and reasonable charges for the medical services provided to the plaintiff, all of which were directly caused by his injuries.
The only issue raised by Mr. Bullock by way of defense was to challenge the contention that he was the person who stabbed the plaintiff on the date in question. Mr. Ramsey's testimony on that point was unequivocal, he knew and recognized the defendant, who lived two houses away, saw him approach and was stabbed by him. While Mr. Ramsey admitted he had used marijuana earlier in the evening, he said his perception and recollection of the events of that night were clear and his appearance and demeanor while testifying supported his credibility. Mr. Bullock's testimony on this issue was that he did not stab the plaintiff. The defendant admitted to being present but said he left the area where the stabbing occurred shortly before the attack and returned after the attack. He claimed to be picking up his mother during that twenty-minute period, but she was not called as a witness. Mr. Bullock testified there was a party going on at the site and he saw the plaintiff arguing or fighting with another unidentified person. Defendant speculated this was the person who stabbed the plaintiff. Having heard the testimony on this narrow issue and observed closely the two conflicting witnesses, the court finds that as a factual matter, the plaintiff has carried the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Mr. Bullock did in fact stab plaintiff on the night in question causing the injuries and damages described above. For clarity in the record, the court notes that this burden was sufficiently carried based only on the evidence recited above. The court will now go on to discuss further evidence which the court finds supports this same factual finding.
This factual finding is further supported by evidence, introduced by plaintiff, that on the day following the attack, defendant was arrested and charged with the assault in question. On May 6, 2014, defendant pled guilty to a violation of § 53a-60 (assault in the second degree). Defendant confirmed in his testimony that this charge and conviction related to the assault on plaintiff that was the subject of the civil suit. While the defendant admitted his plea and conviction on that charge, he dismissed its impact on the basis that it was under the Alford doctrine. The defendant, who represented himself during the civil trial, did not formally address during the trial the impact of his prior plea, but it was clear from his statements that he believed such did not preclude him from denying his personal responsibility at the time of civil trial. This raised in the court's mind a question as to the preclusive effect or weight which a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine can be given in a subsequent civil suit for the same actions.
The court does not give any evidentiary weight to the fact that defendant was arrested or charged with the crime beyond connecting the charge to the assault alleged in the civil suit.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). There was no other evidence offered to show the conviction was under the Alford doctrine or explain which factual elements of the crime were or were not admitted.
" Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414, 421 (1991) (internal quotation marks deleted). This doctrine typically requires the actual litigation of the factual issue on which preclusion is sought, even in criminal cases. On the other hand, " A plea of guilty is, in effect, a conviction and the equivalent of a guilty verdict by a jury." State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 143-44, 874 A.2d 750, 760 (2005). See also State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 473, 365 A.2d 1100 (1976).
While in some regards a plea of guilty under the Alford doctrine is analogous to a plea of nolo contendere, State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 169 n.3, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985), it has been said that " [t]he only practical difference is that the plea of nolo contendere may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case." Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 49, 757 A.2d 501 (2000); see also, State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 205, 842 A.2d 567, 588 (2004). This language suggests that Alford pleas may be considered as admissions. But see, Durrell v. U.S., 384 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2004).
" A plea of guilty is a confession of guilt of the crime charged. It is in effect a conviction and the equivalent of a finding of guilty by a jury. State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 473, 365 A.2d 1100 (1976). A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state's evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the United States Supreme Court treated such guilty pleas as the functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere." State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 169, n.3, 491 A.2d 1075, 1082 (1985).
Not surprisingly, it has been stated that " Connecticut law is not perfectly clear on the application of preclusion principles to a prior guilty plea." Sanabria v. Martins, 568 F.Supp.2d 220, 225 (D.Conn. 2008). In Sanabria, the federal district court carefully considered different expressions of this issue under Connecticut law. Without definitively resolving the issue, the district court proceeded to treat the prior guilty plea as an evidentiary admission, albeit under federal law.
Other cases addressing the use of guilty please under Alford are reviewed in State v. John K., 2014 WL 1193456, at 6, 7 (Conn.Super.Ct. Feb. 24, 2014).
This court agrees that the most appropriate treatment of the prior guilty plea here would be as an evidentiary admission. As such, it adds considerable weight to the evidence presented against the defendant, even if it does not preclude his denial of the conduct in question.
Having determined that plaintiff has proven all the essential elements of his case, the court awards damages as follows: Economic damages in the amount of $23, 738.10; noneconomic damages, including pain and suffering, loss of life's enjoyment, scarring and physical limitations, both past and future, in the amount of $100, 000.00. The total of damages awarded is $123, 738.10.
Judgment shall enter in favor of plaintiff and defendant accordingly.