Opinion
Civil No. 03-5145 ADM/JGL
December 18, 2003
Lazaro Guadalupe Ramos, pro se
Mark Metz, Esq., McLeod County Attorney's Office, Glencoe, MN, on behalf of Respondent
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to the Objections of Petitioner Lazaro Guadalupe Ramos ("Petitioner") [Docket No. 4] to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff's September 8, 2003 Report and Recommendation ("RR") [Docket No. 3]. The RR recommended that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] be summarily dismissed without prejudice, unless Petitioner amended his Petition listing only the fully exhausted claims.
Judge Lebedoff gave Petitioner the option of abandoning his unexhausted claims and amending his habeas petition to include only the exhausted claims, so he could proceed in federal court. Since Petitioner did not file such an amended habeas petition within the deadline specified in the RR, Petitioner is deemed to have waived the option to amend. See RR at 6, 7.
Petitioner does not clearly set forth his objections to the RR, but appears to contest the RR on three basic grounds. First, Petitioner claims he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because of trial errors in the state court, violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as violations of other unspecified constitutional and federal rights. Second, Petitioner contends that his rights cannot be protected in state court because of the state's vested interest in concealing errors. Finally, Petitioner appears to contend that, despite his pro se status, both the federal and state courts have unfairly held him to the high standard of performance that they require of attorneys.
The factual background in this manner is set forth in the RR and is incorporated by reference for purposes of the present Objections. For the reasons set forth below, the Objections are denied and the RR is adopted as modified below.
II. DISCUSSION
The district court must undertake an independent, de novo, review of those portions of a RR to which objection is made and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
A. Petitioner's Claims of Entitlement to Habeas Relief
The RR recommends that the Petition be dismissed due to non-exhaustion of state court remedies because two of Petitioner's four claims for habeas relief have never been fairly presented to the Minnesota state courts.
Petitioner objects to this recommendation, arguing that errors in the state trial court, his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and other general constitutional and federal rights warrant habeas relief. Petitioner also argues that the First Amendment grants him the right to present his claims to a federal court, and that no similar provision exists in the Minnesota Constitution.
While Petitioner may have a right to assert a habeas corpus claim, neither the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, nor any other constitutional provision or federal law grant Petitioner the absolute right to have a habeas claim heard in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In order for a federal court to reach the merits of a habeas claim, Petitioner must follow the procedure established by the federal habeas statute. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that a federal court shall grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus only if "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." Id. § 2254(b)(1). Once this requirement is met, a federal court may hear a habeas corpus petition if the applicant claims a violation of the Constitution or of federal laws or treaties. Id. § 2254(a). The federal court may not reverse a state court adjudication of the merits of a petitioner's claims unless the decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. §§ 2254(d)(1),(2).
A federal court generally will not hear a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition unless the prisoner has first exhausted all available state court remedies. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel 526 U.S. 838, 842(1999). Courts deem federal habeas claims exhausted in state courts only after a petitioner fairly presents each claim he wishes to raise in a federal habeas petition to the highest available state court. Id. at 845 ("state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process"):Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam); Akins v. Kenney, 341 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 2003); McCall v. Benson 114 F.3d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, despite Petitioner's apparent assertions to the contrary, state courts can and must hear federal constitutional claims.
In fact, the cases that Petitioner cites to support his position in his Objections involve federal habeas corpus actions that complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in that the questions presented for review had already been fairly presented and hence exhausted in the applicable state courts. See, e.g., Calderon v. Coleman 525 U.S. 141, 143 (1998); Brecht v. Abrahamson 507 U.S. 619, 626 (1993); Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1993); Caudra v. Sullivan 837 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
While a federal court typically will not hear unexhausted claims, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement if his claims are procedurally barred under state law, because the exhaustion requirement refers only to state remedies still available when the federal petition is filed. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996) (internal citations omitted). However, in cases of exhaustion by procedural default, a federal court may review the defaulted claims only if "the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice" because the procedural bar "provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence." Gray. 518 U.S. at 162. Thus, such claims require proof of sufficient cause to excuse the procedural default and actual prejudice, or a showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the claims are not heard. See RR at 5 n. 5; Coleman v. Thompson 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Akins, 341 F.3d at 686; Jones v. Jerrison 20 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1994).
In Minnesota, post-conviction collateral relief is procedurally barred if the claim presented was already decided on the merits or was "known but not raised at the time of direct appeal . . . unless the `claim is so novel that it can be said that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel at the time the direct appeal was taken and decided.'" Roby v. State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 1995) (citingCase v. State, 364 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1985)): see also State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252-53, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). The "novel" exception applies to claims that petitioners do not intentionally exclude earlier and that fairness requires be heard, such as claims raised by a pro se petitioner who was unable to participate in his initial defense because of antipsychotic medication. Roby, 531 N.W.2d at 484 n. 2 (citingFox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1991)).
In the present case, as Judge Lebedoff explained, not all of Petitioner's claims have been exhausted in the state courts. Petitioner alleges four grounds in his federal habeas corpus petition: 1) that state law enforcement officers violated Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection by interrogating him while he was under the influence of alcohol; 2) that there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner's conviction; 3) that the prosecutor discussed Petitioner's case with others in front of the jury as the jury was being moved out of the courtroom; and 4) that law enforcement officers used threats, duress and coercion to obtain information from Petitioner. Pet. at 5, 6. The record reveals that Petitioner raised grounds two and three in his direct appeal to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which denied these claims on the merits. State v. Ramos, No. C9-01-1808, 2002 WL 1837974 (Minn.Ct.App. 2002) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied, (October 29, 2002). Petitioner has not fairly presented grounds one and four, however, to any Minnesota state court.
A court may choose to dismiss such "mixed petitions," containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, without prejudice for failure to fully exhaust state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). However, the Eighth Circuit recently stated that this disposition is improper where the petitioner has defaulted in the state courts on the unexhausted claims. Akins, 341 F.3d at 686-87 (noting that dismissal of mixed petitions for failure to exhaust state remedies "is not appropriate as to claims for which [petitioner] has no currently `available procedure' under state law to raise the issues").
The next question is whether or not the exhaustion requirement on the claims not asserted in direct appeal has nonetheless been satisfied due to a procedural bar under state law. Here, Petitioner's claims were all known at the time of his direct appeal in state court, as the factual context concerns his arrest and trial. Petitioner's claims one and four, alleging due process violations regarding the interrogation and law enforcement actions, are not so novel that Petitioner would have been unaware of these at the time of appeal. See McCall, 114 F.3d at 757. And as noted above, Petitioner's claims two and three were already denied on the merits in state court. Therefore, all of Petitioner's claims are either exhausted or procedurally defaulted pursuant to Minnesota law. See id; Roby, 531 N.W.2d at 484. Thus, Petitioner has no currently available procedure under state law to raise these issues. See Akins, 341 F.3d at 687; McCall, 114 F.3d at 757.
Regarding Petitioner's properly exhausted claims two and three of his habeas Petition, there is no indication in the state court opinion or in the Petition that these claims implicate federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (applicant must assert a violation of federal statute, Constitution or treaty); Ramos, 2002 WL 1837974, at * 1-2. However, even if these appellate issues were not based purely on state law, the conclusory statements contained in the Petition do not allege facts sufficient to establish that the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals was unreasonable or contrary to any federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Ramos, 2002 WL 1837974; Pet. at 5-6. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to no relief on these grounds.
With respect to the defaulted, federal claims, the final inquiry is whether or not Petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice, or if a miscarriage of justice will occur if this Court does not review the merits of these allegations. See McCall, 114 F.3d at 758. Petitioner makes no attempt to demonstrate cause or prejudice for failing to pursue his newly raised claims in prior state proceedings. He has attempted no showing of actual innocence to meet "the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception." Id. Petitioner thus has no discernable claim for habeas corpus in federal court. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 162.
B. Petitioner's Claims of Prejudice in the State Courts
Petitioner also appears to object to the RR on the ground that his rights cannot be protected in state court because of the state's vested interest in concealing errors. However, he offers no evidence or specific allegations that the state court process was ineffective in protecting his rights. While Petitioner alleges that the state court system is generally biased because it does not want to admit it erred, these conclusory accusations do not suffice for habeas relief.
C. Petitioner's Pro Se Status
Finally, Petitioner objects to Judge Lebedoff's RR based on alleged unfair treatment because of his pro se status. As with his accusations against the state court system, Petitioner presents no evidence to support his claims. Therefore, Petitioner cannot succeed with this objection.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Petitioner's Objections [Docket No. 4] are DENIED,
2. The RR [Docket No. 3] is ADOPTED AS MODIFIED and
3. Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.