Opinion
No. 350312/08.
06-10-2014
Shamicka RAMIREZ, in Infant by Her Mother and Natural Guardian Annette SANTIAGO, and Annette Santiago, Individually, Plaintiff(s), v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, New York City Department of Education, New York City Department of Education Office of Pupil Transportation, is 174 Eugene T. Maleska Campus School, Sharon Delaney, Barbara Liotta, Janet Sturgis, and Iesha Jones, Rainbow Transit, Inc., Defendant(s).
Opinion
In this action for, inter alia, the negligent supervision of a student—such negligent supervision resulting in an alleged accident—defendant RAINBOW TRANSIT, INC. (Rainbow) moves seeking an order granting it summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claims and all cross-claims asserted by co-defendants. Rainbow avers that summary judgment is warranted inasmuch as it properly discharged all the obligations imposed by law—namely safely transporting plaintiff SHAMICKA RAMIREZ (Ramirez) to school, safely discharging her from its school bus and transferring her custody to defendant the NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DOE). Accordingly, Rainbow avers that it was not negligent and that therefore it cannot be held liable for Ramirez' alleged accident, namely, her slip and fall on snow and water within the premises owned, managed, and maintained by DOE. Plaintiffs oppose Rainbow's motion, averring that inasmuch as a version of the facts borne out by the evidence submitted by Rainbow establishes that Rainbow not only failed to provide Ramirez with a safe place to alight from its school bus, but that Rainbow also discharged her from its school bus despite the absence of any DOE employees who could assume custody over her, Rainbow breached the duty of care imposed upon it by law. Accordingly, plaintiffs aver that Rainbow's own evidence raises several material issues of fact which, thus, preclude summary judgment. DOE and the other defendants oppose Rainbow's motion for the very same reasons asserted by plaintiffs.
For the reasons that follow hereinafter, Rainbow's motion is hereby denied.
The instant action is for alleged personal injuries sustained by Ramirez as a result of, inter alia, defendants' negligence in failing to properly and adequately supervise her. Specifically, the complaint alleges that on February 14, 2007, a snowy day, Ramirez, a student at IS 174—a public school owned, operated, and maintained by DOE—slipped and fell on snow and water just inside one of the entrances to IS 174. Plaintiffs allege that shortly before her alleged fall, Ramirez, who was afflicted with cerebral palsy and its resulting orthopedic impairments—including the need to wear leg braces—had been transported to IS 174 by Rainbow within its school bus, had been discharged from the bus at a location other than the one adjacent to the handicap ramp, and was allowed to walk to and into IS 174 unaided. Thus, the complaint alleges that the foregoing conduct by Rainbow as well as DOE's failure provide personnel to escort and aide Ramirez inside constitutes negligence, which negligence caused Ramirez' accident and the injuries resulting therefrom. More specifically, as against Rainbow, the complaint alleges that it had been retained by DOE and defendant the CITY OF NEW YORK (the City) to provide transportation services to DOE's students with special needs pursuant to a written agreement. Rainbow, was required, through its personnel, to drop Ramirez off at the handicap ramp, aid her in alighting from its school bus, and only discharge her to the custody of DOE employees. Plaintiffs allege that on date of the instant accident, Rainbow acted negligently in that it breached the duties owed to Ramirez, such breach proximately causing her accident. As against the DOE, the City, and defendants SHARON DELANEY (Delaney)—principal at IS 174, BARBARA LIOTTA (Lioatta)—vice principal at IS 174, JANET STURGIS (Sturgis)—Ramirez' teacher at IS 174, and IYESHA JONES (Jones)—Ramirez' paraprofessional at IS 174, plaintiffs allege that they negligently failed to abide by Ramirez' individualized education plan which required that due to her physical limitations, she be escorted and aided when entering IS 174. Plaintiffs allege that the foregoing negligence proximately caused Ramirez' accident. Plaintiff ANNETTE SANTIAGO (Santiago) alleges a derivative loss of services claim, alleging that as Ramirez' mother, she sustained damages as a result of defendants' negligence.
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment carries the initial burden of tendering sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material issue of fact as a matter of law (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 [1986];Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 [1980] ). Thus, a defendant seeking summary judgment must establish prima facie entitlement to such relief as a matter of law by affirmatively demonstrating, with evidence, the merits of the claim or defense, and not merely by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof (Mondello v. DiStefano, 16 AD3d 637, 638 [2d Dept 2005] ; Peskin v. New York City Transit Authority, 304 A.D.2d 634, 634 [2d Dept 2003] ). There is no requirement that the proof be submitted by affidavit, but rather that all evidence proffered be in admissible form (Muniz v. Bacchus, 282 A.D.2d 387, 388 [1st Dept 2001], revd on other grounds Ortiz v. City of New York, 67 AD3d 21, 25 [1st Dept 2009] ).
Once movant meets his initial burden on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the opponent who must then produce sufficient evidence, generally also in admissible form, to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact (Zuckerman at 562). It is worth noting, however, that while the movant's burden to proffer evidence in admissible form is absolute, the opponent's burden is not. As noted by the Court of Appeals, [t]o obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant establish his cause of action or defense sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing summary judgment in his favor, and he must do so by the tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form. On the other hand, to defeat a motion for summary judgment the opposing party must show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact. Normally if the opponent is to succeed in defeating a summary judgment motion, he too, must make his showing by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form. The rule with respect to defeating a motion for summary judgment, however, is more flexible, for the opposing party, as contrasted with the movant, may be permitted to demonstrate acceptable excuse for his failure to meet strict requirement of tender in admissible form. Whether the excuse offered will be acceptable must depend on the circumstances in the particular case (Friends of Animals v. Associated Fur Manufacturers, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 1065, 1067–1068 [1979] [internal citations omitted] ). Accordingly, generally, if the opponent of a motion for summary judgment seeks to have the court consider inadmissible evidence, he must proffer an excuse for failing to submit evidence in inadmissible form (Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1999] ).
Moreover, when deciding a summary judgment motion the role of the Court is to make determinations as to the existence of bonafide issues of fact and not to delve into or resolve issues of credibility. As the Court stated in Knepka v. Talman (278 A.D.2d 811, 811 [4th Dept 2000] ), Supreme Court erred in resolving issues of credibility in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Any inconsistencies between the deposition testimony of plaintiffs and their affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion present issues for trial (see also Yaziciyan v. Blancato, 267 A.D.2d 152, 152 [1st Dept 1999] ; Perez v. Bronx Park Associates, 285 A.D.2d 402, 404 [1st Dept 2001] ). Accordingly, the Court's function when determining a motion for summary judgment is issue finding not issue determination (Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404 [1957] ). When the proponent of a motion for summary judgment fails to establish prima facie entititlment to summary judgment, denial of the motion is required “regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers” (Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853 [1985] ).
Rainbow's motion is hereby denied insofar as it fails to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. Contrary to Rainbow's assertion, the very evidence it submits in support of its motion, if credited, establishes that, and could lead a jury to conclude that Rainbow breached the heightened common law duty of care it owed Ramirez, such breach proximately causing her injuries and, thus, establishing Rainbow's liability. Specifically, while the evidence does paint diverging facts, one version establishes that Rainbow, through its employees, discharged Ramirez, who was physically disabled and had trouble ambulating, from its bus, on a snowy day, at or near IS 174, despite the absence of any school personnel willing to assume custody over her and escort her inside. Despite the foregoing, the evidence establishes that Rainbow nevertheless discharged Ramirez from its bus, left her there, divesting itself of custody over her.
It is well settled, that “[a] common carrier owes a duty to an alighting passenger to stop at a place where the passenger may safely disembark and leave the area” (Miller v. Fernan, 73 N.Y.2d 844, 846 [1988];Smith v. Sherwood, 16 NY3d 130, 133 [2011];Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 220 N.Y. 301, 306 [1917];Kasper v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority Long Island Bus, 90 AD3d 998, 999 [2d Dept 2011] ). Thus, any duty owed by a common carrier to its passengers generally ends upon that passenger's exit from the common carrier's vehicle (Wisoff v. County of Westchester, 296 A.D.2d 402, 402 [2d Dept 2002] [“duty to the infant plaintiff as a passenger terminated when the infant plaintiff alighted safely onto the sidewalk”]; Sigmond v. Liberty Lines Transit, Inc., 261 A.D.2d 385. 387 [2d Dept 1999] ). However, because it is well settled that the duty of a common carrier with respect to its passengers also requires it to exercise “reasonable and commensurate care in view of the dangers to be apprehended” (Shahzaman by Shahzaman v. Green Bus Lines Co., 214 A.D.2d 722, 723 [2d Dept 1995] ; Fagan at 306; Blye v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 124 A.D.2d 106, 109 [1st Dept 1987] ), when the common carrier is aware that a passenger has limitations, the duty of care is heightened, requiring that the common carrier exercise “special care and attention beyond that given to the ordinary passenger [and] which reasonable prudence and care demand[ ] for his exemption from injury” Fagan at 307; Kasper at 999 [“To a disabled passenger, a common carrier has a duty to use such additional care or to render such aid for his or her safety and welfare as is reasonably required by the passenger's disability and the existing circumstances, provided that the common carrier's employees knew or should reasonably have known of the passenger's disability.”]; Kelleher v. F.M.E. Auto Leasing Corp., 192 A.D.2d 581, 582 [2d Dept 1993] [“The evidence clearly established the decedent's intoxication at the time he was pulled from the cab, and as such, the defendant common carrier was under a special duty, with regard to the decedent by reason of his insensible condition of exercising such care, precaution and aid as were reasonably necessary for his safety, and of bestowing upon him any special care and attention beyond that given to the ordinary passenger” (internal quotation marks omitted).] ).
The foregoing distinction is aptly illustrated by contrasting the facts and holding in Smith to those in Fagan. In Smith, the Court of Appeals granted the motion by defendants, the owner and operator of a bus, which sought summary judgment over the claims asserted by plaintiffs (Smith at 134). In that case, the infant plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a car while attempting to cross the street in front of the bus from which he had just alighted (id. at 133). In granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the court held that under the common law, generally, the only duty owed to a passenger by a common carrier when a passenger disembarks from its bus is to provide him/her with a safe place to alight. Specifically, the court stated that It has long been the rule that a common carrier owes a duty to an alighting passenger to stop at a place where the passenger may safely disembark and leave the area. Once that occurs, no further duty exists, even if the disembarking passenger is a schoolchild who attempts to cross a street by passing in front of a stopped bus Although plaintiff correctly notes that there is a question of fact regarding the reason why Derek [the plaintiff] was dropped off on the east side of South Salina Street instead of the west side, it is unnecessary to resolve that factual issue because Derek exited the bus at a safe location, terminating the duty owed to him by Centro [the defendant-owner] and Gray [the defendant-operator] (id. at 133–134 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted] ). Contrariwise, in Fagan the Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, which found defendant, a railroad company, liable for the death of deceased plaintiff (Fagan at 313). In that case, deceased plaintiff was visibly intoxicated when he boarded defendant's train and asked that he be dropped off at a stop near his home (id. at 305). Upon reaching his stop, defendant's employee escorted deceased plaintiff off the train, sat him down at the train depot and left him there (id. ). The next morning, deceased plaintiff was found dead on the tracks near the depot and it appeared that he had been run over by several trains (id. ). In rendering judgment in plaintiff's favor, the court noted that a common carrier's obligation is not limited to providing a passenger with a safe place to alight its vehicle, but that additionaly, [t]he defendant [a common carrier] was under the special duty, with regard to the intestate by reason of his insensible condition, known to the conductor, of exercising such care, precaution and aid as were reasonably necessary for his safety, and of bestowing upon him any special care and attention beyond that given to the ordinary passenger which reasonable prudence and care demanded for his exemption from injury. The care which it was bound to exercise with respect to his safety would have reference to his known condition and the situation as a whole (id. at 307). Thus the court reasoned that by reason of deceased plaintiff's apparent intoxication defendant had additional responsibilities to a disembarking passenger and in addition to the the general duty to stop at Carson [deceased plaintiff's stop] for a time reasonably sufficient to enable the passenger to alight, at a place so that he could, using reasonable care, alight safely and pass by a way reasonably apparent, accessible and safe to the depot at Carson, or a designated and proper place, and thence from the property of the defendant; or, in the absence of such a way, to take reasonable and proper precautions to protect him and make safe his passing from the place of alighting to the depot or an appointed exit from its property. It was [also] bound to exercise reasonable and commensurate care in view of the dangers to be apprehended. The relation of passenger and carrier does not, under ordinary conditions, terminate until the passenger has had a reasonable opportunity to safely alight and pass from the station premises of the carrier (id. at 306–307 [internal citations omitted] ). Essentially, the court held that deceased plaintiff's intoxication gave rise to heightened duty of care requiring the common carrier to guard against foreseeable injury to it passenger. In Fagan, deceased plaintiff's resulting demise was, in the court's view, readily foreseeable inasmuch as, “The depot was a small, one-story frame building and was open that night until midnight. In it was a telegraph office in which two small oil lamps were burning. Outside of it no lamp or light was burning. The evidence does not disclose that a person sitting where the intestate was could see any window or light within it. Between the intestate and the depot was no platform, walk, road or pathway. There was the siding track, so filled in, in parts, that wagons could pass over or along it. Carson was a hamlet, scarcely more than a clearing in woodland with a few scattered buildings, or the crossing of a railroad by a country highway. The intestate had lived there through the seven or eight months last prior to his death. There was no evidence that a person seated as he was could see anywhere a light or a lighted window. After the intestate was assisted from the train and before he was discovered, defendant's trains had passed upon the track as follows: South-bound trains at nine o'clock and thirty-five minutes and eleven o'clock and thirty-five minutes P.M., and two o'clock and ten minutes, two o'clock and forty-three minutes and seven o'clock and twenty-two minutes A.M.; north-bound trains, three o'clock and forty-two minutes, four o'clock and thirty-eight minutes, six o'clock and thirty-three minutes A.M.” (id. at 305). In sum, the court in Fagan held that given deceased plaintiff's intoxication, the complete absence of anyone at the depot to aid him—or more specifically, to prevent him from doing anything to hurt himself, and the absence of light, his death, and particularly one occasioned by trains who defendant knew would pass through the depot, was foreseeable and such death against which, defendant should have guarded.
Here, a review of Rainbow's evidence, namely, plaintiff Santiago's deposition testimony, a copy of the same's transcript which Rainbow submits, establishes that Ramirez was born with cerebral palsy and as a result, her mobility, particularly from the waist-down was severely limited. After many surgeries, the last of which was in 2005, Ramirez was able to ambulate unassisted, but still required braces to help her with her balance. Because of her cerebral palsy, while a student at IS 174, Ramirez required transportation to and from her home and IS 174, such transportation was accomplished via a specially equipped bus; namely, one that had a ramp so as to accommodate handicapped individuals. Because, Ramirez also had difficulty walking, even with her braces, she also required the assistance of a paraprofessional to aid her and meet her needs. Prior to attending IS 174, it was Santiago's understanding that Ramirez would be dropped off by the bus at the school's main entrance, which had a handicap ramp. On February 14, 2007, Santiago walked Ramirez down from her apartment and to the bus operated by Rainbow where she handed Ramirez off to the bus matrons on the bus. The bus matrons assisted Ramirez on to the bus and drove her to school. Thereafter, Santiago received a call from the school and learned that Ramirez had been involved in an accident. When Santiago escorted Ramirez down to the bus it was snowing heavily.
Ramirez' testimony at both her deposition and 50–h hearing—the transcripts of which, Rainbow submits—establishes that on February 14, 2007, she was escorted by her mother down from her apartment and down to Rainbow's bus, which bus, would transport her to school. Ramirez was helped on to the bus by one of the matrons and was, thereafter, transported to school. The weather was inclement in that it was snowing and sleeting. Upon arriving at IS 174, Ramirez, as always, was dropped off at an entrance a block away from the main entrance, which had a handicap ramp. As was often the case, Jones, her paraprofessional was not there to help off the bus, and she was, thus, dropped off near the sidewalk, on the road, and in between two cars and left alone. While Gathers, another paraprofessional, was at or near the area where Ramirez had been or was being dropped off, she denied Ramirez' request that she help her into the school From that point, the nearest entrance providing access to IS 174, required Ramirez to walk down two steps and then climb another. Accessing the school from this entrance “proved difficult for Ramirez, who testified that she “had to hold on to stuff, but it wasn't really securing me, so like, I'd like, I would walk stairs by myself, and, like, I was afraid [sic].” Once she alighted from the bus, Ramirez proceeded to walk through snow, up the sidewalk and into the school. Shortly, thereafter, once inside, she slipped and fell on snow and water. On the date of this accident, Ramirez was wearing her leg braces, since they improved her balance.
Acela Perez (Perez), whose deposition transcript is also submitted by Rainbow, testified that on February 14, 2007, she was employed by Rainbow and transported handicapped students to and from schools via buses. Perez testified that prior to February 17, 2007, she had been transporting Ramirez to and from school. She recalled that Ramirez had difficulty walking insofar as she lacked balance. Perez was aware that she could never leave Ramirez alone, that once at IS 174, Ramirez had to be left with a paraprofessional, and that Ramirez required assistance getting on and off the bus. Once at school, Perez and/or the other Rainbow employee “wouldn't bring [Ramirez] down until the para is there, until she comes out [sic],” who would then escort Ramirez inside. While acknowledging that it would have been better practice to drop Ramirez off at the school's main entrance, Perez testified that they would drop her off at the rear of the school insofar as she was told by someone she thought was a school employee that she couldn't drop Ramirez off at the main entrance. On February 14, 2007, Perez, upon arriving at IS 174 helped Ramirez off the bus and handed her to a paraprofessional present thereat.
Myra Gathers (Gathers), a paraprofessional at IS 174 and whose deposition transcript Rainbow submits, testified that on the date Ramirez' accident she was outside when Ramirez was dropped off by Rainbow's bus. Gathers testified that Ramirez was helped off the bus by the bus matron, at which point, because there was ice on the sidewalk between the bus and the school's entrance, asked the matron to escort Ramirez to the door. The matron did not help Ramirez to the door and instead got back on the bus and drove off. Ramirez then proceeded to walk inside the school. Gather's was never asked to help or escort Ramirez inside the school.
While Rainbow submits several other deposition transcripts and documentary evidence, it is clear from the foregoing testimony that Rainbow fails to meet its burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. Specifically, the foregoing version of Rainbow's evidence, when read together, raises material issues of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. More importantly, this version, if credited, could lead a jury, at trial, to conclude that Rainbow was negligent and that its negligence was a, if not the proximate cause of Ramirez' accident.
As noted above, generally, the only duty owed by Rainbow, a common carrier, to a passenger alighting from its bus is to stop at a place where the passenger may safely disembark (Miller at 846; Smith at 133; Fagan at 306; Kasper at 999). However, the duty of a common carrier with respect to its passengers also requires it to exercise reasonable and commensurate care in view of the dangers to be apprehended (Shahzaman at 723; Fagan at 306; Blye at 109), such that when the common carrier is aware that a passenger has limitations, the duty of care is heightened, requiring that the common carrier exercise “special care and attention beyond that given to the ordinary passenger [and] which reasonable prudence and care demand[ ] for his exemption from injury” (Fagan at 307; Kasper at 999). Here, while Perez' testimony, if credited, evinces that Rainbow fulfilled its heightened duty of care to Ramirez by discharging her at her school and to the custody of a paraprofessional, the testimony proffered by Ramirez and Gathers is sharply at odds with Perez' testimony. Specifically, their testimony establishes that despite Ramirez' obvious handicap, namely cerebral palsy, which caused difficulty with her balance and ambulation, she was nevertheless dropped off at IS 174 by Rainbow's bus on a very snowy day and a block away from the school's handicap entrance. She was then left there either despite the refusal by Gathers—the only paraprofessional present—to assume custody over her or despite Gathers' request that Rainbow's employees help and escort Ramirez to the school's entrance and said employess' refusal. Portions of Perez' testimony further establishes that the foregoing occurred despite Rainbow's knowledge that Ramirez had difficulty ambulating, such that she not only needed help getting on and off the bus, but was never to be left alone. In fact, Perez testified that she would only discharge Ramirez from Rainbow's bus to the custody of a paraprofessional.
The evidence, thus, establishes that because Ramirez was visibly handicapped with balance and ambulation issues, Rainbow's duty to her was heightened, requiring that it exercise reasonable and commensurate care in view of the dangers to be apprehended. The foregoing facts, therefore, establish liability against Rainbow under this heightened duty of care because they demonstrate that (1) despite Rainbow's knowledge that Ramirez had difficulty ambulating, Ramirez was nevertheless discharged from Rainbow's bus without a paraprofessional present who could and did assume her custody; and (2) Rainbow discharged her in an area in inclement weather where she would have to traverse both snow and steps to enter the school. Given these facts, Rainbow can hardly nor credibly argue that it did not reasonably apprehend—in other words, that is was unforeseeable—that its actions would result Ramirez' fall—the likes of which did occur and which precipitated the instant suit. Accordingly, because Rainbow's own evidence establishes liability against it, questions of fact exist, precluding summary judgment in its favor.
Since Rainbow fails to meet its burden, the Court need not address the sufficiency of the opposition papers submitted by the other parties (Winegrad at 853).
Notably, whether by design or neglect, Rainbow fails to discuss any of the law relevant to its liability. Instead, its submission is replete with the law governing the liability of the other defendants, namely the school and its employees. It is certainly true, as noted by Rainbow, that “[s]chools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49 [1994];Doe v. Rohan, 17 AD3d 509, 511 [2d Dept 2005] ; Doe v. Orange–Ulster Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 4 AD3d 387, 388 [2004] ), and that such duty derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents and guardians (Mirand at 49; Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 560 [1976] [“The duty owed by a school to its students, however, stems from the fact of its physical custody over them. As the Restatement puts it, by taking custody of the child, the school has deprived the child of the protection of his parents or guardian. Therefore, the actor who takes custody of a child is properly required to give him the protection which the custody or the manner in which it is taken has deprived him. The school's duty is thus coextensive with and concomitant to its physical custody of and control over the child. When that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child's protection, the school's custodial duty also ceases.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) ] ). However, while the school's liability, if any, hinges on the foregoing body of law, Rainbow's liability does not. Moreover, and more importantly, here, whether the other defendants are liable to plaintiffs is not dispositive, doesn't preclude Rainbow's joint and severable liability, and, therefore, certainly doesn't avail Rainbow.
It is well settled that there can be more than one proximate cause to an accident (Rodriguez v. Klein, 116 AD3d 939, 939 [2d Dept 2014; Hagensen v. Ferro, Kuba, Mangano, Skylar, Gacovino & Lake, P.C., 108 AD3d 410, 411 [1st Dept 2013] ). Thus, a defendant seeking summary judgment on grounds that it did not proximately cause an accident must establish that its negligence did not cause the accident (Avina v. Verburg, 47 AD3d 1188, 1189 [3d Dept 2008] ). However, where varying inferences as to causation are possible, resolution of the issue of proximate cause is a question for the jury (Ernest v. Red Creek Cent. School Dist., 93 N.Y.2d 664, 674 [1999] ). Here, rather than exclude Rainbow's negligence as the proximate cause of Ramirez' accident, the evidence does just the opposite. Accordingly on the issue of proximate causation, the evidence is far from undisputed such that this Court will not endeavor to resolve that issue as a matter of law (Rivera v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856, 857 [1962] [“Where the evidence as to the cause of the accident which injured plaintiff is undisputed, the question as to whether any act or omission of the defendant was a proximate cause thereof is one for the court and not for the jury.”] ). It is hereby
ORDERED that Rainbow serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry upon all parties within thirty (30) days hereof.
This constitutes this Court's decision and Order