Opinion
Docket No. 017320-2009
03-28-2012
Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Mahwah Township
George J. Cotz, Esq. Cotz & Cotz 180 Franklin Turnpike Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 Michael A. Austin, Esq. Rubenstein, Meyerson, Fox, Mancinelli & Conte, P.A. Montvale, New Jersey 07645
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
JOSEPH M ANDRESINI
JUDGE
George J. Cotz, Esq.
Cotz & Cotz
180 Franklin Turnpike
Mahwah, New Jersey 07430
Michael A. Austin, Esq.
Rubenstein, Meyerson, Fox, Mancinelli & Conte, P.A.
Montvale, New Jersey 07645
Dear Counsel:
This letter serves as the court's opinion with respect to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc. ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint with the Tax Court appealing the Bergen County Board of Taxation ("County Board") Judgment of Block 1, Lot 131 ("the subject property"). Defendant, Township of Mahwah ("Defendant"), moved for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff's tax appeal, contending that it is entitled to summary judgment because there are no material facts in dispute that would entitle Plaintiff to receive tax exempt status under the present statutory framework of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. In opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff argues that N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 is unconstitutional as applied because it places an undue burden on Plaintiff's Free Exercise of religion. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the statute's requirement that there be a building on the property to qualify for the exemption imposes a tax burden on Plaintiff, whose purported religious ceremonies do not require a structure.
Though neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction in their papers, the court addresses the issue sua sponte. This court first raised the issue of timeliness at oral argument on March 16, 2012, because the Tax Court records indicated that Plaintiff's complaint was filed on November 12, 2009, more than 45 days after the County Board Judgment was issued. For reasons more fully explained below, I conclude that Plaintiff retransmitted a revised complaint within the required timeframe, thereby relating back to the "Received but not filed" date of September 14, 2009. Therefore, I find that Plaintiff's complaint was timely filed and the court has jurisdiction.
As Plaintiff's complaint was timely filed, I can address the merits of the summary judgment motion. For the reasons set forth below, I find that Plaintiff has failed to prove that it is entitled to the tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Procedural History and Findings of Fact
In this matter, Plaintiff seeks relief against the Defendant, contending that Plaintiff is entitled to an exemption from property taxes for the subject property, a vacant parcel of land, under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. The subject property is assessed as follows:
Land $136,300On or about February 1, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application with Defendant for a property tax exemption. In April 2008, Defendant denied Plaintiff's application for exemption from local property taxation. Defendant states that it denied the application based on the fact that the subject property did not contain a structure as set forth in the requirements of the tax exemption statute, N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.
Improvements $0
Total $136,300
N.J.S.A. 54:4-4.4 provides that a taxpayer shall file an initial statement for exemption for taxation on or before November 1 of the pre-tax year.
The Plaintiff filed a tax appeal with the County Board. On August 7, 2009, the County Board issued Judgment affirming the assessor's denial of the exemption and the assessment of $136,300. Plaintiff appealed to the Tax Court by filing a complaint on September 14, 2009. Initially, the complaint was stamped "Received but not filed" by the Tax Court Clerk. On October 29, 2009, the Clerk returned the complaint stamped "Received but not filed" to Plaintiff with a "Deficiency Return Sheet," which indicated that the Plaintiff "used incorrect forms." Plaintiff was directed to fill out and return the enclosed DCM case information statement forms. The "Deficiency Return Sheet" further indicated that if the original pleading was retransmitted within ten days of the letter, it would be filed the date received. On November 12, 2009, the Clerk received the complaint with the proper DCM form, and stamped the complaint filed on that date.
At oral argument on March 16, 2012, the court raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing. In response to the court's inquiry, Plaintiff provided copies of the Deficiency Return Sheet and nonconforming complaint to the Court and the Defendant at oral argument. At the court's direction, the parties submitted brief letters addressing the issue of timely filing. For a more detailed explanation of the jurisdiction issue, see Infra.
On October 31, 2011 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Oral argument was initially heard on January 20, 2012. At oral argument, I requested that the parties supplement the record by filing briefs addressing the issue of the exemption statute's constitutionality. Plaintiff filed additional papers, but Defendant did not file a response. The parties returned to court on February 7, 2012, whereupon I provided the parties the opportunity to supplement the record with information regarding the purpose of Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc. as set forth in its governing documents, as well as further brief the constitutionality issue. Both parties filed supplemental papers, and returned to court on March 16, 2012 for oral argument.
Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation that preserves the Lenape Native American culture and traditions. The Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc. is the former name of the not-for-profit corporation which now operates under the name Ramapough Lunaape Nation ("the Ramapoughs"). In 2012, the Ramapoughs filed a Certificate of Amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to change the name of the entity. Plaintiff was given the subject property as a gift from the prior owner who developed the surrounding residential area. The subject property exceeds five acres in area.
In support of its opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff provided a certification and several documents that identify the purpose of the Ramapoughs: (1) Certification of the elected Chief of the Ramapough Lunaape Nation, Dwaine C. Perry; (2) the Ramapough Lenape Nation Tribal Bylaws; (3) the Application for Authority of Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc.; and (4) the Certificate of Incorporation dated April 26, 1978, among other documents.
According to Chief Perry, the purpose of his community is to preserve the religious beliefs and cultural traditions of the Native Americans that have lived along the New Jersey/New York border before the first Europeans came to the area. Chief Perry states that the Ramapoughs have owned the land in dispute since 1995 and have used the property for religious ceremonies since they acquired it. Chief Perry further states that the Rampoughs' ceremonies are generally conducted outside and require no structure. However, his certification acknowledges pending plans to construct a longhouse on the premises for "accessory" purposes.
The Ramapough Lenape Nation Tribal Bylaws, dated April 30, 2004, provides the purpose of the entity:
to improve, promote, and maintain our culture, customs and independence of our people; to provide for the continued self-government of our people; to encourage the economic well-being of our people; to promote the rights of our people and their common welfare, and to preserve, secure and exercise all the inherent rights and powers of our Indian Nation.
The Application for Authority of the Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc. states that the activities which the corporation proposes to do in the State of New York include:
to advance the culture and tradition of the Ramapough Mountain Indian tribe; to promote charitable recreational activities; to promote the social, religious and cultural advancement of the native born American Indian peoples and to provide a place for native born Ramapough Indians to study and learn about their ancestry and heritage.
The Certificate of Incorporation also provides that the purpose of the Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc. is "to promote charitable, recreational activities; to promote the social, religious and cultural advancement of native born American Indian Peoples; to do anything necessary, suitable and proper for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing purposes."
II. Conclusions of Law
A. Jurisdiction
Neither party in this matter raised the issue of jurisdiction in their moving papers. At oral argument on March 16, 2012, the court raised the issue sua sponte because the Tax Court records indicate that the complaint was filed on November 12, 2009, more than 45 days from the County Board Judgment.
R. 1:3-3 provides an additional 3 days for mailing. For a more detailed explanation, see Infra.
Pursuant to R. 8:3-l(a), "an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the clerk of the Tax Court." To satisfy the filing requirements set forth in the New Jersey Court Rules, the Plaintiff must attach a case information statement to the complaint. Current New Jersey Court Rules, R. 8:3-2(a) (2012). A complaint that does not include a case information statement is nonconforming paper. The Tax Court Clerk shall stamp the non-conforming complaint "received but not filed (date)" and return the complaint to Plaintiff as provided in R. 1:5-6(c). R. 8:3-2(a).
The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction where the complaint was untimely filed. N.J.S.A 54:51A-9 provides that "a complaint seeking review of adjudication or judgment of the county board of taxation shall be filed within 45 days of the service of the judgment.'* When service of the County Board Judgment is by mail, it is deemed complete on the date mailed, subject to R. 1:3-3. R. 8:4-1(2). Pursuant to R. 1:3-3, "when service of a notice or paper is made by ordinary mail, and a rule or court order allows the party served a period of time after service thereof within which to take some action, 3 days shall be added to that period." Thus, if filing by mail, a plaintiff has 48 days from the County Board Judgment to file a complaint with the Tax Court.
In Bass River Twp. v. Driscoll, the court opined that "since statutory language prescribing time for appeal from decision of county board of taxation is clear, definite and unambiguous, it may not be relaxed or dispensed with." 3 N.J. Tax 177 (Tax 1981). In Poll v. City of Plainfield, the court found the Plaintiff's untimely filing of a county board judgment to be a "fatal jurisdictional defect." 25 N.J. Misc, 325 (1947). Furthermore, in Jackson Twp. v. Marsyll of B.B. Inc., the court opined that "without timely filing of a complaint within 45 days of service of county board judgment with respect to assessment of property for tax purposes for subject tax year, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to grant equitable relief by tolling time limitations contained in statute dealing with appeals." 3 N.J. Tax 386 (Tax 1981). Thus, compliance with the mandatory 45 day filing requirement must be strictly construed. See. Tolcntino v. Oxford Twp., 4 N.J. Tax 173 (Tax 1982) (where the court held that "statutory requirements for filing appeals from judgments of county boards of taxation are strictly construed and appeal must be filed in a timely fashion.").
At the court's direction, both parties submitted letter briefs addressing the issue of timeliness. Plaintiff set forth the chronology of its filing of the complaint, and contends that its filing on September 14, 2009 was effective because R. 8:3-4(a) and R. 8:3-5 do not require the use of the DCM case information statement. Defendant submits that the filing of the underlying complaint was untimely and should therefore be dismissed. Defendant states that the Plaintiff had until November 11, 2009 to retransmit the complaint to the Tax Court.
Plaintiff had 45 days from August 7, 2009, the service of the County Board Judgment to file its complaint with the Tax Court. Rule 1:3-3 provides an additional 3 days for mailing, thereby allowing the Plaintiff a total of 48 days from the County Board Judgment to file its complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff had until September 24, 2009 to file its complaint. The Tax Court Clerk initially received Plaintiff's complaint on September 14, 2009. However, the Clerk properly deemed the complaint "non-conforming" for failure to attach the DCM case information statement to the complaint as required by R. 8:3-2. As proclaimed in R. 8:3-2, the clerk stamped the complaint "Received but not filed September 14, 2009," and returned it with a "Deficiency Return Sheet." The "Deficiency Return Sheet" instructed Plaintiff to retransmit a conforming complaint to the Tax Court within 10 days of October 29, 2009. As provided by R. 1:3-3, Plaintiff had an additional 3 days for mailing. Because Veteran's Day fell on November 11 in 2009, Plaintiff had until November 12, 2009 to retransmit the complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff's retransmission of the conforming complaint should relate back to the original date of the complaint, September 14, 2009. Therefore, I conclude that the complaint was timely filed, and the court has jurisdiction.
"It has long been established that, 'in computing a period of time from an event, the day of the occurrence should not be included。.. . . .'" Heico Corp. v. Dir.. Div. of Taxation. 20 N.J. Tax 106 (Tax 2002) (citing McCuiloch v. Hopper, 47 N.J.L. 189, 190 (Sup.Ct. 1885): Hein v. Const. Co., 330 N.J. Super. 282. 285, 749 A.2d 422 (App.Div. 2000)). Moreover, "'[i]t is well settled in this State that where, by statute, an act is due arithmetically on a day which turns out to be a Sunday or legal holiday [also Saturday pursuant to N.J.S.A. 36:1-1.1], it may be lawfully performed on the following day, and if that day be also a dies non on which the public offices are closed to the transaction of business, according to the 'holiday acts' N.J.S.A. 36:1-1 and - 1.1], a similar rule applies.'" Id. (citing Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436, 446-446, 81 A2d 741 (1951), (citations omitted)).
As I find that the court has jurisdiction, I will address the issues raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
B. Summary Judgment Standards
Rule 4:46-2 of the Current New Jersey Court Rules allows a party against whom a claim is made to move for summary judgment in its favor, before the case is tried. The Court can grant the motion if, from the pleadings, depositions, answers, admissions, and affidavits, it appears that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged." R. 4:46-2.
The standard which guides this court when presented with a motion for summary judgment is that summary judgment shall be granted where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The movant bears the "burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact" regarding the claims asserted. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) (citations omitted). "Genuine" means "only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties, on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." R. 4:46-2(c).
In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for summary judgment purposes, the trial court must ascertain "what reasonable conclusions a rational jury can draw from the evidence [.]" Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 NJ 520, 535 (1995). To make the determination, the judge "must accept as true all evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and accord him ... the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom [.]" Id. (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:40-2 (2007)). If reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied. Id.
The "essence of the inquiry" is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The trial court is required to consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 540. Accordingly, "a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute." Ibid. Instead, the non-moving party has the burden "to make an affirmative demonstration, where the means are at hand to do so, that the facts are not as the movant alleges." Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App Div. 1962), certif. denied 37 N.J. 229 (1962).
Even though the allegations of the pleadings may raise an issue of fact, if other papers show that, in fact, there is no real material issue, then summary judgment can be granted. Id. Thus, "bare conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment." U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961) (citing Gheradi v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Trenton, 53 N.J. Super. 349, 358 (App. Div. 1958)). Furthermore, disputed issues that are "of an insubstantial nature" cannot overcome a motion for summary judgment. Brill, 142 N.J, at 539 (citing Judson, 17 N.J. at 75). Therefore, "when the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' . . ., the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Id. at 540 (citation omitted). I find that this matter is ripe for summary judgment.
Thus, I must consider, "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [...trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N J. 436, 445-446 (2007).
To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence in support of its position; it must present "evidence [from] which the jury could reasonable find" for the non-moving party. Anderson, supra 477 U.S. at 252. Accordingly, the opposing party may offer facts which are substantial or material in opposing the motion, in order to defeat the grant of summary judgment. Judson, 17 N.J. at 75. A party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that the evidential material relied upon by the moving party, considered in light of the applicable burden of proof, raises sufficient credibility issues to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." D'Amato v. D'Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 114 (App. Div. 1997).
C. Exemption
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because there are no material facts in dispute that would entitle Plaintiff to qualify for tax exempt status under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. In support of its motion, Defendant relies on the plain language of the exemption statute. Defendant asserts that the subject property does not contain a structure as required by the statute. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to the exemption, as statutes granting exemption from taxation must be strictly construed. I concur.
To come within the exemption from local property taxation under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, the Plaintiff must satisfy the following three elements of the Paper Mill Playhouse test: "(1) [the entity must be] organized exclusively for an exempt purpose; (2) the property must be actually and exclusively used for the exempt purpose; and (3) the applicant must not operate or use its property for profit." Abunda Life Church of Body, Mind & Spirit v. City of Asbury Park, 18 N.J. Tax 483, 484 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Twp., 95 NJ, 503, 506 (1984)). Furthermore, the entity must be incorporated under the laws of New Jersey, the entity must own the property, and there must be a building on the property. N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. To determine whether Plaintiff has met its burden under the exemption statute, I turn to the well established precedent regarding statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute, courts should determine the Legislature's intent. O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002). In construing statutes, " '[courts] ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in the context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. N.J. Div. of Tax., 189 N.J. 65, 79 (2006) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). See also. Matter of Vacancies in Mun. Gov't of Rutherford, 140 N.J. Super. 328, 336 (Law Div. 1976). Courts should not add "'an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment, or engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act. [The court's] duty is to construe and apply the statute as enacted.'" Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 189 N.J, at 79 (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).
As articulated by our Supreme Court in Int'l Sch. Service, Inc. v. West Windsor Twp., "a statute granting exemption from property taxation, such as N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, is subject to strict construction, and the party seeking exemption under its terms bears the burden of proving that the bases for it to have been established. 207 N.J. 3, 15 (2011) (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 NJ, 209 (1961); Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v. Twp. of Readington, 195 N.J. 549 (2008) (explaining that tax exemptions should be strictly construed against claimants to the extent consistent with legislative intent)). This strict construction is supported by the public policy that tax statutes reflect: "the public tax burden is to be borne fairly and equitably. As our Supreme Court explained,
the fundamental approach of our [tax] statutes is that ordinarily all property shall bear its just and equal share of the public burden of taxation . . . Statutes granting exemption from taxation represent a departure and consequently they are most strongly construed against those claiming exemption. Int'l Sch. Service, Inc., 207 N.J. at 15 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 (1961)).As such, the release of the taxpayer from his "just proportion of the public burden should be expressed in unequivocal terms." Grace Peace & Fellowship Church v. Cranford, 4 N.J. Tax 391, 396 (Tax 1982). Therefore, "the claimant has the corollary duty to conduct its affairs in such a fashion as to allow local taxing authorities to readily determine its eligibility for exemption." Int'l Schools Service, Inc., 207 N.J. at 24.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, "all buildings used in the work of associations and corporations organized exclusively for religious purposes, including religious worship or charitable purposes . . ." shall be exempt from taxation. The statute further provides for the tax exemption of "the land whereon [the buildings] are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, and which is devoted to the purposes [listed in this provision] and to no other purposes and does not exceed five acres." However, land is only exempt under the statute as an incident to the tax exempt building. Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1961). Accordingly, land is only a derivative exemption to the building coming within the exemption. Hillcrest Health Services Sys. v. Hackensack City, 18 N.J. Tax 38, 48 (Tax 1998). In Mount Olive Baptist Church v. Newark, the former New Jersey Board of Tax Appeals found that the exemption statute only applies to buildings and not to vacant land, where the taxpayer sought an exemption for land that was used for "open-air religious services." 19 N.J. Misc. 232 (1941). Thus, where there is no building, there is no exemption. Id.
Taxpayers have been denied tax exempt status even where the taxpayers sought an exemption for a building that was partially constructed. In Grace Peace & Fellowship Church, the plaintiff sought an exemption for a church being constructed on the property that was not complete. 4 N.J.Tax at 393. Exempt services were held in the building during construction. Id. Even though the exemption would be applied immediately after the structure was deemed complete, the court denied the exemption because the statute only applies to buildings that are approved for public occupancy. Id. at 400-402. See also. Institute of Holy Angels v. Fort Lee, 80 N.J.L. 545 (1910) (court held that the property tax exemption was denied because the building was incomplete and had to be in "actual use" to be exempt.); Longport v. Bamberger Seashore Home, 91 N.J.L. 330 (1917) (court held while the building was completely erected, it was not in "actual use" on the date of assessment for purposes of the statute).
Plaintiff, in opposition to Defendant's motion argues that the subject property should be tax exempt under the religious use exemption of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, and that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to come within the religious use exemption of the statute, which provides that buildings used exclusively for religious purposes shall be entitled to a tax exemption together with "the land whereon any of the buildings . . . are erected." N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. However, Plaintiff failed to satisfy the building requirement of the exemption statute or the Paper Mill Playhouse test.
Primarily, the burden is on the taxpayer seeking the exemption to demonstrate that the taxpayer is clearly within the exempting statute. 1711 Third Avenue v. City of Asbury Park, 16 N.J. Tax 174, 183 (Tax 1996). The plain language of the statute requires that Plaintiff must establish that a structure erected on the property is used primarily for worship activities. Plaintiff admits that the land is undeveloped. Plaintiff also does not satisfy the Paper Mill Playhouse prong that requires the entity to be organized exclusively for an exempt purpose. Plaintiff provided three governing documents that set forth the purpose of the Ramapoughs: (1) the Ramapough Lenape Nation Tribal Bylaws; (2) the Application for Authority of the Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc.; and (3) the Certificate of Incorporation. Each of these documents provides that the purpose of the Ramapoughs not only encompasses religious practices, but also includes the advancement of the Ramapoughs culture, customs, independence, and common welfare, among other rights. Plaintiff has also failed to establish that the subject property was being used for exempt purposes during the relevant period, as required by the statute. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to a property tax exemption based upon an interpretation of the plain language of NJ.S.A. 54:4-3.6.
D. Constitutionality
Plaintiff contends that N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because it places an undue burden on Plaintiff's Free Exercise of religion. Plaintiff's argument is based upon the position that the statute, which requires that there is building on the property for it to be tax exempt, unfairly imposes a burden on Plaintiff, whose ritual practices do not require a structure. Plaintiff further argues that the public policy pronounced in AIRFA and RLUIPA, "along with the Court's recognition that taxation of religious properties can amount to suppression of religion, leads inexorably to the conclusion that N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 must be read to allow the exemption of land, only, where a structure is not integral to the free exercise of religion." (Brief for the Plaintiff at 3 (February 24, 2012)). I disagree.
American Indian Religious Freedom Act.
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
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In general, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for the protection of religious freedom. U.S. Const, amend I. While this protection is fundamental, it is not absolute, and "burdens, including tax burdens are permitted." Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark v. City of East Orange, 17 N.J. Tax 298, 305 (Tax 1998) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 US. 252 (1982) (holding that imposition of social security taxes on persons who object to the receipt or payment of public insurance benefits on religious grounds does not violate the First Amendment); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S., 1046 (1991) (holding that requiring church to make contributions to workers' compensation fund opposed by such church did not violate First Amendment); Indian Hills Community Church v. County Bd. of Equalization, 226 Neb. 510 (1987) (holding that First Amendment does not prohibit state requirement that religious organization comply with state's reasonable procedures for obtaining property tax exemption); Welch Ave. Freewill Baptist Church v. Kinney, 10 Ohio App. 2d 196 (1983) (holding that denial of tax exemption for vacant lot held by church for no current purpose or any future exempt purpose did not violate the First Amendment); In re Open Door Baptist Church, 63 Pa. Commw. 292 (1981) (holding that denial of tax exemption of part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate First Amendment)).
Furthermore, the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provides for the protection of religious freedom. N.J. Const. art. I, para. 3 and 4. This protection "extends to exemptions from taxation on real and personal property used exclusively for religious purposes." Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 17 N.J. Tax at 305 (citing N.J. Const, art. VIII, § 1, para. 2). However, these exemptions are not absolute. Id. (citing New Life Gospel Church v. State, 257 N.J. Super. 241, 608 A.2d397 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 429, 627 A.2d 1136 (1992) (holding that imposition of government fees did not violate exempt status of religious organization); Bethany Baptist Church v. Deptford Twp., 225 NJ. Super. 355, 542 A.2d 505 (App.Div. 1988) (holding that property used for nonexempt purposes on assessment date and later acquired by exempt church is nevertheless subject to taxation for the succeeding year without violating federal or state constitutions); New Jersey Stake of Church of Jesus Latter Day Saints v. Morris Twp., 3 N.J. Tax 572 (Tax 1981)).
Where a law involving the constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion is both facially neutral and is one of general applicability, it does not need to be justified by a compelling government interest. Church of the Lukimi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeh, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). This is true even when the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Id. However, if a law is discriminatory on its face or is not of general applicability, it must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Id.
In the instant matter, the Plaintiff has not argued that N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 is intentionally discriminatory. On its face, the exemption statute is facially neutral, as the plain language of the law does not support or impair any religious group or practice. Additionally, the exemption statute has general applicability, as all land owners are treated similarly under the statute. Plaintiff contends that there is a disparate impact of the tax exemption statute to the Ramapoughs because it does not meet the building requirement under the statute due to the tribe's religious differences. However, an adverse impact does not necessarily equate to a finding that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 535. Here, the law is both facially neutral and of generally applicability. Accordingly, the government's interest need not be compelling. The State of New Jersey has an interest to raise revenue from property owners in the form of property taxes. The public policy behind the taxation statutes is that all property owners shall share the burden of taxation. Int'l Sch. Service, Inc., 207 N.J. at 15 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214(1961)).
Furthermore, the Tax Court has found that limitations in the exemption statute do not violate New Jersey or Federal Constitutional protections. In N.J. Stake of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the plaintiff challenged the denial of a tax exemption for a parcel of property that was adjacent to the property on which the church was built. 3 N.J. Tax 572 (Tax 1982). The court articulated that "the power to grant or enlarge exemption from taxation resides in the Legislature and may be exercised by that body consistent with state and federal constitutional requirements." Id. (citing N.J. Const. (1947), art. VIII, § 1, P2; Teaneck Twp. v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86 (1955); Camden v. Camden Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 2 A.2d 40, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1938). The court held that the five-acre limitation in the exemption statute did not violate church's Constitutional protections of religious freedom, where the zoning ordinance required a lot size in excess of five acres, thereby resulting in partial taxation of the property.
In the instant matter, there are no material facts in dispute. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence in support of its position. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Primarily, Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the exemption statute, including the existence of a building or congregation, or that the Ramapoughs are an entity organized exclusively for religious purposes. Plaintiff has also failed to prove that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Ramapoughs. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
III. Conclusion
A judgment will be entered by this court in accordance with this opinion granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, affirming the assessment and County Board Judgment.
Very truly yours,
Joseph Andresini, J.T.C. JMA/CMM