Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-1289-JDT-TAB.
March 30, 2005
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 58) AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE (Docket No. 64)
This Entry is a matter of public record and may be made available to the public on the court's web site, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion in this Entry to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
Plaintiff Shirley F. Raines brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendant J. Chenoweth of the Wayne County Sheriff's Department following her arrest during a traffic stop on September 4, 2001. Plaintiff originally sued various entities under a host of legal theories. All that remains is her claim that the arrest and accompanying use of force violated her rights under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Indiana. Defendant Chenoweth now moves for summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND
The facts described in this section are either undisputed, or if disputed, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff with all reasonable inferences based on the facts drawn in her favor.
As illustrated below, a case of mistaken identity can have disastrous consequences — especially when it is law enforcement that happens to be mistaken. While out driving on the evening of September 4, 2001, Plaintiff was pulled over for speeding by Defendant Chenoweth, a Wayne County Sheriff's Deputy. The Defendant wore his standard uniform at the time and was driving a marked patrol car. During the course of the traffic stop, the Defendant ran a check on Plaintiff's driver's license. In doing so, he was alerted by police dispatch that the driver was wanted on an outstanding warrant issued in 1995 for dealing in marijuana. The warrant was for one "Shirley F. McKinney," whose driver's license number, height, hair color, eye color, and social security number matched the information on Plaintiff's driver's license.
Based on the outstanding warrant, the Defendant called for backup. Several other Wayne County Sheriff's patrol cars then arrived at the scene and surrounded Plaintiff's car. With backup assistance in tow, the Defendant returned to Plaintiff's vehicle and asked her to exit. Once out of the car, Plaintiff understandably wanted to know what was happening to her. The Defendant explained that there was a warrant for her arrest under the name "McKinney." Plaintiff replied that she had in fact previously gone by the name McKinney. According to her deposition testimony, Plaintiff used the name McKinney while married to one Dale McKinney from 1972 to 1979, but had not used that name since marrying her current husband, Raines, in 1982. The Defendant then informed Plaintiff that the warrant was for dealing in marijuana. Plaintiff told the Defendant that he was mistaken, and that she had been Mrs. Raines for twenty years. The Defendant replied that Plaintiff's social security number matched the number listed on the warrant and that he was required to take her "downtown," where the matter could be resolved. Plaintiff agreed to cooperate, and asked the Defendant if she could get her purse and keys from the car. Defendant said "yes," and Plaintiff returned to her car. While inside the car, Plaintiff turned her key one notch in the ignition to engage the car's electricity so that she could roll up the windows.
According to Plaintiff, once she started to turn the key an unidentified officer "jerked" her out of the car and forced her up against its side. Plaintiff claims that an unidentified male officer then conducted a "pat down" of her person that included the touching of her genitals and breasts. After the pat down, Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs. Again, Plaintiff cannot identify which officer put her in handcuffs, just that the handcuffs were extremely tight. Despite Plaintiff's cries that she had arthritis and a brain tumor and that the handcuffs were "killing" her, the officers kept her in cuffs and placed her in the front seat of Chenoweth's patrol car. The officers then asked Plaintiff if they could search her car, to which she responded, "I have nothing to hide." From her vantage point inside the patrol car, Plaintiff observed the officers laughing as they emptied the contents of her purse on the trunk of her car and proceeded to unwrap various feminine hygiene items. The officers also removed the interior door panels of Plaintiff's car, which later required her to make extensive repairs to the vehicle. After the search, the officers removed Plaintiff from the patrol car and, based on her complaints of pain, used two sets of handcuffs to create a "double link" of cuffs aimed at reducing her discomfort. In doing so, however, an unidentified male officer conducted another pat down of the Plaintiff that again involved the touching of her genitals and breasts. Plaintiff also claims that she repeatedly informed the officers that the double-cuffing did nothing to ease her pain.
Eventually Plaintiff was taken to jail and released on a $500 bond. The next day, Plaintiff appeared in court and explained to a judge that she was the victim of a case of mistaken identity. The judge dropped the warrant for "Shirley McKinney" at the hearing. Through a series of rather fortunate events, Plaintiff eventually came to find the person whom she believed to be the "real" Shirley McKinney described in the 1995 warrant. It appears that one of the Plaintiff's husband's customers happened to know a Shirley McKinney who worked at the local Burger King. When the customer heard of Plaintiff's encounter with the Sheriff's office at the traffic stop, she decided to give Plaintiff this Shirley McKinney's phone number. The Plaintiff's husband later called Shirley McKinney and cleverly told her that he had received a check in the mail by mistake that was payable to her. McKinney soon came over to the Plaintiff's house for the check, at which point Plaintiff alerted the Wayne County Sheriff's Department. The officer who answered the call verified McKinney's identity through her driver's license, but said he could not do anything because the warrant for her arrest had been dropped.
As a result of the September 4, 2001, traffic stop, Plaintiff purports to have suffered a variety of physical and mental injuries. She filed this lawsuit on September 3, 2003, alleging claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Indiana Constitution. On January 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming Chenoweth and ten unnamed Wayne County Sheriff's deputies as Defendants in their individual and official capacities. The ten unnamed officers were stricken from this case by order of the court on June 10, 2004. Also in June of 2004, the court granted Defendant Chenoweth's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to several of Plaintiff's claims. All that remains is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims and her claims under the Indiana Constitution for false arrest and excessive force.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Before turning to the merits, the court must address two preliminary issues raised by the parties. First, Plaintiff moves to strike certain evidentiary exhibits designated by the Defendant in support of his summary judgment motion. Second, the Defendant challenges the Plaintiff's standing to bring this action.
A. Motion to Strike
Local Rule 56.1(f) provides that:
Collateral motions in the summary judgment process, such as motions to strike, are disfavored. Any dispute regarding the admissibility or effect of evidence should be addressed in the briefs.
Despite this language, Plaintiff's motion to strike was filed separately from her brief in opposition to summary judgment. The court will presume that Plaintiff understood the word "should" in Local Rule 56.1 to mean the permissive "may," and so no negative consequences will result from her use of a collateral motion to challenge evidence. The court would prefer that litigants interpret this portion of the local rule to mean "must, in the absence of a good reason to file a stand-alone motion challenging evidence."
On November 16, 2004, the court granted the Defendant's final motion for an extension of time to file his summary judgment motion, extending the deadline to November 18, 2004. The Defendant did in fact file his motion on the November 18, along with five of his seven evidentiary exhibits. However, the Defendant did not submit his remaining two exhibits until the November 19, one day late. Plaintiff cries foul, and asks that the two tardy exhibits be stricken.
The Defendant does not deny that he was late with two of his exhibits, but says that the reason for the problem was his inability to get the exhibits into the record via the court's electronic filing system. The problem was remedied once the Defendant called the Clerk of the Court for technical assistance, and the exhibits were successfully docketed on November 19.
Under Local Rule 56.1(i), "[t]he Court may, in the interests of justice or for good cause, excuse failure to comply strictly with the terms of this rule [for summary judgment procedure]." A review of the record does not indicate that the Defendant's failure to submit all of his evidentiary exhibits prior to the November 18 deadline was for the purpose of delay. Moreover, parts of the two exhibits that Plaintiff seeks to exclude are specifically included among the exhibits in the Plaintiff's own designation of evidence submitted as part of her response brief. Additionally, the court's electronic filing system was relatively new at that point in time and some interface problems with it were not uncommon as of November 2004. Under these circumstances, the court finds that there is good cause to excuse the Defendant's inability to submit all of his evidentiary exhibits by the November 18 deadline.
Plaintiff's motion to strike (Docket No. 64) is DENIED.
B. Standing
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute this case. On October 3, 2001, the Plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy. Both sides agree that the Plaintiff's claims in the instant suit accrued on September 4, 2001. Because Plaintiff's claims accrued prior to her discharge in bankruptcy, the Defendant contends that her claims are the exclusive property of the trustee in bankruptcy and therefore can only be pursued by the trustee.
It is well settled that a debtor's legal claims constitute "property" that may be included as part of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 200 F.3d 467, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1999). If a cause of action has accrued prior to the debtor's petition for bankruptcy, then it is estate property and only the bankruptcy trustee may pursue it. However, a cause of action that accrues post-petition "is the debtor's to pursue for his own benefit." Holstein v. Knopfler (In re Holstein), No. 04 A 3074, 2005 WL 477961, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. March 2, 2005) (citing Witko v. Menotte (In re Witko), 374 F.3d 1040, 1042-44 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Defendant has not pointed out whether the Plaintiff's petition for bankruptcy was filed before or after the instant case accrued. However, a fair inference is that Plaintiff's claims accrued well after she filed for bankruptcy, given that her petition was granted on October 3, 2001, a mere month after she was arrested by the Defendant. Plaintiff has standing to pursue the instant cause of action.
"Such [bankruptcy] estate is comprised of . . . the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1).
Some courts have determined that causes of action accruing post-petition may be property of the bankruptcy estate if they are "sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past." In re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (relying on Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)). However, for the reasons stated in both Holstein, 2005 WL 477961, and Witko, 374 F.3d at 1042-44, cited above, the situation described in Segal is distinguishable from that involving a lawsuit which has accrued after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The courts finding otherwise have misread Segal and the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and other materials demonstrate that there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the court considers those facts that are undisputed and views additional evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most reasonably favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1999).
B. False Arrest
The Plaintiff's false arrest claim can be disposed of in short order. If an arrest warrant is valid on its face, "the officer executing the warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting the wrong person, unless the officer acts unreasonably . . ." Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987); see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1982). In Brown, the Seventh Circuit found that an officer acted reasonably for Fourth Amendment purposes when he executed a warrant against the wrong individual whose name matched an alias used by the suspect described in the warrant, and who was also a black male of the same age living in the same general area as the suspect. 823 F.3d at 168-69. In Johnson, the court found to be reasonable an officer's arrest of the wrong person who was not even of the same race as the person described in the warrant at issue. 680 F.2d at 41. The Johnson court stressed the practical difficulties that confront a police officer faced with minor discrepancies between a description in a warrant and the appearance of the person to be arrested. Id. Finally, in Patton a police license check during a routine traffic stop turned up a warrant against the driver that matched the driver's name, race, and age. Patton, 822 F.2d at 698. The only discrepancy between the warrant and the driver's license had to do with the driver's address. The court, in finding that the officer-defendant acted reasonably, emphasized the fact that the officer was forced to address the plaintiff's protests of mistaken identity while in the field. Under such "confused and ominous circumstances," the court noted that if the officer had let the plaintiff leave, it might have been impossible to relocate him if it turned out that he was in fact the person sought in the warrant. Id. at 699-700.
The reasonableness of the Defendant's conduct in the instant case is even more apparent than in Brown, Johnson, and Patton. A routine check of the Plaintiff's driver's license indicated that there was a warrant outstanding for an individual with the same license number, social security number, and birth date. The validity of the warrant is uncontested. The only discrepancy between the warrant and Plaintiff's license was that the warrant was for one "McKinney," not "Raines." However, the Plaintiff told the Defendant that she previously used the name "McKinney," and, according to the Defendant, the police dispatcher informed him that the warrant listed the name "Raines" as a possible alias. In an attempt to show unreasonableness, Plaintiff states simply that the Defendant should have taken time during the traffic stop to research her assertion that "she knew Richmond Police Department officers who could identify her." But in light of the pressures and logistical difficulties that confront officers in the field, a failure to conduct an independent investigation into the accuracy of a warrant is not unreasonable. As the Supreme Court noted in Baker, "we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent . . . The ultimate determination of such claims . . . is in the hands of the judge and the jury. . . ." 443 U.S. at 145-46. The fact that Plaintiff was wrongly arrested is indeed unfortunate, and the parties responsible for the discrepancies in the warrant that led to Plaintiff's arrest may be liable. See Johnson, 680 F.2d at 41. But they are not named as defendants. As far as the Defendant is concerned, he simply cannot be held liable for false arrest given the circumstances of this case and the information that he possessed at the time the arrest was executed.
C. Excessive Force
Plaintiff's excessive force claim suffers from several flaws that are fatal to its success. First and foremost, Plaintiff cannot identify the party responsible for inflicting the force that she claims was unconstitutional. Repeatedly throughout her deposition testimony the Plaintiff states that she does not know who jerked her out of the car, who put her in handcuffs, nor who patted her down. (Raines Dep. at 45-47, 50-52, 54, 61.) Neither side disputes that there were multiple officers on the scene by the time any force was used on the Plaintiff's person. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that "`[i]ndividual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can only be based on a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation [of rights] at issue.'" Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000)). Applying that principle, the court recently affirmed the dismissal of two inmates' § 1983 excessive force claims against thirteen defendant prison guards because the plaintiffs "failed to even establish that each and every one of the defendants ever touched [them]. . . ." Harper v. Albert, No. 00-2758, 2005 WL 613400, at *8 (7th Cir. March 17, 2005). Likewise, in this case Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Defendant touched her at any time during the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. Plaintiff's excessive force claim lacks merit.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff could identify the Defendant as being the officer who touched her during the traffic stop and arrest, her excessive force claim would fare no better. The Supreme Court holds that " all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in original). The Graham Court provides that in assessing the reasonableness of the force exerted, courts must look to the "facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396. The Seventh Circuit adds that an "officer's behavior will be `evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred.'" Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001). Finally, "[t]he assessment of reasonableness `must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).
The facts of this case, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, are that an officer grabbed her and pulled her out of the car after she turned her key one notch in the ignition, patted her down, and then handcuffed her despite her protests of pain and discomfort. Accepting these allegations as true, the amount of forced used against Plaintiff was not excessive. The officer on the scene was faced with executing a warrant for an individual he thought at the time was wanted in connection with felonious drug dealing, a serious crime. The fact that Plaintiff admittedly turned her key at least one position in the ignition could reasonably cause an officer to think that she might pose a danger to pedestrians or others in the street, or that she was attempting to escape custody. Furthermore, Plaintiff states that her handcuffs were eventually replaced by double-linked cuffs. Such accommodation indicates that the officers made some effort to respond to Plaintiff's protests. There is no requirement that arrests be wholly without discomfort. See Lawrence, 391 F.3d at 843 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
The Defendant, if indeed he was the officer who applied force to the Plaintiff's person, was operating in the field with limited knowledge, knowing only what was provided in the warrant, and when Plaintiff turned her key in the ignition he was forced to make a split-second judgment as to the necessary safety precautions. The force used in this case was not excessive.
Plaintiff has not cited any cases where a pat down of a female suspect by a male officer amounts to excessive force. While undoubtedly unpleasant and intrusive, the circumstances of the pat down as described by Plaintiff go more towards the officers' mental state than to her claim of excessive force. By the same token, the manner in which the officers are described as laughing as they emptied the contents of Plaintiff's purse is certainly revolting and disconcerting. But such conduct, if relevant at all, relates only to the officers' mental state and not to a claim of excessive force. The court would hope that the Wayne County Sheriff's Department will address the officers' conduct surrounding the search in this case in the appropriate disciplinary proceedings.
Because the court finds that the Defendant cannot be liable for either false arrest or excessive force, the Defendant's official capacity and qualified immunity arguments need not be addressed. However, Plaintiff's efforts to show custom or policy resulting in constitutional harm fall short of raising a question of fact for a jury if the issue were to be reached. Similarly, for the reasons stated above, Deputy Chenoweth would have been protected by the shield of qualified immunity if a genuine question of fact regarding a federal constitutional violation had been presented. A reasonable and well trained deputy sheriff could have understood the conduct alleged to be appropriate and authorized under the circumstances.
D. State Law Claims
Apart from her § 1983 claims, Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant violated the Indiana Constitution by using excessive force and executing a false arrest. The court can retain jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In doing so, the court finds that Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by the immunity provisions in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3.
The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides immunity for police officers acting in the course of their employment if an injury results from "[t]he adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law . . ., unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3(8). The officers in this case were clearly seeking to enforce a law when they arrested Plaintiff pursuant to what they believed at the time was a valid arrest warrant. The court has already determined in Section III.B above that the Defendant's conduct could not amount to false arrest. The test applied by the court is virtually identical to the one used by Indiana courts for the same purpose. See Delk v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Delaware County, 503 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987); Stine v. Shuttle, 450 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App. 1962). Furthermore, Indiana court's apply the same reasonableness test used by this court to determine whether an officer's use of force is excessive. O'Bannon v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). In applying that test, the court determined in Section III.C above that the Defendant did not use excessive force. As such, the Defendant is afforded immunity under Indiana law. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Defendant acted reasonably when he arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a facially valid warrant on September 4, 2001, and neither he nor any other officer used excessive force to effectuate that arrest. Indiana law provides the Defendant with immunity that bars Plaintiff's state law claims. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 58) will be GRANTED.