Opinion
1:22-cv-01545-JPH-KMB
06-20-2023
ABDUL-KHAALIQ S. RAHMAAN, Plaintiff, v. DANIELLE PRUITT, SCOTT CHAPMAN, MATHEW KELLY, JARROD BRADBURY, BRADLEY BURKHART, Defendants.
ORDER DIRECTING FURTHER ACTION
James Patrick Hanlon, United States District Judge.
The Court screened Plaintiff Abdul-Khaaliq S. Rahmaan's amended complaint, dismissed it, and directed him to file a second amended complaint on or before June 8, 2023. Dkt. 30. The Court mailed its Order to Mr. Rahmaan at his last address of record, but the mailing was returned. Dkt. 36. In the meantime, Mr. Rahmaan filed four more complaints. Dkts. 31, 32, 33, 35. None of the complaints are identical-they all have slightly different defendants and allegations. And the fourth one, dkt. 35, suggests that Mr. Rahmaan is trying to add allegations to the complaints already submitted.
Normally, an amended complaint completely replaces any previously filed complaint. See Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture."). Here, however, it does not appear that Mr. Rahmaan meant each successive complaint to be an amendment to the most recently filed complaint. Instead, it appears that Mr. Rahmaan has attempted to set forth different aspects of his claims in different complaints. This is improper. As stated in the Screening Order, there must be a single complaint that "set[s] out every defendant, claim, and factual allegation Mr. Rahmaan wishes to pursue in this action." Dkt. 30 at 11. Accordingly, the Court will give Mr. Rahmaan another opportunity to file a second amended complaint that comports with the instructions given in the Screening Order. See id. at 11-12. Again, he must file a single second amended complaint that sets forth every defendant, claim, and factual allegation he wishes to pursue in this action. That second amended complaint must be filed on or before July 17, 2023. If Mr. Rahmaan fails to file another amended complaint, the Court will assume that he meant the most recently filed complaint-which is in the docket as Docket Number 35-to be the operative complaint in this action and screen that complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b).
The clerk is directed to enclose copies of the following with Mr. Rahmaan's copy of this Order: (1) public docket sheet; (2) Screening Order and attachment, dkts. [30] and [30-1]; and (3) the most recently filed complaint, dkt. [35].
SO ORDERED.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FILING OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Abdul-Khaliq S. Rahmaan was a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Hancock County Jail when he initiated this civil action. Dkt. 1. The allegations in the amended complaint relate to his arrest and his subsequent incarceration. Although he has been released, dkt. 28, this Court has an obligation to screen the complaint before service on the defendants because Mr. Rahmaan was a "prisoner" when he initiated this suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
In another case, he filed an amended complaint that was identical to the amended complaint in this case, so the cases were consolidated. Dkt. 19.
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Amended Complaint
Mr. Rahmaan names five defendants in his amended complaint: Hancock County Sheriff Bradley Burkhart and Hancock County Sheriff's Deputies Jarrod Bradbury, Danielle Pruitt, Matthew Kelly, and Scott Chapman. He seeks more than $180 million in money damages.
In his amended complaint, Mr. Rahmaan also asked the Court to order his release from the Hancock County Jail, but he has now been released, so that request is moot. In addition, he asked the Court to "expose the law enforcement & courts in Hancock County." Dkt. 3 at 5. To the extent that this is a request for relief beyond the money damages he otherwise requests, the Court cannot conduct freestanding investigations, and its jurisdiction is limited to the dispute between Mr. Rahmaan and the defendants named in the amended complaint.
Mr. Rahmaan's complaint relates to events that happened in an underlying Hancock County criminal matter. To provide context to the allegations in Mr. Rahmaan's amended complaint, the Court takes judicial notice of the following information from State v. Rahmaan, No. 30D02-2201-F6-000052 (Hancock County Superior Court 2) ("Criminal Dkt.").
On January 12, 2022, a deputy prosecutor filed an information in Hancock Superior Court 2 alleging that, on or about January 9, 2022, Mr. Rahmaan threatened to shoot Michelle E. Winkler, in violation of Indiana Code § 35-45-2-1(a) and (b)(1)(A). Criminal Dkt. Entry for Jan. 12, 2022. The information was accompanied by a probable cause affidavit signed by Defendant Deputy Pruitt. Criminal Dkt. Entry for Jan. 12, 2022. In the affidavit, Deputy Pruitt stated under penalty of perjury that she had probable cause to arrest Mr. Rahmaan based on the following facts:
All of the statements in the next three paragraphs are taken from the probable-cause affidavit at the Criminal Docket Entry for January 12, 2022 .
On January 9, 2022, Deputy Pruitt was dispatched to a Pilot Travel Center to investigate a disturbance, specifically that-around 4:00 p.m.-an unknown man threatened a Pilot employee. Ms. Winkler stated that the man came into the Pilot just before 4:00 p.m. and bought a shower ticket. When Deputy Pruitt arrived at the Pilot, she saw Mr. Rahmaan outside the Pilot. When she approached his car, he abruptly jumped out of the car. He immediately told Deputy Pruitt that all he wanted was a shower, that he was angry because he wanted to take a shower, and if he could not take a shower, he wanted his $13 back. He stated that he never threatened any Pilot employee or anyone else in the store. He told Deputy Pruitt that terrorists were entering the country, that his father was a free mason, and that he (Rahmaan) was a CIA agent. Mr. Rahmaan's speech was erratic, and none of his statements related to why Deputy Pruitt was called to the Pilot. Mr. Rahmaan handed Deputy Pruitt a green sticky note with random letters and numbers scribbled on it, saying that it was a report number from the Indiana State Police. Mr. Rahmaan stated that his watches were bugged and everyone was in danger.
When Deputy Chapman arrived, Deputy Pruitt went inside the Pilot to speak with Ms. Winkler. She said that Mr. Rahmaan told here there were terrorists coming into our country. He suddenly turned around after buying a shower ticket, looked at two Hispanic men, and stated, "I'm gonna shoot these terrorists and SHOOT YOU TOO!" She was afraid for her life and believed he had a weapon. She told Mr. Rahmaan to leave and not return. He exited the store for a short period and then tried to come back inside. He dropped some socks and his shower ticket, so she tossed the items in his direction. He then pointed at her and yelled, "IT'S TILL COMIN' TO YOU, BITCH!" She ran to the back of the store and locked herself in the back room until police arrived. When Deputy Pruitt spoke to Ms. Winkler, she was visibly shaking, sitting on the floor with her legs tucked to her chest, and had tears running down her face.
Deputy Chapman requested additional units to the Pilot, and the officers decided to take Mr. Rahmaan to jail and charge him with level 6 felony intimidation. Lieutenant Bradbury arrived on the scene and helped Deputy Chapman place Mr. Rahmaan in handcuffs. After he was handcuffed, Mr. Rahmaan started blaming President Biden for what was happening and said that they (the officers) were going to kill him. Deputy Chapman transported Mr. Rahmaan to the Hancock County Jail ("Jail") while Lieutenant Bradbury followed.
On January 12, 2022, Hancock County Superior Court Judge Dan E. Marshall found that probable cause existed for Mr. Rahmaan's arrest for level 6 felony intimidation and held an initial hearing, at which a not guilty plea was entered for Mr. Rahmaan. Crim. Dkt. Entries for Jan. 12, 2022. In September 2022, Judge Marshall held a competency hearing and determined that Mr. Rahmaan was not competent to stand trial. Crim. Dkt. Entries for Sept. 14 and 26, 2022. Mr. Rahmaan was committed to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction so that competency restoration services could be provided. Crim. Dkt. Entry for Sept. 26, 2022. Mr. Rahmaan was transported from the Jail to Hendricks Behavioral Health, Crim. Dkt. Entry for Oct. 12, 2022, where he remained until he was found competent to stand trial and transported back the Jail in January 2023, Crim. Dkt. Entry for Oct. 12, 2022. The charges against Mr. Rahmaan were dismissed without prejudice on April 13, 2023. Crim. Dkt. Entry for April 13, 2023.
In his amended complaint, Mr. Rahmaan makes the following allegations: Defendants Pruitt, Chapman, Bradbury, and Kelly defamed his character and slandered his name by bearing false witness and lying to Judge Marshall. They also falsely imprisoned him and obstructed justice. Defendants Pruitt and Chapman lied to the Hancock County Superior Court about the correct time of day-which was between 7:30 a.m. and 9:34 a.m.-and also "added two Deputy Sheriffs [Bradbury and Kelly] who were not present at the time Plaintiff was arrested." Dkt. 3 at 3. He states, "The only people who were involved were Michelle E. Winkler Pilot Flying Jay store manager to unidentified latino men who were customers and the Plaintiff i complained that there were no towels in the shower no soap & the two unidentified Latino men looked like terrorist and I was led to believe they were going to try and do bodily injury to me while in the shower." Id. at 5 (errors in original).
In addition, he alleges that he was locked in a cell 23 hours a day in administrative segregation for seven months from January 9 to August 11, 2022.
He alleges that he was starved at the Jail because he was not fed enough and that he was not provided with adequate medical attention at the Jail.
After Mr. Rahmaan filed his amended complaint, he sent the Court multiple letters making a number of complaints. See, e.g., dkt. 9. It is unclear which, if any, of these allegations he wants to pursue in this case and, in any event, there can only be one operative complaint in this case. Mr. Rahmaan cannot continually update his claims by simply sending the Court letters. Accordingly, the Court confines its screening to the operative complaint in this action-the amended complaint at dkt. 3.
III. Dismissal of Amended Complaint
Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the amended complaint, the amended complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Mr. Rahmaan makes allegations about the conditions he experienced in the Jail. The Court understands these allegations as an attempt to assert a claim for having been subjected to objectively unreasonable conditions as a pretrial detainee in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2019). But none of the defendants are alleged to have had any responsibility for those conditions. Regarding Sheriff Burkhart, the Court does not infer simply from his title that he was personally aware of and involved with the conditions faced by every inmate at the Jail. Accordingly, any claims based on the time Mr. Rahmaan spent at the Jail are dismissed. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (a defendant is liable only for constitutional violations in which he or she personally participated); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.").
As to Defendants Bradbury and Kelly, the amended complaint includes no factual allegations plausibly suggesting that they engaged in wrongful conduct beyond a conclusory statement that they bore false witness against him, lied to Judge Marshall, and obstructed justice. The Court is not required to accept such conclusory statements, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and does not do so here. The claims against Defendants Bradbury and Kelly are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Because Mr. Rahmaan claims elsewhere that Defendants Bradbury and Kelly were not present when he was arrested, the Court does not understand him to be claiming that these defendants falsely imprisoned him. And, to the extent he is, he has not alleged facts plausibly supporting such a claim because, again, elsewhere he claims that they were not present when he was arrested.
That leaves the claims against Defendants Pruitt and Chapman. To the extent that Mr. Rahmaan is pursuing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations of false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, all of those claims require Mr. Rahmaan to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants Pruitt and Chapman acted without probable cause. See Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012) (to prevail on false-arrest claim under § 1983, plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his arrest); Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2014) (prevailing on § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires showing plaintiff has satisfied all elements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution); Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 649 (7th Cir. 2016) (under Indiana law, malicious prosecution claim requires showing that prosecution was initiated without probable cause); Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989) (existence of probable cause bars Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment).
Here, Mr. Rahmaan's amended complaint includes no such allegations. He states that Defendants Pruitt and Chapman lied about the time when the events leading to his arrest occurred-he says it was between 7:30 and 9:34 a.m. and they said it was 4:00-and about who was present-he says that Defendants Bradbury and Kelly were not present when he was arrested. But such inconsistencies alone do not invalidate or undermine the finding that there was probable cause to arrest, detain, and initiate criminal proceedings against him for threatening Ms. Winkler. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 509 F.3d 353, 35960 (7th Cir. 2007) (probable cause to arrest exists when an officer possesses "knowledge from reasonably trustworthy information that is sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, or is committing, a crime" (cleaned up)).
The probable-cause determination depends on the elements of the underlying criminal offense. Stokes v. Bd. of Educ., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Mr. Rahmaan was charged with level 6 felony intimidation under Indiana Code § 35-45-2-1(a) and (b)(1), which is violated if a person communicates a threat with the intent that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out and the threat is to commit a forcible felony. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4) and (b)(1). Even if Defendants Pruitt or Chapman had made the false statements alleged in the amended complaint, Mr. Rahmaan's allegations do not plausibly suggest that Defendants Pruitt or Chapman lacked probable cause to arrest, detain, or initiate criminal proceedings against him.
Defendant Pruitt's affidavit-which states that Ms. Winkler told him that Mr. Rahmaan threatened to her-demonstrates the existence of probable cause. The Court has no reason to believe that Ms. Winkler is not a reasonably credible witness so there was probable cause even if Mr. Rahmaan denies that he threatened Ms. Winkler. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating, in a case where plaintiff alleged that victim falsely told police that plaintiff battered him, "as long as a reasonably credible witness or victim informs the police that someone has committed ... a crime, the officers have probable cause to place the alleged culprit under arrest"). Accordingly, claims based on false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution are dismissed.
To the extent that Mr. Rahmaan is attempting to proceed with state-law defamation claims, those claims are dismissed. To prevail on a cause of action for defamation under Indiana law, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a communication with defamatory imputation, (2) malice, (3) publication, and (4) damages. Newman v. Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n of Indianapolis, 875 N.E.2d 729, 739 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). Even if Mr. Rahmaan could meet those elements, his claims fail because relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding-as are at issue here-are absolutely privileged. See Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) ("Indiana law has long recognized an absolute privilege that protects all relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of the truth or motive behind the statements."). Absolute privilege provides judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses, in connection with a judicial proceeding, immunity from liability even if they publish defamatory material with an improper motive; this extends to statements, like a probable cause affidavit, made preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Van Eaton v. Fink, 697 N.E.2d 490, 494-95 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998).
Because the Court has been unable to identify a viable claim for relief against any particular defendant, the amended complaint is dismissed.
IV. Conclusion and Opportunity to File an Amended Complaint
Because Mr. Rahmaan added a defendant when he filed his amended complaint, the clerk is directed to add Bradley Burkhart as a defendant on the docket.
The dismissal of the complaint will not in this instance lead to the dismissal of the action at present. "The usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where amendment would not be futile." Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). In the interest of justice, the court will allow Mr. Rahmaan to amend his complaint if, after reviewing this court's order, he believes that he can state a viable claim for relief, consistent with the allegations he has already made. See Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015) ("We've often said that before dismissing a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) a judge should give the litigant, especially a pro se litigant, an opportunity to amend his complaint."); Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013).
Mr. Rahmaan shall have up to and including June 8, 2023, to file a second amended complaint.
The second amended complaint must (a) contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that Mr. Rahmaan is entitled to relief, which is sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis; (b) include a demand for the relief sought; and (c) identify what injury he claims to have suffered and what persons are responsible for each such injury. In organizing his second amended complaint, Mr. Rahmaan may benefit from utilizing the Court's complaint form. The clerk is directed to include a copy of the prisoner civil rights complaint form along with Mr. Rahmaan's copy of this Order.
Any second amended complaint should have the proper case number, 1:22-cv-1545-JPH-KMB, and the words "Second Amended Complaint" on the first page. The second amended complaint will completely replace the original and the amended complaint. See Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture."). Therefore, it must set out every defendant, claim, and factual allegation Mr. Rahmaan wishes to pursue in this action.
If Mr. Rahmaan files a second amended complaint, it will be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). If no second amended complaint is filed, this action will be dismissed without further notice or opportunity to show cause.
SO ORDERED.