Opinion
No. 59411-7-I.
March 3, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-2-16657-4, Sharon S. Armstrong, J., entered October 24, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, C.J., concurred in by Becker, J., and Baker, J. Pro Tem.
RCW 28A.405.900 explicitly exempts persons hired for postretirement employment from the substantive and procedural safeguards afforded to certificated employees of school districts. As a retired employee, Robert Radford was not entitled to these safeguards. Because the school district had not made a promise of continued employment, he did not establish a claim to these procedural protections based on a theory of promissory estoppel. We affirm.
Facts
Robert Radford worked for the Seattle School District (the District) as a principal from 1994 until his retirement in 1999. Beginning in the 2001-2002 school year, the District rehired Radford as an elementary school principal under chapter 41.32 RCW. He worked on a series of one-year administrator contracts through the 2005-2006 school year. The contract stated, the "Administrator shall be employed by the district for the 2005-2006 contract year beginning July 1, 2005 and ending June 30, 2006." The contract also contained a clause that mandated employment be subject to the "statutes governing the public schools of the State of Washington and to all policies, rules, regulations, and procedures of the School District and State Board of Education. . . ." The contract included no explicit renewal provisions for the following year.
On April 6, 2006, Radford received a voice message from Jane Westergaard-Nimocks, the District's director of human resources. Westergaard-Nimocks explained the District would not renew Radford's contract for the following year. Radford responded by requesting an appeal to the Seattle School Board (the Board) and other procedural rights. Radford insisted his employment was continuous, not based on annual renewal, because he was not employed under a "retire/rehire" contract. In a letter, the District's attorney explained that pursuant to statute, Radford was not entitled to the appeal rights given to other certificated employees because he was a retiree hired for postretirement employment.
Radford appealed the Board's decision to King County Superior Court. He alleged the District violated his substantive and procedural due process rights under chapter 28A.405 RCW, breached his employment contract, and violated his United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment rights. His motion for summary judgment was denied. Subsequently, based on affidavits and arguments by the attorneys, the court issued a final order. It found Radford was a retired employee, who was subsequently rehired by the District. Under RCW 28A.405.900, as a retired/rehired employee Radford was exempted from the procedural and substantive protections of chapter 28A.405 RCW. The trial court also rejected an entitlement to renewal of the contract and to these procedural safeguards based on a theory of promissory estoppel because the District did not promise him employment. Radford appealed.
Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Where a trial court has evaluated evidence, appellate review is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). The substantial evidence standard is defined as a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). If the standard is satisfied, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though it may have resolved a factual dispute differently. Id.; Accord Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 403, 419, 128 P.3d 588 (2006).
Radford first argues the trial court erred in finding that he was retired during the 2005-2006 school year, that he received retirement benefits, that no additional contributions were made to his retirement account, and that he was aware of his retired status.
The record amply supports the trial court's findings regarding Radford's retirement. According to the Washington State Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) Radford retired in 1999. Beginning in 2001, he was classified by the department as a "TRS RRTW," the code for a retired/rehired employee. Radford was also coded as a retire/rehire in the District's payroll. After he was rehired in 2001, neither the District nor Radford made any contributions to the retirement system. In order to remain a "retire/rehire" and continue to receive retirement benefits, Radford was restricted in the number of hours he could work in a calendar year. DRS and the District notified Radford when he was close to exceeding the annual hourly limit and the potential consequence of losing his retirement benefits. For each of the years 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006, Radford received notice he was close to exceeding the annual limit. The record supports the trial court's findings that Radford was retired and had knowledge that losing this status would suspend his benefits. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings regarding Radford's retired status.
Second, Radford challenges the trial court's conclusions as unsupported. Specifically, he argues the trial court erred in concluding he was exempt from the procedural safeguards of chapter 28A.405 RCW. Radford's contract for the 2005-2006 school year contained a clause that mandated employment be subject to the laws of Washington State, including "procedures of the School District and State Board of Education . . ." The common school provisions enacted by the legislature, include chapter 28A.405 RCW, which provides provisions for the hiring and discharge of certificated employees based on probable cause. RCW 28A.405.210; RCW 28A.405.220. However, RCW 28A.405.900 explicitly exempts from these procedural protections "retirees hired for postretirement employment under the provisions of chapter 10, Laws of 2001 2d Sp. Sess." RCW 28A.405.900. The record overwhelmingly indicates that Radford was retired, continued to receive retirement benefits, and was classified as a retire/rehire by both the District and DRS. The superior court found Radford was hired for postretirement employment, and therefore properly concluded he was subject to RCW 28A.405.900.
Radford argues the trial court had insufficient evidence on which to base its decision to reject his contract claim based on promissory estoppel. The trial court found the Board "did not at any time promise Appellant that he had a right to employment for the 2006-2007 school year arising from the nature of his contract for the 2005-2006 school year."
To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish "(1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." . . . Promissory estoppel requires the existence of a promise. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment [is] made."
Havens v. C D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172, 876 P.2d 435 (1994). (internal citations omitted). (quoting Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 255, 259 n. 2, 616 P.2d 644 (1980)).
As a preliminary matter, the Board argues that a claim for promissory estoppel falls outside the scope of an appeal under chapter 28A.645 RCW. In his appeal to the superior court, Radford claimed the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not renewing his contract. The court considered promissory estoppel as one theory regarding whether Radford reasonably relied on a promise of continued employment and should therefore be given certain procedural rights. Promissory estoppel was properly considered by the trial court and properly raised here.
Radford contends the trial court had insufficient evidence to find he did not have an expectation of continued employment. The record supports the trial court's findings. The contract itself contains no language of a right to renewal or any promise of continued employment. The contract clearly includes a start and end date. There is no reference to a subsequent school year. Radford argues that a promise may be inferred because he was given an administrator's contract rather than the form called a retire/rehire contract. A certificated school district employee's expectation of continued employment derives from chapter 28A.405 RCW, not the language of the contract. As a retired/rehired employee, Radford is explicitly excluded from the statute that creates the continued expectation of employment.
Radford has not met his burden of proof to establish a claim of promissory estoppel.
II. Due Process
Radford argues that without the protections of chapter 28A.405 RCW, he was denied due process of law. Citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, he argues that state employees are entitled to some procedural safeguards before being deprived of a property interest — their continued employment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 541, 550-551, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it; it must be a legitimate claim of entitlement. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-570, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d. 548 (1972). Such a property interest stems not from the Constitution, but from an independent source such as state law or understandings between the parties that secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Therefore, where an assistant professor's employment contract provided that his appointment was for nine months only, he had no possible claim of entitlement to employment for the following year. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. While the employee surely had an abstract interest in being rehired for the following year, he did not have a property interest in being rehired. Id; see also Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. Wash. Utils. Transp. Comm'n, 149 Wn.2d 17, 24-25, 65 P.3d 319 (2003).
Like Roth, the District employed Radford as a contract employee for the 2005-2006 school year. The contract did not include any language regarding continuation for a following year. Radford worked for the entire contracted period, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006. Radford fails to establish that as a retire/rehire contracted employee he held a property interest in his continued employment. While certificated employees of a school district are granted due process rights under chapter 28A.405 RCW, RCW 28A.405.900 clearly shows the legislature's intent not to provide such due process protections to retire/rehire employees. We hold Radford was not denied due process of law because he did not have a property interest in his continued employment. III. Transcript
Radford argues the District violated RCW 28A.645.020 when it failed to provide the trial court with an official transcript of its decision not to renew his contract. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 969 P.2d 21 (1998); Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin County, 120 Wn.2d 439, 443, 842 P.2d 956 (1993).
The statute requires that
[w]ithin twenty days of service of the notice of appeal, the school board, at its expense, or the school official, at such official's expense, shall file the complete transcript of the evidence and the papers and exhibits relating to the decision for which a complaint has been filed. Such filings shall be certified to be correct.
No appellate court has interpreted the requirements of RCW 28A.645.020. Interpretations of similar statutes may be illustrative. In an appeal from a school board's quasi-judicial decision regarding renewal of a continuing teacher's contract pursuant to former RCW 28A.58.470 (1990), subsequently recodified as RCW 28A.405.330, Washington courts have required strict compliance with the transcript requirements. Hattrick v. N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. No 400, 81 Wn.2d 668, 504 P.2d 302 (1972); see also Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wn.2d 690, 697, 658 P.2d 648 (1983) (requiring strict compliance with transcript requirement of appeals from an agency's quasi-judicial decision). In Hattrick, the school district held a series of quasi-judicial hearings, which included testimony and evidence. Hattrick, 81 Wn.2d at 669. The court reasoned, "[e]ven though the trial court hearing the matter de novo may, at its option, make some use of this transcript or disregard it entirely, a complete transcript may be essential for such purposes as showing prior inconsistent statements." Id. at 670.
However, unlike Hattrick, the District held no quasi-judicial proceeding, made no affirmative decision, or took any action that produced a record. Instead, it merely allowed Radford's contract to expire by its own terms. There was nothing to transcribe and therefore no transcript for the District to submit to the trial court. We hold RCW 28A.645.020 does not apply on these facts.
Radford also argues the superior court should have limited its review to the administrative record. Radford raises this issue for the first time on appeal. At trial, he submitted a number of declarations in support of his appeal, clearly intending for the superior court to look beyond any formal record. Likewise, Radford did not object to the Board filing papers and exhibits relating to his employment.
The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: (1) lack of trial court jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and (3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right.
RAP 2.5. Radford does not argue any constitutional right was affected. Radford did not preserve the alleged error.
Radford assigns error but fails to argue several other issues. Assignments of error not argued and unsupported by legal authority are waived. RAP 10.3(a)(5); Smith v. King, 106 Wn.2d 443, 451-52, 722 P.2d 796 (1986). We need not consider Radford's assignments of error not developed in the record and for which he has cited no authority. State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990).
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: