Opinion
1:20-CV-01000 EAW
2021-11-29
RACHEL D., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Sarah A. Frederick, Frederick Law Offices, PLLC, Orchard Park, NY, for Plaintiff. Graham Morrison, Kathryn Sara Pollack, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Sarah A. Frederick, Frederick Law Offices, PLLC, Orchard Park, NY, for Plaintiff.
Graham Morrison, Kathryn Sara Pollack, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Rachel D. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 19; Dkt. 20), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 24). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 20) is granted and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 19) is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on May 19, 2017. (Dkt. 12 at 14, 94). In her application, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning February 1, 2013, due to the following limitations: tumor in her brain, forehead, pituitary gland, and ear; her left eye not closing properly; inability to keep her eye open for a long period of time; eye sensitivity; depression; and anxiety. (Id. at 14, 96). Plaintiff's application was initially denied on October 23, 2017. (Id. at 14, 113-24). At Plaintiff's request, a hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Melissa Lin Jones in Buffalo, New York, on July 8, 2019. (Id. at 14, 32-67). On July 23, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 11-26). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on June 1, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 5-10). This action followed.
When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper righthand corner of each document.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).
II. Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. § 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on September 30, 2019. (Dkt. 12 at 16). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity. (Id. ).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "history of acoustic neuroma status post craniotomy with resulting headaches, hearing loss, and thoracic aorta aneurysm ; depression; and anxiety." (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of GERD, irritable bowel syndrome, hypertension, mild sleep apnea with nasal obstruction, diabetes, impaired fasting glucose, thyroid disease, acute periods of sciatic pain, and atypical nevus were non-severe. (Id. at 17). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. ). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 2.10, 4.10, 11.05, 12.04, 12.06 in reaching her conclusion. (Id. at 17-19).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), except:
she can only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb ramps or stairs; can never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; may be exposed to moderate noise; and must avoid vibration, heavy moving mechanical parts, and work at unprotected heights. She must avoid working in sunlight. She is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.
(Id. ). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 24).
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of surveillance system monitor, telephone/switchboard operator, and table worker. (Id. at 25). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 26).
II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing: (1) the ALJ violated Plaintiff's due process right to a full and fair hearing by receiving post-hearing evidence regarding her earned income during the relevant period, without notifying Plaintiff and without providing her the opportunity to respond and supplement the record; (2) the ALJ failed to articulate whether she found all the medical opinions of record persuasive, and her analysis of the opinion evidence was internally inconsistent with other material findings in the decision; and (3) the ALJ failed to include in the RFC limitations assessed by Gregory Fabiano, Ph.D., which she found consistent with the record as a whole. (Dkt. 19-1 at 24-33). The Court has considered each of these arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, finds them without merit.
A. The Relevant Period of Disability
Plaintiff's first argument focuses on the relevant period of disability. (Dkt. 19-1 at 24). At the administrative hearing, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff's date last insured was December 31, 2018, meaning that the ALJ had to determine whether Plaintiff became disabled on or before that date. (Dkt. 12 at 34). However, the written determination states that Plaintiff's date last insured was a later date, September 30, 2019. (Id. at 16). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's misstatement of her date last insured at the administrative hearing prevented her from testifying about her impairments and symptoms during the entire period of disability, i.e. , through September 30, 2019. (Dkt. 19-1 at 26). In response, the Commissioner contends that Plaintiff's testimony covered her current functioning through the hearing date of July 18, 2019, and the record includes Plaintiff's treatment records from 2019. (Dkt. 20-1 at 6-9).
In support of her position, Plaintiff relies on Jenifer S. o/b/o Ronald S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 2:18-cv-13-jmc, 2019 WL 102102 (D. Vt. Jan. 4, 2019), where the court found that the ALJ improperly denied disability benefits to the plaintiff based on evidence received after the administrative hearing relating to the plaintiff's date last insured, which had been moved to an earlier date, i.e. , from 2018 to 2015. Id. at *5. The court cited to two cases, Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1984) and Gullo v. Califano , 609 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1979) ; in Townley , "the claimant was denied his due process right to cross-examine a vocational expert and present rebuttal evidence where the ALJ had used a post-hearing vocational report as the primary evidence to deny benefits," and in Gullo , "the ALJ ordered the claimant to submit to a post-hearing examination by an orthopedist and then relied on the report of that examination to deny benefits." Id. The court found that the ALJ's "changing the DLI post-hearing without adequate notification to Plaintiff and without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to supplement the record and attend another hearing, violated Plaintiff's due process right to a full and fair hearing after supplementation of the record." Id. The court explained:
the ALJ's decision denying benefits to Plaintiff was made in reliance on a DLI that was substantially different than the DLI relied on at the administrative hearing and that was assessed based on an Earnings Record that was created after the administrative hearing. The ALJ should have attempted to collect new medical opinion evidence and should have held a second hearing after the DLI was changed due to the discovery at the first hearing that Plaintiff did not have any earnings in the years 2010–2013. Instead, the ALJ obtained a new Earnings Record, changed the DLI in reliance on that Record, and decided Plaintiff's claim based on the new DLI. As noted above, the ALJ's decision to deny benefits was a direct consequence of the new DLI, as the ALJ gave "little weight" to each applicable treating source opinion because it "does not purport to relate back to the expiration of insured status in December 2015." The ALJ essentially summarily disregarded the opinions of multiple treating providers, including Christine Hayner, MSW, LADC; Christina Harlow, DNP; Paul Smith, DPM; and Kevin Kerin, MD, almost exclusively based on the timing of their opinions in relation to Plaintiff's DLI. Had Plaintiff known the ALJ was going to rely on a DLI that was three years earlier than the one both parties made their arguments in reliance on at the administrative hearing, he could have sought more contemporaneous opinions from his treating providers as well as other evidence of his alleged disability prior to the new DLI.
Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted).
The Court does not find Jenifer S. persuasive in this instance. In that case, the ALJ significantly shortened the period of disability by three years without notice to the plaintiff, and as a result much of the medical evidence was not relevant to the new period of disability. Here, the ALJ expanded the period of disability by nine months, and all the medical evidence in the record remained relevant to the new period of disability. Further, unlike the plaintiff in Jenifer S. , Plaintiff has presented both documentary evidence and testimony relevant to her disability claim during the entire period of disability—including during 2019—and therefore there was no violation of her due process rights. For example, the hearing transcript reveals that Plaintiff testified at length to her condition after December 31, 2018, and her attorney asked her several questions relative to her current level of functioning. (See, e.g. , Dkt. 12 at 41, 47-51 (discussing job at Instacart, which Plaintiff started in 2019); id. at 54-55 (discussing current psychiatry treatment and recent changes to her medications); id. at 55-56 (describing how depression and anxiety affects her at home and in the workplace); id. at 58 (discussing pain in her neck, including medication she takes at night); id. at 59 (testifying that her memory "is still a problem for [her]"); id. at 60 (describing recent mood swings); id. (discussing numbness down left arm); id. at 61 (discussing vision floaters, which were "still happening")). Likewise, the administrative record includes Plaintiff's medical records for the period after December 31, 2018, and through June 2019, and at the hearing the ALJ confirmed with Plaintiff there were no records outstanding. (Id. at 35). Plaintiff does not identify any records from the time following December 31, 2018 that she did not submit in support of her claim—in fact, the only records she does reference are mental health records from DENT Neurologic Institute ("DENT") in 2019 (see Dkt. 19-1 at 25), which are in the record. The written determination does not reflect that the ALJ relied on any evidence Plaintiff was not given the opportunity to contest. In other words, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff offered evidence relative to her functioning during the entire relevant period of disability, including through 2019. Accordingly, remand is not required on this basis.
B. The ALJ's Evaluation of Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ neglected to address opinions offered by her treating neurologist, Lazlo Mechtler, M.D., and Kathryn Murphy, FNP. (Dkt. 19-1 at 26). Plaintiff points specifically to Dr. Mechtler's September 1, 2015 opinion that Plaintiff could work 10 hours per week, and Dr. Mechtler's November 6, 2015 opinion that Plaintiff could work only 10 hours per week, and that she needed to work from home. (Id. at 27; see also Dkt. 12 at 375, 383). Plaintiff also references NP Murphy's April 17, 2018 note that Dr. Mechtler had reviewed Plaintiff's March 2018 MRI, which showed multiple intracranial abnormalities causing facial abnormalities and significant imbalance, which left her permanently disabled, and that she and Dr. Mechtler supported Plaintiff's application for long-term disability. (Dkt. 19-1 at 27). In response, the Commissioner contends that Dr. Mechtler's 2015 opinions were rendered prior to the relevant period and in connection with a prior benefit application. (Dkt. 20-1 at 10). With regard to the statement by NP Murphy, the Commissioner contends that it was not an actual "opinion" under the new regulations and is vague and conclusory. (Id. at 13).
"Previously, the SSA followed the ‘treating physician rule,’ which required the agency to give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, so long as it was ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and not ‘inconsistent with the other substantial evidence’ in the record." Soto v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 19-CV-4631 (PKC), 2020 WL 5820566, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2) ). However, the regulations relating to the evaluation of medical evidence were amended for disability claims filed after March 27, 2017. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence , 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at *5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). Because Plaintiff's disability claim was filed on May 19, 2017, the new regulations, codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, apply.
Pursuant to the new regulations, the Commissioner "will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant's] medical sources." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Further, when a medical source provides one or more medical opinions, the Commissioner will consider those medical opinions from that medical source together using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section. Id. Those factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the treatment relationship, and the examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) any other factors that "tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding." Id. at § 404.1520c(c).
When evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, the most important factors are supportability and consistency. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). With respect to "supportability," the new regulations provide that "[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(1). With respect to "consistency," the new regulations prove that "[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The ALJ must articulate her consideration of the medical opinion evidence, including how persuasive he finds the medical opinions in the case record. Id. at § 404.1520c(b). "Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning ‘weight’ to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions and how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions." Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (quotations and citation omitted). Specifically, the ALJ must explain how he considered the "supportability" and "consistency" factors for a medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may—but is not required to—explain how he considered the remaining factors. Id. However, when the opinions offered by two or more medical sources about the same issue are "both equally well-supported ... and consistent with the record ... but are not exactly the same," the ALJ will articulate how he considered the remaining factors in evaluating the opinions. Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(3). "Even though ALJs are no longer directed to afford controlling weight to treating source opinions—no matter how well supported and consistent with the record they may be—the regulations still recognize the ‘foundational nature’ of the observations of treating sources, and ‘consistency with those observations is a factor in determining the value of any [treating source's] opinion.’ " Shawn H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 2:19-CV-113, 2020 WL 3969879, at *6 (D. Vt. July 14, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Barrett v. Berryhill , 906 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2018) ).
Plaintiff is correct that the written determination does not discuss Dr. Mechtler's September and November 2015 statements that Plaintiff can work only 10 hours per week. (See Dkt. 12 at 375 (September 1, 2015 statement that "[Plaintiff] is okay to work ten hours a week per time for doing home sales") id. at 383 (November 6, 2015 statement that Plaintiff can work "10 hrs weekly" and "needs to continue to work from home")). However, these statements, which describe Plaintiff's condition as it existed on a certain date, pre-date the relevant period of disability of May 20, 2016 through July 23, 2019, and therefore the ALJ was not required to consider them. See Davis v. Colvin , No. 6:14-CV-06373 (MAT), 2016 WL 368009, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2016) ("The Commissioner is not required to consider evidence predating or postdating the relevant time period."); Krach v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:13-CV-1089(GTS/CFH), 2014 WL 5290368, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014) ("the ALJ is under no obligation to consider evidence from a time before the relevant period").
Plaintiff alleges in her disability application that she became disabled on February 1, 2013. (Dkt. 12 at 96). Before filing the instant disability application, Plaintiff had filed a prior disability application, which was denied in a decision dated May 19, 2016. (Id. at 73-89). The ALJ found that the prior determination should not be reopened and therefore the relevant period of disability for the instant application began on May 20, 2016. (Id. at 14 ("Given that the undersigned finds no appropriate reason to reopen the prior determination, the determination is a final decision through that date, and the undersigned is bound to consider only the unadjudicated period beginning May 20, 2016.")). Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ's determination in this regard as to the relevant period of disability.
On April 17, 2018, Plaintiff underwent a neurologic re-evaluation at DENT. (Dkt. 12 at 1036-40). The treatment note summarizes Plaintiff's history of brain tumor, and references a March 20, 2018 MRI of her brain, the results of which were reviewed by Dr. Mechtler. (Id. at 1036). The report then states that "[a]s a result of the multiple intracranial abnormalities the patient has been left with facial abnormalities and significant imbalance which leaves her permanently disabled. She has applied for long-term disability which is supported by both Dr. Mechtler and myself." (Id. ). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not discussing this statement, but the ALJ was not required to do so because under the new regulations applicable to Plaintiff's claim, an ALJ is not required to discuss statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i) ("How we consider evidence") (explaining that the ALJ is not required to provide any analysis on evidence "that is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive," including "[s]tatements on issues reserved to the Commissioner," such as "[s]tatements that you are or are not disabled, blind, able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing work"); see also Earl-Buck v. Barnhart , 414 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (statement by a medical source that a claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work" is an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner). Here, the ALJ specifically explained that she "did not provide articulation about the evidence that is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive in accordance with 20 CFR 404.1520b(c)." (Dkt. 12 at 24). The April 2018 treatment note does not contain any further assessment of Plaintiff's functioning in a work setting, but rather states merely that Plaintiff "disabled." Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to consider that statement, and remand is not required on this basis.
C. The RFC and Dr. Fabiano's Opinion
Plaintiff's last and final argument is that the ALJ failed to incorporate limitations assessed by Dr. Fabiano, despite finding that those limitations were consistent with the record. (Dkt. 19-1 at 31). Dr. Fabiano examined Plaintiff on October 12, 2017. (Dkt. 12 at 1014). Following his examination, Dr. Fabiano offered the following medical source statement:
The claimant appears to have moderate limitations in her ability to understand, remember, or apply simple directions and instructions and understand, remember, or apply complex directions and instructions. The claimant does not appear to have evidence of limitation in her ability to use reason and judgment to make work related decisions; sustain an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work; or have an awareness of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions. She appears to have moderate limitations in her ability to interact adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; sustain concentration and perform a task at a consistent pace; regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being; and maintain personal hygiene and appropriate attire. Difficulties are due to mental health symptoms and a lack of motivation.
The results of the examination appear to be consistent with psychiatric problems, but in itself this does not appear to be significant enough to interfere with the claimant's ability to function on a daily basis.
(Id. at 1017). The ALJ found that Dr. Fabiano's statement was "somewhat persuasive," explaining that his finding that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying simple directions and instructions and in maintaining well-being and maintaining hygiene and attire were not supported by the record, but that moderate limitations in the remaining areas described by Dr. Fabiano were consistent with the overall record. (Id. at 24). The assessed RFC limits Plaintiff to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, with occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. (Id. at 19).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adopt in the RFC Dr. Fabiano's findings that Plaintiff had moderate limitations for understanding, remembering, and applying complex directions and instructions; interacting adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; sustaining concentration and performing tasks at a consistent pace; regulating emotions; and controlling her behavior, despite the ALJ's finding that these limitations were supported by the record. (Dkt. 19-1 at 31-32). The Court disagrees. The RFC, which limits Plaintiff to performing simple, routine, repetitive tasks is consistent Dr. Fabiano's observation that Plaintiff has moderate limitations for understanding, remembering, and applying complex directions and instructions, and for sustaining concentration and performing tasks at a consistent pace. See Rivas v. Berryhill , No. 1:17-CV-05143 (ALC), 2018 WL 4666076, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) ("The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that ‘moderate’ limitations [in concentration, persistence, and pace] do not preclude an individual's ability to perform unskilled work.") (collecting cases); Tatelman v. Colvin , 296 F. Supp. 3d 608, 613 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) ("it is well-settled that a limitation to unskilled work ... sufficiently accounts for limitations relating to stress and production pace"). Likewise, the RFC's limiting Plaintiff to only occasional interactions with supervisors, co-workers, and the public accounts for Dr. Fabiano's opinion relating to Plaintiff's ability to interact with others, including that she had moderate limitations for interacting adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. See Laughlan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 17-CV-01055-A (RJA), 2019 WL 2723417, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2019) ("occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors is properly rated as a moderate limitation in social functioning"). In other words, despite Plaintiff's conclusory statement that the ALJ did not adopt the limitations assessed by Dr. Fabiano, the RFC does account for those limitations. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument that the RFC does not incorporate the limitations assessed by Dr. Fabiano is not supported by the record, and remand is not required on that basis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 20) is granted and Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 19) is denied.
SO ORDERED.