Opinion
No. 07-2375-cv.
February 10, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (E. Thomas Boyle, Magistrate Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED.
Appearing for Appellant: Victor M. Serby, Law Office of Victor M. Serby, Esq., Woodmere, NY.
Appearing for Appellee: Robert A. Calinoff, Calinoff Katz LLP (Dorothy H. Riggio, of counsel), New York, NY.
PRESENT: HON. ROBERT D. SACK, HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Manuel and Zulma Quintanilla appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Komori America Corporation ("Komori"). Mr. Quintanilla was injured in a workplace accident when his hand was drawn into the "nip point" between two rapidly turning rollers of the Komori printing press he was operating, thus entrapping and crushing the hand. The district court found that the plaintiffs' expert, who presented evidence that the design of the printing press was defective, was not qualified to testify, and that without his testimony the plaintiffs had failed to establish aprima facie case of design defect. See Quintanilla v. Komori Am. Corp., No. CV 04-5227 (ETB), 2007 WL 1309539, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33126 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.
"We review the district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. A decision to exclude expert testimony is not an abuse of discretion unless it is `manifestly erroneous.'" Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto. . . ." Fed.R.Evid. 702. The plaintiffs' expert, Paul O. Stehlik, who according to the district court appears to be a personal friend of the plaintiffs' attorney, see Quintanilla, 2007 WL 1309539, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33126, at *11, is a New York State Licensed Professional Engineer with a master's degree in engineering. However, he has never worked in the printing industry, and his only prior exposure to printing presses arose from visiting his father at work in a commercial printing plant and visiting printing plants as a tourist. Mr. Stehlik works as a senior mechanical engineer for a company that designs and builds electronic power systems. He also has a consulting practice, through which he has consulted on building inspections, structural analyses, and thermal and stress analyses. Though he does have experience in the mechanical design of certain specific mechanisms (including power conversion systems, commercial telephone equipment, and a variety of other mechanisms), there is no indication that Mr. Stehlik's work involves machines that are in any way similar to printing presses, or that he has received any education or training regarding printing presses or similar machines. It was therefore not manifestly erroneous for the district court to conclude that Mr. Stehlik did not have the requisite qualifications to testify in this case. Cf. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1992) (district court did not err in excluding expert testimony where witness's expertise was not on an issue in dispute).
Moreover, it was not manifestly erroneous for the district court to conclude that, even if Stehlik had been generally qualified to testify as an expert in this case, his testimony would still have been inadmissible because it was unreliable and speculative. See Quintanilla, 2007 WL 1309539, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33126, at *15. A qualified expert may only testify if, inter alia, "the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data." Fed.R.Evid. 702. The crux of Stehlik's testimony was that a nip guard or an interlock would have prevented Quintanilla's accident. However, Stehlik had never seen the Komori America interlock that he testified could have prevented the accident, nor had he reviewed any blueprints of that interlock. Similarly, he had never seen a nip guard installed on a printing press.See Quintanilla, 2007 WL 1309539, at *5-*6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33126, at *17-*19. Stehlik's conclusions regarding these safety devices seem to have been based largely on ANSI B65.1-1995, an industry-wide specification for printing presses of this type; but he conceeded in his deposition that he had not read the interpretations of ANSI B65.1-1995. It was therefore not manifestly erroneous for the district court to rule that Stehlik's testimony was unreliable and speculative.See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996)("expert testimony should be excluded if it is speculative or conjectural").
Inasmuch as Mr. Stehlik's testimony was found inadmissible by the district court, and we find that decision not to be manifestly erroneous, the plaintiffs failed to establish aprima facie case. "In order to establish a prima facie case in strict products liability for design defects [under New York law], the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer . . . marketed a product designed so that it was not reasonably safe and that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury." Voss v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (1983). "The plaintiff . . . is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner." Id. Without Stehlik's testimony, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that, at the time the printing press was manufactured, it was feasible to design it in a materially safer manner. Therefore, irrespective of whether or not the other elements ofVoss were met, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.