Summary
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment where the prisoner sought expungement of his disciplinary records based on a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
Summary of this case from Patkins v. KoenigOpinion
No. 08-15414.
Argued and Submitted June 10, 2010.
Filed August 18, 2010.
Karen C. Marchiano, Steven H. Frankel, Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Gregory Gomez, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Frank C. Damrell, Senior District Judge. Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-01203-FCD/KJM.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
While in state custody in California, Lee Quillar received several disciplinary citations for wearing a beard. Quillar has consistently maintained that he wears the beard for religious reasons. The prison regulations Quillar violated have since been amended such that Quillar's beard is no longer a violation. The disciplinary citations remain in Quillar's file. His primary claim before this court is for injunctive relief to expunge references to those citations from his file, based on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The district court dismissed that claim for want of Article III jurisdiction. Quillar also appeals the district court's denials of his motion to appoint counsel and his motion to obtain limited discovery.
We hold that the district court has Article III jurisdiction over Quillar's claim for injunctive relief to expunge the disciplinary records. The government does not argue that Quillar's rights under RLUIPA were not violated when the discipline occurred. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting preliminary injunction of similar grooming regulation because of substantial likelihood of success on RLUIPA claim). That violation was an injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing. Quillar's claim is ripe because the potentially harmful references to his disciplinary citations are already in his file. Quillar's claim is not mooted by the change in prison regulations because the existence of the disciplinary records is "an ongoing `effect'" of the RLUIPA violation. See Normart-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 1998).
We also hold that Quillar's claim for injunctive relief is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Quillar alleges that the prison violated his RLUIPA rights when it disciplined him. This is not a challenge to "the fact or duration of his confinement." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005).
We remand Quillar's RLUIPA claim for expungement to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Quillar's motion for appointment of counsel. However, we suggest that the district court consider appointing counsel on remand, given the nature of the legal questions presented.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Quillar's motion for limited discovery.
In sum, we reverse and remand as to the district court's dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of Quillar's RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief. We affirm the district court as to the motion to appoint counsel and as to the motion for limited discovery. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
REVERSED, in part, AFFIRMED, in part, and REMANDED.