Opinion
No. 17 C.D. 2013
09-27-2013
Ian Quarles, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Ian Quarles petitions for review of an order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying his administrative appeal from his recommitment resulting from a technical parole violation while a program participant at Renewal, Inc., a specialized community corrections center. We affirm.
In 1999, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County sentenced Quarles to a term of seven years and six months to fifteen years for various firearm and drug-related offenses. Certified Record (C.R.) at 1-1. His original parole maximum date was April 16, 2014. Id. In December 2011, the Board paroled Quarles to a specialized community corrections center, subject to numerous conditions. Id. at 1-17 - 1-26. On January 26, 2012, the Board issued a warrant to commit and detain Quarles. Id. at 1-27. Pursuant to the Board's "Technical Violation Arrest Report," Quarles was arrested that same day and charged with the following technical parole violation: "Condition #7: Offender was unsuccessfully discharged from Renewal, Inc." Id. at 1-28. Subsequently, the Board specified the charge in its "Notice of Charges and Hearing:"
Technical Parole Violations:
Violation of Condition #7: "you shall comply with the special condition listed imposed [sic] by the Board and with special conditions imposed by the parole supervision staff. (Board imposed) Removal or termination from the community correction residency for any reason other than successful completion may result in sanctions or a violation of your parole." On 01/26/2012, you were unsuccessfully discharged from Renewal, Inc. for failure to follow program rules and regulations.Id. at 1-30 (emphasis added).
On May 7, 2012, the Board held a panel hearing on Quarles' technical parole violation. In a decision mailed May 22, 2012, the Board concluded that the violation was established and, accordingly, ordered that Quarles be recommitted as a technical parole violator to serve six months backtime. In determining that Quarles violated his parole by failing to comply with the program rules and regulations at Renewal, the Board relied on the testimony of Parole Agent Ciafre and Mr. Darren Hood, the case manager supervisor at Renewal. They testified that Renewal has a policy requiring participants to procure employment within thirty days of admission pursuant to their treatment plans. Id. at 1-78 and 1-97. If the participant is unable to secure employment within that time period, then Renewal holds a non-compliance hearing. The witnesses indicated that Quarles' parole violation consisted of his admitted refusal to sign a notification form indicating that he would have to attend a hearing due to his failure to obtain work within the requisite time period, not for refusing to find work or not working. Quarles testified that he refused to sign the form due to his belief that he would thereby be acknowledging that he had refused to obtain or maintain employment, not that he had been unsuccessful in procuring employment. Id. at 1-124, 1-133. In addition, Quarles testified as to an alleged medical disability.
Quarles' parole maximum date remained April 16, 2014. C.R. at 1-163.
With regard to the necessity for the form, the parole officer testified that when he placed Quarles into custody, he advised Quarles that "all [he] needed to do was sign the form, it wasn't going to violate [him], but that if [he] refused to sign the form, that [he] would be taken back into custody." Id. at 1-139-1-140. The case manager supervisor reiterated that Quarles was removed from Renewal for refusing to sign the form, not for refusing to find work or not working. Hood further testified that no one was returned to prison for not finding a job and that one of the purposes of the hearing was to afford a parolee the opportunity to explain any medical reasons for not being able to work. Id. at 106. He explained that, as a result of the hearing, a ten-day extension would have been granted and a subsequent review conducted in order to review job search efforts. Id. at 1-106, 1-107. He further testified that program participants were told that they would not be kicked out of Renewal at the end of those ten days. Id.
The Board found the parole officer and program director to be credible and concluded that their testimony constituted sufficient evidence to show that Quarles violated Condition #7 and that, in doing so, he was at least somewhat at fault such that recommitment was warranted. See Hudak v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 757 A.2d 439, 440-41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (holding that where parolee had been hospitalized with a ruptured colon and, consequently, could not report for his curfew, he should not be recommitted because the parole violation required "some kind of fault" on his part). Quarles, acting pro se, sought administrative relief in June 2012, which the Board ultimately denied on December 10, 2012. On January 7, 2013, Quarles filed a petition for review with this Court seeking review of the Board's decision.
Originally, the Board dismissed Quarles' pro se petition as untimely. Upon court-appointed counsel's October 2012 petition for review to this Court and motion to remand, however, we remanded this matter to the Board to address the merits of Quarles' pro se petition. Quarles v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1889 C.D. 2012, filed October 3, 2012). As noted above, the Board denied Quarles' petition. C.R. at 1-282. --------
In determining whether a parolee violated the conditions of his parole, the Board may consider all admissible evidence; however, its holding must rest upon substantial evidence. Price v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Furthermore, the Board has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parolee violated the terms and conditions of parole. Sigafoos v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 503 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). A preponderance of the evidence is proof that leads the fact finder to decide "that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." Id. Finally, we note that the Board, as the ultimate finder of fact, has exclusive discretion to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence and assign evidentiary weight. Flowers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 987 A.2d 1269, 1271 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Quarles maintains that the Board erred in determining that his refusal to sign the form constituted a parole violation where he perceived that signing the form would be tantamount to an admission that he had violated his parole by not obtaining employment. He asserts that his refusal to sign the form was justified since his physical disability precluded him from satisfying Renewal's job requirement. Noting that the form was not presented into evidence at the hearing, Quarles contends that the Board's determination is not supported by substantial evidence in that it relied on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence. We reject Quarles' position.
Regardless of Quarles' subjective understanding as to the significance of signing the form, the evidence reflects that signing the form and proceeding to a hearing were part of Renewal's rules. In order to be paroled to a specialized community corrections center, Quarles had to follow the rules and regulations of the Renewal program. The evidence accepted by the Board in support of its determination indicates that Quarles would have been permitted to present evidence at the non-compliance hearing as to his job search efforts and the effect of his alleged medical disability on such efforts. It is well established that "[t]he granting of parole is not a right of a prisoner but is a matter of administrative discretion." Cunningham v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 410 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). In that regard, "the Board has been given broad discretion in parole matters and is not required to accept justifying or mitigating evidence to excuse the commission of parole violations." Pitch v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 514 A.2d 638, 641-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of September, 2013, the order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge