Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. GIC800859, Frederic L. Link, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
After jury trial in this defamation action, judgment was entered on a special verdict for $250,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive damages in favor of plaintiff Lieu Minh Quang (Quang) against defendant Neil Tran (Tran) and his publication (the Nang Moi newspaper or magazine). The trial court denied Tran's motion for new trial claiming excessive damages. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) Tran appeals, contending the $200,000 in compensatory damages awarded for negligent infliction of emotional distress was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Alternatively, Tran contends the compensatory damages award of $250,000 for both defamation and infliction of emotional distress must be reduced by $50,000 to prevent an alleged double recovery.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress is adequately supported by the evidence. We further conclude that the verdicts on that point contained elements not contained within the libel award, such that there was no award of duplicative damages as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background Summary
In November 2002, Quang filed a libel action against Tran based on certain statements made in Tran's Nang Moi magazine, and republications, that falsely alleged Quang had engaged in extensive improper sexual conduct with several young secretaries employed by the law firm of which he was a manager. The operative amended complaint in this action seeks compensatory and punitive damages for libel and damages for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This Court previously affirmed a trial court order that denied a motion brought by Tran to strike the defamation lawsuit under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Quang v. Tran (Aug. 23, 2004, D041992) [nonpub. opn.] (our prior opinion).) We agreed with the trial court that this statutory scheme was inapplicable to this complaint by a nonpublic figure, about matters not clearly of public interest, and held the motion to strike was properly denied. (§ 425.16.) We now set forth essential background facts as laid out in this court's prior opinion on that matter:
"Tran owns a Vietnamese language publication titled Nang Moi Magazine or Nang Moi Newspaper. Quang's first amended complaint alleges that this publication is a 'weekly advertising circular' and that for several months the publication contained articles falsely alleging that Quang, 'in his capacity as law office manager, has hired female employees, induced them to engage in sexual relations with him, rendered them pregnant and then shipped them out of state to hide the pregnancy.' Quang alleged that in publishing these statements Tran acted with malice and with the intent to injure Quang. Quang attached to his complaint the Vietnamese versions and English translations of two of the allegedly false articles published by Tran. The first article, dated July 20, 2002, reads:
"Some law offices in San Diego make a special practice of placing ads for the hiring of young, pretty ladies. The 'Quang Linh' then always stamps these ladies, getting them PREGNANT. These ladies then are given money to leave the state and stay hidden away. These gentlemen are very 'Quang Lieu' and are very daring in actions, but later went out to 'Minh Quang' the situation, claiming to have been wrongfully blamed. Nang Moi Magazine is verifying this hot news and will report later to our readers and fellow countrymen. (Boldface omitted.)
"The second article, dated July 27, 2002, reads:
"Some law offices in San Diego often place ads for the hiring of young, pretty secretaries. One law office has a Mr. 'Quan' who always lures those secretaries into eating 'raw hot dogs'. After a sample, some of the ladies actually get poisoned by the side effects and their bellies swell up, more and more each day. Quan then moves them to other states to take care of the sickness and in order to avoid tangles with the law and their families. The law office gentleman acts like a mandarin (Quan Lieu) having these ladies eat 'raw hot dogs', which results in a swollen belly, and then goes outside to 'Minh Quang' things, claiming all is false and he is not guilty and does not have bastard children. (Boldface omitted.)
"Tran moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP law." (Our prior opinion.) In declarations submitted in that proceeding, Tran took the position that Quang is a well-known person and public figure in the local Vietnamese community, because he is a law office manager who advertises and seeks to obtain clients among that community for his employer. Tran also suggested that these articles "concern a controversy in the Vietnamese community between himself and an 'old guard' group called the 'Freedom Fighters Alliance Committee,' " and that Quang is somehow involved in this. (Our prior opinion.)
In response to the motion, Quang presented declarations from individuals who read the articles in the original Vietnamese, and who "understood them to be asserting that Quang engaged in improper sexual conduct with secretaries in the law firm. Quang also submitted his own declaration stating he is a manager of a law firm, and denying that he engaged in any form of sexual misconduct alleged in the articles. Quang stated that Tran's articles first appeared in the Nang Moi publication shortly after his employer decided to limit its advertising in this publication. Quang further stated that, 'In response to Mr. Tran's allegation that I am involved in some plot or movement to hurt him, to put him out of business, or to silence the voice of his magazine, I state without reservation that I have never participated in any such movement. [¶] I do not belong to any organizations, political, civic, social or otherwise. I have never given a speech. I have never published an article or an essay or even a poem. I do not attend meetings or rallies or any other gatherings of people involved in local affairs. On only rare occasions in the past have I attended parties or charitable events such as concerts, and have on occasion presented a check for a donation from my employer. I do not provide support of any sort to persons who may have interests inimical to those of Mr. Tran.' " (Our prior opinion.)
As previously stated, the denial of Tran's motion to strike was upheld on appeal in our prior opinion.
B. Procedural Summary
The three-day jury trial included testimony to the same effect, and much more, as contained in the declarations outlined above. The parties, their wives, several acquaintances, and an expert in the Vietnamese culture and language presented extensive testimony about the local Vietnamese community and the importance of a man's reputation, particularly with respect to avoiding sexual immorality or the exploitation of young girls, such as in the workplace. We will set forth only a basic summary of the evidence due to the relatively limited nature of the issues on appeal, concerning emotional distress damages and duplicative damages.
Thanh Nguyen, the expert in Vietnamese culture and language, translated the articles and interpreted their effect on the local community for the jury. He said Quang's reputation had been damaged by these accounts of his alleged conduct, since such acts are considered to be particularly shameful and immoral in this community. A bad reputation hurts not only the individual, but his family and future generations. The expected result of these articles would be that people would stay away from Quang and his employer.
Quang testified about his background in immigrating to the United States from Vietnam, and that it took him 12 years to bring his wife here; during that time he had a girlfriend and an illegitimate child, but his marriage was now strong and he had treated the child well, as well as the child of his marriage. He testified about his career of working 15 years in law offices in San Diego, where he always strived to establish a good reputation. On behalf of his former employer, Quang had placed advertising in Nang Moi off and on for about eight years. Quang changed employment and again placed ads in Nang Moi from early 2002 through July 2002, but no longer did so after his employer decided, for budget reasons, to stop the ad. Quang testified that he received threats from Tran's wife and implied threats from Tran that there would be consequences for this, such as adverse publicity in the newspaper.
One or two weeks later, Quang learned of the false statements about him in Nang Moi regarding his rumored sexual misconduct, and believed this was extortion toward him. He received many calls from people wondering if it were true and he was very embarrassed. There were one or two young ladies in the office where he worked who did in fact get pregnant, but he was not involved in their situations, but he feared people might erroneously believe he was involved. Even his relatives thought so. The local Vietnamese community was small (approximately 40,000-50,000) and people knew one another and talked about such things, so reputations were particularly important in these matters.
Quang testified extensively about the sadness and emotional devastation that he incurred from the publication of Tran's articles. He felt the articles had caused changes in his personality, by making him more passive, or so angry that he almost felt insane. He was afraid to meet people and was not himself, and the articles generally turned his life upside down. The articles accused him of unimaginable deeds. However, he did not ask for a retraction because he was afraid things would only get worse.
Quang suffered from headaches for years after the articles were published. However, he did not seek medical or psychological advice because he did not believe it would help and it would most likely further hurt his reputation in the local Vietnamese community, which generally did not approve of psychiatric treatment. He lost concentration at work off and on, but did not miss any work or suffer a demotion.
Quang felt sorry for his mother, brother and sister and family because these rumors embarrassed all of them. He argued with his wife about the articles. On the witness stand, his wife wept while confirming his testimony that their marriage survived, but she knew he had changed because he was embarrassed to go out and meet people. The publication of the articles deeply hurt both of them and left them numb from suffering.
Quang believed that Tran was retaliating against him because his law office had stopped running ads in the magazine, or possibly because there were politically motivated fights among publishers of these various Vietnamese magazines. He was afraid of Tran and felt as if he were dealing with communists in Vietnam.
Several of Quang's witnesses and acquaintances (Thang Pham and Phuong Nho) testified about reading many such articles, realizing that they were about Quang, and believing that they showed him in a bad light. Many people in the community discussed them and they clearly injured Quang's reputation. However, when these witnesses got acquainted with Quang, they knew that he was a good person despite the articles' false allegations.
Two of the young ladies who had previously worked at Quang's law office testified that he was always a gentleman toward them. However, their families would no longer allow them to work there because of the rumors spread by the articles.
Tran testified, among other things, that he had been sued for libel by several other people, who also knew Quang. Tran claimed the articles were intended to be humorous in nature, or could be interpreted that way, and they were not necessarily about Quang. He denied that he intended to retaliate against Quang for withdrawing his law firm's advertising from Tran's publication. However, he thought it was possible that Quang was part of an organization which sought to harm him (Freedom Fighters Alliance). Tran had recently published allegations against plaintiff of tax evasion or concealing property, or getting a divorce. Tran said he was the victim in this instance.
At one point, after Tran's wife testified, the trial judge barred her from the courthouse for allegedly tampering with witnesses.
C. Special Verdict and Judgment
At the close of testimony, the jury received instructions on the elements of libel and the emotional distress claims. It sent a question to the judge about the difference between "severe" and "serious" emotional distress, and was told to follow the instructions.
After deliberations, the jury decided in favor of Quang's claims for damages for libel and negligent infliction of emotional distress ("serious" emotional distress), but no intentional infliction of emotional distress was found (no "severe" distress). The special verdict awarded Quang $250,000 in compensatory damages, set forth as follows. Regarding the cause of action for libel, the jury allocated compensatory damages as follows:
"Past noneconomic loss including shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Lieu Minh Quang's reputation $30,000
"Future noneconomic loss including shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Lieu Minh Quang's reputation $20,000"
With respect to the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the jury awarded the following compensatory damages:
"Past noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings $150,000 [no reputation damages]
"Future noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Lieu Minh Quang's reputation $50,000"
Later, a majority of jurors awarded Quang an additional $100,000 punitive damages. Judgment was prepared and Tran filed his motion for a new trial, on the grounds the evidence did not support the verdict and damages were excessive. After oral argument, the court ruled there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the verdict. The motion for new trial was denied by minute order. Tran appealed.
DISCUSSION
After setting forth our standards of review, we address Tran's argument that excessive damages were awarded for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We then evaluate his theory that the judgment erroneously allows double recovery for the same wrong, as between the libel and emotional distress claims.
I
RULES OF REVIEW
Under section 624, a special verdict is defined as one in which "the jury find[s] the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court. The special verdict must present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence, and not the evidence to prove them; and those conclusions of fact must be so presented as that nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law." In general, the courts will interpret verdicts in a manner that will uphold them and give them "the effect intended by the jury, as well as one consistent with the law and the evidence. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 375, pp. 427-428.)
A substantial evidence standard of review is normally utilized for challenges to a judgment based on excessive damages claims. '' 'The reviewing court does not act de novo . . . the trial court's determination . . . is entitled to great weight because it is bound by the "more demanding test of weighing conflicting evidence than our standard of review under the substantial evidence rule . . . " All presumptions favor the trial court's determination . . ., and we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment . . .' [Citations.]" (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Writs and Appeals (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶ 8:140, p. 8-84.4, citing Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 259 .) Similarly, "the amount of damages award able is a question of fact for the trier of fact (in a jury trial, first committed to the jury's discretion and next to the discretion of the judge on a motion for new trial)." (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Writs and Appeals, supra, ¶ 8:139, p. 8-84.3, citing Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 709, 727; see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.)
"In actions for libel or slander the amount of damages recoverable is peculiarly within the discretion of the jury, for there can be no fixed or mathematical rule on the subject." (Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co. (1938) 30 Cal.App.2d 77, 90.) The same is true of emotional distress claims: "[T]here is no fixed or absolute standard by which to compute the monetary value of emotional distress . . . ." (Merlo v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 17 (Merlo).)
" ' "The determination of damages is primarily a factual matter on which the inevitable wide differences of opinion do not call for the intervention of appellate courts. [Citation.] An appellate court, in reviewing the amount of damages, must determine every conflict in the evidence in respondent's favor and give him the benefit of every reasonable inference. [Citation.] An appellate court may not interfere with an award unless " 'the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.' " ' [Citation.]" (Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1011-1012(Weller).)
II
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES CONTENTION
"In tort actions, damages are normally awarded for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for injury suffered, i.e., restoring the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his or her former position, or giving some pecuniary equivalent. [Citations.]" (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) § 1548, p.1022.) "On the other hand, the plaintiff is not entitled to be placed in a better position than he or she would have been in had the wrong not been done. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Tran first contends that the $200,000 in compensatory damages awarded for negligent infliction of emotional distress was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. He seeks to have the award vacated, reduced, or a new trial on damages ordered. The jury's special verdict awarded $150,000 in "[p]ast noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings," which did not include any reference to reputation damages (although the previous libel award and the next section of the emotional damages verdict did refer to reputational injury; i.e., $50,000 for "[f]uture noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Quang's reputation").
The negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was presented here under the "direct victim" theory. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1071 (Burgess).) This theory provides no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter); Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) Rather, such damages accompany a proven breach of some other legal duty, where the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach. (Potter, supra, at p. 984.) "Emotional distress is a form of actual damage and must be proved as any other actual damage." (Merlo, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 16.) In this case, the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is generally supported by reference to the libel allegations, which were found true.
Tran relies upon the reasoning of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 928 (Molien), that only "serious mental distress" gives rise to a right to recovery, and only in cases in which a reasonable, normal person "would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) In that case, the Supreme Court also observed that " 'mental suffering frequently constitutes the principal element of tort damages,' " which gave rise to the need for verifiable standards in such cases. (Id. at pp. 928-929.) Tran observes that the jury rejected any claim for "severe" emotional distress, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The question accordingly is whether the testimony provided by Quang, his wife, and his witnesses about the sadness and emotional injury that he incurred from the publication of Tran's articles is enough to prove these general damages, based on a theory of negligence or lack of due care. According to Tran, since Quang never sought any medical or psychological advice, he could not have suffered the necessary serious emotional distress in order to deserve a large damages award. Quang did not seek any counseling from any religious figures. He did not suffer from any demotions or lost work time, and he continued to carry out most of his normal activities, over the three-year period between the 2002 publications and the 2005 trial.
The problem with Tran's arguments in this respect is that there is no absolute requirement that Quang had to prove special damages in order to prove general damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, where there is a related breach of duty that adequately supports emotional distress damages. As already noted, "there is no fixed or absolute standard by which to compute the monetary value of emotional distress." (Merlo, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 17.) Tran can point to no authority that general damages must be limited to some particular proportion related to any award of special damages in this context. Instead, "[a]lthough failure to prove special damages may be a factor in concluding that damages for injury to reputation are excessive [citation], the failure of such proof certainly does not compel the conclusion." (Weller, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1013-1014.) Rather, such matters are particularly suitable for jury determination, and even if such general damages seem relatively high in amount, the inquiry on appeal should be whether they are "so out of proportion with the evidence that we should infer that the judgment is the product of passion or prejudice." (Ibid.) That is not the case here.
For example, the jury heard Quang's explanation that in light of his cultural background, he could not seek medical or psychological assistance, because that would further injure his reputation locally, as being not only immoral but also "crazy." It was not necessary for the jury to endorse that viewpoint in order to understand it, in light of the entire set of circumstances presented. Different people and cultures handle adversity in different ways, and Quang's response to the circumstances of the case could have been evaluated by the jury as a reasonable method of coping with his mental stress. (See Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 at pp. 928-929 .)
Moreover, Quang's wife confirmed his testimony that the publication of the articles adversely affected him and their family in their social and emotional well-being. Since this had been going on, Quang's personality had changed, and he seemed to be more passive, or angry, or afraid to meet people. Quang's associates testified that his reputation had suffered and that this was not justified by his own conduct. Such circumstances could reasonably be evaluated as leading to serious suffering on his part, for a long period of time and for the foreseeable future, specifically due to Tran's conduct from 2002 through the time of trial. It is not dispositive that the jury did not characterize his emotional distress as "severe," since they were also presented with this alternative theory of negligence. Tran's version of the facts, that plaintiff only demonstrated he was sad but was nevertheless able to cope with his situation, is entirely incomplete.
An appellate court must give considerable weight to the jury's evaluation. In addition to Quang's personal and family testimony, there was expert testimony that he suffered a relatively greater impact because of the loss of reputation within his cultural community than might be the case with others. It is appropriate to conclude on this record that the jury had a substantial evidence basis to value this "serious" emotional distress at the amount set, as compensatory damages for injuries suffered, rather than punishment. The trial judge's ruling in denying the new trial motion was likewise supportive of such a conclusion. We cannot say this portion of the award, $200,000, was entirely unsupported by the record, nor that it was improperly motivated by the jury's passion or prejudice. We next turn to whether it should nevertheless be considered to be excessive as a matter of law, under the double recovery argument.
III
DUPLICATIVE DAMAGES ARGUMENT
Tran contends that Quang is recovering damages twice for the same noneconomic harm, through an unconstitutional double recovery. He raised these arguments in his new trial motion and they have been sufficiently preserved on appeal, in light of the alternate theories originally presented to the jury regarding the type of emotional distress that was inflicted.
To analyze Tran's argument, we set out background authorities that have analyzed duplicative damages. First, as summarized in 6 Witkin, Summary of California Law, supra, Torts, section 1550, pages 1023 to 1024, "The general theory of compensatory damages bars double recovery for the same wrong. The principal situation is where joint or concurrent tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the same wrong. Only one complete satisfaction is permissible, and if partial satisfaction is received from one, the liability of others will be correspondingly reduced. [Citations.]"
A California Supreme Court statement of this rule is found in Board of Administration v. Glover (1983) 34 Cal.3d 906 (Glover), in which the court was applying subrogation rules within the context of the workers' compensation law. It was required to consider "the respective obligations of an employer, an injured employee, and an alleged third party tortfeasor within the context of a personal injury settlement between the tortfeasor and the employee and a reimbursement claim by the employer against the tortfeasor for disability retirement benefits paid to the employee." (Id. at p. 910.) In dealing with that set of facts, the court applied the general principle forbidding duplicative damages:
" 'An adjunct of subrogation is the rule prohibiting double recovery of damages, a rule of special importance in the prosecution of subrogation claims because the proration of damages among those who have shared the costs of personal injuries increases the possibility of duplicate claims for the same loss. Only one totality of recovery of damages for personal injuries is allowed, and only one totality of liability may be imposed on the tortfeasor. [Citations.] Duplicate recovery of damages is barred, and neither double recovery of the same item of loss nor double liability for the same item of injury is permitted. [Citations.]' " (Glover, supra, 34 Cal.3d 906, 915-916; italics added.)
This basic principle is again outlined in Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 664, 673 (Krusi). In that case, the court applied the rule to a situation involving the collateral source doctrine and multiple tortfeasors: "The question this court must decide is whether various payments which plaintiff received came from a co-tortfeasor so as to entitle defendant Bear, Stearns to a pro tanto reduction; or whether such payments emanated from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor so as to fall within the collateral source rule." (Id. at pp. 674-675; ["[I]f one tort feasor pays partial compensation to the plaintiff, the liability of other tortfeasors will be correspondingly reduced: '. . . payments by one tortfeasor on account of a harm for which he and another are each liable, diminish the amount of the claim against the other whether or not it was so agreed at the time of payment and whether the payment was made before or after judgment. Since the plaintiff can have but one satisfaction, evidence of such payments is admissible for the purpose of reducing pro tanto the amount of the damages he may be entitled to recover.' "], id. at p. 673.)
The facts of the above two cases, and many other cases in which this issue arises, are more complex than those before us, in which Tran was the only tortfeasor and there are no collateral source issues. Nevertheless, we can apply this same basic rule regarding double recovery. "The general rule of compensatory damages bars double recovery for the same wrong." (Krusi, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 673.) The question accordingly is whether the $50,000 total libel award was for the same acts and the same harm (the same wrong) as the negligent infliction award, which was split into two portions: $150,000 for "Past noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings" (without any reference to reputation damages); and $50,000 for "[f]uture noneconomic loss including emotional distress, shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Quang's reputation." (Italics added.)
In comparing the above special verdicts for emotional distress to the language of the libel verdicts, we see that the libel portion does not mention emotional distress, but refers to "[p]ast noneconomic loss including shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Lieu Minh Quang's reputation ($30,000), and an additional $20,000 for "[f]uture noneconomic loss including shame, mortification, or hurt feelings, and harm to Lieu Minh Quang's reputation." The statutory definition of libel damages in Civil Code section 48a, subdivision (4)(a) includes general damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings, but the statutory categories are not exclusive: "Recovery is also allowed for humiliation and emotional distress. [Citation.]" (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 1701, p. 1231.) In our case, two kinds of emotional distress theories were presented to the jury, along with libel, and the jury ruled in favor of Quang on the negligence theory. This suggests that the negligent infliction of emotional distress finding was intended by the jury to accompany the libel verdict, but to be separate from it, since the instructions and arguments addressed different kinds of wrongs committed by Tran in the course of his publications of the offensive articles.
In a comparable situation in Weller, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1013-1014, the appellate court rejected an argument by the appellants "that presumed damages for injury to reputation may be awarded only if the plaintiff is unable to prove actual damages." The appellants were arguing that awarding presumed damages would be "double recovery." (Id. at p. 1014.) Thus, the appellate court saw no objection to a plaintiff recovering for actual damages for injury to reputation, and also presumed damages to reputation. Otherwise, "[i]f we were to accept appellants' contention that presumed damages are available only in lieu of damages for proven injury to reputation, the plaintiff who can prove $1 of actual injury would be precluded from further recovery, whereas the plaintiff who cannot marshal any evidence of actual injury would not be so limited." (Ibid.)
Another comparable situation arose in Merlo, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 5, in which the appellate court let stand an award of both compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, over objections of double recovery. The court explained that: "Compensatory damages and punitive damages are two different things with two different purposes. Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate an injured party for his injury; punitive damages are awarded to punish a wrongdoer and make an example of him. When both compensatory and punitive damages are awarded, there is no double punishment. There may be double recovery, but, unless and until the Legislature sees fit to alter Civil Code section 3294, it is a permissible double recovery." (Merlo, supra, at p. 20.)
We think that the basic principle stated in Glover, supra, 34 Cal.3d 906, 915-916, is not offended by the special verdict read as a whole. " 'Only one totality of recovery of damages for personal injuries is allowed, and only one totality of liability may be imposed on the tortfeasor. [Citations.] Duplicate recovery of damages is barred, and neither double recovery of the same item of loss nor double liability for the same item of injury is permitted. [Citations.]' " (Ibid.) Here, the damages award for emotional distress accompanies the underlying libel award, and contains references to emotional distress that were not covered by the libel verdict. The jury evidently saw a distinction between the injuries directly caused by the libel, mainly to reputation and related shame, etc., and the private emotional distress that was suffered to Quang's own identity and sense of well-being. Even though a plaintiff can have only one satisfaction or compensation for his overall injuries, this verdict does not offend that principle because it is a reasonable interpretation of the record that different wrongs were committed by the same tortfeasor and different damages could appropriately be awarded. (Krusi, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 673.)
"In actions for libel or slander the amount of damages recoverable is peculiarly within the discretion of the jury, for there can be no fixed or mathematical rule on the subject. Questions concerning the amount of the verdict are directed primarily to the discretion of the trial court, which has the power to weigh the evidence in order to determine whether the verdict is correct in view of all the testimony in the case. The trial court has the power to set aside the verdict if it is considered to be unjust. This power is not vested in a reviewing court. [Citation.] The trial court found no occasion to interfere with the verdict and we find no occasion to interfere with its conclusion." (Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., supra, 30 Cal.App.2d 77, 90.) We should interpret the special verdict in a manner to uphold it and to give it "the effect intended by the jury, as well as one consistent with the law and the evidence. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 375, pp. 427-428.) Tran has made no persuasive argument that the accepted principles regarding double recovery were violated here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent Quang.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., AARON, J.