Opinion
2002-09922.
December 29, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Gar-Ben Associates and We're Associates appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated September 25, 2002, as, upon the granting of the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against them, made at the close of evidence, and upon a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff damages in the sums of $234,000 for past pain and suffering, $515,000 for future pain and suffering, $19,919.18 for past medical expenses, $10,000 for future medical expenses, and $21,500.50 for loss of earnings, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the total sum of $799,151.24.
Gould Cimino (Mauro Goldberg Lilling, LLP, Great Neck, N.Y. [Barbara D. Goldberg and Jennifer B. Ettenger] of counsel), for appellants.
Brody, O'Connor O'Connor, Northport, N.Y. (Patricia A. O'Connor and Scott A. Brody of counsel), for respondent.
Before: GLORIA GOLDSTEIN and WILLIAM F. MASTRO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the liability of the defendants Gar-Ben Associates and We're Associates (hereinafter the defendants), pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), because, upon the evidence presented, there was no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the defendants ( see Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 524; see also Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556; State Farm Ins. Co. v. Amana Refrig., 266 A.D.2d 372, 373). The unrebutted evidence adduced at trial by the plaintiff, an electrician, demonstrated that the defendants, which opted not to call any witnesses or present any evidence at trial, did not provide him with proper protection from height-related dangers connected with his work, and that the ladder on which he worked was inadequate to prevent him from falling 14 feet to the floor after sustaining an electric shock in the course of connecting a ceiling fixture ( see Izrailev v. Ficcara Furniture of Long Is., 70 N.Y.2d 813, 815). Nor did the defendants rebut the plaintiff's showing, established through both eyewitness and expert testimony, that they should have provided him with protective equipment, and that the failure to provide this equipment proximately caused the accident ( see Izrailev v. Ficcara Furniture of Long Is., supra; cf. Grogan v. Norlite Corp., 282 A.D.2d 781; Donovan v. CNY Consol. Contrs., 278 A.D.2d 881; Weber v. 1111 Park Ave. Realty Corp., 253 A.D.2d 376, 378; Gange v. Tilles Inv. Co., 220 A.D.2d 556, 558).
The award of damages in a personal injury case is primarily a question for the jury ( see Lamb v. Babies 'R' Us, 302 A.D.2d 368; Balsam v. City of New York, 298 A.D.2d 479; Stylianou v. Calabrese, 297 A.D.2d 798), whose determination should be accorded great deference ( see Lamb v. Babies 'R' Us, supra; Laguesse v. Storytown, U.S.A., 296 A.D.2d 798). Upon our consideration of the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, we find that the jury's awards to him for past and future pain and suffering do not materially deviate from what would be considered reasonable compensation ( see CPLR 5501[c]; Jansen v. Raimondo Son Constr. Corp., 293 A.D.2d 574; see also Stylianou v. Calabrese, supra; Capuccio v. City of New York, 174 A.D.2d 543).
Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed insofar as appealed from.
The defendants' remaining contention is without merit ( see Zook v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co., 64 A.D.2d 701; see also Wyoming County Bank v. Ackerman, 286 A.D.2d 884).
ALTMAN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, GOLDSTEIN and MASTRO, JJ., concur.