Opinion
Docket No. 019145-2013
12-12-2014
Re: Richard K. and Elizabeth A. Purcell v. Borough of Woodcliff Lake
Brian DeVito, Esq. 154 Union Avenue Suite 35 Rutherford, NJ 07070 Donald Lenner, Esq. 11 State Street Hackensack, NJ 07601
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS JOSEPH M. ANDRESINI JUDGE
(201) 996-8029
Brian DeVito, Esq.
154 Union Avenue
Suite 35
Rutherford, NJ 07070
Donald Lenner, Esq.
11 State Street
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Block 2102, Lot 6.03 Dear Counselors:
This letter serves as the court's opinion with respect to Plaintiffs Richard and Elizabeth Purcell's ("Plaintiff" or "Plaintiffs") motion for reconsideration of this court's Order dated October 17, 2014 in which this court granted the Borough of Woodcliff Lake's ("Defendant") motion for summary judgment.
That motion resulted in the dismissal of the complaint in which Plaintiffs sought retroactive application of deductions against Plaintiffs' property taxes under N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10 et seq. (the "Veteran's Deduction") with respect to their property located at 9 Lyons Court in Woodcliff Lake for tax years 1985 to 2012. In addition to the aforementioned Order, this court also issued an Opinion on the same date which articulated several reasons supporting its decision to grant Defendant's summary judgment motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Facts and Procedural History
For the purpose of providing context, the court will include a brief statement of facts. A full statement of facts can be found in the court's Opinion dated October 17, 2014. Plaintiffs received the Veteran's Deduction to be applied to their property located at 25 Amy Court in the Borough of Woodcliff Lake in 1972. Plaintiffs acquired new property by deed on April 23, 1984 and subsequently moved to that property, located at 9 Lyons Court, also in the Borough of Woodcliff Lake. They did not file a new application for the Veteran's Deduction to be applied to their new property in 1985. Though Plaintiffs continued to pay their property taxes throughout the intervening years, they did not realize they were not receiving the Veteran's Deduction until 2012.
Prior to their move, Mr. Purcell spoke with municipal officials, though the specifics were unclear. The Purcells set forth in their complaint and framed their arguments as contesting Defendant's wrongful denial of the Veteran's Deduction which was to be applied each year without the need for reapplication. Defendants argued, and the court agreed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion, that because Plaintiffs moved residences, they were required to file a new application with respect to their new property.
The court granted summary judgment in this case after three rounds of briefs. The court heard the parties at oral argument on three dates. At the time of the Order and Opinion, the court was satisfied that it had an extensive and complete record on which to make its decision and that further briefs or oral arguments would be superfluous.
Conclusions of Law
Plaintiffs have set forth numerous arguments in favor of relief. The court does not find any of those arguments sufficient to warrant altering the prior decision. Several of those arguments appear to ask the court to alter the reasoning set forth the prior opinion and are not addressed here. The court finds that the bulk of Plaintiffs' arguments are essentially the same as those set forth during the initial summary judgment motion, though they may have been framed in a different manner. The court has already rejected those arguments, with the court referring Plaintiffs to its reasoning in the Opinion, which the court is satisfied addresses them. The court will specifically address a few other arguments below.
I. Standard for Reconsideration
New Jersey Court Rule 4:49-2 provides Plaintiffs with the mechanism by which they may seek reconsideration. The motion was timely and set forth, in some cases, controlling decisions or statutes which in counsel's opinion the court has overlooked or erred.
Reconsideration "is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the interest of justice." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). Reconsideration is appropriate where "1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). Reconsideration is not justified by a litigant's mere dissatisfaction with the court's decision; such arguments are best raised on appeal. Ibid. Plaintiffs have failed to make such a demonstration here and can be best characterized as positing disagreements with the court's prior Opinion. The court will not allow Plaintiffs to reargue the motion. See Capital Finance Co. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied 93 N.J. 521 (2008). The motion must "contain a statement 'of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred.'" Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 598 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting R. 4:49-2). Plaintiffs also failed in this regard. Though, in one instance, Plaintiffs do provide this court with a decision which would seem to favor them, their reliance on that case is misplaced.
II. The Court's Opinion
At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs argued that the Court granted Defendant's motion for reasons not set forth by Defendant in its briefs. Counsel argued that he cannot possibly be expected to predict every argument that might be set forth against his clients, and that had he known how the court viewed the parties' arguments before the court rendered the Opinion, he could have properly briefed the issues so that his clients' position could be fairly considered by the court.
When issuing an opinion which states findings of facts or conclusion of law, the court's only obligation is to clearly state such findings and conclusions, and correlate or explain them, when necessary, in an oral or written opinion. See R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1 (2007); Anastasio v. Planning Board of West Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1986). "Summary judgment must be granted if 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
Plaintiffs have not set forth any legal basis for their argument that the court improperly decided the issues because the bases for some of its decisions on some of the issues were not argued by either party. The court is satisfied that all of the issues before the court, and all of the issues which it decided, were briefed and argued by the parties. Moreover, both sides were fairly represented. Though the court may have based its decision on analyses not briefed by the parties, the court did not decide any issues which were not briefed by the parties. The court adopted what it viewed as the most convincing reasoning for its decision. There is no precedent which requires the court to be bound by the reasoning articulated in the parties' briefs, nor is there precedent which requires the court deny summary judgment based on a movant's poorly argued or poorly drafted brief. As this is a motion for reconsideration and the court is bound by the standard set forth in D'Atria, the court will not disturb its prior decision as Plaintiffs have not presented any precedent requiring it to act otherwise.
In making this statement, the court does not pass judgment on the quality of Defendant's briefs. The briefs speak for themselves and the court will not delve into the adequacy of the arguments made beyond what was stated in the Opinion. The parties were fairly represented.
III. Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs objected to the court dismissing the claims on jurisdictional grounds, as the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by Defendant, nor had Defendant ever argued that this court lacked jurisdiction. However, as Defendant correctly pointed out during oral argument, jurisdiction must be present in every case. Jurisdiction of the court cannot be waived as a defense, by a party, or by an agreement between the parties. See R. 4:6-7; Hendry v. Hendry, 339 N.J. Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 2000); Borough of Closter v. Abram Demaree Homestead, Inc., 365 N.J. Super. 338, 352 (App. Div.), certif denied 179 NX 372 (2004); Macysvn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476. 481 (App. Div. 2000). This court cannot adjudicate a claim over which it does not have jurisdiction. Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978) (citations omitted).
In fact, the court raised the issue sua sponte, see Housing Authority of Newark v. West, 69 N.J. 293, 304 (1976) (citing Caine v. Anchor Petroleum Co., 65 N.J. Super. 271, 274 (App. Div. 1961), as part of the summary judgment motion and asked the parties to brief the N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 issue. In their briefs and at oral argument, Plaintiffs offered a lengthy argument against -8.21's applicability in this case, which the court ultimately found to be self-defeating. During oral argument on the issue, the court asked Plaintiffs' counsel what other basis of jurisdiction existed for this matter, if not section 8.21. Counsel offered R. 8.2. That suggestion was rejected in the Opinion. The court did determine that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 was the appropriate jurisdictional statute for this case, and that therefore the claims (except for 2012) must be dismissed for failure to timely file.
The argument made by counsel, at oral argument on the present motion, that he could not anticipate the jurisdictional issue does not move the court. The issue was raised sua sponte, well in advance of the court's decision, and oral argument was held exclusively on that issue. Counsel argued extensively against N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 as a jurisdictional basis for this court, but neglected to provide the court with another valid basis for jurisdiction.
The Tax Court is one of "limited jurisdiction" which must specifically be designated by statute. McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 546 (2008). In the present motion, Plaintiffs offer N.J.S.A. 2B: 13-2 as the appropriate jurisdictional basis for this court, which they argue was overlooked by the court. N.J.S.A. 2B: 13-2 does not specifically establish jurisdiction in this court, but rather sets forth, generally, the matters which may be heard by the tax court. See James Const. Co., Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 18 N.J. Tax 224, 236-37 (Tax 1999). There must still be a statute which specifically creates Tax Court jurisdiction; "[t]he Legislature did not expand the jurisdiction of the Tax Court when it enacted paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2." Ibid. Thus, for the reasons set forth in the prior Opinion, whether or not N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.21 applies, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IV. Property Taxes as a Lien on the Property
Plaintiffs argue that a new application is not required when the taxpayer changes residences because it is "individual specific." Notwithstanding the fact that Alpha-Bella deals with rollback taxes and Farmland Assessment, property taxes remain a lien against the property and are not a personal obligation of the individual. Alpha-Bella IV, Inc. by United Jersey Bank v. Township of Clinton, 14 N.J. Tax 597, 621 (Tax 1995) (citing City of Newark v. Central & Lafayette Realty Co., Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 18, 21 (App. Div.), certif. denied 75 N.J. 528 (1977)); see also N.J.S.A. 54:5-6; Varsolona v. Breen Capital Services Corp., 180 NX 605 (2004); Freehold Office Park Ltd. v. Township of Freehold, 12 N.J. Tax 433 (Tax 1992). The lien theory is well accepted in the Tax Court, and Plaintiffs have not provided this court with sufficient basis to justify a detour from it in this case. Though the misapplied deduction was recoverable against the individual in Township of Dover v. Scuorzo, 392 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2007), it was the taxpayers that received the benefit in the first place. Because property taxes can be paid by anyone, Freehold Office Park, supra, it stands to reason that in that case, if a third-party had paid the taxes and taken the deduction, the recovery could have been obtained against that party. Scuorzo does not justify a detour from the principle alluded to in the Opinion, and reliance on Alpha Bella was not palpably incorrect under D'Atria.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs failed to show that this court ignored or erred in interpreting controlling decisions, nor did they show that the court failed to consider or appreciate the evidence before it. The fact that Plaintiffs disagree with the reasoning the court adopted in coming to its decision does not establish that its decision was palpably incorrect or irrational, nor does it establish that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.
Very truly yours,
/s/_________
Hon. Joseph M. Andresini, J.T.C.
JMA/JAC